THE NAVIES IN THE 21 ST CENTURY By DR M. VEGO; JMO DEPARTMENT, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

THE NAVIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By DR M. VEGO; JMO DEPARTMENT, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RI., USA ROYAL HIGH INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE, BRUSSELS; 21 NOVEMBER 2011

“THE ONLY WAY TO PREDICT THE FUTURE IS TO HAVE POWER TO SHAPE THE FUTURE.” “IN A TIME OF DRASTIC CHANGE IT IS THE LEARNERS WHO INHERIT THE FUTURE. THE LEARNED USUALLY FIND THEMSELVES EQUIPPED TO LIVE IN A WORLD THAT NO LONGER EXIST.”

ERIC HOFFER (1902-1983)

THE FUTURE GLOBAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

• CONTEMPORARY

POWERS  UNITED STATES  EUROPEAN UNION  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  JAPAN

• RISING POWERS

 PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)  INDIA

• EMERGING POWERS

 BRAZIL  IRAN  TURKEY

CONTEMPORARY POWERS

• UNITED STATES
• EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
• RUSSIAN FEDERATION
• JAPAN

RISING POWERS

• PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(PRC)

• INDIA

EMERGING POWERS

• BRAZIL
• IRAN
• TURKEY

PIVOTAL REGIONS

• GREATER MIDDLE EAST
• SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
• KOREAN PENINSULA
• THE POLAR AREA—THE

ARCTIC IN PARTICULAR.

MARITIME DOMAIN AND ITS DIMENSIONS

• PHYSICAL
• POLITICAL
• SOCIAL
• DEMOGRAPHIC
• ECONOMIC
• MILITARY
• LEGAL
• ENVIRONMENTAL
• OTHER

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION

ECONOMIC DIMENSION

WORLD SEABORNE TRADE 1969-2010

Top 20 largest shipping flags (October 2010)

LEGAL DIMENSION

Source:DCDC (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), Strategic Trends Programme,

global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040 (London: Ministry of Defence, 4th ed., 12 January 2010), p. 67.

Source: DCDC (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), Strategic Trends Programme,

Global Strategic Trends-Out to 2040 (London: Ministry of Defence, 4th ed., 12 January 2010), p. 63.

MILITARY DIMENSION

• SOME 150 NAVIES WORLDWIDE
• RELATIVE DECLINE OF THE U.S.

NAVY

• CHANGING NAVAL BALANCE IN

WESTERN PACIFIC

• RISE OF PRC‘S NAVY (PLAN)
• RISE OF THE INDIAN AND THE

BRAZILIAN NAVIES.

CHINESE NAVAL CHALLENGE

CHINESE EX-SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIER VARYAG

PLAN‘S SOVREMENNY-CLASS MISSILE DESTROYER

PLAN‘S KILO-CLASS SSK

POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT/WAR

• ATTEMPTS BY THE RISING POWERS TO IMPOSE THEIR

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC INFLUENCE ON THE WEAKER NEIGHBOURS

• VIRULENT NATIONALISM
• RELIGIOUS –BASED TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGIES
• LAND/MARITIME BORDER DISPUTES
• STRUGGLE TO CONTROL SCARCE WATER RESOURCES
• COMPETITION OF MAJOR POWERS FOR RELIABLE SUPPLY OF

OIL/NATURAL GAS AND MINERALS

• OVERPOPULATION
• GLOBAL WAR IS UNLIKELY BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE
• POSSIBILITY OF A REGIONAL HIGH-INTENSITY CONVENTIOINAL

WAR EXISTS

• FLASHPOINTS– KOREAN PENINSULA; TAIWAN STRAIT; SOUTH

CHINA SEA; PERSIAN (ARABIAN) GULF; EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

THREATS IN MARITIME DOMAIN

ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE NAVIES

ROUTINE ACTIVITIES

• ENFORCING MARITIME BORDER LAWS &

CUSTOMS

• VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
• SEARCH & RESCUE
• SALVAGE
• ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
• HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY
• OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH

PROTECTION OF THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC INTERESTS AT SEA

• PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL

SHIPPING

• FISHERY PROTECTION
• PROTECTION OF OFFSHORE

OIL/GAS INSTALLATIONS

• PROTECTION OF SEABED MINERAL

DEPOSITS

PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE / DISASTER RELIEF (HA /DR)

• ASSISTANCE IN THE AFTERMATH

OF NATURAL DISASTERS

• EMERGENCY MEDICAL

ASSISTANCE

• GOODWILL ACTIVITIES
• REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
• EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS

6 Jan 2005--US Navy personnel from the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln load food, water, and other supplies onto a US Navy Seahawk helicopter at Banda Aceh.

HOMELAND SECURITY

• SEA-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

(BMD)COMBATING TERRORISM

• PORT SECURITY
• PROTECTION OF CRITICAL

INSTALLATIONS/FACILITIES ON THE COAST

• COUNTER NARCOTICS (DRUGS)
• COUNTER ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
• COUNTER SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION (WMD)

• COMBATING PIRACY
• COUNTER ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION

ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TREATIES

• COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL MARITIME

TERRORISM

• ENFORCEMENT OF UNSCR’S RESOLUTIONS
• COMBATING INTERNATIONAL PIRACY
• ENSURING FREEDOM OF

NAVIGATION/OVERFLIGHT

• COMBATING ILLICIT ARMS TRADE
• COUNTER PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF

MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

• PREVENTING ILLICIT SMUGGLING OF HUMANS

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL MARITIME TERRORISM

COMBATING INTERNATIONAL PIRACY

COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF WMD

PREVENTING ILLICIT SMUGGLING OF HUMANS

ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT

SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRY‘S FOREIGN POLICY

NAVAL POTENTIAL VS. NAVAL INFLUENCE

• COOPERATIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
• COERCIVE (OR “GUNBOAT”) NAVAL

DIPLOMACY

• CONFLICT PREVENTION
• SETTLING MARITIME BORDER

DISPUTES

COOPERATIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY

• ROUTINE NAVAL PRESENCE
• OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS
• EXERCISES/MANEUVERS
• PORT VISITS

 ROUTINE  OPERATIONAL  DIPLOMATIC

• SHOW OF FLAG

COERCIVE NAVAL DIPLOMACY

• THREAT OF USING FORCE
• SHOW OF FORCE
• PREEMPTIVE DEPLOYMENT
• NAVAL DEMONSTRATION
• RAIDS
• BOMBARDMENTS OF THE

COAST

EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES IN SETTLING MARITIME BORDER DISPUTES

SUPPORT OF MILITARY- /THEATER STRATEGY

• SEA-BASED NUCLEAR

DETERRENCE

• CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
• BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
• SECURITY COOPERATION

SUPPORT OF INSURGENCY OR COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)

SUPPORT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

• PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

(PKO)

• PEACE-ENFORCEMENT

OPERATIONS (PEO)

• EXPANDED PKO/PEO
• PEACE-BUILDING (PB)
• PEACE-MAKING

Employment of Naval Forces in Support of Peace Operations

Type Conflict Prevention Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO) Peace Building (PB) Peace Making Objectives

Support of non-military actions aimed to prevent

• ccurrence, escalation,

conflict, and its resumption

• Monitoring / facilitating

implementation of the agreement to cease hostilities

• Support diplomatic

efforts to reach long-term settlement Use of military force or threat of its use to compel compliance with resolutions / sanctions designed to maintain / restore peace / order Support of non-military efforts aimed to strengthen / rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid resumption of hostilities Support of actions aimed to end a dispute and resolve the underlying causes that led to it

Legal Basis

UN Charter, Chapter VI UN Charter, Chapter VII

Use of Force

Only in self-defense Prepared for combat

Tasks

• Provide early warning
• Coastal surveillance /

patrolling

• Preventative

Deployment

• Sanctions / embargoes
• Coastal surveillance /

patrolling

• Harbor defense / protection
• Escort of merchant shipping
• Maritime intercept
• perations (MIO)
• Protection of shore facilities

/ installations

• Protection of offshore oil /

gas facilities

• Defensive mining
• Mine countermeasures

(MCM)

• Monitor / enforce / EEZ
• Sea search and rescue
• Port visits
• Providing neutral site for

negotiations

• Logistical support for

friendly forces ashore

• Threat of use of

maritime forces

• Blockade
• Shore bombardment
• Amphibious landings
• Raids
• Logistical support for

friendly forces ashore

• Supervise cease-fire or

truce

• Protection of

humanitarian aid and delivery

• Secure bases for friendly

land forces

• Support withdrawal of

friendly land forces

• Logistical support for

friendly forces ashore

MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE (MTF) OF THE UN INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL)

48 NM 5,000 SQ NM

THE NAVIES AND HIGH-INTENSITY CONVENTIONAL WAR

NATURE OF WAR

• REFERS TO THOSE CONSTANT,

UNIVERSAL, AND INHERENT QUALITIES THAT ULTIMATELY DEFINE WAR THROUGHOUT THE AGES

• THE NATURE OF WAR NEVER

CHANGES—IT IS TIMELESS.

NATURE OF WAR AND ITS MAIN FEATURES:

• DOMINANT ROLE OF

POLICY AND STRATEGY

• VIOLENCE
• HOSTILITY/HATRED
• BLOODSHED
• SUFFERING
• IRRATIONALITY
• UNPREDICTABILITY
• UNCERTAINTY (“FOG

OF WAR”)

• FRICTION
• FEAR
• DANGER
• ACCIDENTS
• CHANCE
• LUCK

CHARACTER OF WAR

• CHARACTER OF WAR REFERS TO

THOSE TRANSITORY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL, AND ADAPTIVE FEATURES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE DIFFERENT PERIODS OF WARFARE THROUGHOUT HISTORY

• IN CONTRAST TO ITS NATURE, THE

CHARACTER OF WAR IS EVER- CHANGING.

CHARACTER OF WAR AT SEA IS AFFECTED BY:

• DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

• DOMESTIC POLITICS
• ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
• DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES
• IDEOLOGY
• MEDIA/PUBLIC OPINION
• ADVANCES IN SCIENCE &

TECHNOLOGY

• INFLUENCE OF NAVAL

THEORETICIANS

• CHANGES IN THE

CHARACTER OF WAR ON LAND

• INTERNATIONAL LAW OF

THE ARMED CONFLICT

DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

• FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS (1792-

1802) AND NAPOLEONIC WARS (1803- 1815)

• WORLD WAR I
• WORLD WAR II
• COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN

1991

• THE RISE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA (PRC).

INFLUENCE OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON NAVAL WARFARE

CHARACTERISTICS OF NAVAL WARFARE

• ARE PRIMARILY DUE TO THE

UNIQUENESS OF NAVAL PLATFORMS AND THEIR WEAPONS/SENSORS AND THE FEATURES OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY OPERATE.

• .

• THE OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE ARE

PREDOMINANTLY PHYSICAL IN THEIR CONTENT

• OFFENSIVE VS. DEFENSE (CARL VON

CLAUSEWITZ’S VIEWS ON DEFENSE AND WAR AT SEA)

• CLAUSEWITZIAN CONCEPT OF POINT OF

CULMINATION AND WAR AT SEA

• SEA IS COMMON TO ALL BELLIGERENTS AND

NEUTRALS

• AT SEA, THE INTERESTS OF THE

BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS ARE INTERWOVEN

• THE SEA IS A “HIGHWAY”—IT BELONGS TO NO

ONE

• PHYSICAL SPACE ON LAND IS USUALLY MORE LIMITED

THAN AT SEA/OCEAN

• GROUND FORCES ARE MORE TIED TO A SPECIFIC

PLACES THAN NAVAL FORCES ARE

• THEIR MOVEMENT IS GENERALLY SLOWER THAN THE

MOVEMENT OF NAVAL FORCES

• THERE ARE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN ENSURING

COVERTNESS OF MOVEMENT OF ONE`S NAVAL FORCES

• IT IS USUALLY MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE

AT SEA THAN ON LAND

• NAVAL WARFARE TEND TO BE MORE DECISIVE

• GROUND FORCES ARE ALMOST

CONTINUOUSLY IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY AND NAVAL FORCES ARE NOT

• NORMALLY, THE NAVIES EMPLOY ALL THE

AVAILABLE FORCES (THE EXCEPTION CAN BE LARGE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS)

• NAVAL FORCES CANNOT BE QUICKLY

RECONSTITUTED—IT TAKES VERY LONG TIME TO BUILD OR EVEN REPAIR AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER, LARGE SURFACE COMBATANT AND SUBMARINE.

ROLE OF THE NAVIES

• WAR AT SEA IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF WAR AS

WHOLE; THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF WAR IS ON LAND—IT IS THERE WHERE THE HUMANS LIVE

• THERE WERE ONLY FEW EXAMPLES OF

PURELY NAVAL WARS (ATHENS VS. SYRACUSE IN 413 BC; DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH ARMADA IN 1588; THE FIRST ANGLO-DUTCH WAR IN 1652-1654)

• THE MAIN ROLE OF A NAVY IS TO CREATE

PREREQUISITES FOR THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF FRIENDLY FORCES ON LAND.

OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE

OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL WARFARE

01-GA-1021-1

OBJECTIVES

ESTABLISHING/MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING BASING/DEPLOYMENT AREA CONTROL

STRONGER SIDE SEA CONTROL CHOKE POINT CONTROL

ESTABLISHING/MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING BASING/DEPLOYMENT AREA CONTROL

SEA DENIAL SCALE WEAKER SIDE OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC OR OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL

CHOKE POINT CONTROL DENIAL

DESTROYING/WEAKENING THE ENEMY’S/PRESERVING FRIENDLY MILITARY- ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AT SEA

RELATIVITY OF SEA CONTROL

PHYSICAL SPACE OPEN OCEAN PERIPHERAL (MARGINAL) SEAS ENCLOSED SEAS SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS INSHORE WATERS

JMO-01-GA-0810-2

DURATION

• PERMANENT CONTROL
• TEMPORARY CONTROL

DEGREE

• ABSOLUTE CONTROL

(SEA MASTERY)

• LIMITED

(“CONDITIONAL” OR “WORKING”) CONTROL

• DISPUTED

(CONTESTED) CONTROL

PHYSICAL SCOPE

• GENERAL CONTROL
• LOCAL CONTROL
• COMBINED

GENERAL- LOCAL CONTROL

PHYSICAL MEDIUM

• CONTROL OF THE

SURFACE

• CONTROL OF THE

SUBSURFACE

• CONTROL OF THE

AIR(SPACE) LITTORAL WATERS NARROW SEAS

STRUGGLE FOR INFORMATION SUPERIORITY/DENIAL

• WILL BE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY WITH

STRUGGLE FOR SEA CONTROL/SEA DENIAL

• IT IS HIGHLY DYNAMIC
• LIKE SEA CONTROL, CONTROL OF

CYBERSPACE WILL BE RARELY ABSOLUTE BUT GENERAL AND/LOCAL

• TEMPORARY RATHER THAN PERMANENT
• IT WILL BE CONDUCTED DURING THE ENTIRE

WAR

THE FUTURE OF FUNDAMENTAL NAVAL WARFARE AREAS

• SURFACE WARFARE
• SUBMARINE WARFARE
• NAVAL AIR WARFARE
• NAVAL ANTI-AIR WARFARE
• MINE WARFARE (MIW)
• ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW)
• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (AW)
• NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE

IS AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT ON THE OPPOSED SHORE STILL A VIABLE OPTION?

I also predict that large-scale amphibious

• perations…will

never occur again.

• Gen. Omar

Bradley Chairman JCS 19 October 1949

• BUT WE HAVE TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT WHERE

IT WOULD BE NECESSARY OR SENSIBLE TO LAUNCH ANOTHER MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AGAIN – ESPECIALLY AS ADVANCES IN ANTI-SHIP SYSTEMS KEEP PUSHING THE POTENTIAL LAUNCH POINT FURTHER FROM SHORE. ON A MORE BASIC LEVEL, IN THE 21ST CENTURY, WHAT KIND OF AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY DO WE REALLY NEED TO DEAL WITH THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIOS, AND THEN HOW MUCH?

Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition : Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Gaylord Convention Center, National Harbor, Maryland, Monday, May 03, 2010

IS THERE A FUTURE FOR MARITIME TRADE WARFARE??

• ATTACK ON MARITIME TRADE
• DEFENSE & PROTECTION OF

MARITIME TRADE

SHIPS IN PORTS/ ANCHORAGES CARGO LOADING /OFFLOADING FACILITIES

ELEMENTS OF MARITIME TRADE

PPT-01-VEGO-64(JMP)041101

PORTS / ANCHORAGES CARGO STORAGE FACILITIES SHIPPING AT SEA ROAD TRAFFIC RAILROAD/ ROAD JUNCTIONS SHIP REPAIR FACILITIES INTERNAL WATERWAY TRAFFIC RAIL TRAFFIC SHIPYARDS

ELEMENTS

IS CONVOYING STILL AN EFFECTIVE METHOD OF DEFENSE & PROTECTION OF MERCHANT/MILITARY SHIPPING?

ENDURING IMPORTANCE OF THE HUMAN FACTOR IN NAVAL WARFARE

SCIENCE VS. ART OF NAVAL WARFARE

• THE CONDUCT OF NAVAL WARFARE IS

AN ART NOT A SCIENCE

• STUDY OF NAVAL WARFARE AND

DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL THEORIES IS A SCIENCE

• THE APPLICATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND

UNDERSTNADING OF NAVAL WARFARE IS AN ART.

QUESTIONS?