Office of Nuclear Security Department of Nuclear Safety and Security - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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International Atomic Energy Agency International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) 2012 EUROSAFE Forum 6 November 2012, Brussels, Belgium Office of Nuclear Security Department of Nuclear Safety and Security 1 OUTLINE


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International Atomic Energy Agency

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International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)

Office of Nuclear Security Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

2012 EUROSAFE Forum 6 November 2012, Brussels, Belgium

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International Atomic Energy Agency

OUTLINE

  • Introduction
  • IPPAS History and Process
  • Benefits of IPPAS Missions & Follow-up Activities
  • Statistics of IPPAS Missions
  • Current IPPAS Activities
  • Conclusion

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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INTRODUCTION

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International Atomic Energy Agency

CONTEXT

THE POSSIBILITY THAT NUCLEAR OR OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL COULD BE USED FOR MALICIOUS PURPOSES IS REAL. A global threat demands a global response.

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International Atomic Energy Agency

The Vision

ACHIEVING WORLDWIDE, EFFECTIVE SECURITY WHEREVER NUCLEAR OR OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IS IN USE, STORAGE AND/OR TRANSPORT, AND OF ASSOCIATED FACILITIES

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International Atomic Energy Agency

UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT AND RISK

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What is the threat?

criminals or terrorists acquiring and using for malicious purposes:

  • Nuclear weapons
  • Nuclear material to make IND
  • Radioactive material for RDD or RED
  • Sabotage of nuclear installations or

transport Who poses the biggest risk?

  • The States that does not recognize

the threat of nuclear terrorism

  • The State that does not take

preventive action

  • The State that is complacent
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International Atomic Energy Agency

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THE NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREAT

  • THEFT OF NUCLEAR WEAPON
  • THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

(IMPROVISED NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, IND)

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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THE NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREAT

THEFT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR RDD OR RED

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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THE NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREAT

SABOTAGE OF FACILITY OR TRANSPORT (Physical, Cyber)

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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Potential Targets in Figures

> 25.000 nuclear weapons > 3.000 tons civil and military HEU and Pu > 480 research reactors (> 100 with HEU) > 100 fuel cycle facilities > 430 operating nuclear power plants > 100.000 Cat I and II radioactive sources > 1.000.000 Cat III radioactive sources

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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Nuclear Security

Prevention Detection Response

… to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.

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THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, IMPLEMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF A NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME WITHIN A STATE RESTS ENTIRELY WITH THAT STATE

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS HISTORY AND PROCESS

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International Atomic Energy Agency

History of International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)

  • Board of Governors in 1995 requested

secretariat to provide advisory service to assist States with an appraisal of their national systems for physical protection upon request

  • f that State
  • First IPPAS mission was conducted in 1996
  • Revised and updated 1998, review in April

2000

  • Up to now, 55 IPPAS missions conducted

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS OBJECTIVES

REVIEW STATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION REGIME AND TO COMPARE WITH INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND GUIDANCE

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS OBJECTIVES

ASSIST MEMBER STATES AND NUCLEAR OPERATORS TO IMPLEMENT REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF INFCIRC/225: THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR FACILITIES

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS OBJECTIVES

IDENTIFY GOOD PRACTICES

THAT COULD BE COMMUNICATED TO OTHER MEMBER STATES FOR LONG-TERM IMPROVEMENT

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (STATE LEVEL)

INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION, ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND COOPERATION

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (STATE LEVEL)

INTEGRATION AND PARTICIPATION OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS (LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, …)

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (STATE LEVEL)

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION (INCLUDING CRIMINAL LAW/CODE, REGULATIONS/DECREES/ORDERS ETC )

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (STATE LEVEL)

  • ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF

THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY

  • LICENSING/AUTHORISATION

PROCESS

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (STATE LEVEL)

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND DESIGN BASIS THREAT

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES LEVEL)

SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES LEVEL)

SECURITY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES LEVEL)

PROTECTION SYSTEMS (BY DESIGN, IN OPERATION……)

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

CONTROL, SAFETY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS Technical system

Detection (including access control), Delay, Guarding and, Response

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS SCOPE (FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES LEVEL)

SECURITY PROCEDURES, SECURITY CULTURE

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  • The Convention on the Physical Protection
  • f Nuclear Material and its 2005

Amendment

  • Nuclear Security Recommendations
  • NSS No.13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5)
  • NSS No.14
  • Other relevant IAEA Nuclear Security

Series Documents

Basis for Recommendations and Suggestions

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International Atomic Energy Agency

IPPAS Process

Formal Request Preparatory Meeting IPPAS Mission Final Mission Report Follow-up

AWARENESS

AND Informal Consultations IPPAS WORKSHOPS IPPAS MISSION

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IPPAS mission report is Highly Confidential

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS MISSION

DURATION OF THE MISSION FROM 6 DAYS TO 2 WEEKS.

TEAM COMPOSITION

TEAM LEADER AND FOUR OR MORE EXPERTS, MULTINATIONAL, MULTIDISCIPLINARY , IAEA TECHNICAL OFFICER, TECHNICAL WRITER MAY BE INCLUDED

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IPPAS Workshop, 5-7 November 2012, Sydney, Australia

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FINAL IPPAS MISSION REPORT

  • Draft report amended accordingly
  • FINAL REPORT PRODUCED BY

IAEA

  • In accordance with the IAEA policy

and procedures, IPPAS mission report is treated as “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL” information

  • Distribution of the report is at the

discretion of IAEA

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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BENEFITS OF IPPAS MISSIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES

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International Atomic Energy Agency

IPPAS MISSION: Output/Benefits

  • IPPAS report providing:
  • Independent views and

recommendations of international team of experts

  • Advice, which establishes solid

basis for further enhancement the national physical protection regime

  • Exchange of international experience
  • Broadening knowledge
  • International recognition of good

practices

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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IPPAS Follow-up Activities

  • Necessary additional advice
  • Legislative and regulatory assistance
  • Training for regulators and operators
  • DBT methodology
  • Equipment for upgrades
  • Bilateral cooperation

Requested by Host country

Based on the recommendations

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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Benefits of IPPAS Follow-up Activities

  • Enhanced legal and regulatory

framework for physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material

  • Capacity enhanced for human

resources development

  • DBT defined and used for design and

effectiveness evaluation of Physical Protection Systems

  • Technical means of PPS upgraded
  • Nuclear Security Culture enhanced
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International Atomic Energy Agency

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STATISTICS OF IPPAS MISSIONS

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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Statistics of IPPAS Missions

  • 55 missions conducted since 1996
  • 14 follow-up missions
  • 37countries received mission
  • More than 100 experts from 29 countries participated in IPPAS

missions

  • In average, 25 recommendations, 8 sugesstions provided and 3

good practices identified during the mission

  • Latest missions were conducted to: Sweden, the UK, France, the

Netherlands (follow-up) and Finland (follow-up)

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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STATISTICS OF IPPAS MISSIONS (3)

  • 1996 – 2 missions: Bulgaria, Slovenia
  • 1997 – 3 missions: Hungary, Poland, Romania
  • 1998 – 1 mission: Czech Republic
  • 1999 – 2 missions: Lithuania, Peru
  • 2000 – 2 missions: Belarus, Democratic Republic of Congo
  • 2001 – 2 missions: Indonesia, Ukraine
  • 2002 – 4 missions: Bulgaria (follow-up), Czech Republic (follow-up + Temelin),

Lithuania (follow-up), Romania (follow-up)

  • 2003 – 9 missions: Ukraine (follow-up +Chernobyl NPP), Ukraine (KNPP), Turkey,

Norway, Armenia, Philippines, Chile, Mexico, Peru (follow-up)

  • 2004 – 3 missions: Iran, Ukraine (Chernobyl Shelter), Kazakhstan
  • 2005 – 4 missions: Thailand, Switzerland, Netherlands, Egypt
  • 2006 – 5 missions: Kazakhstan (follow-up), Mexico (follow-up), Slovak Republic,

Serbia and Montenegro, Uzbekistan

  • 2007 – 3 missions: Ghana, Ukraine (follow-up), Indonesia (follow-up)
  • 2008 – 2 missions: Netherlands (Facilities mission), Georgia
  • 2009 – 6 missions: Finland, Netherlands, Belarus (follow-up), Turkmenistan,

Bangladesh, Singapore

  • 2010 – 2 missions: Slovenia (follow-up), Cuba
  • 2011 – 3 missions: Sweden; UK, France,
  • 2012 – Netherlands (follow-up), Finland (follow-up)
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International Atomic Energy Agency

Statistics of IPPAS Missions(2)

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IPPAS Missions Regional Distribution

Africa Asia Europe Latin America

IPPAS Missions by year

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CURRENT IPPAS ACTIVITIES

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Current IPPAS Activities

  • Finalization of the development of IPPAS guidance

(implementing modular approach)

  • Conduct of IPPAS missions on request of member states

(requests received from Romania and Kazakhstan (LEU Bank) for 2012 and from Australia, Hungary, Korea and USA for 2013)

  • Preparation and conduct of IPPAS mission to the IAEA

SGAS facilities at Seibersdorf

  • Arrangements for Technical meeting to discuss IPPAS

experience and further improvement of this service (19-23 November 2012 in Vienna)

  • Conduct of the Regional Workshop on IPPAS in Australia

(5-7 November 2012)

  • Preparation for the International Seminar on IPPAS to be

conducted in France in 2013

  • Provision of follow-up assistance to MSs

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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Conclusions

  • IPPAS is fundamental in providing in-depth evaluation of state’s

physical protection regime

  • Basis for development of comprehensive support programme to

member states in upgrading nuclear security at the State and facility levels

  • Essential in addressing sustainability and in promoting of nuclear

security culture

  • It is an important tool to build confidence within the international

community and the general public with regard to the effectiveness

  • f national nuclear security regimes

WE LOOK FORWARD TO IPPAS BECOMING ‘DE FACTO’ THE NORM

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International Atomic Energy Agency

Nuclear Security Conference

  • 1-5 July 2013 in Vienna
  • A global forum for policymakers, senior officials, managers

and experts from all areas of nuclear security to…

  • Review experience and achievements to date
  • Enhance understanding of current approaches and

identify trends

  • Discuss technical developments and issues
  • Formulate views on the future directions and priorities

for nuclear security

  • Provide input to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan for

2014-2017

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International Atomic Energy Agency

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…Thank you for your attention