Challenges and opportunities Trends to address New concepts for: - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Text

• Challenges and opportunities
• Trends to address
• New concepts for:

– Offensive sea control – Sea‐based AAW – Weapons development – Increasing offensive sea control capacity – Addressing defensive and constabulary missions

• Capability and program implications

• In 2001, the Navy planned a new surface

warfare approach

– New family of CG(X), DD(X), LCS – Employing “Network‐centric warfare” – All three ships now cancelled/truncated

• Navy has an opportunity to implement new

surface warfare concept

– Final specifications for Flight III DDG‐51 – Concept and design of follow‐on SSC and modifications to LCS – Phased modernization of remaining CGs – New weapons and sensors

• This study proposes a plan focused on:

– Large and small surface combatants – Results possible by mid‐2020s

China the “pacing challenge” but not the only, or most likely, A2/AD threat the surface forces will face

Iran shows less capable militaries can combine geography and “fire and forget” weapons in effective A2/AD network

23% 6% 16% 23% 13% 5% 7% 53% 57% 67% 67% 55% 9% 13% 20% 28% 38% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 1946 1961 1976 1991 2006

Types of Active Conflicts

Extrasystemic Conflict Interstate Conflict Internal Conflict Internationalized internal conflict

Number of Active Conflicts

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Proxy, paramilitary, and indirect conflicts on the rise

100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 800,000 900,000

Millions of FY2015 $

Historical Budget Authorities

Army Navy Air Force Defense Wide

KOREA DRAWDOWN KOREA DRAWDOWN VIETNAM DRAWDOWN VIETNAM DRAWDOWN COLD WAR DRAWDOWN COLD WAR DRAWDOWN OIF/OEF DRAWDOWN OIF/OEF DRAWDOWN

Army Navy Air Force DoD‐wide

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Percent of Budget by Category

Historical Budget Authorities as Percent of Total DoN Budget Authority

DoN Share of Healthcare MILPERS Operations and Maintenance R&D and Procurement Other Spending

Budgets unlikely to rise; pressure continues on R&D and procurement

Cold War “Outer Air Battle”

– Enabled carriers to approach within striking distance of Russia – Surface fleet’s contribution was “Up, Out and Down” – Ships & aircraft able to engage Soviet bombers outside anti‐ship missile range

Variation in Y-values is for illustration only, not intended to reflect relative altitude

50 nm 100 nm 150 nm 200 nm 250 nm 300 nm Range:

Enemy Combatant BrahMos SS-N-19 Kosar Nasr Karus Tondar C-701 C-801 C-704

Surface-Launched Missile Threat to U.S. Surface Combatants

50 nm 100 nm 150 nm 200 nm 250 nm 300 nm Range:

Naval Strike Missile range from IHS Jane’s Navy International. All other ranges from IHS Jane’s Defence: Weapons database. * RGM-84L, a Harpoon Block II variant, is the only variant in service with the U.S. Navy. ** Extended-range Harpoon Block I variant previously in U.S. and foreign service.

U.S. Surface Combatant Enemy Combatant

BAMS Secure Data Link DDG TAGOS

Future Anti-Submarine Weapon Future Anti-Ship Missile SM-6

• Surface combatants will conduct bulk of sea control

– Subs, carriers, amphibious ships conducting power projection in future scenarios

• Defeat enemy weapon launchers, not just enemy weapons

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Successful Engagements Defending Missile Single Shot Pk S‐L‐S SS‐L‐S

Mission Missile Number Long‐range Defensive AAW SM‐6 16 Mid‐range Defensive AAW SM‐2 32 ESSM 32 (8 cells) BMD SM‐3 6 Strike Tomahawk 24 SUW Harpoon 8 non‐VLS ASW VLA 10

5 nm Ship Self-Defense 30 nm Defensive AAW DDG LCS LCS JHSV

• Shift to a single, dense defensive AAW layer

– Smaller interceptors; just as capable and more numerous as longer range – Acknowledges challenges against OTH targets – Enables integration of lasers, railgun and electronic warfare

• Long‐range interceptors used for offensive AAW

ASBM ASCM Salvo EMRG Laser RAM CIWS ESSM

• Laser on some Flight III DDG‐51

– 300‐500 kW able to conduct air defense – Needed power and cooling (~1500kW) too high for other ships – Smaller laser (~60‐100 kW) could be used for counter‐ISR, counter‐UAV

• EM railgun on JHSV, DDG‐1000

– 32 MJ able to conduct air defense, strike – Power requirement of 17MW – 64 MJ EMRG on DDG‐1000 for strike

• Shift defensive AAW to ~30 nm range

– Smaller ESSM‐like interceptor – EW systems – Laser – Electromagnetic railgun

• More capacity needed

from each VLS cell

• Emphasize:

– relevant capability – multi‐mission applicability – smaller size; > 1 per cell

• Planned solutions are

large, single‐ mission weapons

• No ASW weapon able to
• utrange sub‐launched

anti‐ship missiles

Mission Missile (replacement) Number Offensive AAW SM‐6 32 Defensive AAW ESSM Blk II 96 (24 cells) BMD SM‐3 6 Strike Tomahawk (NGLAW) 24 SUW Harpoon (LRASM) 8 non‐VLS ASW VLA (None) 10

Getting the most out of the ship’s main battery – the VLS magazine

Mission Current Missile Number Future Missile Number Offensive AAW SM‐6 16 SM‐6 42 Defensive AAW SM‐2 32 ESSM Blk II 96 (24 cells) ESSM 32 (8 cells) BMD SM‐3 6 SM‐3 4 Strike Tomahawk 24 LRASM 18 SUW Harpoon 8 non‐VLS LRASM / SM 18/42 ASW VLA 10 New ASW Missile 8 Multi‐mission LRASM Long‐range ASROC SM‐6 for offense ESSM for defense

5 10 15 20 25 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31 FY32 FY33 FY34 FY35 FY36 FY37 FY38 FY39 FY40 FY41 FY42 FY43 Ship Count Fiscal Year

Operating CG 52‐62 Phased Mod CGs Operating CG 63‐73 CG‐47 Replacement

Fiscal Year Number of CGs

Cruiser phased modernization needed for offensive sea control, air defense commander capacity

Cruiser phased modernization needed for offensive sea control, air defense commander

Iwakuni Naval Air Station Sasebo Naval Base Yokosuka Naval Base Misawa Air Base Tokyo THAAD Batteries THAAD Batteries PAC-3 Batteries PAC-3 Batteries

Shore‐based BMD systems should replace BMD ships in defense of fixed locations overseas

Passive Listening Secure Data Link Mutually-Supporting Air Defenses Passive Towed Array

150 to 300 nm range engagement

Variable Depth Sonar

Enabling small surface combatants able to contribute to offensive sea control with CGs and DDGs or on their own

Future Anti‐Submarine Weapon Future Anti‐Ship Missile

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31 FY32 FY33 FY34 FY35 FY36 FY37 FY38 FY39 FY40 FY41 FY42 FY43 FY44 Follow on SSC LCS MCM PC FFG DDG‐1000 Future Large Surface Combatant DDG‐51 Flight III DDG‐51 Flight IIA DDG‐51 Flight II DDG‐51 Flight I CG

Number of Surface Combatants

Growing SSC shortfall requires new approaches to escort, training and security missions so CGs and DDGs can focus on offense

SSC reqmt Large Surface Combatant reqmt CSG escorts BMD stations

LCS Procurement FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 1 1 2 2 2 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 4 4 4 3 3 3 3

Follow‐on SSC Procurement FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 2 3 3 3 3 3 3

• Modify LCS to be the follow‐on SSC

– Only one variant

• Equip for defensive AAW, ASW and

SUW missions

– VLS (24 cell) – 3D radar (not SPY) – ASW mission package – Same gun

• Upgrade selected LCS with VLS

• Evolve to dedicated LCS crews

– Forward base 16 LCS

• Upgrade selected LCS with VLS
• Consider buying more JHSV

4 LCS 4 LCS 8 LCS 8 LCS 8 LCS

117 Days 117 Days 117 Days 117 Days 117 Days 117 Days 117 Days 117 Days LCS 1 Deployed Homeport LCS 3 Homeport Deployed Crew 101 LCS 1 Off Hull LCS 3 LCS 1 Off Hull LCS 3 LCS 1 Off Hull Crew 102 Off Hull LCS 3 LCS 1 Off Hull LCS 3 LCS 1 Off Hull LCS 3 Crew 103 LCS 3 LCS 1 Off Hull LCS 3 LCS 1 Off Hull LCS 3 LCS 1

Deployed Homeport LCS forward 60‐120 days 30 days LCS CONUS 120‐210 days 180 days

Shift LCS to dedicated crews; base some in today’s overseas SSC ports

• Separate mission packages

from LCS program

– Whole MCM mission package – Whole SUW mission package – Parts of ASW mission package

• Add new mission packages

– Electronic warfare – Humanitarian assistance – Maritime security

• Consider expanding non‐

combatant fleet

– Less expensive option for some

• perations in low‐threat

environments

• Challenges demand a new approach to surface warfare

– Networked family of CG(X), DD(X), LCS no longer viable – Access threats increasing defensive demands on all surface combatants – Instability will increase demands for training, cooperation and security – Budgets will preclude new designed until 2030s

• Navy has opportunity to implement a new surface fleet concept

– Flight III DDG‐51 – Follow‐on SSC and modifications to LCS – Phased modernization of CGs – New weapons and sensors (LRASM, AMDR variants, ESSM Block II, SEWIP) – Potential of the National Fleet

• Surface fleet must refocus on offensive sea control

– CGs and DDGs equipped and available to defeat enemy platforms – Restore ability of SSCs to do escort, training and constabulary missions

Restoring the surface fleet’s ability to gain sea control, protect non‐ combatant ships, train allies and partners, and secure sea lanes