INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVES INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVES - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

3/ 8/ 2007 3/ 8/ 2007 Opinions are of the author and not the Opinions are of the author and not the FBI FBI

INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVES INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVES MATERIAL AND NON MATERIAL AND NON-

• MATERIAL SOLUTIONS

MATERIAL SOLUTIONS

• Initiatives can be broken down into material and

Initiatives can be broken down into material and non non-

• material solutions to the information sharing

material solutions to the information sharing problem; problem;

• Large and complex issues synchronizing

Large and complex issues synchronizing software, systems, etc.; software, systems, etc.;

• Interim solutions have also evolved involving

Interim solutions have also evolved involving non non-

• material solutions

material solutions – – the Human factor; the Human factor;

• The NJTTF is an example of a non

The NJTTF is an example of a non-

• material

material solution; solution;

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National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)

Established In The Wake Of The 9/11 Attacks, the NJTTF Is A Multi-agency Task Force Consisting Of 41 Government Agencies Co-located Within The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

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NJTTF

Mission

To Enhance Communication, Coordination And

Cooperation Between Federal, State, And Local Government Agencies Representing The Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Defense, Diplomatic, Public Safety And Homeland Security Communities By Providing A Point Of Fusion for The Sharing Of Intelligence.

To Provide Program Oversight Of The JTTFs. To Provide Operational Support To CTD By Providing A

Platform For Nationwide Intelligence and Trend Analysis Projects.

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BARRIERS TO INFORMATION SHARING BARRIERS TO INFORMATION SHARING

TECHNOLOGICAL INCOMPATABILITY, HUMAN TECHNOLOGICAL INCOMPATABILITY, HUMAN NATURE NATURE,

, ORGANIZATIONAL/CULTURAL

ORGANIZATIONAL/CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, AND SYSTEMIC HURDLES DIFFERENCES, AND SYSTEMIC HURDLES

• COMPUTER PROGRAMMI NG I NCOMPATABI LI TI ES

COMPUTER PROGRAMMI NG I NCOMPATABI LI TI ES ARE ONE DI MENSI ON OF THE PROBLEM; ARE ONE DI MENSI ON OF THE PROBLEM;

• A SECOND DI MENSI ON I NVOLVES

A SECOND DI MENSI ON I NVOLVES HUMAN NATURE HUMAN NATURE W HI CH TRADI TI ONALLY RESI STS CHANGE; W HI CH TRADI TI ONALLY RESI STS CHANGE;

• ORGANI ZATI ONAL AUTHORI TI ES REI NFORCE

ORGANI ZATI ONAL AUTHORI TI ES REI NFORCE I NFORMATI ON SEGREGATI ON I NFORMATI ON SEGREGATI ON -

• -
• AND BREEDS A

AND BREEDS A CULTURAL TENDENCY NOT TO SHARE CULTURAL TENDENCY NOT TO SHARE OVER TI ME OVER TI ME LEADI NG TO A THI RD DI MENSI ONAL PROBLEM; LEADI NG TO A THI RD DI MENSI ONAL PROBLEM;

• FI NALLY, ORGANI ZATI ONAL AUTHORI TI ES AND

FI NALLY, ORGANI ZATI ONAL AUTHORI TI ES AND POLI CI ES PROHI BI T SHARI NG I N SPECI FI C POLI CI ES PROHI BI T SHARI NG I N SPECI FI C CI RCUMSTANCES CI RCUMSTANCES --

• W HI CH I S A FOURTH

W HI CH I S A FOURTH DI MENSI ON AND A DI MENSI ON AND A SYSTEMI C PROBLEM; SYSTEMI C PROBLEM;

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THE CURRENT FOCUS OF EFFORT TO SOLVE THE CURRENT FOCUS OF EFFORT TO SOLVE THE INFORMATION SHARING PROBLEM THE INFORMATION SHARING PROBLEM

• THE MAJORITY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO

THE MAJORITY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO ENABLE GREATER INFORMATION SHARING ENABLE GREATER INFORMATION SHARING CENTERS ON SOLVING THE TECHNOLOGICAL CENTERS ON SOLVING THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEM; PROBLEM;

• WHILE MONUMENTAL BY ITSELF, SOLVING THIS

WHILE MONUMENTAL BY ITSELF, SOLVING THIS PROBLEM MAY PROBLEM MAY NOT NOT SOLVE THE INFORMATION SOLVE THE INFORMATION SHARING DILEMMA; SHARING DILEMMA;

• THE HUMAN NATURE DIMENSION TAKES TIME

THE HUMAN NATURE DIMENSION TAKES TIME AND CAN EVENTUALLY BE RESOLVED; AND CAN EVENTUALLY BE RESOLVED;

• A SECONDARY EFFORT IS BEING MADE ON THE

A SECONDARY EFFORT IS BEING MADE ON THE CULTURAL AND SYSTEMIC FRONTS BUT THESE CULTURAL AND SYSTEMIC FRONTS BUT THESE EFFORTS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH; EFFORTS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH;

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WHY TERRORISTS SUCCEED IN THE WHY TERRORISTS SUCCEED IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

• International Law is based on relationships between

International Law is based on relationships between nation nation-

• states, individual sovereignty concepts, and

states, individual sovereignty concepts, and mutual and bilateral state agreements. mutual and bilateral state agreements.

• Sovereign authority, whether by country boundary or

Sovereign authority, whether by country boundary or agreement, is geographical in nature. agreement, is geographical in nature.

• Terrorist, asymmetric threats operate and successfully

Terrorist, asymmetric threats operate and successfully exploit the seams of international geography and exploit the seams of international geography and agreements either because nations are unwilling or agreements either because nations are unwilling or are unable to stop this threat. are unable to stop this threat.

• Authority, responsibility, and response to terrorist

Authority, responsibility, and response to terrorist threats are geographically limited unless there is threats are geographically limited unless there is close, coordinated action between nation states. close, coordinated action between nation states.

• Typically, the international ability to respond to

Typically, the international ability to respond to terrorist threats is too slow because nations are terrorist threats is too slow because nations are unwilling to compromise on sovereignty issues. unwilling to compromise on sovereignty issues.

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HOW THE U.S GOVERNMENT AND HOW THE U.S GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE SIMILAR OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE SIMILAR VULNERABILITIES VULNERABILITIES

• The U.S. and many Government

The U.S. and many Government’ ’s structures, authorities, s structures, authorities, and responsibilities are similarly segregated or aligned with and responsibilities are similarly segregated or aligned with defined roles, missions, policies, and funding lines that are defined roles, missions, policies, and funding lines that are analogous to the territorial boundaries of nation states. analogous to the territorial boundaries of nation states.

• Terrorist asymmetric threats are therefore able to operate

Terrorist asymmetric threats are therefore able to operate in these governmental gaps and seams just as they are in these governmental gaps and seams just as they are able to operate in the territorial gaps and seams of able to operate in the territorial gaps and seams of countries. countries.

• The U.S. Government

The U.S. Government ’ ’s structure and authorities are s structure and authorities are contained in the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. contained in the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947.

• The NSA of 1947 was built on a Cold

The NSA of 1947 was built on a Cold-

• War paradigm of

War paradigm of perceived conventional war and its reliance on international perceived conventional war and its reliance on international agreements founded on concepts of sovereignty. agreements founded on concepts of sovereignty.

• Governmental statutory authorities, policies, and

Governmental statutory authorities, policies, and procedures, DoD areas of responsibility for Combatant procedures, DoD areas of responsibility for Combatant Commanders, and fiscal laws governing the necessary Commanders, and fiscal laws governing the necessary funding for these endeavors are not favorably organized or funding for these endeavors are not favorably organized or structured to combat terrorist threats. structured to combat terrorist threats.

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AN INITIAL ATTEMPT AT FIXING THE SYSTEMIC PROBLEM IN THE U.S.

• The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act

provides an effort at consolidation and organization of the United States IC under one structure to combat asymmetric threats, but the necessary statutory and regulatory changes to

• perationalize this effort may not exist. (There is power for

the DNI to make policy but a shortage in methodology to conduct operations consistent with it).

• Absent organizational, statutory, and budgetary changes,

there is little incentive for governmental agencies to cooperate.

DNI

Collection, Analysis & Production I ntelligence Tradecraft System s Strategic Plans I nform ation Dom inance

Identify Define Monitor To Enable Deter Disrupt Defeat

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OUR GOVERNMENT OUR GOVERNMENT’ ’S STRUCTURE MAY S STRUCTURE MAY FACILITATE TERRORISM FACILITATE TERRORISM

• The Current U.S. Government structure,

The Current U.S. Government structure, authorities, and responsibilities are aligned with authorities, and responsibilities are aligned with defined roles and funding lines based on a cold defined roles and funding lines based on a cold-

• war mentality.

war mentality.

• Terrorist asymmetric threats are therefore able to

Terrorist asymmetric threats are therefore able to

• perate in the gaps and seams between these
• perate in the gaps and seams between these

governmental, organizational constructs. governmental, organizational constructs.

• The NSA of 1947 was built on a Cold

The NSA of 1947 was built on a Cold-

• War

War paradigm of conventional war threats and under paradigm of conventional war threats and under international agreements founded on concepts of international agreements founded on concepts of sovereignty. sovereignty.

• Statutory authorities and policies, DoD areas of

Statutory authorities and policies, DoD areas of responsibility for Combatant Commanders, and responsibility for Combatant Commanders, and fiscal requirements necessary for funding these fiscal requirements necessary for funding these structures do not favorably organize to counter structures do not favorably organize to counter terrorist threats. terrorist threats.

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THE OVERARCHING QUESTION THE OVERARCHING QUESTION

• Will solving the technological

Will solving the technological problem solve the information problem solve the information sharing dilemma? sharing dilemma?

• Is there a requirement for total

Is there a requirement for total government restructure to combat a government restructure to combat a modern terrorist threat? modern terrorist threat?

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CONCLUSION CONCLUSION

• Unless the NSA of 1947 is restructured to combat

Unless the NSA of 1947 is restructured to combat modern terrorist threats, the existing structure works modern terrorist threats, the existing structure works to the advantage of a mobile, asymmetric adversary. to the advantage of a mobile, asymmetric adversary.

• Modern examples of this vulnerability are

Modern examples of this vulnerability are demonstrated in the gaps and seams in our structure demonstrated in the gaps and seams in our structure

• f government: Jurisdictional issues surrounding Port
• f government: Jurisdictional issues surrounding Port

and border security; CONUS and OCONUS CT and border security; CONUS and OCONUS CT jurisdiction; Aviation Treaties and International jurisdiction; Aviation Treaties and International Agreements; Immigration rules ; cargo inspections Agreements; Immigration rules ; cargo inspections and the impact on trade; and all the related fiscal and and the impact on trade; and all the related fiscal and policy restraints associated with these mission areas. policy restraints associated with these mission areas.

• Just as Geographic Combatant Commanders were I

Just as Geographic Combatant Commanders were I initially reluctant to embrace the UCP changes in DoD initially reluctant to embrace the UCP changes in DoD giving SOCOM the role of GWOT planning lead, giving SOCOM the role of GWOT planning lead, Federal Governmental Agencies are as likely to resist Federal Governmental Agencies are as likely to resist incursion into traditional functional roles, missions, incursion into traditional functional roles, missions, and funding streams of their Agencies. and funding streams of their Agencies.