Overview of the Development and Discussion on Evolving Safeguards - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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International Atomic Energy Agency

Overview of the Development and Discussion on Evolving Safeguards Implementation

Jill N. Cooley Department of Safeguards

IAEA

Contents

• Key Developments in Safeguards Implementation

for the ‘State as a whole’

• Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation

as Applied to all States

• Elements of the State-Level Concept
• Key Assurances
• Next Steps

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Key Developments in Safeguards Implementation for the ‘State as a whole’

1991 IRAQ: greater consideration of ‘State as a whole’ 1995 Board: requests CSA States to facilitate implementation

• f Programme

93+2 Part I Measures 1995 First State evaluation report 2002 Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards 2001 First SLA for a State under integrated safeguards implemented 1997 Board approves Model AP 1971 INFCIRC/153: Application of safeguards to all nuclear material (NM) 1992 Board: reaffirms “all” NM to be under SG in CSA States 1995 Board: reaffirms SG system for CSAs should be designed to verify “correctness and completeness of State’s declarations” Progressive development and implementation of SLAs for States with the broader conclusion and under IS (based on the 2002 Framework) 1999 First broader conclusion drawn for a ‘State as a whole‘

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1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

2007 Resolution GC(51)/RES/15: “further effectiveness and efficiency when a State level perspective is used in the planning, implementation and evaluation of safeguards activities” 2010 Medium Term Strategy 2012– 2017:“further develop” SLC and “develop and implement SLAs for all States” with CSAs 1993 Board: essential to verify correctness and completeness of DPRK initial report 2013 GOV/2013/38 2014 GOV/2014/41 Supplementary Document

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State-Level Concept The general notion of implementing safeguards in a manner that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope

• f the State’s safeguards agreement

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Scope of Application of SG Agreements and the Associated Generic Objectives Scope

Generic Objectives CSA all nuclear - to detect diversion of declared nuclear material

material - to detect misuse of declared facilities

• to detect undeclared nuclear material or

activities in the State as a whole

Item specified - to detect diversion of nuclear material subject to

items safeguards

• to detect misuse of facilities and other items

subject to safeguards

VOA nuclear

• to detect undeclared withdrawal of safeguarded

material in nuclear material in selected facilities selected facilities

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Analyse diversion/acquisition paths Identify applicable safeguards measures Develop annual plan for safeguards activities Conduct in-field & HQ safeguards activities

Follow-up activities?

Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Safeguards Activities Drawing Safeguards Conclusions Developing State-Level Approaches

Establish and prioritize technical objectives Collect and process safeguards relevant information Establish findings and draw safeguards conclusions

Collecting and Evaluating Information

Evaluate results of safeguards activities Evaluate all safeguards relevant information

Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to all States

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Elements of the State-Level Concept

Elements

CSA Item- Specific VOA Generic objectives

√ √ √

Technical objectives

√ √ √

Acquisition path analysis

√

Diversion path analysis

√ √

State-level safeguards approach addressing:

• All nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the

State

√

• Specified facilities, nuclear material, equipment or other

items subject to safeguards in the State

√

• Nuclear material in selected facilities or parts thereof in the

State

√

Annual implementation plan

√ √ √

State-specific factors

√ √ √

Evaluation of all safeguards relevant information

√ √ √

Safeguards conclusion drawn and reported for a State

√ √ √

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State-Specific Factors

• Safeguards-relevant factors particular to a State

used in the development of an SLA and in the planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities for that State

• Based on factual information about a State, are
• bjective and are objectively assessed by the

Agency in the implementation of safeguards for a State

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State-Specific Factors

i.

The type of safeguards agreement in force for the State and the nature of the safeguards conclusion drawn by the Agency

ii.

The nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities of the State

• iii. The technical capabilities of the State or regional system of

accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC)

• iv. The ability of the Agency to implement certain safeguards

measures in the State

v.

The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the Agency in the implementation of safeguards

• vi. The Agency’s experience in implementing safeguards in the

State

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Analyse diversion/acquisition paths Identify applicable safeguards measures Develop annual plan for safeguards activities Conduct in-field & HQ safeguards activities

Follow-up activities?

Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Safeguards Activities Drawing Safeguards Conclusions Developing State-Level Approaches

Establish and prioritize technical objectives Collect and process safeguards relevant information Establish findings and draw safeguards conclusions

Collecting and Evaluating Information

Evaluate results of safeguards activities Evaluate all safeguards relevant information

Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to all States

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Developing a State-Level Approach

Spen t fuel Reprocessing Conversion Pu Pu Detect undeclared conversion to Pu (metal) in the State Detect diversion of spent fuel assemblies from declared reactors Detect undeclared reprocessing activity in the declared hot cell

• Nuclear material accountancy
• Inspections
• Design information verification
• Inspections
• Evaluation of open source information
• Complementary access, where

applicable

State’s nuclear and nuclear- related activities and capabilities as a whole

Analyse acquisition paths Establish and prioritize technical objectives Identify applicable safeguards measures

Spen t fuel Hot cell Undeclared activities in declared facility Undeclared activities in the State

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Analyse diversion/acquisition paths Identify applicable safeguards measures Develop annual plan for safeguards activities Conduct in-field & HQ safeguards activities

Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Safeguards Activities Drawing Safeguards Conclusions Developing State-Level Approaches

Establish and prioritize technical objectives Collect and process safeguards relevant information Establish findings and draw safeguards conclusions

Collecting and Evaluating Information

Evaluate results of safeguards activities Evaluate all safeguards relevant information

Role of the State

Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to All States

State

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Key Assurances

• The State-level concept (SLC) does not, and will not, entail

the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part of either States or the Agency, nor does it involve any modification in the interpretation of existing rights and

• bligations
• The SLC is applicable to all States, but strictly within the

scope of each individual State’s safeguards agreement(s)

• The SLC is not a substitute for the AP and is not designed

as a means for the Agency to obtain from a State without an AP the information and access provided for in the AP

GC(58)RES/14 – September 2014

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Key Assurances (2)

• The development and implementation of State-level

approaches requires close consultation with the State and/or regional authority, particularly in the implementation

• f in-field safeguards measures
• Safeguards-relevant information is only used for the

purpose of safeguards implementation pursuant to the safeguards agreement in force with a particular State – and not beyond it

GC(58)RES/14 – September 2014

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Next Steps

• Continue to implement and update the existing SLAs for States

with CSAs and APs in force and for which the broader conclusion has been drawn

• Progressively develop and implement SLAs for States with:
• CSAs and APs in force for which the broader conclusion has

been drawn but the necessary arrangements for implementing an SLA have not yet been completed

• CSAs and APs in force for which the broader conclusion has

not yet been drawn

• CSAs in force without an AP
• Item-specific safeguards agreements in force
• VOAs in force

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Next Steps (2)

• In developing and implementing an SLA for a State, the Agency

will conduct consultations with the State and/or regional authority, particularly on the implementation of in-field safeguards measures.

• The Secretariat will continue to engage in open dialogue on

safeguards matters with States to increase transparency and build confidence and, in that regard, intends to continue to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards.

• The Board of Governors will be kept informed of progress

made in the development and implementation of safeguards in the context of the SLC and the associated impact on effectiveness and efficiency, as appropriate.

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Thank You