ABACC and the Safeguards Regional System MARCO MARZO Workshop on - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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ABACC and the Safeguards Regional System MARCO MARZO Workshop on - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Aug 19, 2022 32 likes •304 views

Agncia Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares Agencia Brasileo-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares ABACC and the Safeguards Regional System MARCO MARZO Workshop on Nuclear

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Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares

ABACC and the Safeguards Regional System

MARCO MARZO

Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Response to Radiological Emergencies

Rio de Janeiro - Brazil – 12 February 2019

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

The Bilateral Agreement

  • Signed in July 1991
  • Ratified in December 1991
  • Countries committed to use nuclear

materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes

  • ABACC starts its activities in April 1992
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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Mission of ABACC

  • To verify that all nuclear materials and

facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes

  • To apply the Common System of Nuclear

Materials Accounting and Control (SCCC)

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Structure of ABACC

Commission Secretary

Planning & Evaluation Operations Inspetors Accounting Technical Support Administrative & Finance Institutional Affairs

2 Argentines 2 Brazilians 1 Argentine 1 Brazilian 1 Argentine 1 Brazilian ≈ 50 inspectors of each country Non-permanent staff Each technical area: 1 Argentine and 1 Brazilian

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Technical Objective of Safeguards

The technical objective of the traditional safeguards is to detect timely the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials for the fabrication of a nuclear weapon device or any other explosive device, and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Fissile Material to Produce a Rudimentary Nuclear Weapon Device

A significant quantity of fissile material is the amount needed to fabricate a rudimentary nuclear weapon device

25kg high enriched Uranium 8kg Plutonium

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Significant Quantities

Nuclear Material Quantity Pu, U233 8 kg HEU 25 kg U235 LEU 75 kg U235 Natural U 10 t Depleted U or Th 20 t

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Detection Time

Category of Nuclear Material Time Direct-use material (fresh Pu, HEU, U233) 1 month Irradiated direct use material (Pu in spent fuel elements) 3 months Indirect-use material (LEU, Nat. U or Th) 1 year

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Flow of Information

Nuclear Facility National Authority ABACC

  • Maintains

Accounting and Operational Records

  • Takes the Physical

Inventory

  • Sends Accounting

Reports to National Authority

  • Prepares the

Technical Questionnaire (DIQ)

  • Maintains Centralized

Accounting Records

  • Audits the facility

records

  • Sends Accounting

Reports

  • Prepares the Technical

Questionnaire

  • Negotiates the

Application Manual (Facility Attachment)

  • Maintains Accounting Data

Basis

  • Audits the facility records
  • Evaluates the consistency

between records and reports

  • Examines and verifies

Technical Questionnaires

  • Elaborates Safeguards

Approaches

  • Proposes and negotiates

Application Manuals

  • Verifies nuclear materials
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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Nuclear Facilities (as of Jan 31, 2019)

TYPE OF FACILITY ARGENTINA BRAZIL TOTAL Conversion & Fuel Fabrication 9* 2 11 Uranium Enrichment Plants 2 3 5 Power Reactors 5*;** 3* 8 Research Reactors, Critical Units, Subcritical Units 7* 8** 15 Others (R&D Facilities, Storages, LOF) 28* 11** 39 Total 51 27 78

* One facility under construction; ** One designed facility

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Verification Activities

  • Visits to verify the information contained in the Technical

Questionnaire (DIVs)

  • Inspections to verify the nuclear material inventory and its

changes

  • Announced inspections (1 week notification)
  • Short Notice inspections (24h)
  • Unannounced inspections (2h)
  • Use of Containment & Surveillance to maintain the continuity
  • f knowledge on NM inventories
  • Environment Sampling
  • To confirm that the facility operates as declared
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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Inspections

  • 3000+ inspections performed
  • About 100 inspections annually
  • Inspection effort: ≈ 1000 inspector.days
  • On average ≈ 4 inspectors on inspection

mission every day

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Nuclear Material Verification

  • Nuclear Material Accountancy as fundamental

safeguards measures

  • Nuclear material quantity and/or quality

determined by measurements

  • Containment and Surveillance as

complementary safeguards measures

  • To keep continuity of knowledge over the

nuclear material

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Nuclear Material Measurements

  • Integral measurements
  • Mass, volume, item counting
  • Non-Destructive Measurements (NDA)
  • Gamma detection
  • Neutron detection
  • Destructive Measurements (DA)
  • Determination of U concentration
  • Determination of U enrichment
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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

NDA: Hand Held Detector HM-5

  • Gamma spectrometer of

low resolution: NaI detector

  • Identification of materials

and isotopes

  • Verification of U

enrichment

  • Digital
  • Up to 50 gamma spectra

with 1024 channels can be stored

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

NDA with Mini-Multi Chanel Analyser

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LaBr3 Radiation Detector

  • Robust
  • Low cost
  • Intermediate

resolution between NaI and Ge detectors

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Neutron Coincidence Collar

Determination of U Mass in fresh fuel elements

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Cerenkov Radiation Detector To verify spent fuel elements in ponds of nuclear power plants

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Cerenkov Detector Images

Improved Cerenkov View Device (ICVD) Digital Cerenkov View Device (DCVD)

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Destructive Measurement (DA)

  • Determination of Uranium in the compound
  • e.g. U in UO2 or UF6
  • Determination of Uranium Enrichment
  • Analytical Laboratories available in the two

countries

  • ≈ 40 samples/y collected by ABACC
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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Analytical Laboratories

Brazilian Labs Argentine Labs Centro Tecnológico da Marinha em São Paulo – CTMSP Laboratório de Caracterização de Urânio Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA) Unidad de Actividad Química - UAQ Coordenação de Salvaguardas – DRS/CNEN Laboratório de Salvaguardas - LASAL Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA) Centro Atómico Constituyentes – CAC Laboratorio de Control Químico y Físico – U. A. Combustibles Nucleares

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Cont Containmen ainment t Mea Measur ures es

Paper Seals

(1000 seals/y)

Metallic Seals

(700 seals/y)

Electronic Seals

(≈ 50 seals applied)

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Su Surveillan eillance ce Systems Systems

DCM-14 – Digital Camera Module 14 ≈ 60 cameras installed

Systems composed by a microprocessor and associated circuits that digitilize the images captured by cameras

DCM-C5 – Digital Camera Module C5 40 cameras procured 28 already installed

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Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019

Applications of Surveillance Systems

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Safeguards Agreement - Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, AIEA Quadripartite Agreement

  • Signed in 12/1991 and ratified in 03/1994
  • IAEA shall apply its safeguards taking into account the SCCC
  • ABACC and the IAEA shall avoid unnecessary duplication
  • f activities
  • ABACC and the IAEA shall obtain independent conclusions
  • A series of provisions to define how the IAEA shall cooperate

with ABACC

  • Agreed safeguards approaches
  • Common use of equipment
  • Joint inspection procedures
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www.abacc.org.br marzo@abacc.org.br

Thank you Muchas gracias Muito obrigado