Week 2: Religion Michaelmas 2019 Dr Anna Krausova Introduction - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Week 2: Religion Michaelmas 2019 Dr Anna Krausova Introduction - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Political Sociology Week 2: Religion Michaelmas 2019 Dr Anna Krausova Introduction Political Sociology Various ways to approach the intersection between political science and sociology The study of religion an excellent example


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Political Sociology Week 2: Religion

Michaelmas 2019 Dr Anna Krausova

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Introduction

  • Political Sociology
  • Various ways to approach the intersection between political science

and sociology

  • The study of religion an excellent example
  • Some housekeeping
  • Lecture slides: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sant3223/
  • Ask questions: anna.krausova@sociology.ox.ac.uk
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Sociological theory: Durkheim’s functionalism

  • Sacred v. profane (Religious Life (1912[1995])
  • All societies founded on distinction between sacred & profane
  • Whether what is sacred is a God, or an object, or a ritual, or freedom of speech
  • “social facts”
  • External to the individual; social norms, values and institutions
  • But, unclear how these “social facts” emerge, operate, reproduce themselves, and

particularly change “A society is to its members what a god is to its faithful… Precisely because society has its own specific nature that is different from our nature as individuals it pursues ends that are also specifically its own; but because it can achieve those ends only by working through us, it categorically demands our cooperation. Society requires us to make ourselves its servants, forgetful

  • f our own interests.” (Religious Life, pp.208-9)
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Sociological Theory: Marx’s materialism

  • Masks ‘true reality’

 false consciousness and alienation  yet understanding religion crucial for understanding social conditions from which it emerges  historical materialism

  • But, what about examples such as liberation theology in Latin America or Protestant

reformation in Western Europe? “Man makes religion, religion does not make man…. The wretchedness of religion is at once an expression of and a protest against real wretchedness. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (Marx, 1844 [1970], p.131)

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Sociological Theory: Weber’s interpretivism

  • Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905)

One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born—that is what this discussion has sought to demonstrate— from the spirit of Christian asceticism. ” (Weber, 1905[2010]: 122-3)

  • Protestant religious doctrine generates certain values (accumulation of wealth as a calling,

an end in its own right, to prove ‘predestination’) Individuals with values adopt certain kind of economic behaviour  helps bring about capitalist economy

  • However, causality/endogeneity problem:
  • Do values impact the economy (Weber), or does the economy influence values? (Marx)
  • Changes in economy could have favoured one particular religious group
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“A person’s religious identity inevitably shapes his or her values and political positions. The relationship between religion and parties arises from a centuries-old interplay of these two forces.” (Dalton, Citizen Politics, 2014)

  • Long history of religious wars (e.g. early Muslim conquests, Christian Crusades,

Protestant-Catholic wars of religion)

  • Development of ideologies, political institutions and political competition shaped

by religion “Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.” (Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 1993)

Politicisation of religion

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“system of beliefs and practices based on belief in, or acknowledgement of, some superhuman power or powers” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2009)

  • Problems with defining religion:
  • What beliefs are religious? Is belief necessary?
  • Not all religions have a God or Gods
  • Core beliefs can differ between elite and members
  • People can be considered members of a religion irrespective of belief (e.g.

Jews, Catholics) & vice versa (e.g. Church of England)

  • If belonging to a group is necessary, how active do you have to

be?

  • Various indicators used:
  • Self-identification.
  • Attendance (also marriages, christenings, etc.)
  • Beliefs

Definition of religion?

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Three dimensions (Dobbelare, 1981)

  • Level of society and institutions
  • Within religious institutions
  • Individual level association with religious institutions
  • Linked to modernisation in three ways.
  • Social differentiation: especially adoption of health and education by the state
  • Societalization: reduction in the importance of community relative to the wider society
  • Rationalization: reduces need for coordination and ordering by values (Bell, 1976)
  • Globally, Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that religiosity is strongest where

economic and physical security are weakest

Modernisation/Secularisation

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Norris & Inglehart (2004)

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Crouch (1990)

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England & Wales Census (ONS, 2001/2011)

Question: What is your religion?

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  • Globally religion  Primarily Western Europe where 
  • Even within W Europe, measures of secularization (identification, church attendances, religious

marriages, etc.) disputed

  • Changing practice not general decline of religion? (e.g. Martin, 1978)
  • e.g. religious TV and radio, New Age spirituality and ‘believing without belonging’
  • Still, any increases in above too small to compensate for decline in traditional religious
  • Plurality of religions and free competition can explain high religiosity in the US
  • Norris and Inglehart (2004):
  • US has low levels of security due to limited welfare state, and it is just one case
  • Eastern Europe where religion  after 1989 – increasing inequality
  • Still, Gorski and Altinordu (2008) criticise Norris and Inglehart (2004)
  • using ‘existential security’ to mean basic physical needs in non-Western countries but higher-order psychological needs

(predictability, protection against risk) in US

  • making a temporal argument based on cross-sectional data

Critics of secularisation

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  • Most European states originally legitimated by religion
  • to maintain power, the church allied with political elite to resist moves towards

democratization

  • France:
  • Since the revolution, state strongly anti-clerical, most notably in the education policy
  • E.g. battle over headscarves in schools (although more complex)
  • England
  • Early victory of state over church (C16th)
  • Church remains established but politically weak
  • US, Ireland, Greece and Poland
  • Separation of (majority) church from state has allowed religion to flourish

 It is the association with political elite, rather than religion, that lead to rejection

  • f the church (Martin, 1978)

Church versus State

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  • Muller and Neundorf (Soc

Forces, 2012)

  • Cold War cohorts less religious than

predecessors in Central Eastern Europe

  • Bigger drops with more communist

repression of religion

  • But, post Cold War religious recovery

in East, despite secularisation in W Europe

  • Post Cold War cohorts most religious

in East, but least in W Europe

Empirical example: Religion in Eastern Europe

  • Religiosity  with GDP in CE Europe, but  with GDP in W Europe
  • Religiosity moves with religious legislation, but in different directions in East and West
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Muller & Neundorf (2012)

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  • Muller and Neundorf (Soc Forces, 2012)
  • Evidence for secularization
  • Berger’s theory of plausibility [legitimacy] structures
  • Norris and Inglehart’s existential security hypothesis
  • Role of the state

“Not only did we find that the state played a crucial role in the disestablishment of religion in Eastern Europe. It also is one of the driving forces of its re-establishment after 1990.” Muller and Neundorf , 2012, p.577)

 However, could also be other way round: state follows changing public opinion?

  • Not entirely clear whether evidence for modernisation theory as opposed to revival

arguments (Northmore-Bell & Evans, 2016)

Empirical example: Religion in Eastern Europe

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What evidence would we look for to evaluate secularisation as

  • pposed to the revival argument?
  • Secularisation/Modernisation
  • ?
  • Revival
  • ?

Empirical example: Religion in Eastern Europe

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What evidence would we look for to evaluate secularisation as opposed to revival argument?

  • Secularisation/Modernisation
  • Socio-economic predictors, with higher (and/or less decreasing religiosity) among less

wealthy/economically secure residents

  • Correlation between GDP and religiosity
  • Economic crises may trigger increase in religiosity
  • New adherents from socio-economically vulnerable sections (Norris & Inglehart, 2004)
  • Revival
  • Opposite to above, socio-economic variables should lose predictive power
  • E.g. growing support for Orthodox church in Russia among urban professionals and wealthy
  • ligarchs (Evans & Northmore-Ball, 2012)
  • Linked to nationalism and national revival

Empirical example: Religion in Eastern Europe

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  • Northmore-Bell & Evans (2016)

“Proponents of both the secularization and revival arguments note cross-national variation that does not fit with either over-arching approach, but neither argument can explain the variation in a systematic manner; a large number of countries are dismissed as exceptions” (p.33)

  • Individual country cases show instances of both revival and secularization
  • Institutional abilities of Catholic v. Orthodox Churches to resist state oppression explain why

religiosity revived in Orthodox countries but remained steady in Catholic countries

  • Catholic countries: state never completely stamped out official religion  continued open

affiliation

  • Orthodox countries: institutionally weaker Church subservient to state  Church lost credibility

 open adherents only returning now

  • Traditionally more protestant/mixed East Germany and Czech Rep. have generally declining trend

Empirical example: Religion in Eastern Europe

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Northmore-Bell & Evans (2016)

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Northmore-Bell & Evans (2016)

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Northmore-Bell & Evans (2016)

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  • Secularisation v. revival?
  • Northmore-Bell & Evans (2016):
  • Secularisation in W Europe v. revival in E Europe
  • Most pronounced revival in E Europe Orthodox countries
  • Wave 2/2000s: no correlation between socio-economic variables and

affiliation/attendance (as secularisation would predict)

  • Still, the studies use different definitions of religiosity:
  • Norris & Inglehart: both values and practices
  • Muller & Neundorf: belief in God
  • Northmore-Ball & Evans: religious affiliation and church attendance

Empirical example: Religion in Eastern Europe

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  • Bruce (2003) secularization  liberal democracy
  • Protestant reformation  capitalism (Weber) and the tolerance of different sects

 liberalism  liberal democracy

  • Democratization of Catholic countries perhaps result of the successful practice of democracy

in Protestant countries?

  • Catholic Church only officially accepted democracy in 1944
  • Only Western Europe / US?
  • Substantial difference between the level of democratization between the Islamic

and non-Islamic regions with Arab states especially unlikely to be democratic

  • BUT 

Religion and Democracy

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  • Debate about democracy in Islamic countries and

Islamic democracy (March, 2015)

  • Davis and Robinson (2006): support for Sharia

law associated with economic communitarianism (state economic intervention)

  • Non-violent Islamist groups often successful in

elections due to reputation for good governance built up in opposition to autocratic regimes (Cammett and Luong, 2014)

  • Norris & Inglehart (2004 & 2012): public support

for democracy not noticeably lower in the Muslim world

Religion and Democracy

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  • Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan

(2011): Beliefs and behaviour counteracting

  • Religious beliefs reduce support for

democracy (WVS data)

  • But social interaction from religious

behaviour can increase support

  • While overall Muslims pro-

democractic, among Muslims both more belief and behaviour associated with less support for democracy

Religion and Democracy

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  • Rose and Urwin (1969):
  • Religious divisions, not class, the

main social bases of parties in the Western world today

  • Where religion, class and linguistic

divides co-exist (e.g. Belgium, Canada, S. Africa and Switzerland) (Lijphart, 1979)

  • Effects of religiosity also in European

Parliament Elections (van der Brug et al., 2009) 

  • Also evidence that effects of religion

greater where more religious diversity

Religion and Electoral Behaviour

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  • Dalton (Citizen Politics, 2014): both

denominational and religiosity effects on voting modest

  • Decline in contributions mainly due to

declining loyalty among Christians as a whole, and declining numbers of church goers (Best, 2011)

  • Decline in religion as a basis for vote choice?

Brooks et al, 2006 

Religion and Electoral Behaviour

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  • Stability of religious differences in Britain (Tilley,

2014)

  • Religious cleavage in Britain 
  • Not fully explained by ideological or socio-economic

differences between religions

  • Religious identity, religiosity & partisanship transferred from

parents to children: socialisation

  • Identification with established church little impact on

party choice unless accompanied by church attendance

  • Kotler-Berkowitz (2001): religious

denominational effects in Britain can depend on belief & class identity

  • E.g. greater Labour voting among Catholics seems

weaker among stronger believers & working class

Religion and Electoral Behaviour

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  • Secularisation maybe be peculiar to Christianity in (parts of) Europe
  • Despite the fact that
  • in much of W Europe Christian religious affiliation & participation in decline

& there are relatively few material inequalities clearly attributable to religious identity & the state operates on largely secular principles

  • Religion is still a major factor in electoral politics, perhaps due to`freezing' of the party system

(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) or simply that moral values matter in politics

  • Political Islam - interesting relationship between religion and both democracy & political violence

(note that Muslim countries not generally more violence-prone (Gleditsch and Rudolfsen, 2016))

  • What about yet another potential cleavage?  Ethnicity next week

Conclusion

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Past exam questions:

  • Q. Does the importance of religion in politics change mainly through cohort

replacement? (2019)

  • Q. Are religious voters ‘values voters’? (2018)
  • Q. How do the political implications of Islam differ from those of Christianity? (PPE

2017)

  • Q. Why is religiosity a more important electoral cleavage than religious

denomination in Western democracies? (PPE 2010)

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Selected references:

  • Bruce, Steve (2003). Politics and Religion. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Dalton, R. J. (2014). Citizen politics : public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies. LA:

SAGE.

  • Durkheim, E. M. and K. E. Fields (1995[1912]). The elementary forms of religious life. New York; London: Free.
  • Marx, K., et al. (1970[1844]). Critique of Hegels' 'Philosophy of right'. Cambridge: University Press.
  • Müller, Tim, & Anja Neundorft. (2012). “The Role of the State in the Repression and Revival of Religiosity in

Central Eastern Europe.” Social Forces 91(2): 559–82

  • Northmore-Ball, K. and G. Evans (2016). "Secularization versus religious revival in Eastern Europe: Church

institutional resilience, state repression and divergent paths." Social Science Research 57: 31-48.

  • Norris, Pippa & Ronald Inglehart. (2004). Sacred and Secular. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Tilley, J. (2015). 'We don't do God? Religion and party choice in Britain'. British Journal of Political Science. 45(4)

907-927

  • Weber, M. and T. Parsons (2010[1921]). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. London: Routledge.

The lecture slides build on previous lecture material by Professor Stephen Fisher