Você confiaria a sua vida à nuvem ?
Técnicas para a computação terceirizada com privacidade e segurança
Flavio Bergamaschi Emerging Technologies, IBM Hamish Hunt Emerging Technologies,IBM
Voc confiaria a sua vida nuvem ? Tcnicas para a computao - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Voc confiaria a sua vida nuvem ? Tcnicas para a computao terceirizada com privacidade e segurana Hamish Hunt Flavio Bergamaschi Emerging Technologies, IBM Emerging Technologies,IBM Cloud Computing and Security Security
Flavio Bergamaschi Emerging Technologies, IBM Hamish Hunt Emerging Technologies,IBM
▪ Landscape is now asymmetric ▪ Large number of mobile devices ▪ Large compute power in the cloud ▪ No control over the cloud servers ▪ No control over the communication channels ▪ Powerful servers …. untrusted …. or honest but curious
Alice Input Data Result Perform the correct computation, sends result to Alice Snoops the Comms Channel See Alice’s data Bob Honest but curious Looks at Alice’s data Eve
Alice Input Data Result Decrypts, performs the correct computation, encrypts the result before sending. Snoops the Comms Channel Can’t see the data Bob Honest but curious Looks at Alice’s data Encrypts/Decrypts Eve
▪Verifiable delegation How to ensure the encrypted result we get back is the result of the intended computation “F”? Enc(F(x)) vs Enc(F’(x)) ▪Functional privacy How to protect the computation “F” ▪ Server Privacy The computation being evaluated leaks nothing about the inputs. ▪ Functional encryption Reveals the result of the computation but nothing else. e.g. Spam filter for encrypted email
▪Encrypted Searches Tokenization: **very little security Property preserving encryption Deterministic encryption Everytime Enc(x) generates same cyphertext **very little security Order preserving encryption Takes an ordered universe of plaintext and produces cyphertexts that can be compared/sorted ▪Searchable Symetric Encryption Encrypts the data in a way that in a way that it can be privately queried Encrypts the search structure Protects the data with standard AES
▪Secure Multi-party computation Multiple participants compute a public function on their private data without revealing the input data and only share the result. e.g. Millionaires problem. ▪Fully Homomorphic encryption Allows for the computation to be preformed on encrypted data without ever decrypting it Enc(x) + Enc(y) = Enc(x+y) Enc(x) * Exc(y) = Enc(x*y)
▪Access Pattern Leakage ▪Data Leakage ▪Control Flow Leakage ▪Size Leakage
Useful Computation Security Secure Multi-party Computation Homomorphic Encryption Encrypted Searches .
How to secure the data in the cloud in a way that we can perform computations
Alice Input Data Result Performs the correct computation, without decrypting the input
Snoops the Comms Channel Can’t see the data Bob Can’t see Alice’s data Doesn’t learn anything. Encrypts/Decrypts Eve
Theoretical Solution first proposed by Craig Gentry (IBM) in 2009
Rapid improvements to the theory have led to algorithmic efficiencies making practical implementations possible.
Real Oblivious Transfer Can the bank provide information to the police without knowing the query or the information returned?
Encrypted Edit Distance Encrypted Genomes IDASH PRIVACY & SECURITY WORKSHOP 2015
Current Version.
equivalence) are 1000 times larger than the plaintext.
Av Aw Bv Bw
Expected Edit
V1 V2 Vn V5 V1 V3 V4 V6 1 5 3 7 .
COMP
1 1 1 1 .
Mult
1 5 3 7 1 1 5 3 7 . Max weight 1 1 3 4 1 1 5 7
Vetor Criptografado Resultado Criptografado FHE Match Engine Descriptografado FHE Base de Dados
16
Desempenho em relação à configurações de segurança de dados da NSA para 'Secret' e 'Top Secret'
Secret Top Secret
▪HELIB - Biblioteca de Codigo Aberto para computacao Homomorfica https://github.com/shaih/HElib ▪Fullu Homomorphic Encryption without Bootstrapping https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/277 ▪Future Directions in Computing on Encrypted Data https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/~nigel/ECRYPT-MPC/ ▪Seminario: Computing on Encrypted Data http://people.csail.mit.edu/vinodv/6892-Fall2013/