Political Sociology Week 3: Ethnicity Michaelmas 2019 Dr Anna - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Political Sociology Week 3: Ethnicity Michaelmas 2019 Dr Anna Krausova Definitions Race: physical (phenotypical) differences considered socially significant (ASA) Ethnicity: shared culture such as language, ancestry, practices and
▪ Race: physical (phenotypical) differences considered socially significant (ASA) ▪ Ethnicity: shared culture such as language, ancestry, practices and beliefs (ASA) ▪ Ethnic group, nation, etc. (collective groups) ▪ Not primordial, nor static, but dynamic ➔Product of social interaction (intentional and unintentional)
▪ Collective identity construction
▪ Analytical sociology and structural individualism: “Instead of assuming social norms or pre-existing identities as given… this approach regards dynamics of identity construction and group identification as part of the process that leads to the definition of both the individual and group interest.” (Baldassarri, 2011: 402) ▪ Explanations, and mechanisms; not purely descriptive/interpretive ▪ Importance of individual agency, but within wider social structures ▪ How can we use individual decisions and interactions to explain the various political effects of ethnicity (as well as emergence/persistence of ethnic groups)? ➔ Micro-macro linkages
▪ Democratisation in Latin America – (unexpected) emergence of ethnic cleavages
▪ Changing citizenship regimes (threats to autonomy) + international indigenous rights => indigenous movements (Yashar, 2005) ▪ Decentralisation + reserved seats => indigenous political parties (Van Cott, 2003)
▪ Example: Bolivia
▪ Evo Morales - first indigenous President ▪ Core supporters, Aymara- and Quechua-speaking rural labourers- previously in peasant unions; yet, since 1970s qua indigeneity (e.g.
Evo Morales inauguration ceremony: Tiwanaku, 2006
➔Collective identity, such as ethnicity
▪ Both ascribed and self-defined ▪ Both inwardly experienced and outwardly signalled ▪ Also, relational ➔Obverse question (Hechter, 1976): ethnic boundary as focus of investigation, not the cultural ‘stuff’ inside ➔ "categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories.” (Barth, 1969: 9) ▪ social boundaries (although may map spatially)
▪ Another example from Bolivia
▪ 2001 Census: 62% indigenous ▪ 2011 Census: 41.7% indigenous ?!
▪ 1991 UK Census measure:
▪ White ▪ Black
▪ Caribbean ▪ African ▪ Other
▪ Indian ▪ Pakistani ▪ Bangladeshi ▪ Chinese ▪ Other Asian ▪ Other-Other
2011 Census ➔ ▪ Consultation for 2021 Census:
“Specific requests for additional
included; Anglo-Irish, Cornish, Cypriot, Eastern European, English, Gypsy, Irish Traveller, Jewish, Kashmiri, Latin American, Orthodox Jewish, Roma, Sikh, Somali, Turkish, Western European, White Cornish, White European and Yemeni. Some respondents also advocated allowing respondents to tick multiple categories and removal of the use of colour terminology.“
https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/censustransformati
ewoncontentforenglandandwales
▪ Need for some (comparable) measures of ethnicity ▪ US: in 1993, black men earned on average ~$10,000 p.a. more than white men (diff. for women “only” $2,000) (Bennet, 1995) ▪ UK ‘ethnic penalty’ (Heath et al, 2019; Li & Heath, 2018) ➔
▪ cumulative discrimination? (e.g. job search CVs (Wood et al. 2009; Heath 2018) ▪ additional ‘Muslim penalty’? (Heath, Li, and Woerner-Powell 2018)
▪ OECD: Unemployment typically higher among migrants overall
▪ OECD: Unemployment typically higher among migrants overall
▪ Recent migrants more likely to be economically active overall – still, unemployment rates higher ▪ EU v. non-EU
▪ Again, likely explanation:
Economic Activity/Country of Birth Total UK Non-UK Non-UK: EU Non-UK: Non-EU Total (16-64) 45,496,780 38,586,185 6,910,595 2,210,202 4,700,393 Economically active 28,818,355 24,296,379 4,521,976 1,543,684 2,978,292 % of total 63.3 63.0 65.4 69.8 63.4 Unemployed (excl. FT students) 1,802,620 1,480,455 322,165 77,114 245,051 % of total 4.0 3.8 4.7 3.5 5.2 % of all economically active 6.3 6.1 7.1 5.0 8.2
Source: England & Wales 2011 Census, ONS. https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011
▪ Ethnic minorities share views
population
▪ Despite differential experiences
▪ Distinct agenda on civil liberties / asylum / anti- discrimination
▪ Also distinct ethnic agenda on foreign policy, anti-terror, and ethno-religious cultural protection
▪ Discrimination as basis for politicisation of ethnicity ➔ ▪ But, discrimination/racism also as a result of politicisation of ethnicity ➔
▪ Tower Hamlets v. Ealing
▪ Similar history of immigration and conflict over local resources ▪ “Immigrant-native confrontation ”escalated in Tower Hamlets 1980s - died down in Ealing
Local politicians competed for minority votes, but in different ways
▪ TH: allocation of housing v. E: housing largely private
Economic differences
▪ Segregation
▪ Groups live apart, either by minority choice or majority imposition
▪ Assimilation
▪ Disappearance of cultural and other distinctions ▪ Segregated assimilation: minorities may be assimilated, but not equally into all sections of society (Portes, 1995)
▪ Integration
▪ All barriers to full participation dismantled (Kymlicka 1995) - “parity of participation” (Fraser, 2003) ▪ Integration may be faster in certain spheres (public/private)
▪ Multiculturalism:
▪ diversity of groups which are expected to remain culturally distinct and differences may even be supported by the state (Multicultural Policies = MCPs)
➔ Political consequences?
▪ Crowding-out hypothesis (e.g. Gitlin 1995) ▪ Corroding effect hypothesis (e.g. Wolf & Klausen 2000; Barry 2001) ▪ Misdiagnosis effect (Barry, 2001)
(Kymlicka & Banting, 2006)
▪ Crowding-out hypothesis (e.g. Gitlin 1995) ▪ Corroding effect hypothesis (e.g. Wolf & Klausen 2000; Barry 2001) ▪ Misdiagnosis effect (Barry, 2001)
▪ Latin America: indigenous movements sometimes only able to gain recognition, not redistribution, but usually not for the lack of trying (Van Cott in Kymlicka & Banting, 2006)
▪ Crowding-out hypothesis (e.g. Gitlin 1995) ▪ Corroding effect hypothesis (e.g. Wolf & Klausen 2000; Barry 2001) ▪ Misdiagnosis effect (Barry, 2001)
▪ Latin America: indigenous movements sometimes only able to gain recognition, not redistribution, but usually not for the lack of trying (Van Cott in Kymlicka & Banting, 2006)
performance better explains the latter (Evans in Kymlicka & Banting, 2006)
(Evans in Kymlicka & Banting, 2006)
(Evans in Kymlicka & Banting, 2006)
▪ Still, trying to test hypotheses
(opinion formation, social interaction, etc.) by only evaluating macro-level data
▪ ‘system of interaction’ between individual and environment ▪ 1st assumption: behaviour is purposive ▪ 2nd assumption: behaviour is contingent
▪ Negative correlation between ethnic heterogeneity & public goods provision (Habyarimana, Humphreys et al., 2007) ▪ But, mechanism?
▪ Preferences? ▪ Strategies?
▪ No evidence for preferences, but strategies/technologies
▪ In-group reciprocity norms + ‘Findability’ = Easier to punish co- ethnics for non- cooperation
▪ Democratic norms stronger among 1st generation ▪ Knowledge stronger among 2+ generation ▪ Electoral turnout?
▪ Political participation of minorities slightly lower
▪ But, largely explained by registration rates (partly due to citizenship and temporary status)
lower in constituencies with more ethnic minorities, ethnic minority turnout greater in such places (Cutts et al. 2006).
▪ Ethnic minorities (especially Latinos) lower turnout than Whites on average, but there are exceptions
▪ Obama: African-American turnout high ▪ Differences in turnout can be explained by differences in education, class and religious activity (Verba et al., 1993) ▪ Similar factors related to high turnout for whites (e.g. socioeconomic status, political interest, efficacy, social connectedness) apply to ethnic minorities
▪ However, important historical and contemporary contests over citizenship and voting rights
▪ Civil Rights movement, Voting Rights Act (1965), Shelby County v Holder (2013)
▪ Overall, ethnic minorities less likely to participate in protest politics in US and elsewhere
▪ E.g. Mexican Americans most likely to protest when some but not too many social ties with whites (Santoro et al., 2012) ▪ Cross-cutting ties can increase ethnic identity and political interest ▪ While too much bridging social capital can be a bad thing for minority participation
▪ Anoll (2018): Social norms and neighbourhood context matter in US ethnic participation patterns
▪ Blacks value and reward turnout more than other groups because of the Civil Rights movement, while Latinos value protest participation more than Whites.
▪ Stronger effect for Blacks in Black areas ▪ For Latinos where many are not just Latino but foreign born.
▪ Suggests existing rather than historical disenfranchisement poignant for Latinos Anoll (2018)
▪ Whites less likely to vote when there are fewer people from their own ethnic group (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999)
▪ Before 1930 Blacks (with a vote) almost all Republican (the party of Lincoln) ▪ Realignment of Blacks to FDR's Democrats in 1930s with the New Deal ▪ Further reinforcement in 1964 with the Civil Rights Act ▪ Since then Black voters have been around 80% ➔ Democrat ▪ While race is clearly the major cleavage in the US, Blacks are
than Whites. ▪ Blacks concentrated in safe Democratic districts
▪ ➔ limiting their political influence
▪ Obama: white backlash? ➔ https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
US Election Exit Polls
White vote D White vote R Difference
▪ Ethnic minorities tend to be under-represented in legislatures
▪ Comparative work difficult due to data availability /functional equivalence
▪ Institutional arrangements can make a difference
▪ Mixed evidence that PR improves minority representation (Lijphart) ▪ Majoritarian systems can help if minorities clustered ▪ Reserved seats (e.g. India) or minority-majority districts (USA) can be established
▪ Dilemmas of Inclusion (Dancygier, 2017)
▪ Left-wing political party calculation: if local Muslim population large enough (given electoral system), Musilm candidates will win votes ▪ Inclusion but can create tensions:
▪ Sex-segregated Labour party rallies (Birmingham 2015) ?
▪ Ethnic minorities constitute 8% of MPs but . .
▪ c. 13% of the population ▪ c. 10% of the electorate
▪ Increase in EM representation for Tories
▪ placing more EM candidates in safe seats (despite an electoral penalty) ▪ “modernisation” drive in 2010
▪ Labour EM candidates
▪ tend to do at least as well as white candidates in diverse areas, and in 2017 they won marginal seats with EM candidates
▪ Ethnic minority candidates suffered an average electoral penalty of 4 % from whites
▪ Largely as anti-immigrant voters less willing to vote for Muslims
▪ No significant effect of candidate ethnicity for non-Muslim, Indian and black voters ▪ Pakistani candidates benefited from an 8-point average electoral bonus from Pakistani voters
▪ Ethnicity
▪ perhaps the most important source of arbitrary inequality, strength of identity, and political polarization
▪ Political representation of ethnic minorities
▪ varies, partly as a result of institutional differences & party strategies, as well as voter preferences ▪ Relatively small numbers limit electoral power ▪ Local level: potential gains, but also potential for backlash
▪ Need to be careful about how we measure ethnicity, and how to evaluate hypotheses that link micro-level preferences and behaviour to macro-level
leaders when voting in elections? (2019)
than others with the way democracy works? (2018)
economic factors? (2017) Q Do welfare states depend mainly on social solidarity? (2017)
Review 25.
OUP.
101(04)
Press.
CUP. The lecture slides build on previous lecture material by Professor Stephen Fisher