A Canadian Perspective on the IAEAs State-level Concept Presented - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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A Canadian Perspective on the IAEAs State-level Concept Presented - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People Vienna, October 20-24, 2014 A Canadian Perspective on the IAEAs State-level Concept Presented by Patrick Burton Senior Safeguards Advisor Canadian

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nuclearsafety.gc.ca IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People Vienna, October 20-24, 2014

A Canadian Perspective on the IAEA’s State-level Concept

Presented by Patrick Burton Senior Safeguards Advisor Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission October 21, 2014

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 2

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

  • The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is Canada’s

Safeguards Regulatory Authority (SRA).

  • The CNSC regulates the use of nuclear energy and materials. Its

mandate is to:  Protect the health, safety, and security of Canadians and the environment;  Implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy;  Disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public.

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 3

Outline

  • IAEA Safeguards in Canada
  • The IAEA’s State-level Concept
  • Effectiveness
  • Efficiency
  • Non-Discrimination
  • Acceptance of the State-level Concept
  • Conclusions
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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 4

IAEA Safeguards in Canada

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 5

Canadian Fuel Cycle

Uranium Mining and Milling UOC Uranium Refining UO3 Uranium Conversion Fuel Fabrication Power Reactors UO2 Fresh Fuel Research and Development Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) and Research Reactors Spent Fuel Spent Fuel UF6 U O C U O C

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 6

IAEA Safeguards in Canada

  • Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) - 1972
  • Additional Protocol (AP) - 2000
  • First Broader Safeguards Conclusion attained in 2005
  • Extensive ‘Roadmap’ of IAEA questions addressed
  • 57 Complementary Accesses between 2000 and 2005
  • IAEA approval for their “State-level Integrated

Safeguards Approach for Canada” in 2005

  • Developed by the IAEA through an iterative and cooperative

process involving the CNSC and industry

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 7

The IAEA’s State-level Concept

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 8

The IAEA’s State-level Concept

  • At a high level, the idea that IAEA safeguards should be

reactive to the conditions (good or bad) in each State

  • Not a new idea!
  • INFCIRC/153 Art. 81 embodies most of the SLC
  • Discussed by the Board of Governors since 2005

“State-level Concept” means safeguards that are based on State-level approaches developed for each State, using safeguards objectives common to all States, and taking State-specific factors into account

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 9

The IAEA’s State-level Concept

The IAEA’s State-specific Factors (paraphrased)

I. The type of safeguards agreement(s) in force, and the IAEA’s safeguards conclusion(s) under the agreement(s) II. The State’s nuclear fuel cycle and related capabilities III. The technical capabilities of the SSAC/RSAC IV. The ability of the IAEA to implement certain safeguards measures (SNRIs, UIs, RM, Mailbox) V. The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the Agency VI. The Agency’s experiences in implementing safeguards in the State

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 10

The IAEA’s State-level Concept

  • Why move to the SLC?
  • The CNSC feels that implementation of the SLC across

all States will positively affect:

  • The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards
  • The efficiency of IAEA safeguards
  • The non-discriminatory nature of IAEA safeguards
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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 11

Effectiveness under the SLC

  • INFCIRC/153 and the Criteria have been shown to be

ineffective via multiple cases of non-compliance

  • Too focused on ‘correctness’ – declared material, facilities
  • ‘State as a whole’ aspects folded into detection probabilities
  • Legal authority to pursue indications of undeclared material or

activity perceived as insufficient

  • Under the SLC, the IAEA will consider of all safeguards-

relevant information for all States to address this issue

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 12

Effectiveness under the SLC

  • Consideration of all safeguards-relevant information will

evaluate the completeness of a State’s reporting, regardless

  • f the safeguards agreement in force
  • Evaluating completeness is within the IAEA’s existing legal authority

under a 153-style agreement

  • The IAEA has existing tools under INFCIRC/153 to follow up
  • n discrepancies
  • Amplification and Clarification reports, Special Inspections
  • An in-force AP is still required in order for the IAEA to draw a

conclusion on completeness

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 13

Efficiency under the SLC

  • The Department of Safeguards faces considerable

resource challenges

  • Ongoing growth of the global nuclear industry, including the

expansion of nuclear power into new States

  • Ongoing cases of non-compliance, which take significant

resources

  • A ‘no real growth’ budget
  • Although not the primary goal of the SLC, significant

efficiencies can be generated through its implementation

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 14

Efficiency under the SLC

  • The SLC allows the IAEA to adapt to the conditions in a

State via evaluation against State-specific Factors

  • Evaluation against State-specific Factors permits justified

increases or decreases in safeguards effort

  • Achievement of technical objectives no longer intrinsically linked

to performing the activities dictated by the Criteria

  • This represents a fundamental shift in IAEA thinking
  • Efficiencies will come because most States are in full

compliance with their Safeguards obligations

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 15

Efficiency under the SLC in Canada

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 16

Efficiency under the SLC in Canada

  • Canadian State-specific Factors
  • CSA + AP in force, broader conclusion annually since 2005
  • Natural uranium-based fuel cycle; no reprocessing or enrichment
  • Support for SNRIs, UIs, Remote Monitoring, transmission of data

direct from facilities to the IAEA safeguards mailbox

  • Timely and accurate State Reports
  • An SSAC that strives to be cooperative – responsiveness to IAEA

questions, timely granting of multiple entry/exit visas, timely access to sites, safe working conditions, etc.

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 17

Efficiency under the SLC in Canada

  • As long as Canada continues to have a significant

nuclear industry, the IAEA will continue to spend significant safeguards effort in Canada

  • 2013 Canadian PDIs were more than 6% of total PDIs expended

by the IAEA

  • PDIs in Canada will vary from year to year based on

relevant nuclear activities, inspection results, etc.

  • There is no ‘steady state’ – variation from year to year is normal
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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 18

Non-discrimination under the SLC

  • IAEA Safeguards must continue to be, and must continue to

be perceived as being, non-discriminatory

  • Non-discrimination under the Criteria was based on the

treating all States the same

  • Simple, easy-to-understand system of non-discrimination
  • Non-discrimination under the SLC is based on treating all

States fairly

  • More sophisticated – taking relevant aspects of current situation,

past performance into account

  • States help determine what is ‘fair’
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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 19

State-specific Factors under the SLC

I.The type of safeguards agreement(s) in force, and the IAEA’s safeguards conclusion(s) under the agreement(s) II.The State’s nuclear fuel cycle and related capabilities III.The technical capabilities of the SSAC/RSAC IV.The ability of the IAEA to implement ‘certain safeguards measures’ (SNRIs, UIs, RM, Mailbox) V.The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the Agency VI.The Agency’s experiences in implementing safeguards in the State

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 20

Acceptance of the State-level Concept

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 21

Acceptance of the SLC

  • Beginning in 2012, some States expressed concerns

about the SLC in a Board of Governors meeting

  • The IAEA has since expended considerable effort to

better explain the SLC to States

  • GOV/2013/38, created at the request of the 2012 General

Conference Safeguards Resolution

  • 7 Technical Meetings in 2014, open to all States, to better

describe the SLC and to receive feedback from Member States

  • The ‘Supplementary Document’, GOV/2014/41, and Corrigenda
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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 22

Acceptance of the SLC

  • The consensus Safeguards Resolution from the 2014

IAEA General Conference demonstrates States’ widespread acceptance of the SLC

  • The same resolution contains important caveats which

the IAEA must keep in mind

Implementation within existing legal rights; Close consultation with States; Ongoing updates on SLC implementation to the BoG

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 23

Conclusion

  • Based on nearly ten years of experience, Canada strongly

supports the implementation of the SLC across all States Effective – Efficient – Non-discriminatory

  • State-level approaches are not new and the application of

SLAs to all States is a natural evolution

  • The concept adheres to the fundamental principles of non-

discriminatory, technically-based and effective safeguards

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Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 24

Thank-you! Questions?

nuclearsafety.gc.ca

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