nonlinear pricing without single crossing
play

Nonlinear Pricing without Single Crossing Dmitri Blueschke Guilherme - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS Nonlinear Pricing without Single Crossing Dmitri Blueschke Guilherme Freitas Martin Szydlowski Nan Yang Klagenfurt University California Institute of


  1. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS Nonlinear Pricing without Single Crossing Dmitri Blueschke ∗ Guilherme Freitas † Martin Szydlowski ‡ Nan Yang § ∗ Klagenfurt University † California Institute of Technology ‡ Northwestern University § VU University Amsterdam & Tinbergen Institute ICE2009, Aug 12th 1 / 41

  2. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS O UTLINE N ON -L INEAR P RICING IN M ONOPOLY M ARKET 1 A N E XAMPLE W ITH S INGLE C ROSSING 2 A N E XAMPLE W ITHOUT S INGLE C ROSSING 3 N UMERICAL E XPLORATIONS 4 Non-Uniform Distribution of Types Two Dimensional Types 2 / 41

  3. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS O UTLINE N ON -L INEAR P RICING IN M ONOPOLY M ARKET 1 A N E XAMPLE W ITH S INGLE C ROSSING 2 A N E XAMPLE W ITHOUT S INGLE C ROSSING 3 N UMERICAL E XPLORATIONS 4 Non-Uniform Distribution of Types Two Dimensional Types 3 / 41

  4. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS G ENERAL S ETUP A continuum of consumer with type θ ∈ Θ . Consumer with type θ values quantity q by v ( q, θ ) . Monopolist, without being able to observe consumers’ types, charges nonlinear tariff t ( q ) . Monopolist’s cost function C ( q ) . With Revelation Principle, monopolist solve the following problem � θ t ( θ ) − C ( q ( θ )) dF ( θ ) maximize q,t θ subject to v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � 0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ (IR) ∀ θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ (IC) v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � v ( q ( θ ′ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ′ ) 4 / 41

  5. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS T HE R OLE OF S INGLE -C ROSSING Definition: v q monotonic in types θ . What does it mean? Ordering of demands. Incentive to lie “downwards”. Local incentive constraints imply global incentive constraints (F .O.C. is valid). 5 / 41

  6. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS T HE R OLE OF S INGLE -C ROSSING Definition: v q monotonic in types θ . What does it mean? Ordering of demands. Incentive to lie “downwards”. Local incentive constraints imply global incentive constraints (F .O.C. is valid). 5 / 41

  7. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS O UTLINE N ON -L INEAR P RICING IN M ONOPOLY M ARKET 1 A N E XAMPLE W ITH S INGLE C ROSSING 2 A N E XAMPLE W ITHOUT S INGLE C ROSSING 3 N UMERICAL E XPLORATIONS 4 Non-Uniform Distribution of Types Two Dimensional Types 6 / 41

  8. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS A N E XAMPLE W ITH S INGLE C ROSSING Values: v ( q, θ ) = θ √ q , with θ ∼ U [2 , 3] and q � 0 . Cost: C ( q ) = cq , c > 0 . Tariff: t � 0 . � 3 t ( θ ) − C ( q ( θ )) dF ( θ ) maximize q,t 2 v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � 0 ∀ θ (IR) subject to ∀ θ, θ ′ (IC) v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � v ( q ( θ ′ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ′ ) 7 / 41

  9. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS A N E XAMPLE W ITH S INGLE C ROSSING Values: v ( q, θ ) = θ √ q , with θ ∼ U [2 , 3] and q � 0 . Cost: C ( q ) = cq , c > 0 . Tariff: t � 0 . � 3 t ( θ ) − C ( q ( θ )) dF ( θ ) maximize q,t 2 v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � 0 ∀ θ (IR) subject to ∀ θ, θ ′ (IC) v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � v ( q ( θ ′ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ′ ) 7 / 41

  10. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS N UMERICAL A PPROACH We solve this constrained maximization problem numerically. Discretize type space with N grid points, θ ∈ { θ 1 , . . . , θ N } . 1 Reformulate the original problem to the discretized problem 2 N 1 � maximize q,t t ( θ i ) − C ( q ( θ i )) N i =1 v ( q ( θ i ) , θ i ) − t ( θ i ) � 0 ∀ i (IR) subject to v ( q ( θ i ) , θ i ) − t ( θ i ) � v ( q ( θ j ) , θ i ) − t ( θ j ) ∀ i, j (IC) Use KNITRO Active Set Algorithm to solve the discretized 3 problem. Increase N to improve the approximation. 4 8 / 41

  11. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS 0.35 0.03 0.04 0.3 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.07 0.2 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.1 0.1 0.05 0 −0.05 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 F IGURE : v ( q, θ ) under different discretization schemes 9 / 41

  12. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 Analytic Solution Approximation with 101 grid points Approximation with 21 grid points 0 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 F IGURE : q ( θ ) under different discretization schemes 10 / 41

  13. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS −3 x 10 1 0.03 0.04 0 0.05 0.06 0.07 −1 0.08 0.09 −2 0.1 Deviation −3 −4 −5 −6 −7 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 Type F IGURE : Approx. error for q ( θ ) under different discretization schemes 11 / 41

  14. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS O UTLINE N ON -L INEAR P RICING IN M ONOPOLY M ARKET 1 A N E XAMPLE W ITH S INGLE C ROSSING 2 A N E XAMPLE W ITHOUT S INGLE C ROSSING 3 N UMERICAL E XPLORATIONS 4 Non-Uniform Distribution of Types Two Dimensional Types 12 / 41

  15. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS A N E XAMPLE W ITHOUT S INGLE C ROSSING Values: v ( q, θ ) = θq − θ 2 q 2 , with θ ∼ U [2 , 3] and q � 0 . Cost: C ( q ) = 3 q 2 , c > 0 . Tariff: t � 0 . � 3 t ( θ ) − C ( q ( θ )) dF ( θ ) maximize q,t 2 v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � 0 ∀ θ subject to v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � v ( q ( θ ′ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ′ ) ∀ θ, θ ′ 13 / 41

  16. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS A N E XAMPLE W ITHOUT S INGLE C ROSSING Values: v ( q, θ ) = θq − θ 2 q 2 , with θ ∼ U [2 , 3] and q � 0 . Cost: C ( q ) = 3 q 2 , c > 0 . Tariff: t � 0 . � 3 t ( θ ) − C ( q ( θ )) dF ( θ ) maximize q,t 2 v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � 0 ∀ θ subject to v ( q ( θ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ) � v ( q ( θ ′ ) , θ ) − t ( θ ′ ) ∀ θ, θ ′ 13 / 41

  17. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS Discret: 0.5000 Profit: 0.200057 0.35 quantity tariff 0.30 profit utility 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 Types θ 14 / 41

  18. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS Discret: 0.1000 Profit: 0.200376 0.35 quantity tariff 0.30 profit utility 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 Types θ 15 / 41

  19. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS Discret: 0.0800 Profit: 0.200316 0.35 quantity tariff 0.30 profit utility 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 Types θ 16 / 41

  20. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS Discret: 0.0500 Profit: 0.200269 0.35 quantity tariff 0.30 profit utility 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 Types θ 17 / 41

  21. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS Discret: 0.0400 Profit: 0.200284 0.35 quantity tariff 0.30 profit utility 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 Types θ 18 / 41

  22. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS Discret: 0.0300 Profit: 0.198063 0.40 quantity tariff 0.35 profit utility 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 Types θ 19 / 41

  23. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS Discret: 0.0200 Profit: 0.195707 0.45 quantity tariff 0.40 profit 0.35 utility 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 Types θ 20 / 41

  24. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS Discret: 0.0100 Profit: 0.191614 0.45 quantity tariff 0.40 profit 0.35 utility 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 Types θ 21 / 41

  25. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS S OLUTIONS q q NSC ( θ ) CS − q SC ( θ ) CS + q 0 1 √ 2 6 q 2 q 1 1 √ 6 2 6 3 θ Figure 2.8: The decision an the marginal tari F IGURE : Vieira’s Isoperimetric Approach 22 / 41

  26. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS O UTLINE N ON -L INEAR P RICING IN M ONOPOLY M ARKET 1 A N E XAMPLE W ITH S INGLE C ROSSING 2 A N E XAMPLE W ITHOUT S INGLE C ROSSING 3 N UMERICAL E XPLORATIONS 4 Non-Uniform Distribution of Types Two Dimensional Types 23 / 41

  27. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS N ON -U NIFORM D ISTRIBUTION OF T YPES Experiments: Variations of Uniform Discretization More mass (grid points) near the beginning. More mass near the end. More mass at both ends. More mass in the middle. 24 / 41

  28. N ON -L INEAR P RICING S INGLE C ROSSING N O S INGLE C ROSSING E XTENSIONS I MPLEMENTATION coarse grid distance 0.04, fine grid distance 0.02. 64 -76 variables, 1024 - 1444 constraints Multistart option - 100 runs KNITRO with Active Set algorithm Best solution chosen 25 / 41

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend