Preparedness in contributing to the Sendai Framework MARK HAILWOOD - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Man-Made Hazard Disaster Risk Management Understanding Prevention and Preparedness in contributing to the Sendai Framework MARK HAILWOOD SECTION 31 AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY Disaster Risk Management Man-Made
MARK HAILWOOD SECTION 31 – AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY
Natural disaster risks Humanitarian disaster risks, and Man-Made disaster risks
are covered in one Disaster Risk Management Framework!
fields there is a need to develop common understandings and appreciation of differences for:
Terminology Concepts associated with the use of the terminology Approaches to effective Disaster Risk Management.
communicate effectively.
e.g. pumping strategies and sand sack deployment to defend a location against flooding
consequences:
e.g. temporary accommodation, heavy lifting equipment, emergency drinking water supplies, emergency health care facilities
National, regional planning, international networks, lists and databases
Man-Made Hazards):
Has existed for over 40 years. Has developed extensive experience at local, national and international level. Experience is documented in policies, regulations, standards, as well as research published in journals and shared at conferences.
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Feyzin, France 1966 Fire and explosion of an LPG storage in a refinery, Flixborough, UK 1974 Fire and explosion of a 30 t release of cyclohexane, 28 killed, 89 injured Seveso, Italy 1976 Release of contents of a chemical reactor, contamination of several km² with contents including ca. 2 kg TCDD (Dioxin), evacuation
Bhopal, India 1984 Release of a toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate from a storage tank, > 3000 killed, > 170000 injured, the site is still contaminated Schweizerhalle, Basle, CH 1986 Fire in a warehouse storing pesticides. 10000 m³ contaminated fire-fighting water containing 30 tonnes of chemicals released to Rhine. Major disruption to drinking water supply, ecological damage over 500 km.
Baia Mare, Romania 2000 Collapse of a dam at a tailings pond released 100000 m³ liquid conatinin 50 – 100 tonnes of cyanides and heavy metals to the Somes, Tisza and Danube rivers (ca 2000 km river pollution) Enschede, Netherlands 2000 A stock of ca. 100 t of explosives was detonated by a smaller fire. This led to a massive explosion and fireball which destroyed and damaged property over a wide area, 21 killed, > 900 injured. Toulouse, France 2001 An explosion in an ammonium nitrate and fertiliser factory destroyed the facility and caused widespread damage in the surrounding area, 29 killed, ca. 2500 injured Buncefield, UK 2005 The massive overfilling of a petroleum storage tank by pipeline at a fuel storage depot led to several explosions and a fire which engulfed 22 storage tanks, substantial property damage
Viareggio, Italy 2009 5 of 14 rail tank wagons carrying LPG derailed close to the railway station of Viareggio before
exploded, 32 killed, 26 injured, several houses destroyed Evangelos Florakis, Cyprus 2011 Explosion of confiscated munitions at a naval base destroyed a neighbouring power plant, 13 killed, 62 injured, widespread power-cuts, economic costs ca. 10% GDP. Sant'Angelo, Italy 2013 Explosion at a pyrotechnics factory, 5 killed Gorni Lom, Bulgaria 2014 Munitions factory dismantling anti-personnel
3 injured, huge craters – buildings “disappeared”, debris flew up to 1 km. Modugno, Italy 2015 Explosion at a pyrotechnics factory, 6 killed
primary responsibility to take all measures necessary to prevent the
responsible for the inspection and enforcement activities to ensure that operators comply with their responsibilities. Also responsible for land-use planning.
exists between EU, OECD, UN-ECE, UNEP, ILO, WHO, ICCA (industry associations) to share experience and exchange good practice and lessons learned.
Initiator Consequence
Incident*
Consequence Consequence Initiator Initiator Initiator Initiator Preventative measures Limiting measures Barrier
* Release of energy or
hazardous substance
Understanding the inherent risks in the chemicals and their reactions Principles of inherent safety Design and construction of the plant and equipment Control and alarm systems Qualification and training of personnel Planing and execution of maintenance and inspection
Secondary and tertiary containment Fire protection systems including fire-fighting crews Physical barriers to protect against fire & blast
Dow Fire & Explosion Index Hazard and operability Study (HAZOP) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
Responsibilities, Processes and Procedures Management of Change (MoC) Continual Control Process, Senior Management Review
Initiator Consequence
Incident*
Consequence Consequence Initiator Initiator Initiator Initiator Preventative measures Limiting measures Barrier
* Potential for impact
environment
FLOOD causes consequences Exceptional amount
Water level rise in neighbouring countries Damage to the defenses/dam cut Flooding/isolation of settlement Damage to critical infrastructures Damage to buildings Using reservoirs Dam cut Sudden snow melt
TOP EVENT
Using sand bags Dam cut Strengthening of defenses (dam)
Safety barriers Safety barriers
Using sand bags Source: Hungarian DRA by ZGyenes
hazard?
Management systems to provide robustness?
Data and information exchange between authorities to be able to “discover change”
support the planning for disasters? – Recognising that systems will fail.
chains and develop lessons learned?
Which disasters / major accidents / hazardous incidents should we be recording? What should the data look like, e.g. Loss Data Initiative? What is the natural & humanitarian disaster equivalent to eMARS?
the disaster risk management framework (Sendai)
accident risk management.
prevent exposure to hazards are an effective step in preventing loss of life, damage to property and the environment.
systems can and will fail and strategic planning is necessary.