WhyCivilResistanceWorks EricaChenoweth,Ph.D. WesleyanUniversity - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Why
Civil
Resistance
Works
 Erica
Chenoweth,
Ph.D.
 Wesleyan
University
 April
8,
2010


Some
ConvenBonal
Wisdoms?
 • Insurgents
use
violence
because
 – It
is
effecBve
 – It
is
a
last
resort
 • Nonviolent
resistance

 – Is
ineffecBve
against
brutal
regimes
 – Is
ineffecBve
for
achieving
“tough”
demands
 – Only
emerges
in
contexts
where
it
is
likely
to
 succeed
in
the
first
place


Project
Scope
 • The
Project
Does
Not:
 – Explain
the
emergence
of
different
campaigns

 – Examine
cases
outside
of
the
three
issue
areas
(i.e.,
civil
rights,
 anB‐war,
etc.)
 – Argue
that
nonviolent
campaigns
are
morally
superior
to
violent
 campaigns
 – Establish
a
formula
for
campaign
success
 – Focus
on
the
human
experience
of
conflict
 • Goals
of
the
Project:
 – Assess
the
empirical
validity
of
the
convenBonal
wisdom
 – Compare
trends
in
the
outcomes
of
nonviolent
and
violent
 campaigns
 – Explore
the
condiBons
under
which
campaigns
succeed
and
fail
 – Make
some
claims
about
the
strategic
uBlity
of
different
 approaches
to
poliBcal
contestaBon


Introducing
NAVCO
 • Nonviolent
and
Violent
Campaign
Outcomes
Dataset
 – 323
campaigns
from
1900‐2006
 – Ideal
types:
nonviolent
and
violent
 – Campaign
goals:
regime
change,
anB‐occupaBon,
 secession
 – Unit
of
analysis:
campaign
end
year
 – Examples
of
typical
variables
 • Campaign
peak
membership
 • Security
force
defecBons
 • Violent
government
repression
 • Material
support
received
from
a
foreign
state
 • Regime
type,
regime
capabiliBes,
country
populaBon,
etc.


Figure
1.
Success
Rates
of
Nonviolent
and
Violent
Campaigns,
1900‐2006
 70%
 60%
 50%
 40%
 Nonviolent
 30%
 Violent
 20%
 10%
 0%
 Success
 ParBal
Success
 Failure
 p=.000


Figure
2.
Success
Rates
by
Decade,
1940‐2006
 70
 60
 50
 Nonviolent
 40
 Violent
 30
 20
 10
 0
 1940‐1949
 1950‐1959
 1960‐1969
 1970‐1979
 1980‐1989
 1990‐1999
 2000‐2006
 p=.000


The
Puzzle
 
Why
has
nonviolent
resistance
been
more
 effecBve
than
violent
insurgency
in
the
20 th 
 century?


The
Argument:

 The
Primacy
of
ParBcipaBon
 • The
superior
mobilizaBon
capacity
of
 nonviolent
campaigns
advantages
them
 relaBve
to
violent
campaigns.
 • Mass,
nonviolent
acBon
is
more
likely
to
divide
 the
regime,
whereas
violent
acBon
is
more
 likely
to
unite
the
regime.


Explaining
ParBcipaBon
in
Nonviolent
 Resistance
 • Lower
physical
barriers
 • Lower
informaBonal
barriers
 • Lower
moral
barriers
 • Fewer
commitment
problems


Figure
1.
The
Effects
of
Campaign
Type
on
Campaign
ParBcipaBon
 9.5 11.5 Nonviolent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns Violent Campaigns Violent Campaigns Logged Membership, fitted values Logged Membership, fitted values 12 12 11.5 11 10 9.5 11 10.5 10.5 10 12 11.5 Logged Membership, fitted values 11 10.5 10 9.5 Violent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns p=.00


Figure
2.
The
Effects
of
Campaign
Membership
on
the
Probability
of
 Success
 p=.02


Figure
3.
The
Effects
of
Campaign
Membership
on
the
Probability
of
 Security
Force
DefecBons,
by
Campaign
Type
 Nonviolent Campaigns log members log members Pr(defect) Pr(defect) Nonviolent Campaigns Violent Campaigns Violent Campaigns 10 15 5 0 10 15 15 10 15 5 10 0 5 .4 .2 5 .6 .8 .4 .2 .8 .6 Violent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns .8 .6 Pr(defect) .4 .2 0 5 10 15 5 10 15 log members p=.07


The
Effects
of
Repression
 • Though
repression
is
quite
common
against
 nonviolent
and
violent
campaigns,
its
effects
 vary
 – Violent
campaigns
facing
government
repression
 are
less
than
20%
likely
to
succeed
 – Nonviolent
campaigns
facing
repression
are
over

 46%
likely
to
succeed
 • Backfire
ohen
results
from
government
repression
 • The
state
cannot
repress
all
of
the
people
all
of
the
 Bme.


Figure
4.
The
Effects
of
Campaign
Type
on
the
Probability
of
 Receiving
External
State
Support
 Pr(Campaign Receives Foreign State Support) Nonviolent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns Violent Campaigns Violent Campaigns Pr(Campaign Receives Foreign State Support) 0 .6 .4 .4 .2 .2 0 .6 .6 Pr(Campaign Receives Foreign State Support) .4 .2 0 Violent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns

The
Consequences
of
Insurgency
 • Violent
campaigns
create
“structural
violence”
 long
aher
the
insurgency
ends
 • Nonviolent
campaigns
are
more
likely
to
 improve
governance
and
stability
 – Democracy
 – Civil
peace


Post‐Conflict
Regime
Type
 Violent

 Nonviolent
 Campaigns
 Campaigns
 Probability
of
Being
 a
Democracy
Five
 Years
a;er
the
 4%
 41%
 Conflict
Has
Ended
 P=.000


Post‐Conflict
Regime
Type,
Extant
 Democracies
Only
 Violent

 Nonviolent
 Campaigns
 Campaigns
 Probability
of
Being
 a
Democracy
Five
 Years
a;er
the
 15%
 84%
 Conflict
Has
Ended
 P=.000


Post‐Conflict
Civil
War
Onset
 Violent

 Nonviolent
 Campaigns
 Campaigns
 Probability
of
 Experiencing
a
Civil
 War
within
Ten
 43%
 28%
 Years
of
the
End
of
 the
Conflict
 P=.07


Study
LimitaBons
 • Considers
only
ideal
types
 – Nonviolent
and
violent
campaigns
 – Two
broad
categories
of
goals
 • Over‐aggregated
unit
of
analysis
 – Campaign
as
the
unit
of
analysis,
rather
than
different
 tacBcal
choices
(or
non‐events)
 – Fails
to
capture
the
iteraBve
nature
of
the
conflict
 (inter‐group
and
campaign
vs.
state
interacBons)
over
 Bme.
 • StaBsBcs
show
only
correlaBon,
not
causaBon.


Study
Extensions
 • CollecBng
panel
data
from
1900‐2008.
 • CollecBng
daily
events
data
from
1989‐2009.
 – Textual
Analysis
by
Augmented
Replacement
 InstrucBons
(TABARI)
 • Including
many
other
variables,
especially
 intra‐organizaBonal
variables.


QuesBons
 echenoweth@wesleyan.edu