Supply Chain Risk Management Trixie Brewer HQ AFMC/A4R FOUO - For - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

FOUO – For Official Use Only Air Force Materiel Command Supply Chain Risk Management Trixie Brewer HQ AFMC/A4R FOUO - For Official Use Only

FOUO – For Official Use Only Great Power Competition, Military – Civilian Fusion  Under great power competition, we see the fusion of military and commercial sectors, where adversaries are weaponizing commercial activity as a means of degrading US military capability.  Examples include:  Russia’s cornering of rare earth element markets; and the use of cartel -like actions  China’s practices of commercial entity exploitation  Weaponized Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A)  Pressuring partner companies to transfer technology as normal business  Exploiting networks of scientific, academic, & business contacts to steal IP & tech secrets  Controlling ports via targeted ownership & insertion of Chinese-owned tech for access to transiting goods  Exploitation of DoD commercial supply chains to introduce counterfeit parts  Focused kinetic warfare-based strategies to exploit the commercial domain: Anti-Access/Area- Denial (A2AD) & Disruption Deliver and Support Agile War-Winning Capabilities FOUO - For Official Use Only

FOUO – For Official Use Only Risk Lurking in the Industrial Base The domain of warfare is expanding well beyond the battlefield to create a new contested space! Warfare on the Battlefield 1. Warfare Against Supply Lines Feeding the Battle 2. Commercial Industrial Base Warfare Against War Supporting Production Capability 3. Warfare Against the Industrial Base to Shape War 4. 1 2 3 4 Weaponiz We onized ed M&A &A Inte tell llec ectual tual proper erty ty th theft Cybe ber, , softw tware are, , and hardwa ware re att tt a ck cks Deliver and Support Agile War-Winning Capabilities FOUO - For Official Use Only

FOUO – For Official Use Only Enterprise SCRM Operational View  Centralized, integrated function EN DoD & comprised of AF, AFMC and Center SAF/HAF LG / A4 resources that coordinate for effective, TSN efficient SCRM PK Enterprise SCRM  An integrated function brings JA AFOSI & A effectiveness and efficiency in: B A2 C  Processes  Tools Installation Program Support  Communication Offices (IMSC) (AFLCMC )  Coordination  Program Management Nuclear Testing Enterprise (AFTC) Sustainment Labs (AFNWC ) (AFSC) (AFRL ) Deliver and Support Agile War-Winning Capabilities 4 FOUO - For Official Use Only

FOUO – For Official Use Only Network Illumination 674 Sub-Tier Suppliers Identified Deliver and Support Agile War-Winning Capabilities FOUO - For Official Use Only

FOUO – For Official Use Only Risk Findings Weight (10pts) 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.50 1.00 2.50 Involvement of Number Difficulty Risky Foreign of Risk of Difficulty Severity Risk Supplier Risk Entity Lenses Likelihood Mitigation to Detect of Impact Score Boeing Thousands of documents related to 3 4 3 3 3 3 4.83 Texas Instruments Texas Instruments sold sensitive ele 3 2 3 3 2 3 4.50 Acronis Acronis’ Management has several ties to Russian government entities 3 1 3 3 1 3 4.25 Everspin Technologies Supplier’s lack of profitability increases its susceptibility to bankruptcy and foreign influence 2 3 3 3 1 3 4.25 Intel The AMD-THATIC joint venture will e 3 3 2 3 2 3 4.25 MobileIron MobileIron’s use of Acronis software in its provision of services to the DoD makes it a foreign influence and cyber risk 3 2 2 3 3 3 4.17 Imagination Technologies Shareholders of Imagination Tech, a 4 3 3 2 1 3 4.17 Xilinx Xilinx Inc.’s FPGAs are frequent targets for foreign acquisition & counterfeiting฀ 3 2 3 2 2 3 4.08 TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturin 3 1 1 3 3 3 3.92 Aeroflex Cobham recently acquired Aeroflex 3 3 3 1 3 3 3.92 Marvell Chinese investors, including a PRC S 3 1 2 3 1 3 3.92 Xilinx Flextronics has a history of mislabel 1 2 3 3 3 2 3.92 Cypress Semiconductor Former Chairman of Cypress Semico 3 2 2 2 2 3 3.75 Fairchild Semiconductor Fairchild Semiconductor is a target f 3 2 2 2 2 3 3.75 GlobalFoundries An industrial tool virus infected the 2 2 3 2 1 3 3.75 Everspin Technologies Everspin Technologies is partially ow 3 1 2 3 2 2 3.67 Microsemi Microsemi accused of ITAR and FCA 2 3 2 2 2 3 3.67 GlobalFoundries UAE’s purchase of GlobalFoundries raises influence concerns about DoD’s reliance on it as a Trusted Foundry ฀ 2 2 1 3 2 3 3.67 Insyde Software Firmware made by Insyde Software 3 1 2 2 2 3 3.67 Lattice Semiconductor Lattice Semiconductor has been targ 3 3 2 3 1 2 3.67 DDC DDC was recently acquired by TransD 0 1 2 3 2 3 3.58 Xcerra Xcerra received an acquisition offer 3 2 2 2 1 3 3.58 Silicon Motion Malicious code can be uploaded to S 3 3 1 2 2 3 3.50 Acronis Russian Government-owned power 3 1 3 3 1 1 3.42 Acronis Acronis has a history of cyber securi 0 1 1 3 3 3 3.42 Microchip A Chinese company allegedly copie 3 2 1 2 2 3 3.42 Micron Micron and its innovations have bec 3 3 2 2 1 2 3.25 Harris Corporation A Harris Corporation contractor pled 0 1 2 2 2 3 3.17 Intersil Counterfeit Intersil chips have been 0 1 2 2 2 3 3.17 IDT Chinese and Pakistani investors atte 3 1 2 2 1 2 3.08 Deliver and Support Agile War-Winning Capabilities FOUO - For Official Use Only

FOUO – For Official Use Only Risk Findings, Cont. Weight (10pts) 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.50 1.00 2.50 Involvement of Number Difficulty Risky Foreign of Risk of Difficulty Severity Risk Supplier Risk Entity Lenses Likelihood Mitigation to Detect of Impact Score Microsemi ProASIC3 chips could have backdoor 0 1 1 2 3 3 3.00 Halo X-ES’s supplier, Halo Electronics, makes products that are prone to counterfeit substitution in the marketplace 1 1 2 2 2 2 2.92 NXP NXP products are often substituted 1 1 2 2 2 2 2.92 Pentair Pentair subsidiaries have a history o 2 3 1 2 2 2 2.92 Cobham Cobham faces an insider-trading pro 0 2 3 2 2 1 2.75 Marvell Marvell has a history of questionabl 1 1 2 3 1 1 2.75 Microchip Atmel was the previous target of Ch 2 2 2 1 2 2 2.75 Exar Reliance on Asian manufacturers fo 2 1 2 2 2 1 2.67 Intel Intel microprocessors are vulnerabl 1 1 2 1 3 2 2.67 Pericom Pericom’s integrated circuit chips are frequent targets for foreign acquisition and have been targeted by the PRC in the past 3 2 1 1 2 2 2.58 SMIC The Chinese Government is the larg 3 1 1 2 2 1 2.50 STMicroelectronics Multiple state-sponsored entities o 2 2 1 3 0 1 2.50 Texas Instruments Texas Instruments employees adve 3 1 1 1 1 2 2.33 Fairchild Semiconductor Fairchild has been engaged in a long 0 2 2 2 1 1 2.25 Intersil Intersil faced a lawsuit regarding its 0 2 2 2 1 1 2.25 ON Semiconductor ON Semiconductor focuses producti 1 2 1 1 2 2 2.25 Exar MaxLinear’s recent purchase of Exar could jeopardize Exar’s continued production and design of supplied parts 0 1 2 1 1 2 2.17 Harris Corporation 3 2 1 1 2 1 2.17 The SEC caught the chief executive o Silicon Labs Silicon Labs is overly reliant on 3 sma 0 1 1 2 3 1 2.17 Curtiss-Wright Curtiss-Wright’s sales to Russian entities raise concerns of foreign influence through reverse engineering 1 1 1 2 1 1 2.00 Halo Halo Electronics is susceptible to for 2 1 1 1 1 1 1.75 MobileIron MobileIron faces financial challenge 0 1 2 1 1 1 1.75 Pericom Pericom Semiconductor is susceptib 3 1 1 1 0 1 1.75 Global Foundries GlobalFoundries acquired IBM’s poorly-performing chip-manufacturing unit, placing it at financial risk 0 1 1 1 2 1 1.58 Microchip Microchip’s withdrawal of a severance package for employees indicates problematic and unethical business practices 0 1 1 1 2 1 1.58 Linear Tech Linear Technology has been sued by 0 2 1 1 1 1 1.50 Curtiss-Wright Overcharging government clients and gender discrimination undercut Curtiss-Wright’s business ethics 0 1 1 1 1 1 1.42 NXP NXP is threatened by financial issue 0 1 1 1 1 1 1.42 Micron Micron, who supplies DRAM chips to 0 1 1 1 0 1 1.25 Cypress Semiconductor Most Cypress Semiconductor parts l 0 1 1 0 2 1 1.17 Deliver and Support Agile War-Winning Capabilities FOUO - For Official Use Only