INTRODUCTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION MEASURES - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

16 16th

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November ember, , 2017 17

Hir iron

• nob
• bu NAKAMU

KAMURA RA, T akashi KIMURA, Katsuyuki YAMAZAKI, T akahiko KITAO, T akashi TASAKI, T

• ru IIDA

INTRODUCTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION MEASURES INCLUDING TRUSTWORTHINESS PROGRAM AT TOKAI REPROCESSING FACILITIES

T

• k
• kai

ai Re Repr process

• cessing

ing T ec echnolo hnology Dev gy Developmen elopment t Ce Center nter Japa pan n Atomic

• mic En

Ener ergy gy Age genc ncy y (J (JAEA) AEA)

In International l Confer eren ence ce on P Phy hysica ical l Protecti tion

• n of N

Nucle lear Ma Material and Nucle lear Facil ilit itie ies (In Insider Threa hreat & T Trustwo worthiness hiness)

1

• 1. Introduction

After the Great East Japan Earthquake followed by the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in 2011, Japan learned a lesson that the blackout could cause the event of severe accident. T

• develop effective security measures based on the lesson learned from such crisis

and to meet the IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) in Japan made a partial amendment of the regulations concerning the reprocessing activity in 2012 and 2016, respectively. 1.

• 1. Stren

engt gthe heni ning ng o

• f sec

ecur urit ity mea easu sures es (2012 2012 (enforce ced d by by M March 2014)) )) 2.

• 2. Int

ntrodu ductio ion o n of trus ustwo worthi hine ness ss pr progr gram (2016 2016 (en enforced in N ced in Novem embe ber 2 2017) 7))

• Promoting Nuclear Security culture
• Introduction of limited access area (LAA) and secondary central alarm station (SAS)
• Strengthening of the information control and cyber security measures
• Introduction of a new definition of vital area against explosion risk when blackout
• Introduction of 2 person rule

Following additional security measures were mainly introduced and implemented. Items with underline include measures for Insider Threat.

2

• 2. Strengthening of security measures

JAEA T

• kai reprocessing facilities that have more than 20 facilities including several

facilities classified as Category I, II and III implemented all of those security measures except for trustworthiness program by the end of March 2014. By engaging the hardware and software of security measures, our security level could be dramatically improved and enhanced.

Improvement of physical protection information control procedure Establishment of cyber security measures and introduction of security control plan Improvement of emergency response procedure Improvement of education and training JAEA T

• kai Reprocessing Facility

Implementation of the activity

• f nuclear security culture

3

What material is stored in Tokai reprocessing facility

Storage rage Faci cilitie lities

( ): Category

Storage rage Area Physi sical/ cal/ Chemi mical cal fo form rm Sabotage tage / U Unauth uthor

• riz

ized ed Re Remo moval al (UR) R) Main Plant (I) SF Pond Spent Fuel Assemblies Sabotage T anks Pu nitrate Solution Sabotage / UR T anks U nitrate Solution UR High Active Liquid Waste Storage (I) T anks High Active Liquid Waste (FP , Pu and U) Sabotage U product storage facilities (III) Room Uranium Trioxide Powder (UO3) UR Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (I) T anks Pu, U nitrate Solution Sabotage / UR Gloveboxes, Canisters MOX powder (PuO2-UO2) UR Spe pent Fu Fuel Pond U Nitrat tratio ion n T anks ks UO UO3 Powde der Pot

• t

MOX Caniste ster

Since our T

• kai reprocessing facility has a large amount of nuclear material (Pu, U) and fission product

(FP), through the frequent security assessment, high level of security should be maintained against sabotage and unauthorized removal (UR) for the viewpoint of outsider and insider threat.

Red Character: relatively high safety / security risk.

• 2. Strengthening of security measures

4

Uninte terrup rruptibl tible Power r Supp pply fo for PP sy syst stem Fe Fence ce/Came amera ra・Se Sens nsor/Fl r/Flus ush h righ ght

Inner ner area area

Protect tected ed area ea

Insp spect ction n of f pr prohibi bite ted d items ms (ID, Metal al ch check ck) Gate (Acc ccess ss C Contr trol)

• l)

App pproach ach- pr preventing ting fe fence ce

CAS Guard d station

• n

Vital tal area area

・Cybe ber Secu curity ty Plan an ・Eme merge genc ncy Proce cedu dure Ra Rando dom m pa patrol

• l

Inner ner area area

Th The r e rep epres esen entativ ive e se secur urit ity mea easu sures es be before e the he M March ch 2014

There is no limited access area and secondary central alarm station.

• 2. Strengthening of security measures

5 No Parking king except parking ing zone P P P SAS AS Uninte ninterrup ruptible le Power Su Supply for PP syst stem Limited Access ess Area Addition

• nal

Guar uard St Station Fence with Raz azor

• r barbed

d wire Camera ra・Se Sens nsor

• r/Sir

Siren en/F /Flus lush right Rando andom m patrol in each h area Protected Area ea Insp nspect ction

• n of prohibi

bited items (I (ID, , Metal and nd Explos

• sive

ve item check) Gat ate (A (Acce cess ss Control) Approa

• ach

ch- preventing ng fence

CAS Guard rd stati tion

• n

Inner ner area

New Vital Area ID check 2 person

• n rule

Veh ehic icle le Barri rrier er

Se Security Measur asures es Central al Control room Cyber Se Security Measur asures es ・Una Unaut uthori horized d access ess from external rnal Threat eat ・Cyber Se Security Plan an (E (Enha nhanced d to a all compute mputer syst stem) ・Improv

• vement

ment of

• f

emergency ncy procedur ure

Th The r e rep epres esen entativ ive e se secur urit ity mea easu sures es after er the he Ma March h 2014

(A (After ter intr trodu

• duction

ction th the security urity me measur sures es based ed on IAEA EA INF NFCIRC IRC 225 25 / Rev.5 .5) : Effective for the facility operator and security force through our security experience. RED: ED: Ne New Securi rity ty Me Measur ures

• 2. Strengthening of security measures

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• 3. Overview of Trustworthiness program in Japan

In addition to the general security measures, as on s one o e of f cou

• untermeasur

ntermeasures es fo for in r insid sider er thr hreat eat, trustworthiness program was newly introduced* in 2016, and enforced in 1st November, 2017 for the following facilities. The screening is basically implemented by business (facility) operator. Sc Scop

• pe o

e of t f the he fa facil cility ity to in

• intr

trod

• duce

uce tru rustw stwor

• rthiness

thiness pr prog

• gram

ram

• Nuclear Power Reactors (commercial including R&D stage)
• Reprocessing Facilities

Sc Scop

• pe o

e of t f the he pe person son wh who en

• enter

ter to to an and/ d/or

• r ha

hand ndle le wi with th

• T
• enter inner area (category I and II)
• T
• enter CAS (Central Alarm Station) and 2nd CAS (SAS)
• T
• handle secret information in terms of physical protection.

* The amendment of reactor and reprocessing regulation was implemented.

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Screening flow for Trustworthiness Program

Self

• De

Decl clarat ratio ion With offic ficial ial Ce Certificat cate

Judgement of Entry by manager OK

NG Temporary Entry*

Nece cessi ssity ty

• f Perm

rmane anent Entry Drug Alcohol Mental Checker

At least 2 interviewers

Documentary Examination Personality, Drug and Alcohol Test Interview

Jud udge ge

The interview is recorded by video camera

Judging Committee in JAEA

Informa

• rmatio

ion Co Control System (Registered ed and Shared ed with Japan anese e Other O Operat ator)

Deneg egati ation

• n

Suspension

Accep eptatio ation

Issue of ID card

（Valid for 5 years）

Labor Control Information

Examination Team

Claim Reply

License to enter inner area (Sample)

* * Esc

scorted d by by t the acc ccept pted d pe perso son who has a l s a lice cense se.

• 3. Trustworthiness Program

No subscription

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• 1. Name, Birthday and Nationality (official certificate)
• 2. Residence (official certificate)
• 3. Name of company with department
• 4. Academic background and work experience
• 5. Work experience and job content at atomic facility

6.

• 6. Over

Overseas seas travel avel hi hist story y (Passport)

• 7. Criminal and disciplinary background

8.

• 8. Gu

Guar ardian dian pr presen esence e or abs bsenc ence e (official certificate) 9.

• 9. Alc

lcoho hol, l, Dr Drug, ug, Me Ment ntal l st status us (medical certificate (if necessary))

• 10. Pledge of no relation with sabotage by foreign country

11.

• 11. Ple

ledge dge of no no r rel elation ation wi with t h terr erroris

• rism

m and nd a crim ime ri e ring ng in includ ludin ing g ga gang ngst ster ers 12.

• 12. Ple

ledge dge of no no fa fals lse e de decla laratio ration 13.

• 13. Ple

ledge dge of comp mplia lianc nce e and nd conf nfid identi entialit ality

Self-Declaration with official certificate

• 3. Trustworthiness Program

Official certificate issued from local governments Passport Self-Declaration Sheet Materials to be prepared

Prior to submit a self-declaration with official certificate, following subscriptions are necessary at the viewpoint of privacy protection. ・ Use se of pe perso sona nal l in inform rmat ation ion ・ Inf nform rmation ion sh sharin ing etc.

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Criteria of Judgement for screening In case that the following points are confirmed through declarations and interview, etc.

In accordance with above criteria of judgement, final screening judgement is made based on the interview results, personality, drug and alcoholic test results, etc. by Physical Protection Manager (designated by law)

• 3. Trustworthiness Program
• False Declaration
• Great difficulty by bankruptcy, etc.
• Common relation with terrorism and gangsters
• A luck of capacity to appreciate one’s situation or self-control
• Legal violations history regarding physical protection such as

sabotage or information leak

• There is some possibility for sabotage and/or information leakage

by the comprehensive judgement

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• 4. Exercise Training for Insider Threat

Insider

（Unauthorized removal of Pu nitrate samples) Metal/NM Detector （Activated)

①

②Call security force from CAS

③

④

Limited Access Area Protected Area Inner Area

Security force

Catch the insider And recover samples

CAS timely provides security force with situations. Emergency Door

JAEA planed and implemented exercise training for insider threat (unauthorized removal of Pu nitrate samples (SFM; Special Fissionable Material)) by employee last year. The image of the training was shown in the following figure. Par artici cipants f ants for

• r the tr

e trai ainin ing: g:

Facility Operators (all employees), Regulators (Nuclear Regulation Authority (safeguards and security)), Security Forces (local police and Japan Coast Guard)

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Summary of the training exercise

 Communication between CAS and security forces  Timely emergency call when CAS detects insider threat  Performance of security system (metal/SFM detector, surveillance cameras, etc.)  Identification of insider (name and section) and stolen SFM when it is found  Information collections and directions by manager of physical protection  Procedure for recovering stolen SFM In the training exercise, following abilities and capabilities were confirmed.

• Discussion among operator, regulator and security force after the exercise is

very good opportunity to review Plan-Do-Check-Action cycle.

• Operator improves physical protection measures (if necessary) in accordance

with their comments* and performs training exercise several times to keep the high degree of security level.

• This kind of training is the representative approach for safety and security

interface.

* Detailed comments cannot be described because of PP sensitive information.

• 4. Exercise Training for Insider Threat

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• 5. Promoting Nuclear Security Culture (1)

We would introduce 2 kinds of activity for the promoting security cultures that is being implemented in JAEA T

• kai Reprocessing Facility in order to keep high level of security mind.

(1) ) Case se-Study dy Edu ducatio ion Leaving key in the cabinet

Found drone crushes Physical protection coordinating section prepared ten sheets of security events that actually could happen, distributes and asks all employees in T

• kai reprocessing facility to think about

what is the risk, what action they should take, what countermeasures should be taken.

Im Impl plement ementation ation (o (onc nce e pe per ye r year) r)

• Average 5 people in one group
• Choose one sheet
• 4 steps discussion
• Submission of discussion results

(Example)

4 st step eps dis s discus ussi sion

• n
• Brain Storming of all risks
• Extract a few important risks
• Consider countermeasures
• Decide action target

(Example)

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• 5. Promoting Nuclear Security Culture (2)

(2) Ind ndic icatio ion n of a Post ster er (yea early ly) ) Since our goal is the reform of sense for the nuclear security through the many activities of nuclear security culture, it was concluded that this poster was very useful and effective to conduct our security businesses. Impo portant nt thi hing ngs a s are to e to cu cult ltiv ivate e the he sense sense of no notic icin ing. g.

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• 6. Conclusion

T

• kai reprocessing facilities introduced and implemented a lot of security

measures for hardware and software based on the Japanese regulation referred from IAEA INFCIRC225 Rev.5. Against the insider and outsider, we could establish the effective and reasonable security measures from the viewpoint of unauthorized removal and sabotage comprehensively. Trustworthiness program is enforced in 1st November 2017, it is expected that the security measures for insider would be highly strengthened. Since we are going to promote decommissioning stage, in order to conduct the decommissioning without any security events, further improvements will be implemented continuously.

Thank you very much for kind attention.