Developmental pricing of Developmental pricing of steel and iron - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Developmental pricing of Developmental pricing of steel and iron - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Developmental pricing of Developmental pricing of steel and iron ore Examining the evidence Robert Stillman March 2011 Robert Stillman, March 2011 1 The DTI view on developmental pricing The DTI view on developmental pricing DTI believes


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Developmental pricing of Developmental pricing of steel and iron ore

Examining the evidence

Robert Stillman March 2011 Robert Stillman, March 2011

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The DTI view on developmental pricing The DTI view on developmental pricing

DTI believes that high steel prices have retarded the growth of downstream f t i th t t l manufacturing that uses steel DTI believes that having Sishen iron ore available to domestic steel producers at below-market “cost plus” prices is also an important part of the growth equation:

  • By supporting lower prices of steel in SA, which will help downstream

manufacturing

  • By supporting the development of the local steel industry

The goal of today’s presentation is to examine whether the evidence supports these beliefs

Developmental pricing examining the evidence Developmental pricing – examining the evidence Robert Stillman, March 2011

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Proposed agenda Proposed agenda

Background on the iron ore and steel industries in South Africa Analysis of the DTI’s views on developmental pricing Q & A

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Developmental pricing – preview of main points Developmental pricing preview of main points

Lower steel prices will not have a significant effect on downstream manufacturing output – steel accounts for a small share of the costs of most manufacturing output steel accounts for a small share of the costs of most downstream manufacturers Th i f Si h i h h d d ill h ff t d ti The price of Sishen iron ore has had, and will have, no effect on domestic steel prices AMSA would be the only steel producer that would benefit materially from below-market “cost plus” prices of Sishen iron ore. For the other steel producers who use little if any Sishen ore, lower steel prices will squeeze their already thin margins Even with “cost plus” prices for Sishen iron ore, AMSA’s growth opportunities

Developmental pricing examining the evidence

p p , g pp are limited. SA steel producers cannot compete effectively on international markets because of SA’s locational disadvantage

Developmental pricing – examining the evidence Robert Stillman, March 2011

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Background on the iron ore and steel industries in South Africa

Developmental pricing examining the evidence Developmental pricing – examining the evidence Robert Stillman, March 2011

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Iron ore – current production and future growth Iron ore current production and future growth

  • pportunities

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Magnitude of the growth opportunities in iron ore Magnitude of the growth opportunities in iron ore

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Steel production capacity and exports Steel production, capacity and exports

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Developmental pricing of steel and iron ore

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The DTI view on developmental pricing The DTI view on developmental pricing

DTI believes that high steel prices have retarded the growth of downstream f t i th t t l manufacturing that uses steel DTI believes that having Sishen iron ore available to domestic steel producers at below-market “cost plus” prices is also an important part of the growth equation:

  • By supporting lower prices of steel in SA, which will help downstream

beneficiation

  • By supporting the development of the local steel industry

Developmental pricing examining the evidence Developmental pricing – examining the evidence Robert Stillman, March 2011

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Have high steel prices retarded the growth of Have high steel prices retarded the growth of downstream manufacturing?

Because steel accounts for a modest share of the costs of most downstream users, a reduction in the price of steel would not result in significant increases in downstream manufacturing output

  • International evidence suggests that the elasticity of demand for steel is

about -0.2 to -0.3

  • This means that a 10% reduction in price would increase the downstream

use of steel (and hence downstream output) by only about 2% - 3%

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Understanding why the demand elasticity is so low – Understanding why the demand elasticity is so low evidence on cost shares

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DTI’s views on “cost plus” pricing of Sishen iron ore – DTI s views on cost plus pricing of Sishen iron ore some initial observations

AMSA has been able to charge steel import parity prices (IPP) because it g p p y p ( ) has market power. IPP is basically as high as domestic steel prices can go

  • Note that AMSA has charged IPP notwithstanding access to iron ore at

cost plus 3%. cost plus 3%. If AMSA faced more competition, domestic steel prices would be forced down in the direction of export parity (EPP) EPP is as low as domestic steel down in the direction of export parity (EPP). EPP is as low as domestic steel prices could go in a competitive market.

  • If AMSA were prepared to offer steel domestically at EPP, DTI

presumably would be delighted EPP is the perfectly competitive price presumably would be delighted. EPP is the perfectly competitive price Iron ore export parity is the price at which Kumba proposes selling Sishen

Developmental pricing examining the evidence

  • re to domestic steel producers. Yet, even though EPP is the perfectly

competitive price, DTI objects

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AMSA is the only steel producer that would benefit AMSA is the only steel producer that would benefit materially from “cost plus” pricing of Sishen ore

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Would below-market prices for Sishen ore nevertheless Would below market prices for Sishen ore nevertheless support lower steel prices to downstream manufacturers?

Below-market prices for Sishen ore would have no effect on domestic steel prices and hence no effect on growth of downstream beneficiation

  • Steel EPP is the floor for domestic steel prices
  • Steel IPP is the ceiling
  • Where steel prices end up within this range depends on the level of

competition in the domestic steel industry and any decision by co pet t o t e do est c stee dust y a d a y dec s o by government to intervene

  • None of these variables (i.e. the floor, the ceiling, or where prices end up

within this range) are affected by the price of Sishen ore within this range) are affected by the price of Sishen ore

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Would below-market prices for Sishen ore support growth Would below market prices for Sishen ore support growth

  • f the local steel industry?

AMSA is the only steel producer that buys Sishen ore in any significant

  • volume. AMSA is therefore the only steel producer whose ability to grow

could be affected even theoretically by the price of Sishen iron ore Even when AMSA paid “cost plus” prices for Sishen ore, however, its growth

  • pportunities were limited. AMSA (and other SA steel producers) cannot

compete effectively on international markets because of SA’s locational disadvantage

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Developmental pricing – summary of main points Developmental pricing summary of main points

Lower steel prices will not have a significant effect on downstream manufacturing output – steel accounts for a small share of the costs of most manufacturing output steel accounts for a small share of the costs of most downstream manufacturers Th i f Si h i h h d d ill h ff t d ti The price of Sishen iron ore has had, and will have, no effect on domestic steel prices AMSA would be the only steel producer that would benefit materially from below-market “cost plus” prices of Sishen iron ore. For the other steel producers who use little if any Sishen ore, lower steel prices will squeeze their already thin margins Even with “cost plus” prices for Sishen iron ore, AMSA’s growth opportunities

Developmental pricing examining the evidence

p p , g pp are limited. SA steel producers cannot compete effectively on international markets because of SA’s locational disadvantage

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Discussion Discussion

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London Tel +44 (0)20 7664 3700 ( ) Fax +44 (0)20 7664 3998 99 Bishopsgate London EC2M 3XD United Kingdom Brussels Tel +32 (0)2 627 1400 81 Avenue Louise Brussels B-1050 Belgium Belgium Paris Tel +33 (0)1 70 38 52 78 27 Avenue de l’Opéra 75001 P i 75001 Paris France

Robert Stillman March 2011 www.crai.com/ecp Robert Stillman, March 2011

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