Infrastructure System Interconnectivity Effects on Resilience Rae - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Infrastructure System Interconnectivity Effects on Resilience

Rae Zimmerman Professor of Planning and Public Administration New York University – Wagner School International Workshop on Modeling of Physical, Economic, and Social Systems for Resilience Assessment National Institute of Standards and Technology October 19-21, 2016 Washington Dulles Airport Marriott, Dulles, VA

Energy Water

Commu- nication Transport

Cite material used from this presentation as: R. Zimmerman (2016) Infrastructure System Interconnectivity Effects on Resilience, presented at the National Institute of Standards and Technology International Workshop on Modeling of Physical, Economic, and Social Systems for Resilience Assessment, Dulles, VA; include other references cited within this presentation.

Concepts and Scope

Introduction

• Resilience and interconnectivity are addressed for infrastructure and its services

including relationships to society and the environment.

• Resilience is used in numerous contexts. A generic concept for infrastructure resilience

used here is: “bounce back,” “bounce forward” or don’t bounce at all.[1]

• Interconnectivity connotes multiple-directional or one-directional dependencies or

interdependencies among infrastructures. It can influence vulnerability and resilience.[2]

• Many types of infrastructure resilience and interconnectivity exist and at many scales.

The Backdrop

• Environmental threats are increasing in some areas, but more importantly the

consequences are increasing regardless of the extent of the threats.

• Condition, performance and investment typically do not include interconnectivity, which

can exacerbate weaknesses in single infrastructures.

• Siting, material, structural, design, and resource (financial and institutional) factors

contribute to the resilience of interconnectivity and resilience relationships to society.

Going Forward

• Interconnectivity, its contribution to infrastructure vulnerability, and its value in

promoting resilience are key inputs to infrastructure resilience modeling.

Sources: [1]L. Vale (2014) The politics of resilient cities: Whose resilience and whose city? Building Research & Information, 42(2), 191-201; summarized in R. Zimmerman (2016) Resilient Urban Infrastructure for Adapting to Environmental Disruptions, in Handbook on Urbanization and Global Environmental Change, K. C. Seto, W. D. Solecki, and C. A. Griffith, eds., London, UK: Routledge, 2016, pp. 488-512; 492. [2]S.M. Rinaldi, J.P. Peerenboom and T.K. Kelly (December 2001) Identifying, understanding and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 11–25

• I. The Backdrop:
• 1. Selected Natural and Human Hazards

Source: NOAA (2006) NOAA Celebrates 200 years

NYC Environmental Protection

Source: Hollis Stambaugh and Harold Cohen (2010) Bridge Collapse and Response Minneapolis, Minnesota USFA-TR-166/August 2007. U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series I-35W U.S. DHS, FEMA, U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Programs Division.

MTA

U.S. Coast Guard photo, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011) p. 88 NOAA (2013) Service Assessment, Hurricane/Post Tropical Cyclone Sandy, Cover page NOAA (2016) Service Assessment The Historic SC Floods of Oct 1-5, 2015, Photos by NWS Weather Forecast Offices and USGS, pp. 15, 22.

Affecting Infrastructure

Selected Trends in Natural Hazards

• NOAA’s National Climate Data Center (2016) reported the continued

prominence of severe storms and flooding among other weather or climate related events whose losses exceed a billion dollars.[1]

• NOAA’s National Hurricane Center reported that the recent couple of

decades accounted for the most severe storms in dollar losses and other factors.[2]

• The National Climate Assessment trends and projections reported increases

in most climate change-related extreme phenomena: temperature, sea level rise, heavy precipitation, hurricanes.[3]

• Swiss Re reported generally increasing trends in catastrophic losses

(according to their threshold definitions based on “insured losses (claims), economic losses, and casualties”): “353 catastrophe events across the world in 2015, up from 339 in 2014. Of those, 198 were natural catastrophes, the highest ever recorded in one year,” most of which are weather-related.[4]

• NOAA reported that records are being exceeded or almost being exceeded

for temperature (NOAA’s State of the Climate), hurricane extremes, and ice loss (NOAA National Snow and Ice Data Center).[5]

Sources: [1]NOAA National Climate Data Center (2016) [2]Blake, E.S., C.W. Landsea and E.J. Gibney (August 2011) The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2010 NWS NHC-6, available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/nws-nhc-6.pdf [3]Walsh, J., et al. (2014) Ch. 2: Our Changing Climate. Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment, J. M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and G. W. Yohe, Eds., U.S. Global Change Research Program, 19-67. doi:10.7930/J0KW5CXT. pp. 19-67.Page 20-

• 21. http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/our-changing-climate/introduction

[4]Swiss Re (2016) Sigma Report No. 1/2016, pages 2 and 5. [5]NOAA (2016) State of the Climate; National Snow and Ice Data Center Note: These findings can vary by location.

• 2. Infrastructure Condition and Selected Factors

Influencing Condition

Condition 2013: U.S. average is “D”, from D- (water) to C+ (bridges).[1] Age: NYC infrastructure age ranges, according to CUF[2], are: sewer mains and subway facilities (about 80-90 years old) to airport support facilities (40-50 years old); water mains and bridges are in the middle. Design and environmental issues: However, age may not be the whole story, since many bridge collapses have occurred in newer bridges.[3] Usage and capacity:

• According to EIA, energy production and

use steadily increased nationwide.[4]

• Vehicle Miles of Travel steadily increases

(U.S. DOT[5]) and transit ridership also (APTA)

• CTIA indicates the exponential growth in cellular technologies.[6]
• The Pew Center [7] indicates dramatic increases in information

technology usage, i.e., for the internet, computers and cell phones. Investment: ASCE estimates a $3.6 trillion need to 2020.[1]

Sources: [1] ASCE (2013) Cumulative Infrastructure Needs by System Based on Current Trends Extended to 2020 (Dollars in $2010 billions) http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/grade-sheet/americas-infrastructure-investment-needs [2]Center for Urban Future (2015) Caution Ahead, New York, NY: CUF, p. 11; [3]R. Zimmerman, Transport the Environment and Security, 2012; [4] http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf; [5] U.S. DOT, FHWA Highway Statistics (April 2013) [6] CTIA (2014) Annual Wireless Industry Survey; [7] Pew Research Center, February 2014, “The Web at 25,” summarized from pp. 4, 11 and 13 Available at: http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/the-web-at-25-in-the-u-s.

• 3. Siting: Population and Infrastructure

Concentrations at Coasts

Source: R. Zimmerman and C. Faris, “Infrastructure Impacts and Adaptation Challenges,” Chapter 4 in Climate Change Adaptation in New York City: Building a Risk Management Response, New York City Panel

• n Climate Change 2010 Report, edited by C.

Rosenzweig and W. Solecki. Prepared for use by the New York City Climate Change Adaptation Task Force. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 1196. New York, NY, NY Academy of Sciences, 2010, pp. 63-85.

• Pp. 68, 69, 73. CSO figures drawn from

NYCPlaNYC. Source: S. G. Wilson and T. R. Fischetti (May 2010) Coastal population trends in the U.S.: 1960-2008, p. 7. http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p25-1139.pdf

Population Density Change, U.S. Counties, 1960-2008 NYC Power Plants NYC Combined Sewer Outfalls

Siting Consequences: NYC Subway Stations Flooded in the August 8, 2007 Storm

Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2007), August 8, 2007 Storm Report, New York, NY: MTA, p. 49. (Ovals added signifying affected stations in 2007).

• September 8, 2004 storm 7 lines were

disrupted

• April 15, 2007, 12 were disrupted, July 18,

2007, 9 were disrupted,

• August 8, 2007, 19 lines had reduced or no

service

• Most of the lines were back within 12

hours.

• In 2007, some outer areas where poorer

populations live were spared flooding, but

• thers were flooded (Brooklyn and

Queens)

• 31 of 468 stations; 15 of 25 lines

vulnerable

• 4. Materials: Example - Non-Absorbent, Impervious

Surfaces Selected U.S. Cities

Source: U.S. EPA (October 2008) Reducing Urban Heat Islands: Compendium of Strategies, Chapter 5, “Cool Pavements,” p. 1 and p. 12, http://www.epa.gov/heatisld/resources/compendium.htmLawrence Berkeley National Labs.

Extent of pavement coverage Extent of pavement coverage by land use

Source: T. Litman (2011) Why and how to reduce the amount of land paved for roads and parking facilities, Environmental Practice 13 (1), p. 40.

From Litman (2011):

• Roadway area is the largest contributor to impervious surfaces for housing lots

(2000 sq ft)

• Roadway area is greatest for single-family large lot homes and least for high-rise

apartments

• Other impervious surface contributors are the housing area itself and parking

• 5. Resources: Example of Cities with Increasingly

Suburban Poor Populations and Availability of Rail Transit

• About a dozen cities were identified by the Brookings

Institution where the ratio of 2010 to 2000 share of poor populations exceeded 20%.[1]

• These cities were aligned with heavy rail, commuter

rail and light rail, and the percent share of these types

• f rail transit were computed for each city.[2]
• Results showed that only one city, Chicago, exceeded

a ten percent share for any rail type, and most of the cities, except for Chicago accounted for less than 5%

• f the share.[2]

Sources: [1] E. Kneebone, The Brookings Institution. [2] R. Zimmerman (2012) Transport, the Environment and Security. Making the Connection, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., p. 16. http://www.e-elgar.com/bookentry_mainUS.lasso?id=13884; Information on trips was compiled from U.S. DOT National Transit Database.

• II. Infrastructure Interconnections:

Attribute Summary

• Generic infrastructure interconnections:

– Electric Power – with Transportation, Water, and IT; – Transportation – with Water, and IT; – Water – IT

• Specification of the direction and magnitude of flows of goods, services,

and/or information among infrastructures

• Scale: Component-level connections (ranging from small parts to large

multiple interrelated systems*)

• Types:

– Temporal Interconnections – Physical* – Cyber* – Spatial Interconnections (geographic)* – Logical*

• Implications: Impact and Likelihood of Cascading Failures from

Interconnections

Source: C. Perrow (1984) Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, New York: Basic Books, pp. 89-100, and *cited in Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), p. 21.

Interconnections Potentially Vulnerable to Cascading Disruptions

Source: R Zimmerman photo, Salt Lake City, 2011. Source: http://www.nec- commission.com/cin_projects/catenary-power-supply- systems/

Water and other infrastructures Electric power and rail transport

Source: U.S. DHS (2010) Water and Wastewater Systems Sector-Specific Plan An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2010, Washington, DC: U.S. DHS, p. 10. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp- water-2010.pdf

Energy-Water Connections: Quantified Sector Level Flows Nationwide, U.S., 2011

Source: U.S. Department of Energy (June 2014) The Water-Energy Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. DOE, p. 210.

Interconnections within Energy Systems: Pipeline Interconnections for Petroleum and Natural Gas

Natural Gas

Source: http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/NaturalGasPipelineSystems.htm?n

• cache=464

Red lines added signify selected Hurricane Sandy disruptions.

Petroleum

Source: http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/PetroleumPipelineSystems.h tm?nocache=6756

Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration data reports 2.6 million miles of U.S. pipelines; almost half are natural gas distribution lines.

US GAO (January 2013) Better Data and Guidance Needed to Improve Pipeline Operator Incident Response, Washington, DC: US GAO, p. 6, http://www.gao.gov/assets/6 60/651408.pdf

Concentration as a Characteristic of Interconnections: Transportation Example

• Transportation ridership and its infrastructure are highly

concentrated in a few states

– About half of U.S. transit ridership, transit user populations, and transportation infrastructure is concentrated in just a handful of states.[1,2] – About half of automobile ridership (annual vehicle miles of travel) is concentrated in 9 states.[1] – About half of roadway mileage is within 14 states.[1] – Half of enplanements occur at under five % of U.S. major airports.[1]

• Transportation infrastructure and use is similarly concentrated

within just a few urban areas.[3,4]

Sources: [1] Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics databases. [2] R. Zimmerman, “Critical Infrastructure and Interdependency,” Chapter 35 in The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, edited by D. G. Kamien. New York, NY: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2006, pp. 523-545; p. 532. [3] R. Zimmerman, “Critical Infrastructure and Interdependency Revisited,” Chapter 20 in The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook – 2nd edition, edited by D. G. Kamien. New York, NY: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2012, pp. 437-460. Page 446-447. [4] R. Zimmerman (2012) Transport, the Environment and Security: Making the Connection, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Source: .U.S. DOT, RITA Transportation Statistics Annual Report 2013, p. 15 http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/site s/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/TSAR_2 013.pdf

Concentration: Energy, Water and Telecom

Energy

• About half of the petroleum refineries in the U.S. are in just a few states.[1]
• About half of the power plants in the U.S. are in about a dozen states.[1]
• Henry’s Hub is an area in the U.S. where major oil distribution lines converge.[2]
• Energy transmission lines tend to enter urban areas at only a few locations.

Water

• About 7% of community water supply systems serve half of the population.[3,4]
• A similar disproportionality exists in the area of wastewater treatment systems.
• Distribution and storage facilities for urban areas tend to be highly concentrated.

Telecom [5]

“The growth in cellular technology has been very dramatic. According to the 2010 Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association (CTIA) semi-annual survey of the wireless industry, between 1985 and 2010, the number of estimated connections for all uses increased almost 1000-fold (889 times); Interestingly, this reflects a growing centralization and hence vulnerability, since . . . from 1985 to 2010, the connections per cell site grew from 373 to 1,197.”

Sources: [1] R. Zimmerman, “Critical Infrastructure and Interdependency Revisited,” Chapter 20 in The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook – 2nd edition, edited by D. G. Kamien. New York, NY: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2012, pp. 437-460. Page 446. [2] R. Zimmerman (2012) Transport, the Environment and Security: Making the Connection, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. [3] R. Zimmerman, “Critical Infrastructure and Interdependency Revisited,” 2012, Page 446. [4] R. Zimmerman, “Water,” Chapter 5 in Digital Infrastructures: Enabling Civil and Environmental Systems through Information Technology, edited by R. Zimmerman and T. Horan. London, UK: Routledge, 2004, pp. 75-95; p. 81. 5] R. Zimmerman (2012), citing CTIA

• III. Consequences of Interdependencies:

General Failure Modes (all infrastructures)

• Obliteration/inundation,

e.g., submersion or debris entrainment

• Undermining
• Disintegration
• Physical impingement /

structural collapse

• Corrosion; other material

failures and distortions

• Facility inoperability

through functional impairment

• Service disruption
• Social, economic

and environmental consequences

Some Consequences, e.g., Transportation Water, and Land Interconnections

Source: NOAA/NGDC, E.V. Leyendecker, USGS, Collapse of Freeway in 1989 Loma Prieta, CA Earthquake Hurricane Katrina Source: FEMA Hurricane Sandy Source: MTA Source: FEMA New Orleans, LA 9/4/05 -- School buses have been swamped by the floodwaters following Hurricane Katrina. Photo by: Liz Roll, 9/4/05 ID: busses.jpg 14794 Source: MTA. (November 2, 2012) Water in Cranberry Tube on AC Line. Source: MTA. Debris from Jamaica Bay fills Tracks Inside Broad Channel A Station

• n November 1, 2012.

PHYSICAL IMPINGEMENT/ STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE OBLITERATION/INUNDATION SUBMERSION

Electric Power and Other Infrastructures: Impacts of Loss

• f an Electric

Power Distribution Substation

Source: U.S. DHS (June 2014) Sector Resilience Report:: Electric Power Delivery, p. 9.

Action/Event Initial Consequences Possible 2nd Level Consequences e.g., to Other Infrastructure Possible 3rd Level Consequences to Users Restoration Scenarios

OR

Electric Power Disruption Actual Break of Transmission Lines Dysfunction/ Stoppage of energy distribution systems Water/Sewer/Sanitation stops Pumps stop Communication Disruption Internet Phones etc. Computing (data) disruption Transportation Electrified train lines shut down Flooding occurs because dewatering pumps fail Surface roads congested Goods movement stops People can’t get to jobs Health impacts from polluted drinking water No water (supply); impaired water Recreation: beach pollution Spread of toxins and pathogens Scenario 1 Repair or Replace Infrastructure after it breaks Scenario 2 Harden infrastructure beforehand to reduce the magnitude of destruction Scenario 3 Backup systems to reduce impact of outages Business impacts, including agricultural machinery Disruption in access to capital, e.g., ATM machines Property value impacts Electric Power Disruption Substation disrupted Distribution line breach (not break)

• 1. INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITY

ASSESSMENT Uses engineering and environmental models to identify and forecast likelihood of breakage or stoppage

• 2. RISK AND CONSEQUENCE

ANALYSIS

• 3. ECONOMIC IMPACT

ANALYSIS

M O D E L S

Electric Power Outage Scenario (2003)

Cyber Failure Source: Created by R. Zimmerman, NYU-Wagner School

Using Energy Connections with Transportation and Water to Estimate Recovery from Electricity Outages, 2003 Blackout

Outage Durations, August 2003 Blackout (Total Duration = approx. 42-72 hrs)

T(i)/T(e)*

Infrastructure Outage/Electricity Outage Transit-electrified rail (NYC) 1.3

Traffic Signals (NYC) 2.6

Cleveland Water Supply System

2.0 Detroit Water Supply System 3.0

Source:* R. Zimmerman and C. Restrepo, “The Next Step: Quantifying Infrastructure Interdependencies to Improve Security,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, Vol. 2, Nos. 2/3, 2006, pp. 215-230. Summarized from Table 3.

Full and Partial Restoration of New York City Subway Lines, Post-Hurricane Sandy, 10/28/12-11/12/12

Source: R. Zimmerman, RAPID/Collaborative Research: Collection of Perishable Hurricane Sandy Data on Weather-Related Damage to Urban Power and Transit Infrastructure,” National Science Foundation, the U. of Washington (lead), Louisiana State University, and New York University;

• R. Zimmerman (2014), “Planning Restoration of Vital Infrastructure Services Following Hurricane Sandy: Lessons Learned for Energy and

Transportation,” J. of Extreme Events, Vol. 1, No. 1. Picture: MTA. Fixing A Train Tracks on the “flats” near Jamaica Bay

Electric power recovery as a %

• f customers served

Failure Mode Examples for Infrastructure Interconnections:

Electric Power, Transportation, Water, IT

• IT and all infrastructures: [1]

– In 2012, ICF-CERT reported the following based on 198 attacks: 41% (82) in energy; 3% (6) in nuclear;15% (29) in water, and 3% (5) in transportation; – By 2013, based on 256 attacks they reported: 59% (151) in energy; 3% (8) in nuclear; 5% (13) in water, and 5% (12) in the transportation sector

• Electric Power and Transportation:

– Hurricane Sandy resulted in extensive flooding of electric power infrastructure that was a key factor in transit vehicle, signal, and switch

• utages and lighting and signal outages for road transportation[2]
• Transportation and Water:

– For water management, unavailable or blocked drainage infrastructure can cause road, rail and vehicle flooding in the short-run and material disruptions in the long run [3]

Note: Only examples of two-way infrastructure interconnections are given, but in reality, many examples exist of more complex interconnections Sources: [1] Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (October/November/December 2012) ICS-CERT Monitor http://ics-cert.us- cert.gov/sites/default/files/ICS-CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Oct-Dec2012_2.pdf summarize from p. 5. Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (October-December 2013) ICS-CERT Monitor, p. 1, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Oct-Dec2013.pdf [2] NYS 2100 Commission (2013) 2100 Commission Report. Recommendations to Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure, Albany, NY: The Commission. [3] A contributing factor to the Mianus Bridge Collapse in CT was the paving over of drainage facilities which created water damage to steel components on the bridge. NTSB (1984), Highway Accident Report: Collapse of a Suspended Span of Interstate Rte 95 Highway Bridge over the Mianus R. Greenwich,

• CT. 6/28/83, Washington, DC, USA, NTSB.

• IV. From Failure Modes to Resilience:

A Basis for Modeling

Energy Commu- nication Transport Water Energy Commu- nication Transport Water Conventional infrastructure interdependencies are potentially vulnerable to breaks in single links that can cause cascading damages across multiple infrastructure systems. Distributed or alternative infrastructure systems enable more flexible, relatively simpler interconnections by adding additional resources that can perform and connect independently (dashed lines) or through traditional interdependent system linkages (dashed double arrows). Lines exemplify linkages.

rail wind hydro bike bus wells solar Other water sources Other alternate sources Trucked water TV radio

Note: Only two-way, simple infrastructure interconnections are shown, but more complex interconnections occur involving more infrastructures. Created by R. Zimmerman, NYU-Wagner School.

Using Interconnectivity to Promote Resilience

• Selected Measures

– Intersection of hazards and infrastructure nodes and links – Recovery time

• Illustrative Methods

– Multiple routes, modes, and resources (decentralized, redundant, shared, and “slack resources”) – Redundant structures and functions – Effective communication – Hazard mitigation and emergency planning

• Components

– Resources – Physical Systems – Environmental Systems – Social Systems

From Spoke Structure to Interconnected Structure Note: Illustrates redundancy and flexibility from interconnectivity; best applied to dense systems

Source:FEMA (2016) Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Status RiskMap http://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-plan-status

1.Resources Valuing Infrastructure

• Contributions to the economy:

– Infrastructure capital as a contributor to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank) – High value of infrastructure assets (in the trillions of dollars) (U.S. Bureau of the Census)

• How do we capture that value to support

future infrastructure investment?

• The cost of not investing
• Reliance on disaster funding in the short-

term

Financing via Emergency Funding: Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 (DRAA)

Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Sandy Program Management Office (PMO) (January 23, 2014) Monthly Public Financial Update, Washington, DC: US HUD, p. 4 available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HSTFSupp_Rpt123113.pdf

Financing via Capital Budgeting

Selected Permanent Restorations After Hurricane Sandy - Making Old Things New, 2013 and beyond

• April 4, 2013. Number 1-train service to South Ferry

substituted by service through the old South Ferry station[1]

• May 31, 2013. A-train service to the Rockaways restored[1]
• September 3, 2014. Greenpoint Tube repaired - G Line [2]

September 15, 2014. Montague Tunnel repaired - R Line [3]

• Other tunnels, stations, and transit facilities under

construction to 2016 and beyond[4]

Source: Based on data compiled by R. Zimmerman from MTA public information sources: [1]*http://web.mta.info/sandy/timeline.htm, [2]MTA (September 2, 2014) Full G Service Resumes Between Long Island City and Greenpoint Fix&Fortify Work Improves Resiliency & Reliability of G Line http://www.mta.info/press-release/nyc-transit/full-g-service-resumes-between-long-island-city-and-greenpoint [3]MTA (September 15, 2014) Services Resumes Through Montague Tubes (13 months) http://www.mta.info/news/2014/09/15/services-resumes- through-montague-tubes; MTA (September 15, 2014) Governor Cuomo Announces Early Completion of Superstorm Sandy Recovery Work In Montague Subway Tunnel R Train Service between Brooklyn and Manhattan Restored Ahead of Schedule and Under Budget http://www.mta.info/press-release/nyc-transit/governor-cuomo-announces-early-completion-superstorm-sandy-recovery-work [4]MTA CPOIC April 2014 presentations

• 2. Physical Systems:

Electric Power, Water, Transportation

• Electric Power and Transportation:

– Back up power (short-term) – Decentralized power and alternative transportation modes with different energy inputs (long term) – Alter Transportation to Avoid Disabled or Vulnerable Electric Power Systems: Modes (demand responses, surface vs. rail), Routes, Timing, Usage, e.g., telecommuting – Technology – robotics – Facility design: Elevate, Relocate

• Electric Power and Water

– Alternative/backup power – Alternative water sources – Alternative supplies and supply routes

• Electric Power distribution and production with all other

Infrastructure: Strengthen, Relocate, Underground, Seal*

*Source: Consolidated Edison Company of NY (203) Post Sandy Enhancement Plan, New York, NY: Con Edison.

Alternatives for Avoiding Adverse Effects of Interconnections between Water and Energy

• Energy Usage for Water Reduction

– Water recycling in energy systems – Fluids other than water for energy cooling systems

• Water Usage for Energy Reduction

– Energy recovery – Alternative (renewable) energy sources – Less energy and/or water intensive products or methods of production, including those in other infrastructure sectors, e.g., transportation

Source: Summarized from U.S. Department of Energy (June 2014) The Water-Energy Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. DOE, p. 109, 97.

Adapting Interconnectivity for Resilience: IT

• IT and all infrastructure

– Capacity expansion – Alternative communication modes – Alternative structures – Alternative procedures to improve communication management

• IT and Transportation

– Capacity expansion – Redundancy – Improved operational performance and usage training

• IT and Water

– Capacity expansion – Sensor technologies to detect contamination, adhere to water quality standards, detect intrusions, and other IT security

• IT and Electric Power (both fossil fuels and renewables):

– IT has considerable value for energy systems in detecting anomalies, managing production, routing, accident avoidance through detection, distribution under normal conditions (bringing dispersed resources from extraction sites to concentrated production points and concentrated production resources to dispersed consumption points), and emergency conditions, e.g., detecting conditions that warrant preemptive shutdowns

Alternative Vehicles Connecting Transportation (Vehicles) to Energy (Fueling Stations)

Source: *R. Zimmerman (2012) Transport, the Environment and Security. Making the Connection, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., p. 142,143. http://www.e-elgar.com/bookentry_mainUS.lasso?id=13884. **Pictures from R. Zimmerman

Autolib, Paris, France**

Fueling Station Location for Alternative Fuels, miles from interstate highways, U.S.*:

• Only about 10% were under
• ne quarter mile
• Almost half were between one

quarter mile and 5 miles

• About a third were greater than

10 miles

Automated vehicle, Masdar, UAR**

Flexibility Through Multi-Modal Interconnections:

Bus Connections at Subway Stations, NYC

• Connections between buses and subways

do and can continue to provide alternative transportation modes in emergencies

• Nationally, bus connectivity is highest with

rail transit

• The New York City subway stations vary

in numbers of buses stopping at stations from a couple of dozen to none

• Bus connectivity is in part related to the

number of train tracks located at each station

Source: Zimmerman, R. et al. (2014) Promoting Transportation Flexibility in Extreme Events through Multi-Modal Connectivity, New York, NY: NYU-Wagner. Funded by the U.S. DOT Region 2 University Transportation Research Center (UTRC). Photos from R. Zimmerman.

Adaptation for Flood Protection by Integrating Innovative Pedestrian Transportation Corridors,

• St. Jean de Luz

Photograph by R. Zimmerman

Interconnecting Wastewater Treatment, Electric Power, and Water Management Infrastructure, NYC Post-Hurricane Sandy

Source: NYC Environmental Protection (October 2013) NYC Wastewater Resiliency Plan. New York, NY: NYC DEP, p. 5.

Changing Materials to Balance Heat Exchange Changes in Cooling over Time for Concrete and Asphalt

Source: U.S. EPA (October 2008) Reducing Urban Heat Islands: Compendium of Strategies, Chapter 5, “Cool Pavements,” p. 5, http://www.epa.gov/heatisld/resources/compendium.htmLawrence Berkeley National Labs. Asphalt lightens over time thus increasing reflectivity and concrete darkens over time thus decreasing reflectivity.

Innovative Streets: Controlling Water, Heat and Other Factors

• Strategies

– Spatial and temporal adaptations – Reducing Roadways: Decentralizing streets; Deconstructing large roadways

• Specialized Approaches

– Cooling pavement surfaces for heat absorption – Green corridors for ecological protection – Green corridors for pedestrian thoroughfares – Streets for stormwater control (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) – Streets for waste recycling (glasphalt, plastic bags) – Streets for electric power generation – Streets as utility corridors

Source: R. Zimmerman (2012) Transport, the Environment and Security. Making the Connection, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., p. 140-150. http://www.e-elgar.com/bookentry_mainUS.lasso?id=13884

• 3. Environmental Systems and Infrastructure:

Wildlife Corridors at Roads and Bridges

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration (2006), ‘Along roads’, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/wildlifeprotection/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.viewTopic&topicID=1

Roadside Swale, Salt Lake City, Utah Street and Subway Flooding Protection: Elevated Grate Barriers, NYC

Water & Transportation Infrastructure Interconnectivity

Source: Photos by R. Zimmerman 2012

Connecting CSO Basins (Gray Infrastructure) with Green Infrastructure Technologies

Source: NYC DEP (2009) NYC Green Infrastructure Plan 2009, p. 54, p. 62.

• 4. Social Systems

Role of Human Behavior: Will People Adapt

Transportation Example: Psychological and Social Determinants of Route Choice Potential Factors Influencing Individual Choice of Transportation Routes

• Crowding, congestion
• Reliability
• Predictability / certainty
• Number of transfers required
• Time (transfer among modes and waiting time)
• Cost
• Safety
• Number of alternatives
• Aesthetics (including cleanliness)
• Access to other non-transit related resources (stops for shopping, etc.)

Potential Factors Contributing to Variations in Individual Choice Decisions

• Income
• Trip purpose
• Trip length (scale)
• Health status
• Miscellaneous travel preferences and customs

Source: Z. Guo and N. H.M. Wilson (2011) Assessing the cost of transfer inconvenience in public transport systems: A case study of the London Underground, Transportation Research Part A 45 (2011) 91–104; Z. Guo (2011) Mind the map! The impact of transit maps on path choice in public transit, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 45 (7), 625–639.

How We Use Land

Population Density, Household Characteristics and Transportation Per Household CO2 Emissions, U.S.

Source: U.S.DOT, FHWA (March 2009) NHTS Brief. The Carbon Footprint of Travel, p. 2 http://nhts.ornl.gov/briefs/Carbon%20Footprint%20of%20Travel.pdf

Alternative Land Adaptation Measures, NYC Department of City Planning

Source: New York City Department of City Planning (2013) Coastal Climate Resilience, Urban Waterfront Adaptive Strategies, New York, NY: NYC DCP, p. 5. http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/sustainable_com munities/urban_waterfront_print.pdf

• V. Future Research Needs and Lessons for

Policy as Inputs to Modeling

• Provide greater specification and quantification of linkages,

e.g., in terms of flows, inputs and outputs, acknowledging the uncertainty and variability

• Understand overall conditions (internal/external to systems)

under which interconnections are strengthened or weakened (network theory; concentration effects)

• Identify interventions that change adverse cascading effects:

Address concentration effects by reducing them through alternative designs

• Understand the role of and how to shape human behavior to

support interconnections that reinforce resilience

Acknowledgements

The author acknowledges support from the following grants for portions of this presentation: “Resilient Interdependent Infrastructure Processes and Systems (RIPS) Type 1: A Meta-Network System Framework for Resilient Analysis and Design of Modern Interdependent Critical Infrastructures,” funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), 2014-2016 (1441140). Critical Resilient Interdependent Infrastructure Systems and Processes (CRISP) Type 1— Reductionist and integrative approaches to improve the resiliency of multi-scale interdependent critical infrastructure,” funded by the NSF (1541164) “Urban Resilience to Extreme Weather Related Events Sustainability Research Network (UREx SRN),” funded by the NSF (1444755). “RAPID/Collaborative Research: Collection of Perishable Hurricane Sandy Data on Weather-Related Damage to Urban Power and Transit Infrastructure,” funded by the NSF, with the U. of Washington (lead) and Louisiana State University (1316335). “Promoting Transportation Flexibility in Extreme Events through Multi-Modal Connectivity” Faculty research grant from the University Transportation Research Center, Region 2. Portions of this presentation were presented at other venues. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this presentation are the opinions of the author and not necessarily those of the NSF or the U.S. DOT.