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How Do Auditors Order Their Tasks, and How Does Task Ordering Affect Performance? Robert P. Mocadlo College of Business & Public Administration University of North Dakota Background Auditors need to meet deadlines and budgets


  1. How Do Auditors Order Their Tasks, and How Does Task Ordering Affect Performance? Robert P. Mocadlo College of Business & Public Administration University of North Dakota

  2. Background • Auditors need to meet deadlines and budgets • Archival evidence shows that reporting deadlines affect audit quality – López and Peters 2012, Bryant-Kutcher et al. 2013, Lambert et al. 2015, Glover et al. 2015 • How can auditors reduce time/effort while still completing all of their tasks? – Some audit tasks have more flexibility than others, so auditors could use this flexibility to ensure that all their tasks are completed 2

  3. Task Performance Perfunctory Consummate performance performance Performance 0 Inefficient Incomplete Performance range The size of the performance range depends on the subjectivity of the task’s criteria or guidance

  4. Objective Tasks • Performance range: narrow (or zero) • Low ability to decrease time/effort – Moving from the upper threshold to the lower threshold saves only a little (or no) time/effort 0 Performance Performance range 4

  5. Subjective Tasks • Performance range: wide • High ability to decrease time/effort – Moving from the upper threshold to the lower threshold can save a lot of time/effort 0 Performance Performance range 5

  6. Hypotheses 1 and 2 When auditors are assigned both an objective and subjective task: H1: They are more likely to choose to perform the objective task first regardless of time pressure H2: Performance will decrease more with time pressure for the subjective versus the objective task 6

  7. Mitigating Effects of Criteria Subjectivity • What would cause auditors to prioritize subjective tasks? – Subjective accounts (more likely to require subjective audit tasks) tend to be riskier, which may lead to a higher assessed risk for these accounts in the planning phase of the audit – Increased importance of higher-risk tasks – Less likelihood of negative consequences from incomplete work on lower-risk tasks 7

  8. Hypotheses 3 and 4 Regardless of time pressure, when auditors are assigned both an objective and subjective task: H3: Auditors will be more likely to perform the subjective task first if the assessed inherent risk for the account covered by the subjective task is high versus low H4: Performance will be higher on the subjective task relative to the objective task if the assessed inherent risk for the account covered by the subjective task is high versus low 8

  9. Experimental Procedure • 113 auditor participants were given two tasks to complete – Objective task: matching sales invoices to supporting documentation – Subjective task: forming an expectation for a substantive analytical procedure related to workers’ compensation (adapted from Clor-Proell & Maines 2014) • Both tasks needed to be completed within an overall time limit • Auditors chose which task to perform first, worked on that task, then spent any remaining time on the second task 9

  10. Independent Variables • Task Type (within-participants) – Objective and subjective • Time Pressure (between-participants) – In both conditions, participants were told that each task should take 10 minutes (20 minutes total) – Low : Participants had 25 minutes to complete both tasks – High : Participants had 15 minutes to complete both tasks • Subjective Task Risk (nested, between-participants) – Low vs. High (provided in the background) – Objective task risk is always low 10

  11. Dependent Variables • First Task Chosen (objective or subjective) • Performance – Objective task: number of seeded errors caught (out of three) – Subjective task: level of disaggregation of data used to form expectation (three possible levels) 11

  12. Results for H1 and H3 (First Task Chosen) • 67 of 113 participants (59%) performed the objective task first – Binomial probability test: p = 0.03 Logistic Regression for First Task Chosen Two-tailed χ 2 df p-value Constant 1 0.98 0.323 Time Pressure 1 3.64 0.056 Task Presentation Order 1 1.93 0.165 Time Pressure × Task Presentation Order 1 0.76 3.850 Subjective Task Risk 1 6.27 0.012 Time Pressure × Subjective Task Risk 1 9.91 0.002 Task Presentation Order × Subjective Task Risk 1 0.71 0.399 Time Pressure × Task Presentation Order × Subjective Task Risk 1 2.94 0.086 10/17/2016 12

  13. Results for H1 and H3 (First Task Chosen) • Under High Time Pressure – First Task Chosen is dependent on Subjective Task Risk (Fisher’s exact test = 0.021) – When Subjective Task Risk is low (e.g. the inherent risk is the same across both tasks): • 22 of 30 participants (73%) performed the objective task first • Supports H1 – When Subjective Task Risk is high (e.g. the inherent risk is higher for the subjective task): • 14 of 33 participants (42%) performed the objective task first • Supports H3 13

  14. Results for H1 and H3 (First Task Chosen) • Under Low Time Pressure – No significant relationship between First Task Chosen and Subjective Task Risk (p = 0.150) • Therefore, H1 and H3 are conditionally supported (when Time Pressure is High) 10/17/2016 14

  15. Results for H2 and H4 (Performance) H2: Task Type × Time 3 Pressure interaction when Objective Task 2.5 performed first (p = 0.002) 2 Performance 1.5 H2: Task Type × Time Pressure interaction 1 when Subjective Task performed first .5 (p = 0.138) 0 Low TP High TP Low TP High TP H4: No effect of Objective Task Performed First Subjective Task Performed First Subjective Task Risk (smallest p = 0.389) Objective Task Subjective Task 15

  16. Supplemental Analyses • Alternative specifications for robustness • Reduced observations based on manipulation check failures • Time spent on tasks • Likelihood of participants being able to complete both tasks • Effect of task difficulty 10/17/2016 16

  17. Summary and Contribution • Auditors’ task ordering matters! • If subjective tasks are necessary to audit subjective accounts, auditors may be taking on more risk than they realize • Standard-setters, regulators, and audit firms should consider how the objective or subjective language in their guidance may interact with auditors’ incentives 17

  18. Thank you! 18

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