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CDM in Departure Sequencing with Adapted Rubinstein Protocol Vitor - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM in Departure Sequencing with Adapted Rubinstein Protocol Vitor Filincowsky Ribeiro University of Bras lia UnB Computer Science Department


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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks

CDM in Departure Sequencing with Adapted Rubinstein Protocol

Vitor Filincowsky Ribeiro

University of Bras´ ılia – UnB Computer Science Department – CIC Air Transportation Research Lab – Translab

Bras´ ılia, August 21th 2015

Vitor F. Ribeiro CoDMAN 21/08/2015 1 / 51

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks

Agenda

1 Introduction 2 Theoretical Foundations 3 CoDMAN 4 Simulations and Results 5 Conclusion remarks

Vitor F. Ribeiro CoDMAN 21/08/2015 2 / 51

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Introduction

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Airport infrastructure

Significant increase of pax movement in the Brazilian airports

  • Avg. 10% per year in the past decade

Challenge: prevent congestion in the terminals Bottleneck: application of constraining measures Consequences: increase of costs associated to delays

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Airport infrastructure

TWR Operations Departing order and separation time between aircraft Auxiliary computer systems No decision support so far Results depend exclusively on the controller’s expertise

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Motivation

Necessity of an efficient departure management Intelligent slot allocation Dynamic adjustments in the departure queue Fairness in delay costs distribution Bargaining Complex procedure

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Motivation

Negotiation among the agents: no documented slot allocation solution

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Motivation

Negotiation among the agents: no documented slot allocation solution Proposal: computational model for departure management in the airports Game Theory Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) Collaborative Departure Management - CoDMAN

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Objectives

Major objective Provide a computational model for an efficient departure management in the airports

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Objectives

Major objective Provide a computational model for an efficient departure management in the airports What do we need: Development of a system which implements CDM for aircraft queuing prior departure

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Specific objectives

Simulation of critical scenarios found in the airports under distinct demand conditions

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Specific objectives

Simulation of critical scenarios found in the airports under distinct demand conditions Development of a CDM-based queuing algorithm

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Motivation Objectives

Specific objectives

Simulation of critical scenarios found in the airports under distinct demand conditions Development of a CDM-based queuing algorithm Development of a slot allocation methodology using negotiation among the agents in Game Theory

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Theoretical Foundations

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Collaborative Decision Making

Collaborative Decision Making Joint operation among all impacted entities Fairness in cost distribution Sharing of complete and up-to-date information

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

A-CDM

Airport Collaborative Decision Making Capacity and traffic flow management in the airport scope Delay reduction and increase of predictability of events Resource usage optimization

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Game Theory

Mathematical approach for interest conflicts or cooperation in interactive situations Individuals or sets (agents) in a game are entities that should adopt a given behaviour Status progression consists in agents decisions or in results of probabilistic events

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Multiagent games

Formal description of strategic situations Actions of the agents are interdependent Randomness of agents decisions is granted by mixed strategies

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Multiagent games

Cooperative vs Non-cooperative games

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Multiagent games

Cooperative vs Non-cooperative games Every situation can be mapped into a real number (payoff ) which express the players’ preference or interest Payoff function

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Multiagent games

Cooperative vs Non-cooperative games Every situation can be mapped into a real number (payoff ) which express the players’ preference or interest Payoff function The player’s goal is maximize its payoff function The next scenario should be as favourable as possible

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Nash Equilibrium

All players act in order to maximize their payoff Agents observe or try to predict the actions of the other players Every choice made by a player is the best response given the choices of the other players A player cannot unilaterally alter its strategy and obtain a greater payoff Central solution in strategic equilibrium

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Rubinstein Protocol

Negotiation among agents Complete information about the actors Alternate offers protocol Iterations consist in the evaluation of the opponent’s offer Acceptance, new offer proposition, negotiation abandonment

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CDM Game Theory

Rubinstein Protocol

Negotiation among agents Complete information about the actors Alternate offers protocol Iterations consist in the evaluation of the opponent’s offer Acceptance, new offer proposition, negotiation abandonment Final offer arbitration Unsuccessful negotiation Control entity applies one of the previous valid offers

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

The CoDMAN System

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Collaborative Departure MANagement

Main tasks Collaborative functionality under CDM principles Framework for real-time attendance and tactical decision support about usage of resources on ground Search for an optimum departure sequence by the aircraft

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

CoDMAN Operation

Access to operational attributes of the aircraft Interface with real-time data provision systems Exploitation of agents’ rationality Part of the controller’s responsibility is transferred

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Game Theory in CoDMAN System

Departure sequencing is a basic allocation problem Each agent must be provided complete and up-to-date information Agents are the aircraft which negotiate with each other the slot occupancy In ATFM context, flights are agents that work in order to maximize their efficiency

Delay costs reduction Individual actions conditioned to behaviour of other agents

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Game Theory in CoDMAN System

Initial departure queue is established according to the flight plans Manipulations in the queue take advantage of free slots and try to preserve the primary departure order Responsive actions

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Game Theory in CoDMAN System

Environment composed by n players Specific payoff function

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Game Theory in CoDMAN System

Environment composed by n players Specific payoff function Nash Equilibrium convergence Global stability point Isolated actions do not yield better individual results

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Mathematical model

Two main categories of agents Aircraft: search for the accomplishment of the scheduled take-off and landing times Airport: prevention of saturation situations conditioned to current capacity and safe operation of all flights

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Scenario modeling

Operational parameters of airport and TMA

F: set of active flight in airport and TMA aircraft on ground (Fg), landed included (F −

g )

airborne aircraft (Fa), departed included (F −

a )

Ip: airport capacity parking slots (I f

p )

runways (I r

p)

Ca(t): landing capacity in instant t Cd(t): departing capacity in instant t Qa: set of aircraft in TMA waiting authorization for landing Qd: set of aircraft in land waiting authorization for take-off K: total delay cost

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Scenario modeling

Departing capacity is defined by the amount of aircraft that can be delivered Cd(t) = I r

p −

Ia(t) + Id(t)

  • (1)

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Scenario modeling

Departing capacity is defined by the amount of aircraft that can be delivered Cd(t) = I r

p −

Ia(t) + Id(t)

  • (1)

Landing capacity is defined by airport instant capacity Ca(t) = min{I f

p − F − g , I r p −

Ia(t) + Id(t) }

(2)

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Scenario modeling

Departing capacity is defined by the amount of aircraft that can be delivered Cd(t) = I r

p −

Ia(t) + Id(t)

  • (1)

Landing capacity is defined by airport instant capacity Ca(t) = min{I f

p − F − g , I r p −

Ia(t) + Id(t) }

(2) Total delay cost is defined by the sum of the individual costs K =

n

  • i=1

ki (3)

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Aircraft modeling

Aircraft attributes

td

i : original departure time allocated to an aircraft;

ta

i : calculated arrival time at the destination airport;

vi: cruise speed; tf

i : estimated flight time until arriving to the final destination;

ci: aircraft max occupancy, in number of passengers; Di: maximum delay acceptable to an aircraft, expressed in minutes; pi: number of passengers onboard an aircraft; Bi: size of an aircraft, expressed as a real number in [1.0, 3.0]; wi: aircraft wingspan; σi: significance of an aircraft, expressed as a positive real number; li: the actual delay imposed on an aircraft, expressed in minutes; ki: actual weighted individual cost, i.e., the payoff function of the aircraft.

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Aircraft modeling

Aircraft significance is defined by pax, size and distance to the destination airport σi = vitf

i

Bi wi pi ci (4)

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Aircraft modeling

Aircraft significance is defined by pax, size and distance to the destination airport σi = vitf

i

Bi wi pi ci (4) Weighted cost of individual delay is based on the aircraft significance ki = li Di σi (5)

Aircraft with greater significance are those which present greater operational costs

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Slot Negotiation

First moment: FIFO order Scenario assessment Opportunity to adjust the departure slots according to individual interests Knowledge about the other agents favours the cooperative behaviour

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Basic slot allocation flowchart

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Slot Negotiation

Possible actions during the negotiation Advance (adv): an earlier slot is offered to the opponent Delay (del): opponent receives the offer of delaying its push-back time in order to relinquish its slot to the proponent Swap (swp): opponent is asked to swap its slot with the

  • proponent. The parcially collaborative characteristic favours

this decision

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Slot Negotiation

Possible answers to the offers Accept (acc): opponent accepts the proposal and earns the proper payoff Reject (rej): opponents rejects the offer and both shall accept the arbiter intervention Counter-offer (ctr): opponent calculates another counter-offer, restarting the bargaining process and turning into the active agent

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Departure queue checkup process for negotiation

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Slot Negotiation

Eagerness gradient γ = w max(w, tobt − tcur) (6)

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Slot Negotiation

Eagerness gradient γ = w max(w, tobt − tcur) (6) Discount factor δ = 1 + γ1γ2 (7)

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks CoDMAN Operation Game Theory in CoDMAN System Implementation

Rubinstein model adapted to CoDMAN

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

Simulations and Results

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

Scenario description

Bras´ ılia International Airport (SBBR) Yard: 40 aircraft Runways for departure and landing: 2 Both runways can be simultaneously used

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

FIRs in Brazil (FIR-BS evidenced)

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

Case 1: Strategic allocation

Attribute Before After Flights out of schedule 35 36 Avg delay for delayed aircraft 3.48 minutes 3.26 minutes Avg cost for delayed aircraft 643.95 476.193 Total delay 73 minutes 62 minutes Std deviation for delays 0.92 1.05 Std deviation for delay costs 229.17 182.43 Total delay costs 13522.9 9047.67 Avg cost per delayed aircraft decreased 26% Total scenario cost decreased 33%

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

Case 2: Dynamic allocation

Attribute Before After Ground Holding measures 7 6 Airborne Holding measures 2 2 Flights out of schedule 43 45 Avg delay for delayed aircraft 2 minutes 1.66 minutes Avg cost for delayed aircraft 385.884 272.286 Total delay 86 minutes 73 minutes Std deviation for delays 0.98 1.04 Std deviation for delay costs 264.16 199.41 Total delay costs 16593 11980.6 Total scenario cost decreased 27.8%

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

Case 3: Runway reduction

Virtual reduction of airport infrastructure to only one runway Impact Qtd. Departures 201 Landings 229 Total flights processed 515 Ground Holding application 68 Airborne Holding application 32 Delayed flights 102 Airport infrastructure quickly reaches its maximum operation capacity Scenario degradation is quite evident

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

Case 3: Runway reduction

Evaluation of degradation when one runway is removed Attribute Before After Avg delay for delayed aircraft 3.23 minutes 3.01 minutes Avg cost for delayed aircraft 595.233 544.848 Total delay 329 minutes 319 minutes Std deviation for delays 2.34 2.39 Std deviation for delay costs 570.475 523.71 Total delay costs 60713.8 56119.4 Avg increase of 65% in individual delay costs Scenario performance is almost 4x worse in terms of operational costs

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

Case 4: Runway addition

Aerodrome operates with three virtual runways Impact Qtd. Departures 202 Landings 231 Total flights processed 518 Ground Holding application Airborne Holding application Off-schedule flights 35 There was no need of constraining measures application at any time

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Scenario description Simulation scenarios

Case 4: Runway addition

Scenario optimization when a runway is added Attribute Before After Avg delay for delayed aircraft 2.09 minutes 1.69 minutes Avg cost for delayed aircraft 396.14 277.27 Total delay 73 minutes 61 minutes Std deviation for delays 0.93 0.99 Std deviation for delay costs 243.83 192.33 Total delay costs 13865 9981.53 Avg scenario cost decreased 28%

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Evaluations Research evaluation

Conclusion remarks

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Evaluations Research evaluation

Evaluations

Simulation Cost Cost Optimization scenario Before After (avg / total) Static allocation 13522.9 9047.67 26% / 33% Dynamic allocation 16593 11980.6 29.4% / 27.8% Runway reduction 60713.8 56119.4 8.5% / 7.6% Runway enhancement 13865 9981.53 30% / 28%

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Introduction Theoretical Foundations CoDMAN Simulations and Results Conclusion remarks Evaluations Research evaluation

Evaluations

Static sequencing

Decrease of 33% in sequencing costs evinces the benefits of an adequate strategic planning

Simple dynamic allocation

Optimization: 27.8% Standard deviation of the costs presented the greater reduction, evincing that this allocation is the one which distributes the delay costs among the aircraft in the better way

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Evaluations

Capacity reduction

Loss of queue maneuverability Free slots go scarce as time goes by Increase of swap offers Optimization was only 7.6% Bad cost distribution

Capacity augmentation

Optimization: 28% (best result) Despite it is a good solution, it is not realistic

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Conclusion remarks

Objectives The proposed objectives were accomplished Conclusion: a scenario modeled under the principles of CDM in fact behaves as a complete information cooperative game

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Contributions

1 Innovative solution to slot allocation problem Vitor F. Ribeiro CoDMAN 21/08/2015 50 / 51

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Contributions

1 Innovative solution to slot allocation problem 2 Aid to the decision making process by the human agent in a

complex environment

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Thank you!

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