Military Safeguards: An Outlier Case Orpet Peixoto ABACC - - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

IV Semana de Engenharia Nuclear

11 e 15 de Agosto de 2014 Engenharia Nuclear da Escola Politécnica da UFRJ

Military Safeguards: An Outlier Case

Orpet Peixoto ABACC - Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material E-mail : orpet@abacc.org.br

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Outline

• Nuclear Safeguards in Brazil
• ABACC System
• Military Safeguards
• Special Cases
• Opportunities

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O Regime De Não-proliferação Nuclear

Proteção Física

Acordos mundiais, regionais, bilaterais

Regimes de controle das exportações

Salvaguardas da AIEA

Fornecimento de material, tecnologia e equipamentos Nucleares e duais Proteção contra apropiação, roubo e outras atividades ilícitas

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History

• Import of Nuclear material and installations;
• Agreement type INFCIRC /66
• Specified Equipment
• Indigenous Programs
• International Pressure
• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

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Argentina and Brazil Facts

• Argentina

and Brazil are, respectively, the 8th and 5th largest countries by landmass in the world (11.3 million square kilometers);

• Population
• f

~240 million inhabitants;

• Two thirds of South America's

surface, population and Gross National Product (GNP);

• Nuclear

program – highest development in Latin America – wide technological fuel cycle

• Industrial e technological capacity;
• Growing and economical situation;
• Tension, conflicts and hegemony.

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Historic Facts from Argentina and Brazil

• No real tension between the states;
• The culture of non discriminatory

acceptance;

• The international pressure for peaceful use

guarantees;

• The technical community collaboration;
• How to give the international steps

to demonstrate the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

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INSTALLATIONS SAFEGUARDED BY ABACC

• 2 Multipurpose reactors (materials tests and radioisotope)
• Isotopic Separation Laboratories
• Small Power reactor
• Land prototype naval reactor

Type of installation Argentina Brazil Total Conversion and Fuel Fabrication 8 2 10 U-Enrichment Plants 1 3 4 Power Reactors 3 (*) 3 (*) 6 Research Reactors 6 6 12 Others (R&D, Storage, LOF) 24 11 35 Total 42 25 67

(*) Including one Power Reactor under construction in each country.

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ABACC - Foundation and Purpose

• Binational organization created in July 1991

with the purpose to manage and apply the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC), established by the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic

• f Argentina.
• Its headquarters are located in Rio de Janeiro,
• Brazil. ABACC also has an office in Buenos

Aires, Argentina.

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The Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - SCCC

• The Common System of Accounting and Control of

Nuclear Materials is a mechanism created in order to verify if Argentina and Brazil utilize their nuclear materials exclusively for peaceful purposes.

• The SCCC consists of the General Procedures and the

Application Manuals for each installation. – The General Procedures contain the directives of the SCCC. – The Application Manuals are negotiated between the ABACC and the respective country for each facility.

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The Bilateral Agreement

In July 1991, the Bilateral Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy was signed.

• Established the Common System of Accounting and Control of

Nuclear Materials (SCCC)

• Created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and

Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

• The Basic Undertakings of the bilateral Agreement between

Argentina and Brazil are:

• To use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful

purposes.

• To prohibit in the respective territories:
• The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by

any means of any nuclear weapon; and

• The receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any other

form of possession of any nuclear weapon.

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ABACC-IAEA relationship the Quadripartite Agreement

The Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the IAEA for the Application of safeguards, called the Quadripartite Agreement, entered into force in March 1994. The Basic Undertakings of the Quadripartite Agreement are:

– The acceptance by the State Parties of safeguards on all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities within their territories, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. – The IAEA, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the SCCC.

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Organization of the Secretariat

• Commission

– 2 Argentinean members – 2 Brazilian members

• Secretariat

– Professional Staff (12)

• 6 areas

– Clerical Staff (9) – Inspectors (around 90)

• Cross inspection system
• Budget - Aproximate 5 Millions US$

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100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Inspector days

Inspection Effort

Argentina Brasil Total

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20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Number of inspections

Total of Inspections

Argentina Brasil Total

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Legal Framework - NPT – INFCIRC 153

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED lN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

• 14. The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is

required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement, the following procedures will apply: (a ) The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear: (i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and (ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in sue h an activity, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall again apply as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in the State and of any exports of such material; and (c ) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. The Agency's agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate to the temporal and procedural provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein. 15

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Legal Framework - Quadripartite – INFCIRC 435

SPECIAL PROCEDURES Article 13 If a State Party intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement for nuclear propulsion or operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such

• ther non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency, the following procedures

shall apply: (a) that State Party shall inform the Agency, through ABACC, of the activity, and shall make it clear: (i) that the use of the nuclear material in such an activity will not be in conflict with any undertaking of the State Party under agreements concluded with the Agency in connection with Article XI of the Statute of the Agency or any other agreement concluded with the Agency in connection with INFCIRC/26 (and Add.1) or INFCIRC/66 (and Rev.1 or 2), as applicable; and (ii) that during the period of application of the special procedures the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) the State Party and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, these special procedures shall apply only while the nuclear material is used for nuclear propulsion or in the operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which the special procedures shall be applied. In any event, the other procedures provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a nuclear activity other than the above. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such material in that State Party and of any export of such material; and (c) each arrangement shall be concluded between the State Party concerned and the Agency as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of such activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein . 16

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Military Installations - Nuclear Process Technology

• Nuclear Conversion Facilities
• Uranium enrichment facilities
• Fuel fabrication facilities
• Uranium Isotopic Separative

Laboratories

• Storage Places
• Nuclear Process Technology
• Land Prototype Nuclear Reactor

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Previous Cases

• Enrichment Plants

– Special Agreements – High inspection effort

• Nuclear Weapons States – VOAs
• India
• The case !!!

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Boundary conditions

Control of Nuclear Material and Installation an environment of:

• Nuclear Process technology

– Fuel – Reactor

• Technological Issues

– Special Engineering Solutions (Nuclear and Naval)

• Military Strategic Data

– Submarine performance (vehicle & warship)

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Parameters for nuclear material control

• Significant Quatity

– Direct Use Material:

• Pu less than de 80% de Pu238 8 kg of Pu total
• HEU (U e ≥ 20%)

25 kg of U235 – Indirect Use:

• U with e < 20%)

75 kg of U235 Note: Nuclear naval reactors few thousand (2 to 10) tons of U / 100 to 500 kgs of Pu per core LEU more Pu Production

• MATERIAL “TIMELINESS”

– Direct use (non irradiated) 1 month – Direct Use (irradiated) 3 months – Direct use < 1 SQ 1 year – Indirect Use 1 year

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Concepts

• Safeguards implementation for a State is

governed by the rights and obligations of the ABACC/IAEA and the relevant State contained in the safeguards agreement;

• Safeguards are the technical means for verifying

compliance by the State with their respective legally binding undertakings set out in the relevant safeguards agreements

• IAEA and ABACC apply safeguards effectively

and efficiently

• Technical Guarantees of non diversion

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Safeguarding

• Bulk Material
• Fuels

– Shape and design (remain for the rest of fuel cycle) – Indirect measures

• Challenging instruments
• Transfers

– Loading and Unloading flasks – Transfers – Indirect measures

• Unattended monitoring Systems

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Safeguarding

• Reactors

– Fueling load (process – integrated load) – Access to core x Access to the ship – Containment and Surveillance?

• Type of containment (seal)
• Frequency of verification
• Long time refueling
• Spent Fuel Storage

– Containment and Surveillance

• Pool storage
• Dry storage

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Safeguarding

• Design Information Verification - DIV

– Access – Strategic Points

• LEU and HEU fuels

– Timeliness

• Plutonium – guarantee of non reprocessing
• Special Procedures

– Exemption (quantity)

–Special rules

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Safeguarding

• Challenges

– Access without disclosing sensitive data

• Protection
• Non proliferation

– Access in a timely manner – Special safeguards tools to perform verification

• Indirect measurement (attended and unattended)
• Sealing

– Findings achieved in very non deterministic approach

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Initiatives

• Neither IAEA nor ABACC has experience
• ABACC and IAEA are discussing the initial steps
• f the land prototype approach (LABGENE)
• IAEA include the issue on the 2012- 2022

Strategic Planning

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Remarks

• Rights and obligations shall be followed;
• Brazilian non proliferation credentials is an

important component to allow discussion of special procedures and to minimize international concern;

• ABACC and IAEA shall guarantee that the

nuclear material, while in use at submarines will not be used for production

• f nuclear weapons

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Opportunities at Safeguards and Regulation Area

• National Authority – 20 to 25 persons;
• Operators – 15 to 20 persons;
• AIEA – 15 to 20 persons;
• Analytical Laboratories – 15 to 20 persons;
• ABACC – 6 to 10 persons;
• Experience is required;
• Technology development;

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NDA and DA

• Inter-comparison of DA results;

– Needs to be re-start;

• Standards for NDA calibration;
• Special systems for enrichment plants;
• Swipe sampling results comparison and

analysis

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Destructive Analysis UF6 sampling methodology with alumina pellets ABACC Cristallini Method

• IAEA Qualification - Status
• ASTM Qualification – Project

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Surveillance

• Fast PTI surveillance

system;

• Incorporate:

– Authentication; – Revision – Containment tools

• Of the shelf items

 Test bench for new or upgraded systems

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Load cell authentication

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State of health

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State of health

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Mund

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ABACC Inspectorate

• Around 45 professionals per country, coming from the

nuclear area.

• Proposed by the country, and approved by the

Commission.

• Temporary relationship with ABACC, only for the

time of “inspection mission”.

• The Secretariat selects the inspectors, according to

special needs.

• The inspectors of each state party perform

inspections at the other country's facilities.

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ABACC’s Inspectors Background

Chemical Engineering/ Industrial Chemistry 28% Electrical/ Electronic/ Network Engineering 21% Physical/ Chemical/ Biochemical/ Mathematical/ Geological Sciences 25% Mechanical/ Metallurgical/ Civil/ Naval Engineering 22% Chemical/ Electrical/ Electronical/ Mechanical Technician 4%

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ABACC Inspectorate

Number of years in the field

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Technical implementation of ABACC

• Safeguards

international inspectorate must have:

• human resources capacity;
• a set of well developed and

useful equipment;

• a trained and knowledgeable

inspectorate body; and

• a good headquarters support.

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Building Competence

• Safeguards studies – Concepts and approaches
• Non Destructive Assay (NDA) and Destructive Assay

(DA)

• Swipe sampling
• Containment and Surveillance (C&S)
• Training
• Data management
• Headquarters support
• Special knowledge

– Assessment Groups – analysis and suggestion on safeguards issues – Special technical meetings; – Swipe sampling

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Cooperation on Developing a Spent Fuel Gross Defect Detection System at ATUCHA-I ABACC/LLNL

Action Sheet 22

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THANK YOU

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