Chemical And Biological Terrorism: Combating The Evolving Threat of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Norman J. Glover, FAEI, FASCE, FIStructE Executive Director: AEGIS Institute - New York, NY Researcher-WMD: Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, Wilts, UK

Chemical And Biological Terrorism:

Combating The Evolving Threat of Terrorism

Terrorism

• The sudden, violent, sometimes seemingly irrational

attack that strikes at unsuspecting citizens in their homes and workplaces, destroying their faith in society’s ability to provide safety

• Often an attempt to coerce or extort compliance with a

political demand

Terrorism

• It is a real problem
• It is here
• It is not going away
• There is no political or policing solution in the

foreseeable future

• Consequence management is an after the fact

– Reaction prevention and protection are better

Saves lives

• There are things that engineers and architects can do to

protect the public while we seek a solution

The tactics of Terrorism

• Bombing
• Arson
• Assassination
• Armed assault
• Kidnapping
• Hostage taking
• Hijacking
• Chemical attack
• Biological attack
• Radiological attack

(nuclear)

• Electronic

Bombing - The tactic of choice

• It is attention getting
• There is a wide choices of targets
• Materials are readily available and inexpensive
• Can be carried out by a small group, or even a single

person

• There is a high probability of escape without

apprehension or even identification

Terrorism: It has changed

• It used to be political - designed to:

– Get attention – Demonstrate power – Win sympathy and support – Send a message – Compel negotiations

• Now – The terrorist is interested in inflicting causalities
• Major weapons continue to be bombs and guns

– But with increased casualties

• Offensive potential capabilities appears to be greater

than defensive capabilities at this time

Emerging: War on Society

• The terrorist - pseudo religious

– Cults – Rogues – Disaffected

• Goals - Target damage - Escalating casualties

– May not seek political influence or support

• Attack on US soil is easy (and likely)
• The target may seem purposeless
• Our Allies may see this as an internal problem
• Unanswered attacks may encourage copycat attacks
• Defensive action is likely to necessitate restrictions of

democratic freedoms and individual liberties

Planning a Terror Attack

• Motive - Influence or destruction
• Response wanted

– Attention – Fear – Retaliation

• Select target to secure response

Planning a Terror Attack - Cntd.

• Internal goals

– “Freedom fighters” want a moral “high” – Younger followers want an exciting fix – Something dynamic – Show power – Shoot a gun or explode a bomb

• Ramsey Yousef wanted

– 250,000 deaths at the WTC – 100,000 deaths at NY bridges and tunnels – Downing of 15 planes in one day in the Phil. Is.

The Terrorist has Tw o Constant Problems

• Supply
• Security
• We must consider the possibility of an “asymmetric”

attack by a state supported surrogate, on a superpower that can’t be challenged

Chemical and Biological Terrorism

The Poor Man’s Atom Bomb

Comparative Coasts

• As weapons of mass destruction (WMD) they are

relatively cheap

• Estimated cost for mass causalities / Km 2

– Conventional weapons $2000 – Nuclear weapons $800 – Chemical weapons $600 – Biological weapons $1

• WMD by definition of the US Dept. of Health and Human

Services are those that can cause 1000 or more casualties

Chemical and Biological Agents

• Although very different in their effects and time of
• nset, their pathways, and the vulnerabilities they

exploit are very similar

• While militarized agents and dissemination methods are

more efficient, attack requires no cruise missile, no artillery, no jet bomber.

• A back pack or truck mounted sprayer, a hairspray

canister or even a perfume atomizer can produce significant casualties

Chemical Agents

• Suitably disseminated, produce incapacitating, lethal or

damaging effects on man, animals, plants or materials

• Chemical agents are comparatively immediate in their

action.

– Recovery is time and agent dependent

Classification of Chemical Warfare Agents

• Vesicants - Blistering Agents
• Cyanide - “Blood” agents
• Pulmonary Agents - Attack the lungs
• Nerve Agents - Attack neuro-muscular systems
• Dosage is defined by concentration and time of

exposure

– LCt50 = Lethal to 50% exposed

Nerve Gasses

• Considered the primary threat

– High toxicity – Absorbed through the eyes, respiratory tract and skin – Name Vapor Toxicity - LCt50 (Inhalation) (Mg - Min/M3) – GA (Tabun) *140 **400 ***70 – GB (Sarin) 50-100 50-100 35 – GD 70 70 35 – VX 30-35 10 15 – * Chemical and biological defense handbook RMCS, 1996 – ** Field management of chemical casualties, USAMRIID, 1996 – *** USACHPPM tech guide 244, July 1999

Toxic Industrial Chemicals

• There are hundreds of Toxic Industrial Chemicals that,

while less efficient, can be used

– Inexpensive – Easily obtained

Sarin - GB

• A colorless odorless liquid, derived from phosphorous,

lethal to humans and animals

– A respiratory and percutaneous hazard – Blocks and paralyzes the neuromuscular system on which respiration and voluntary muscles depend

• Effects

– Nose – Rhinnorea (runny nose) – Airways – Bronchoconstriction (congested chest) – CNS - loss of consciousness, seizure – Eyes – miosis (pin point pupil)

Biological Agnets

• Include agents effective against humans, animals,

plants, materials and food

• Anti-personnel agents: Three general categories

– Pathogens - Microorganisms

Bacteria Viruses Rickettsia Fungi

– Toxins – Bioregulators

Potential Bio-Agents

• Anthrax
• Plague
• Encephalitis
• Staphlococcal Enterotoxin
• Tularemia
• Smallpox
• Many others

Anthrax

• Bacillus Anthracis: The Greek word for coal

– The color of the formed scab

• Endemic infection of animals
• Humans infected through skin by contaminated fluids
• r hides

– Also by inhalation or eating infected meat

• The self-styled national disease of Czarist Russia

– Caused 3500 deaths annually

• USSR produced 5000 tons in 1987
• Iraq produced 6000 liters prior to the Gulf war.

Anthrax - Cntd.

• The US Joint Chiefs consider Anthrax the biggest

biological threat to the armed forces

• 300 Threats of Anthrax attack in the US in 1999
• 1 Trillion spores per gram
• LD50 dosage(now called Median Infectious Dose, LD50)

– 10,000 spores by inhalation (US or USSR manufactured level

• f virulence)

– This is not a minimum infectious dose

• A series of tests at Ft. Detrick developed the following

curve

– LD80% - 100,000 spores – LD33% - 1,000 spores – LD14% - 100 spores

• Potentially a single spore can be fatal (probability 1%)

Anthrax - Cntd.

• One to six day incubation, followed by fever, muscle

pain, cough and fatigue

• Pre-treatment with vaccines and anti-biotics have been

found effective in reducing and preventing fatality

• Once symptoms occur - fatality rate is more than 90%

Anthrax: Sverdlovsk, USSR 1979

• Population - 200,000
• Estimated in plume - 50,000
• 64 deaths from 4 - to 42 days after release
• 14% recovered after treatment
• Estimated total quantity of toxin

– US Army - Dugway 1 gm. – DIA 10 gm. – CIA 70 gm. – Minimum 2-4 milligram (Meselson – Guillemun)

• Estimated exposure: 6-10 spores / person

Necessary Requirements for Planning a Biological Attack (ANTHRAX)

• 1 – Willingness to use this weapon
• 2 – Ability to secure a virulent strain as a basis for

production

• 3 – Ability to produce / grow a quantity of the toxin
• 4 – Ability to design and build a dissemination device

capable of producing large numbers of causalities

Current U.S Planning: Consequence Management

• All major planning deals with post attack response and

recovery

• Establish that there has been an attack
• Identify the agent to treat
• Triage and medical treatment
• Order the required body bags
• Decontaminate
• Restore services
• Hunt down the perpetrator(s)

Functional goals of Involved Agencies

• Medical

– Identify the agent – Treat the casualties

• Government

– Decontaminate – Maintain or restore vital services

• Law Enforcement

– Identify and arrest the criminal

• Armed Forces

– Force protection: Use of masks and protective garments

Proposed Alternative Program: Getting Ahead of the Curve

• Prevent attack
• Protect the public
• Mitigate weapons effects

Joint Working Group: Chemical and Biological (C/B) Terrorism Defense

• March 3, 1999 - DOD, DOE & DOJ together with

representatives of professional societies (United Engineering Foundation, ASCE, AEI, ASME, AIChE) established the JWG:CBT

– Carry out a program of research and planning to assess the vulnerability and mitigate the effects of WMD on our homes and work places

• As its first project, JWG:CBT commenced the “Building

Protection Program, BPP”

– To consider the vulnerabilities and defense of tall office buildings using currently available technologies

BUILDING PROTECTION PROGRAM

• 1. Identify the problem.

– Consider the available/probable agents and their methods of

• dissemination. While their effects are different, the methods of

use/attack are very similar. It is from this fact that we shall develop our defensive plans.

• 2. Assess the vulnerabilities of potential targets.
• 3. Develop attack scenarios
• 4. Deny Access to vulnerable points by fences, locks and

alarms or relocation.

• 5. Deter attackers by CCTV and other surveillance methods to

make attack without apprehension or identification unlikely.

• BLDG. PROTECTION PROGRAM, contd.
• 6. Detect the attempted intrusion of Chemical - Biological

Agents, by developing broad spectrum, multiple agent and toxic material detectors.

• There are no existing “deployable” biological agent detectors.

– Existing detection/identification devices can identify 5 or 6 militarized chemical agents in I to 2 minutes. – Deficiencies in detection must be supplanted by “increased awareness” – In 1962, it was estimated that a CB attack would thoroughly contaminate the Pentagon in 15 minutes – In modern high rise buildings, HVAC air velocities will vary from 500 to 2500 feet per minute. The tallest building can be contaminated in a

• minute. Lethal dosage is possible within 6 minutes

– To protect occupants, we must separate the detection and identification tasks and act on detection alone.

• BLDG. PROTECTION PROGRAM contd.
• 7. If we can identify the existence of an attack, we can take

active measures:

–

• A. Evacuation

–

• B. Shelter in Place

–

• C. Defensive Operation of the existing HVAC plant.

Shut down Reversal of Fans Zone closure Venting of toxins Other measures

• BLDG. PROTECTION PROGRAM contd.
• 8. Installation of HEPA Filtration and HEGA Adsorption

(Currently available off the shelf)

– Costs – Pressure Drops & Operating Problem – Compensating Fans – Filter replacement

• BLDG. PROTECTION PROGRAM contd.
• 9. Identify and encourage development of promising

technologies.

– Detection / Early Warning

• Continuous Sampling
• Fluorescent-Laser Automatic Particle Sizer
• Time of Flight Spectrometer
• Rapid Reporting of Non-Traditional Data

– Suppressive Sprinklers – Continuous on-line prophylaxis

Pulsed UV Light Corona Plasma Cathodic Oxidation

The Building Protection Program (BPP)

• The BPP Considered

– 1 – A number of attack scenarios: interior of exterior – 2 – Vary levels of toxins virulence considering

US/USSR level of manufactured State sponsored manufacture of “Iraqi” level Manufacture by independent terrorists

– 3 – Dissemination devices with efficiencies varying from 1.5% to 50%

• Conclusion

– At this time, reduction of vulnerability is the best answer

The Immune Building

• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

is currently involved in a project to develop a series of future buildings for military purposes that are “inherently” protected against chemical or biological attack

– Through the utilization of technologies currently under development or yet to be developed