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Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications gnes Kiss (TU Darmstadt) Jian Liu (Aalto University) Thomas Schneider (TU Darmstadt) N. Asokan (Aalto University) Benny Pinkas (Bar-Ilan University) 20.07.17 |

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SLIDE 1

Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications

Ágnes Kiss (TU Darmstadt) Jian Liu (Aalto University) Thomas Schneider (TU Darmstadt)

  • N. Asokan (Aalto University)

Benny Pinkas (Bar-Ilan University)

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 1

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SLIDE 2

Private Set Intersection (PSI)

≈ 𝑂

𝐵

𝑂𝐶

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 2

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SLIDE 3

Private Set Intersection (PSI)

? ? ? ? ? ? ?

≈ 𝑂

𝐵

𝑂𝐶

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 2

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SLIDE 4

PSI with Unequal Set Sizes

𝑂

𝐵

𝑂𝐶 ≫

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 3

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SLIDE 5

PSI with Unequal Set Sizes – Mobile Messaging Service

...

𝑂

𝐵

𝑂𝐶 ≫

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 4

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SLIDE 6

PSI with Unequal Set Sizes – Mobile Messaging Service

...

? ? ? ? ? ?

𝑂

𝐵

𝑂𝐶 ≫

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 4

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SLIDE 7

PSI with Unequal Set Sizes – Malware Detection Service

...

𝑂

𝐵

𝑂𝐶 ≫

3 Mio 95 [TLP+17]

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 5

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SLIDE 8

PSI with Unequal Set Sizes – Malware Detection Service

𝑂

𝐵

𝑂𝐶 ≫

...

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

3 Mio 95 [TLP+17]

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 5

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SLIDE 9

What do we have?

  • OT-based protocols efficient for 𝑶𝑩 ≈ 𝑶𝑪
  • Garbled BF based protocols [DCW13,RR17]
  • Hashing-based protocols [PSZ14,PSSZ15,KKRT16]

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 6

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SLIDE 10

What do we have?

  • OT-based protocols efficient for 𝑶𝑩 ≈ 𝑶𝑪
  • Garbled BF based protocols [DCW13,RR17]
  • Hashing-based protocols [PSZ14,PSSZ15,KKRT16]

Require sending data linear in 𝑂

𝐵 for each element of the client (𝑃(𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝐶))

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 6

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SLIDE 11

What do we have?

  • OT-based protocols efficient for 𝑶𝑩 ≈ 𝑶𝑪
  • Garbled BF based protocols [DCW13,RR17]
  • Hashing-based protocols [PSZ14,PSSZ15,KKRT16]
  • Protocols linear in the set sizes (𝑷 𝑶𝑩 + 𝑶𝑪 )
  • Based on public-key crypto: OPE [FNP04], DH [HFH99]
  • Based on Oblivious PRF evaluation: NR [FIPR05,HL08],

AES [PSSW09], RSA [CT10]

Require sending data linear in 𝑂

𝐵 for each element of the client (𝑃(𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝐶))

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 6

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SLIDE 12

What do we have?

Can these be adapted to unequal set sizes?

  • OT-based protocols efficient for 𝑶𝑩 ≈ 𝑶𝑪
  • Garbled BF based protocols [DCW13,RR17]
  • Hashing-based protocols [PSZ14,PSSZ15,KKRT16]
  • Protocols linear in the set sizes (𝑷 𝑶𝑩 + 𝑶𝑪 )
  • Based on public-key crypto: OPE [FNP04], DH [HFH99]
  • Based on Oblivious PRF evaluation: NR [FIPR05,HL08],

AES [PSSW09], RSA [CT10]

Require sending data linear in 𝑂

𝐵 for each element of the client (𝑃(𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝐶))

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 6

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SLIDE 13

What do we have?

Can these be adapted to unequal set sizes?

  • OT-based protocols efficient for 𝑶𝑩 ≈ 𝑶𝑪
  • Garbled BF based protocols [DCW13,RR17]
  • Hashing-based protocols [PSZ14,PSSZ15,KKRT16]
  • Protocols linear in the set sizes (𝑷 𝑶𝑩 + 𝑶𝑪 )
  • Based on public-key crypto: OPE [FNP04], DH [HFH99]
  • Based on Oblivious PRF evaluation: NR [FIPR05,HL08],

AES [PSSW09], RSA [CT10]

Require sending data linear in 𝑂

𝐵 for each element of the client (𝑃(𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝐶))

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 6

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SLIDE 14

Our Contributions

Improve existing linear complexity protocols for unequal set sizes Prototype implementation

  • f improved

protocols Further extensions for real-world applications

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 7

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SLIDE 15

Base Phase Data-independent, depends on 𝑂𝐶

max maximum number of client inputs

Setup Phase Depends on the 𝑂

𝐵 elements in the database

Online Phase Depends on the 𝑂𝐶 elements in the client set

Precomputed PSI – Three Phases

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 8

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SLIDE 16

Base Phase Data-independent, depends on 𝑂𝐶

max maximum number of client inputs

Can be precomputed without any knowledge on the inputs Setup Phase Depends on the 𝑂

𝐵 elements in the database

Online Phase Depends on the 𝑂𝐶 elements in the client set

Precomputed PSI – Three Phases

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 8

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SLIDE 17

Base Phase Data-independent, depends on 𝑂𝐶

max maximum number of client inputs

Can be precomputed without any knowledge on the inputs Setup Phase Depends on the 𝑂

𝐵 elements in the database

The server can perform most of the computation in advance Online Phase Depends on the 𝑂𝐶 elements in the client set

Precomputed PSI – Three Phases

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 8

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SLIDE 18

Base Phase Data-independent, depends on 𝑂𝐶

max maximum number of client inputs

Can be precomputed without any knowledge on the inputs Setup Phase Depends on the 𝑂

𝐵 elements in the database

The server can perform most of the computation in advance Online Phase Depends on the 𝑂𝐶 elements in the client set

Precomputed PSI – Three Phases

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

Same for all clients?

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 8

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SLIDE 19

Base Phase Data-independent, depends on 𝑂𝐶

max maximum number of client inputs

Can be precomputed without any knowledge on the inputs Setup Phase Depends on the 𝑂

𝐵 elements in the database

The server can perform most of the computation in advance Online Phase Depends on the 𝑂𝐶 elements in the client set Computation on the client’s few elements is fast

Precomputed PSI – Three Phases

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

Same for all clients?

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 8

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SLIDE 20

Bloom filter 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

𝐼1 𝐼2 … 𝐼𝑙

1 2 ... i ... j ... n

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 9

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SLIDE 21

Bloom filter

𝑓: 004912345678910

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

𝐼1 𝐼2 … 𝐼𝑙

1 2 ... i ... j ... n

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 9

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SLIDE 22

Bloom filter

𝑓: 004912345678910

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0

𝐼1 𝐼2 … 𝐼𝑙

1 2 ... i ... j ... n

𝐼1(𝑓) 𝐼2(𝑓) … 𝐼𝑙(𝑓)

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 9

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SLIDE 23

Bloom filter

𝑓: 004912345678910

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0

𝐼1 𝐼2 … 𝐼𝑙

1 2 ... i ... j ... n

𝐼1(𝑓) 𝐼2(𝑓) … 𝐼𝑙(𝑓)

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 9

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SLIDE 24

Bloom filter

𝐹(𝑓): fti45jxcfuu984fghdr56fguew91jm

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0

𝐼1 𝐼2 … 𝐼𝑙

1 2 ... i ... j ... n

𝐼1(𝐹(𝑓)) 𝐼2(𝐹 𝑓 ) … 𝐼𝑙(𝐹(𝑓))

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 9

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SLIDE 25

Efficient and Secure Updates

Insertion in Bloom filter 𝐹(𝑓): fti45jxcfuu984fghdr56fguew91jm 𝐼1 𝐹(𝑓) , 𝐼2 𝐹(𝑓) , … , 𝐼𝑙(𝐹(𝑓))

Deletion: Counting Bloom filter

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 10

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SLIDE 26

Key generation, Precomputation

Base Phase

Agree on key, parameters, Precomputation Precomputation Encrypt database and insert in Bloom filter

Setup Phase

Store Bloom filter Encrypt element privately

Online Phase

Request encryption of elements privately Check and output intersection locally

Precomputed PSI – PSI with PRF: RSA-PSI, NR-PSI, GC-PSI

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

BF Encryption

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 11

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SLIDE 27

Key generation, Precomputation

Base Phase

Agree on key, parameters, Precomputation Precomputation Encrypt database and insert in Bloom filter

Setup Phase

Store Bloom filter Encrypt element privately

Online Phase

Request encryption of elements privately Check and output intersection locally

Precomputed PSI – PSI with PRF: RSA-PSI, NR-PSI, GC-PSI

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

BF Encryption

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 11

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SLIDE 28

Key generation, Precomputation

Base Phase

Agree on key, parameters, Precomputation Precomputation Encrypt database and insert in Bloom filter

Setup Phase

Store Bloom filter Encrypt element privately

Online Phase

Request encryption of elements privately Check and output intersection locally

Precomputed PSI – PSI with PRF: RSA-PSI, NR-PSI, GC-PSI

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

BF Encryption

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 11

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SLIDE 29

Key generation 𝛽

Base Phase

Key generation 𝛾 Encrypt database with 𝛽

Setup Phase

Encrypt encrypted database with 𝛾 and insert in Bloom filter Encrypt encrypted elements with 𝛽

Online Phase

Encrypt elements with 𝛾 Check intersection

Precomputed PSI – PSI with Diffie-Hellman – DH-PSI

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

Encryption with 𝛾 Encryption Encryption with α𝛾

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 12

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SLIDE 30

Key generation 𝛽

Base Phase

Key generation 𝛾 Encrypt database with 𝛽

Setup Phase

Encrypt encrypted database with 𝛾 and insert in Bloom filter Encrypt encrypted elements with 𝛽

Online Phase

Encrypt elements with 𝛾 Check intersection

Precomputed PSI – PSI with Diffie-Hellman – DH-PSI

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

Encryption with 𝛾 Encryption Encryption with α𝛾

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 12

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SLIDE 31

Key generation 𝛽

Base Phase

Key generation 𝛾 Encrypt database with 𝛽

Setup Phase

Encrypt encrypted database with 𝛾 and insert in Bloom filter Encrypt encrypted elements with 𝛽

Online Phase

Encrypt elements with 𝛾 Check intersection

Precomputed PSI – PSI with Diffie-Hellman – DH-PSI

|𝑂𝐵| |𝑂𝐶| ≫

Encryption with 𝛾 Encryption Encryption with α𝛾

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 12

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SLIDE 32

Our Contributions

Improve existing linear complexity protocols for unequal set sizes Prototype implementation

  • f improved

protocols Further extensions for real-world applications

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 13

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SLIDE 33

Computation and Communication – PC Malware Detection

Protocol\Phase Base phase Setup phase Online phase RSA-PSI 14 ms 0 MB 57.4 min 1.8 MB 0.9 sec 0.1 MB ECC-DH-PSI 1 ms 0 MB 22.1 min 35.5 MB 0.4 sec 0.1 MB NR-PSI 0.1 sec 2.2 MB 12.6 min 1.8 MB 1.4 sec 0.5 MB GC-PSI 1.3 sec 44.5 MB 0.3 sec 1.8 MB 0.3 sec 0.5 MB

FPR = 10−3 𝑂

𝐵 = 220

𝑂𝐶 = 128 𝑂𝐶

max = 256

AES-NI

1 Gbps LAN C/C++ C/C++

AES-NI AES-NI

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 14

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SLIDE 34

Computation and Communication – Mobile Malware Detection

Protocol\Phase Base phase Setup phase Online phase RSA-PSI 1.4 sec 0 MB 57.4 min 1.8 MB 7.7 sec 0.1 MB DH-PSI 1 ms 0 MB 8.6 min 35.5 MB 2.9 sec 0.1 MB NR-PSI 0.7 min 2.2 MB 12.7 min 1.8 MB 31.6 sec 0.5 MB GC-PSI 7.6 min 44.5 MB 1.7 sec 1.8 MB 18.1 min 0.5 MB

FPR = 10−3 𝑂

𝐵 = 220

𝑂𝐶 = 128 𝑂𝐶

max = 256

AES-NI

Wifi C/C++/Java Java

AES-NI AES-NI ECC-

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 15

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SLIDE 35

Computation and Communication– Mobile Messaging

Protocol\Phase Base phase Setup phase Online phase RSA-PSI 2.7 sec 0 MB 40.8 days 5.4 GB 15.4 sec 0.2 MB DH-PSI 1 ms 0 MB 6.1 days 256 GB 5.9 sec 0.2 MB NR-PSI 0.7 min 4.2 MB 9.0 days 5.4 GB 1.1 min 1.0 MB GC-PSI 7.6 min 89.0 MB 0.5 hour 5.4 GB 0.6 hour 1.0 MB

FPR = 10−9 𝑂

𝐵 = 230 (1 billion users)

𝑂𝐶 = 256 𝑂𝐶

max = 512

AES-NI

Wifi Java C/C++/Java

AES-NI AES-NI ECC-

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 16

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SLIDE 36

Protocol\Phase Base phase Setup phase Online phase RSA-PSI 2.7 sec 0 MB 40.8 days 5.4 GB 15.4 sec 0.2 MB DH-PSI 1 ms 0 MB 6.1 days 256 GB 5.9 sec 0.2 MB NR-PSI 0.7 min 4.2 MB 9.0 days 5.4 GB 1.1 min 1.0 MB GC-PSI 7.6 min 89.0 MB 0.5 hour 5.4 GB 0.6 hour 1.0 MB

FPR = 10−9 𝑂

𝐵 = 230 (1 billion users)

𝑂𝐶 = 256 𝑂𝐶

max = 512

AES-NI

Wifi Java C/C++/Java

AES-NI AES-NI ECC-

Computation and Communication– Mobile Messaging

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 16

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SLIDE 37

Our Contributions

Improve existing linear complexity protocols for unequal set sizes Prototype implementation

  • f improved

protocols Further extensions for real-world applications

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 17

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SLIDE 38

Same Encrypted Database for Multiple Clients

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 18

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SLIDE 39

Same Encrypted Database for Multiple Clients Content delivery network (CDN)

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 18

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SLIDE 40

Effect on Performance – Mobile Messaging

Protocol\Phase Base phase Setup phase Online phase RSA-PSI 2.7 sec 0 MB 40.8 days 5.4 GB 30.7 sec 0.3 MB DH-PSI 1 ms 0 MB 6.1 days 256 GB 11.8 sec 0.3 MB NR-PSI 0.7 min 4.2 MB 9.0 days 5.4 GB 2.1 min 2.0 MB GC-PSI 7.6 min 89.0 MB 0.5 hours 5.4 GB 1.2 hours 2.0 MB

FPR = 10−9 𝑂

𝐵 = 230 (1 billion users)

𝑂𝐶 = 512 𝑂𝐶

max = 512

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 19

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SLIDE 41

Effect on Performance – Mobile Messaging

Protocol\Phase Base phase Setup phase Online phase RSA-PSI 2.7 sec 0 MB 40.8 days 5.4 GB 30.7 sec 0.3 MB DH-PSI 1 ms 0 MB 6.1 days 256 GB 11.8 sec 0.3 MB NR-PSI 0.7 min 4.2 MB 9.0 days 5.4 GB 2.1 min 2.0 MB GC-PSI 7.6 min 89.0 MB 0.5 hours 5.4 GB 1.2 hours 2.0 MB

FPR = 10−9 𝑂

𝐵 = 230 (1 billion users)

𝑂𝐶 = 512 𝑂𝐶

max = 512

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 19

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SLIDE 42

Effect on Performance – Mobile Messaging

Protocol\Phase Base phase Setup phase Online phase RSA-PSI 2.7 sec 0 MB 40.8 days 5.4 GB 30.7 sec 0.3 MB DH-PSI 1 ms 0 MB 6.1 days 256 GB 11.8 sec 0.3 MB NR-PSI 0.7 min 4.2 MB 9.0 days 5.4 GB 2.1 min 2.0 MB GC-PSI 7.6 min 89.0 MB 0.5 hours 5.4 GB 1.2 hours 2.0 MB

FPR = 10−9 𝑂

𝐵 = 230 (1 billion users)

𝑂𝐶 = 512 𝑂𝐶

max = 512

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 20

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SLIDE 43

Effect on Performance – Mobile Messaging

Protocol\Phase Base phase Setup phase Online phase RSA-PSI 2.7 sec 0 MB 40.8 days 5.4 GB 30.7 sec 0.3 MB DH-PSI 1 ms 0 MB 6.1 days 256 GB 11.8 sec 0.3 MB NR-PSI 0.7 min 4.2 MB 9.0 days 5.4 GB 2.1 min 2.0 MB GC-PSI 7.6 min 89.0 MB 0.5 hours 5.4 GB 1.2 hours 2.0 MB

Cuckoo filter in follow up work [RA17]  4 GB

FPR = 10−9 𝑂

𝐵 = 230 (1 billion users)

𝑂𝐶 = 512 𝑂𝐶

max = 512

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 20

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SLIDE 44

Summary

Improve existing linear complexity protocols for unequal set sizes Prototype implementation

  • f improved

protocols Further extensions for real-world applications

Thank you for your attention!

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 21

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SLIDE 45

References

[CT10]: E. De Cristofaro, G. Tsudik: Practical private set intersection protocols with linear complexity. In FC’10. [DCW13]: C. Dong, L. Chen, Z. Wen: When private set intersection meets big data: an efficient and scalable protocol. In CCS’13. [FIPR05]: M. J. Freedman, Y. Ishai, B. Pinkas, O. Reingold: Keyword search and

  • blivious pseudorandom functions. In TCC’05.

[FNP04]: M. J. Freedman, K. Nissim, B. Pinkas: Efficient private matching and set

  • intersection. In Eurocrypt’04.

[HFH99]: B. A. Huberman, M. K. Franklin, T. Hogg: Enhancing privacy and trust in electronic communities. In EC’99. [HL08]: C. Hazay, Y. Lindell: Efficient protocols for set intersection and pattern matching with security against malicious adversaries. In TCC’08. [KKRT16]: V. Kolesnikov, R. Kumaresan, M. Rosulek, N. Trieu: Efficient batched

  • blivious PRF with applications to private set intersection. In CCS’16.

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 22

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SLIDE 46

References

[PSSW09]: B. Pinkas, T. Schneider, N. P. Smart, S. C. Williams: Secure two-party computation is practical. In Asiacrypt’09. [PSSZ15]: B. Pinkas, T. Schneider, G. Segev, M. Zohner: Phasing: Private set intersection using permutation-based hashing. In USENIX Security’15. [PSZ14]: B. Pinkas, T. Schneider, M. Zohner: Faster private set intersection based

  • n OT extension. In USENIX Security’14.

[RA17]: A. C. D. Resende, D. F. Aranha: Unbalanced Approximate Private Set

  • Intersection. Eprint 2017/677.

[RR17]: P. Rindal, M. Rosulek: Improved private set intersection against malicious

  • adversaries. In Eurocrypt’17.

[TLP+17]: S. Tamrakar, J. Liu, A. Paverd, J. Ekberg, B. Pinkas, N. Asokan: The circle game: Scalable private membership test using trusted hardware. In AsiaCCS’17.

20.07.17 | Private Set Intersection for Unequal Set Sizes with Mobile Applications | Ágnes Kiss | Slide 22