Tight Private Circuits: Achieving Probing Security with the Least - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Jan 23, 2024 •134 likes •655 views

Tight Private Circuits: Achieving Probing Security with the Least Refreshing Sonia Belaid, Dahmun Goudarzi, and Matthieu Rivain dahmun.goudarzi@pqshield.com 1 Side-Channel Attacks and Higher-Order Masking in 1 in 2 in 3

Tight Private Circuits:   Achieving Probing Security with the Least Refreshing Sonia Belaid, Dahmun Goudarzi, and Matthieu Rivain dahmun.goudarzi@pqshield.com �1
Side-Channel Attacks and Higher-Order Masking in 1 in 2 in 3 ⊗ ⊕ ⊕ ⊗ • Higher-Order Masking: For each in , in = m 1 + m 2 + … + m d �2 �2
Implementation Transformation [ x ] [ y ] [ z ] x y z [ ] ⊕ R ⊗ ⊕ [ ] ⊗ [ ] ⊗ ⊕ ⊗ [ ] ⊗ [ ] ⊗ �3 : d-sharing [ x ] : multiplication gadget [ ] ⊗ : addition gadget [ ] ⊕ : refresh gadget R �3
Secure Gadgets Addition gadget Multiplication gadget Refresh gadget [ x ] [ y ] [ x ] [ y ] [ x ] [ ] ⊕ [ ] ⊗ R [ z ] = [ x + y ] [ z ] = [ x ⋅ y ] [ z ] = [ x ] • Addition gadget: [ x ] + [ y ] = ( x 1 + y 1 , x 2 + y 2 , …, x d + y d ) • Refresh gadget: Ref ([ x ]) = [ x ] [1] [ ] ⊗ �4 �4

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