Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Alberto Muti Contents - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Alberto Muti Contents - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Alberto Muti Contents Safety, Security, Safeguards as Policy Areas Nuclear Safety Nuclear Security Nuclear Safeguards Introduction Safety, Security, Safeguards as policy areas: forms


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Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards

Alberto Muti

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Contents

  • Safety, Security, Safeguards as Policy

Areas

  • Nuclear Safety
  • Nuclear Security
  • Nuclear Safeguards
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Introduction

  • Safety, Security, Safeguards as policy areas:

forms of governance developed to manage risks connected to the use of nuclear technology.

  • Action at different levels:

– Facility: Management, internal rules, practices – National: Policies, regulatory framework – International: treaties, cooperation agreeements, trade control regimes, IAEA

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Introduction

SECURITY: Protecting against Malicious acts SAFEGUARDS: Stopping the spread

  • f nuclear weapons

SAFETY: Preventing accidents

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Nuclear Safety

“The achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation hazards.”

IAEA Nuclear Safety Glossary

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Nuclear Safety – Domestic

  • The oldest of the “three S”
  • High-profile incidents have energised the

international community:

– Chernobyl (1986) – Fukushima (2011)

  • Safety is a responsibility of the state and
  • f facility operators – IAEA provides

assistance

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Nuclear Safety – Domestic

  • Domestically, countries pursue this

through appropriate legislation, and through regulatory activity – licensing and inspections

  • Operators develop and implement policies

at facilities in accordance to best practices and national law.

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Nuclear Safety – International

Key International Agreements on Nuclear Safety:

  • Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994)
  • Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel

Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (1997)

  • Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear

Accident (1986)

  • Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear

Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986)

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Nuclear Safety – International

  • IAEA supports the implementation of these

treaties and encourages ratification

– IAEA acts as coordination body for the implementation of these treaties

  • IAEA supports improvements in Nuclear

Safety in Member States

  • IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (2011)
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Nuclear Safety – International

IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (2011)

  • Safety assessments of nuclear facilities
  • Peer review service
  • IAEA Safety Standards form a bedrock of

recognised and trusted good practices

  • Supports the implementation and

strengthening of international instruments on nuclear safety

  • Provides assistance to government

authorities and private sector

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Nuclear Safety – International

IAEA Assistance:

  • Support to new infrastructure projects
  • Liaising with operators through bodies

such as WANO

  • Capacity-building:

–500 Technical Cooperation projects on NS –14 Coordinated Research Projects

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Nuclear Security

“The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.”

IAEA Nuclear Safety Glossary

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Nuclear Security

  • The youngest of the “Three S”
  • Energised by changes in the international

environment:

– Disgregation of the former Soviet Union – 9/11 Attacks and “War on Terror”

  • Since then, it has risen to prominence in

international agenda – and profoundly changed as a concept

  • Nuclear Security is a responsibility of the

state

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Nuclear Security

  • “Original” nuclear security was physical

protection: guards, gates and guns

– Principles such as “Defence in Depth” and “Deter, Detect, Delay, Respond, Recover”

  • Over time, the concept expanded to

include the human elements of security:

– Insider Threat – “Security Culture” among facility staff

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Nuclear Security – Domestic

  • Government:

– Sets Regulations and standards, including defining threat (DBT) – Leverages law enforcement, intelligence and counterterrorism resources

  • Facilities

– Establish physical protection – Follow appropriate protocols (NMAC) – Train staff to maintain security

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Nuclear Security – International

Key International initiatives on Nuclear Security:

  • Cooperative Threat Reduction

Programmes (1990s onwards)

  • Global Partnership (G7-backed, 31

members, 2002)

  • Nuclear Security Summits (2010-2016)
  • US Partnership for Nuclear Security
  • EU CBRN Centres of Excellence
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Nuclear Security – International

Key International agreements on Nuclear Security:

  • Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material (1980) + 2005 Amendment

  • Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security
  • f Radioactive Sources
  • International Convention for the Suppression
  • f Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007)
  • UN Security Council Resolutions:

– 1373 (2001) – 1540 (2004)

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Nuclear Security – International

  • Not all these instruments relate back to the

IAEA – the international framework is more fragmented

  • The IAEA has stepped up to provide a

coordination and support role on nuclear security after 2001

  • Key documents: Nuclear Security Plans,

starting in 2003. Current plan is 2018-2021

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Nuclear Security – International

IAEA Support on Nuclear Security

  • IAEA Nuclear Security Series provides a a

bedrock of recognised and trusted good practices

  • Supports implementation and ratification of

CPPNM and Amendment, maintains CoC

  • Supports with needs assessment and

coordinates assistance providers

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Nuclear Security – International

  • Assists with Physical Security

Enhancements

  • Delivers training and capacity-building
  • Supports and equips national regulators
  • Assessment and Peer Review services on

a range of issues, including physical security, regulation, staff training

– IPPAS is a good example and well- documented in a Nuclear Security Series Guide

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Nuclear Safeguards

“A set of technical measures applied by the IAEA

  • n nuclear material and activities, through which

the Agency seeks to independently verify that nuclear facilities are not misused and nuclear material not diverted from peaceful uses.”

IAEA

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Nuclear Safeguards

  • Item-specific Safeguards (1960s) were

created as a confidence-building measure

  • With the NPT (1970), Safeguards became

the key instrument to verify adherence to non-proliferation commitments

  • Established through Bilateral treaties

between the IAEA and Member States

  • IAEA’s role is to verify compliance
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Nuclear Safeguards

Goals of Safeguards:

  • Detect the diversion of nuclear material to

the manufacture of nuclear weapons

  • Deter the diversion of nuclear material by

risk of early detection

  • Ensure that all nuclear activity a state

undertakes is for peaceful purposes and that a state is not engaging in illicit nuclear activities.

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Nuclear Safeguards

Key approaches in Safeguards:

  • Creation of a State System for

Accountancy and Control (SSAC) of Nuclear Material at the state level

  • Submission of regular reports on nuclear

material and activities to the IAEA

  • IAEA inspection of nuclear facilities to

verify reports and prove compliance

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Nuclear Safeguards

  • Nuclear Material: Uranium, Plutonium,

Thorium “of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched”

  • Amount, composition and chemical form of

material measured :

– When passing through “Key Measurement Points” – When held in “Material Balance Areas”

  • A “Facility” for safeguards: fuel cycle facility
  • r location where a certain material is stored
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Nuclear Safeguards

  • State Authorities collect information from
  • perators and compile regular reports to the

IAEA, including:

– Inventory holdings of material – Operations – including transformation of composition and form of material (e.g. enrichment, fuel fabrication) – Transfers of material between facilities in the same country – Imports and exports – Losses and Material Unaccounted For

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Nuclear Safeguards

IAEA Inspectors verify correctness of reports through a number of approaches:

  • Visual observation
  • Non-destructive assay (radiation detection,

neutron counting)

  • Destructive assay (samples) and

environmental sampling

  • Use of tamper-indicating devices (seals, tags)

and remote monitoring systems (cameras, alarms)

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Nuclear Safeguards

Key Safeguards Agreements:

  • Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

(INFCIRC/153)

  • Small Quantities Protocols
  • Additional Protocols (INFCIRC/540)
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Nuclear Safeguards

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

  • “Classic” Safeguards
  • First post-NPT Safeguards agreement,

covers all the state

  • Reports and inspections system focuses on

verifying correctness of declarations Small Quantities Protocol:

  • Suspends application of most CSA provisions

for states with little to no nuclear material

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Nuclear Safeguards

  • Cases of nuclear proliferation in 1990s

proved that a state with a CSA could run a secret, illegal nuclear weapons programme and remain undetected –Iraq

  • CSA was sufficient to verify correctness,

but could not guarantee completeness

  • Safeguards needed a new instrument
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Nuclear Safeguards

Additional Protocol

  • Introduced in 1996
  • Expands reach of safeguards to verify that

there is no undeclared activities

  • Gives IAEA inspectors new forms of

access

  • Voluntary measure (subject to fierce

international debate)

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Nuclear Safeguards

Additional Protocol reporting

  • Expanded reporting on nuclear sites (maps

and information of use of building)

  • Expanded reporting on source material,

uranium mines, and nuclear waste

  • Expanded reporting on non-nuclear activities
  • f fuel cycle interest

– R&D and industrial plans – Manufacturing, import and export of material and equipment related to nuclear technology

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Nuclear Safeguards

Additional Protocol inspections

  • Environmental sampling at nuclear sites
  • Complementary Access to areas and

buildings not declared as nuclear facilities

  • Complementary Access to

decommissioned facilities

  • Managed Access to areas that present

health and safety or confidentiality risks

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Any Questions?