JPOs initiatives Commissioner Akira Matsunaga November 7th 2019 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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JPOs initiatives Commissioner Akira Matsunaga November 7th 2019 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

JPOs initiatives Commissioner Akira Matsunaga November 7th 2019 Table of Contents 1. Background 2. JPOs Initiatives (1) Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) (2) Hantei Advisory -Opinion


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SLIDE 1

JPO’s initiatives

Commissioner Akira Matsunaga

November 7th 2019

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SLIDE 2
  • 1. Background
  • 2. JPO’s Initiatives

(1) Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) (2) “Hantei” Advisory-Opinion System to Judge the Standard Essentiality of Patents

  • 3. Open Questions

Table of Contents

1

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SLIDE 3
  • 1. Background
  • 2. JPO’s Initiatives

(1) Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) (2) “Hantei” Advisory-Opinion System to Judge the Standard Essentiality of Patents

  • 3. Open Questions

2

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SLIDE 4

3

Imminent Issue on SEPs: Changes in Licensing Negotiations

Telecom company vs Telecom company

In the Past

Telecomm company vs Company in other business

In IoT Era

Disputes/Negotiations among ICT companies Disputes/Negotiations among parties from different business Cross-licensing Perspectives on licensing rates

Almost consistent Significantly different

Perspectives on Essentiality

Can be easily evaluated by parties Difficult for licensees to evaluate Possible Difficult

Suppliers

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SLIDE 5

Source: Made by the JPO based on “the SEP Guide”, “Research Report on Actual State of How Disputes over SEPs Were Being Resolved”, and various news reports. 4

Disputes over SEPs Arising in Numerous Countries

China

National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) v. Qualcomm Iwncomm v. Sony Huawei v. Samsung

Japan

Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) v. Qualcomm Apple v. Samsung

U.K.

Unwired Planet v. Huawei Conversant Wireless Licensing v. Huawei

EU

European Commission v. Qualcomm Huawei v. ZTE

Germany

Nokia v. Daimler Sisvel v. Haier

U.S.

Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Continental Automotive v. Avanci et al. Core Wireless Licensing v. Apple CSIRO v. Cisco Apple v. Qualcomm HTC v. Ericsson

 Continental Automotive v. Avanci et al case (U.S. District Court in California in 2019)  Nokia v. Daimler case (Germany, Regional Court in 2019)

Major Lawsuits and Administrative Actions Concerning SEPs Disputes Arising among Different business

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SLIDE 6

JPO’s Initiatives to Deal with SEP Issues

 The environment surrounding SEPs is undergoing a great change as the wider use of the IoT.  The range of parties involved in licensing negotiations has been expanding to companies in various business.

 “Guide to Licensing Negotiations involving Standard Essential”  “Hantei on SEPs”

Background

5

JPO’s Initiatives

 Perspectives on reasonable licensing rates are different in licensing negotiations between telecommunications business and other business.  It is difficult to resolve disputes through cross-licensing.  When disputes are arising among parties from different business in decisions on whether or not patents at issue are based on the essential standards, the parties may fail to reach an agreement.

Issues to Be Solved

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SLIDE 7
  • 1. Background
  • 2. JPO’s Initiatives

(1) Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) (2) “Hantei” Advisory-Opinion System to Judge the Standard Essentiality of Patents

  • 3. Open Questions

6

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SLIDE 8
  • I. Purposes of the Guide

 Aiming to ・ Enhance transparency and predictability ・ Facilitate negotiations between rights holders and implementers ・ Help prevent or quickly resolve disputes concerning SEPs  Not Recipes (Not legally binding, Not intended to be prescriptive)

  • II. Licensing Negotiation Methods
  • A. Good Faith

 Desirable acts  Specific examples of actions in bad faith

  • B. Efficiency

 Factors in terms of enhancing the efficiency of licensing negotiations  Who in the supply chain should be the main entity?

  • III. Royalty Calculation Methods
  • A. Reasonable Royalties

 How to determine the royalty basis  How to determine royalty rates

  • B. Non-discriminatory Royalties

 Is a use-based license discriminatory?

  • C. Other Factors

 Methods for paying royalties

7

Overview of the Guide

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SLIDE 9
  • I. Purposes of the Guide

 Aiming to ・ Enhance transparency and predictability ・ Facilitate negotiations between rights holders and implementers ・ Help prevent or quickly resolve disputes concerning SEPs  Not Recipes (Not legally binding, Not intended to be prescriptive)

  • II. Licensing Negotiation Methods
  • A. Good Faith

 Desirable acts  Specific examples of actions in bad faith

  • B. Efficiency

 Factors in terms of enhancing the efficiency of licensing negotiations  Who in the supply chain should be the main entity?

  • III. Royalty Calculation Methods
  • A. Reasonable Royalties

 How to determine the royalty basis  How to determine royalty rates

  • B. Non-discriminatory Royalties

 Is a use-based license discriminatory?

  • C. Other Factors

 Methods for paying royalties

8

Overview of the Guide

Based on the framework suggested by the ECJ

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SLIDE 10

 Based on the framework suggested by the European Court of Justice (Huawei v. ZTE case, 2015), the Guide summarizes factors that parties should consider at each stage in the negotiation process.

  • Rights holders do not provide any claim

charts.

  • Rights holders do not provide any claim

charts to the implementers.

  • Implementers unreasonably have

delayed negotiations

  • Implementers refuse to conclude any

confidentiality agreement.

9

Stages in Licensing Negotiations and Good Faith Negotiations

  • 1. Offer

licensing negotiations

  • 2. Express

willingness to

  • btain a

license

  • 3. Offer

FRAND terms

  • 4. Present

Counteroffers

  • n FRAND

terms Right Holder Implementer Lawsuits or ADRs

Stages in Licensing Negotiations SEP Right Holder’s Argument

End-Product Manufacturer’s Argument

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SLIDE 11
  • I. Purposes of the Guide

 Aiming to ・ Enhance transparency and predictability ・ Facilitate negotiations between rights holders and implementers ・ Help prevent or quickly resolve disputes concerning SEPs  Not Recipes (Not legally binding, Not intended to be prescriptive)

  • II. Licensing Negotiation Methods
  • A. Good Faith

 Desirable acts  Specific examples of actions in bad faith

  • B. Efficiency

 Factors in terms of enhancing the efficiency of licensing negotiations  Who in the supply chain should be the main entity?

  • III. Royalty Calculation Methods
  • A. Reasonable Royalties

 How to determine the royalty basis  How to determine royalty rates

  • B. Non-discriminatory Royalties

 Is a use-based license discriminatory?

  • C. Other Factors

 Methods for paying royalties

10

Overview of the Guide

Further discussions are needed

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SLIDE 12

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Parties to Negotiate in Supply Chain

Supplier 1 Supplier 2

Offer licensing negotiation Components (e.g. TCU)

Offer licensing negotiation

Components (e.g. module)

Patent Indemnification Agreement Patent Indemnification Agreement

Supply Chain

Implementer to become a party in negotiation

Right Holder

End-Product Manufacturer

  • The Guide organizes factors to be considered, such as who in the supply chain, for

example, either end-product manufacturers or parts manufacturers, should be the main entity in concluding any licensing agreements.

  • License to all
  • Access for all

SEP Right Holder’s Argument

End-Product Manufacturer’s Argument

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SLIDE 13

Smallest Salable Patent Practicing Unit (SSPPU) Approach Entire Market Value (EMV) Approach

SEP Right Holder’s Argument

End-Product Manufacturer’s Argument

 The Guide organizes factors to be considered in determining the basis for calculating royalties, i.e., the prices of individual parts or prices of completed end-products.

Royalty Base: EMV and SSPPU

12

Chips Communi- cation Modules Telematics Control Unit (TCU) End products

Essential part of SEP technology Relation between Contribution

  • f SEP and Royalty Base
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SLIDE 14
  • 1. Background
  • 2. JPO’s Initiatives

(1) Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) (2) “Hantei” Advisory-Opinion System to Judge the Standard Essentiality of Patents

  • 3. Open Questions

13

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SLIDE 15

Standard

Advisory Opinion “Hantei” for Essentiality Check

14 Request for Advisory Opinion

(Specify subject product/process (allegedly infringing product/process), etc., Compare/explain claims of the patented invention and the subject product/process)

Reply Proceedings by Administrative Judge Panel

(Compare/determine claims of the patented invention and the subject product/process, etc.)

 JPO began providing advisory opinion “Hantei” for essentiality check on April 1st, 2018 for the purpose of early dispute resolution of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs)

Demandant Demandee

Advisory Opinion “Hantei”

Advisory Opinion (The Virtual Subject Article, etc. falls or does not fall within the technical scope of the patented invention)

Essentiality Check Utilizing the “Hantei” System

Request for Advisory Opinion

(Specify Virtual Subject Article (Virtual Object), etc. that is compliant with the standard, Compare/explain claims of the patented invention and the Virtual Subject Article)

Reply Proceedings by Administrative Judge Panel

(Compare/determine claims of the patented invention and the Virtual Subject Article, etc.)

Advisory Opinion (The subject product/process, etc. falls or does not fall within the technical scope of the patented invention)

If Hantei is concluded that the Virtual Subject Article, etc. “falls” within the technical scope of the patented invention => It is possible to determine that the patented invention is “essential” to the standards

  • a. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
  • b. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
  • c. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・

the technical scope of the patented invention

  • a. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
・・・・・・・・・・・・
  • b. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
・・・・・・・・・・・・
  • c. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
・・・・・・・・・・・・
  • a. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
  • b. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
  • c. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・

configuration of Virtual Object Virtual Object

the technical scope of the patented invention

  • a. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
・・・・・・・・
  • b. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
・・・・・・・・
  • c. ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
・・・・・・・・

configuration of allegedly infringing product/process allegedly infringing product/process

Demandee Demandant

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SLIDE 16
  • 1. Background
  • 2. JPO’s Initiatives

(1) Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) (2) “Hantei” Advisory-Opinion System to Judge the Standard Essentiality of Patents 3.Open Questions

15

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SLIDE 17
  • I. Purposes of the Guide

 Aiming to ・ Enhance transparency and predictability ・ Facilitate negotiations between rights holders and implementers ・ Help prevent or quickly resolve disputes concerning SEPs  Not Recipes (Not legally binding, Not intended to be prescriptive)

  • II. Licensing Negotiation Methods
  • A. Good Faith

 Desirable acts  Specific examples of actions in bad faith

  • B. Efficiency

 Factors in terms of enhancing the efficiency of licensing negotiations

 Who in the supply chain should be the main entity?

  • III. Royalty Calculation Methods
  • A. Reasonable Royalties

How to determine the royalty basis

 How to determine royalty rates

  • B. Non-discriminatory Royalties

 Is a use-based license discriminatory?

  • C. Other Factors

 Methods for paying royalties

16

Overview of the Guide

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SLIDE 18

Q1: Which kind of considerations would affect whether SSPPU or EMV?

 HTC v. Ericsson (US, 2019) The IPR policy of the ETSI neither requests nor excludes any FRAND license using royalty based on the SSPPU approach.  FTC v. Qualcomm (US, 2019) Qualcomm must make SEP license available to modem-chip suppliers on FRNAD terms.

Q: What kind of considerations would affect whether the SSPPU approach

  • r EMV approach should be used?

Which do SEPs technology contribute to, End-products or Chips?

Basis for calculating royalties is to be identified based on the part to which the essential part

  • f the SEP technology contributes to the end-

product.

Chips Commu- nication module

Telematics Control Unit (TCU)

End- products Essential part of SEP technology 17

Relation between Contribution

  • f SEP and Royalty Base
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SLIDE 19

Q2: Who in the supply chain should be the main entity?

Q: For the supply chain side, who should be the main entity in licensing negotiations with the SEP owner to facilitate licensing negotiations efficiently?

18

 A supply chain consisting of end-product manufacture and two suppliers of Tier1 and Tier2.  Communication module is being manufactured by Tier2  Patent indemnification obligation agreements are concluded between the end-product manufacture, supplier Tier1, and supplies Tier2, under each of which suppliers bear the payments of licensing fees.

Case

Supplier 1 Supplier 2

Components (e.g. TCU)

Offer licensing negotiation

Components (e.g. module)

Patent Indemnification Agreement Patent Indemnification Agreement

Supply Chain

Right Holder

End-Product Manufacturer

Implementer to become a party in negotiation

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SLIDE 20

Q3: Who should determine the allocation of the licensing fees among the supply chain?

Q: Who should determine the allocation of the licensing fees among the supply chain?

19

 A supply chain consisting of end-product manufacture and two suppliers of Tier1 and Tier2.  Communication module is being manufactured by Tier2  Patent indemnification obligation agreements are concluded between the end-product manufacture, supplier Tier1, and supplies Tier2, under each of which suppliers bear the payments of licensing fees.

Case

Supplier 1 Supplier 2

Components (e.g. TCU) Components (e.g. module)

Patent Indemnification Agreement Patent Indemnification Agreement

Supply Chain

Implementer to become a party in negotiation

Right Holder

End-Product Manufacturer

+

 Negotiations between end-product manufacturer and Right holder. Offer licensing negotiation

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Questions Being Raised

  • The 4G and 5G telecommunications technologies are

becoming widely used.

  • Licensing negotiations have become more complicated.
  • Different types of business without any common

background are conducting licensing negotiations.

  • Difficult to reach a consensus on the essential issue of to

what extent each player contributes to creating added value by using the 4G and 5G telecommunications technologies.

20

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Questions Being Raised

Consumers

Telecom Energy

Common parts and appliers

・・・

Industrial infra-structure

to what extent each player contributes to creating added value

End-product manufactures Service business

IT companies ×

Smart agriculture Automobile Factory Smart house

End-product manufactures/ service business

Create added value

In the age of the IoT,

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SLIDE 23

Expectations for Further Discussions

  • Various parties with conflicting interests are negotiating licensing

agreements involving SEPs. > not easy to resolve disputes over licensing negotiations.

  • Evaluate the value of 4G and 5G technologies.
  • Evaluate how much 4G and 5G technologies have contributed to

creating the entire added value of new technologies and innovative products.

  • Discuss these evaluations from the broad perspectives.
  • Promote a multi-stakeholder process in which various stakeholders

discuss together such as business, academia and government.

22

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