implementation 2019.12.05 PRISMA in a nutshell The PRISMA capacity - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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implementation 2019.12.05 PRISMA in a nutshell The PRISMA capacity - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CAM NC and its implementation 2019.12.05 PRISMA in a nutshell The PRISMA capacity platform offers easy access to infrastructure operators for the European energy community. 39 +640 Shippers TSOs +1700 4 Network points SSOs on the


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CAM NC and its implementation

2019.12.05

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The PRISMA capacity platform offers easy access to infrastructure operators for the European energy community.

PRISMA in a nutshell

+640

Shippers

+1700

Network points

  • n the platform

39

TSOs

4

SSOs 2

+8 +86.000

Concluded contract in 2018

+7. +7.800

Secondary trades in 2018

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SLIDE 3

Agenda

Main elements of the regulation Auction Algorithms Secondary Market Auction results

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SLIDE 4

Agenda

Main elements of the regulation Auction Algorithms Secondary Market Auction results

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What is in the CAM NC

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Most relevant obligations for capacity allocation

  • Standard capacity products (art. 9)
  • Publication and start of the auctions (from art. 11 to art. 15)
  • Allocation mechanisms: “Ascending clock auction” (art. 17) and

“Uniform-price auction” (art. 18)

  • Bundled capacity products (art. 19)
  • Capacity booking platform and secondary Market (art.37)

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Standard Capacity Products

Yearly Quarterly Monthly Daily Within-day

Balance

  • f the day

Next day Next month Max 12 months Min 5 years and max 15 years 7

  • Same products could be offered as

“firm” or as “interruptible” capacity

  • All available capacity shall be offered

bundled

Ascending clock Uniform price

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SLIDE 8

ENTSOG Auction calendar

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Organization of WD products

16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 11:00 04:00 05:00 07:00 09:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 17:00 18:00 16:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 06:00 04:00 05:00 Gas Day D Gas Day D-1

24h 24h 24h 24h 23h 23h 22h 22h 21h 21h 20h 20h 19h 19h 18h 18h 17h 17h 16h 16h 15h 15h 14h 14h 13h 13h 12h 12h 11h 11h 10h 10h 9h 9h 8h 8h 7h 7h 6h 6h 5h 5h 4h 4h 3h 3h 2h 2h 1h 1h

  • Day-ahead auction for the product runtime of the

next gas day takes place everyday at 16:30 CE(S)T

  • The first within-day auction has the same

product runtime (06:00-06:00) and it starts at 19:00 CE(S)T

  • Every consecutive within-day auctions starts at

full hour and lasts for 30 minutes.

  • The last Within-day auction starts at 01:00 for

the product runtime of 05:00 – 06:00 (the same gas day)

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Agenda

Main elements of the regulation Auction Algorithms Secondary Market Auction results

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Auction algorithms

Ascending clock

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

Price Available capacity

1 2 3 1 2 3

Amount

  • Demand and available

capacity

  • Defined price steps
  • Ascending price

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • There are different possible behaviors
  • Example 1: Undersell in first bidding round
  • Example 2: Clearance in first bidding round
  • Example 3: Oversell
  • Example 4: Undersell

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Ascending Clock

Example 1: Undersell in 1st bidding round

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

Example 1: Undersell in 1st bidding round

  • Round 0.0, RT
  • Less demand than available

capacity

  • Auction closes after Round

0.0

  • Only RT will be charged

B1 B2 B3 Price Amount

  • avail. capacity
  • 1. bidding

round (0.0)

P0 Legend:

P0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

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Ascending Clock

Example 2: Clearance in first bidding round

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

Example 2: Clearance in first bidding round

  • Round 0.0, only Regulated

Tariff (RT) applies

  • The available capacity is

fully requested by the four participants

  • The auction closes after

round 0.0

  • Only RT will be charged

B1 B2 B3 B4 Price Amount

  • avail. capacity
  • 1. bidding

round (0.0)

P0 Legend:

P0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

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Ascending Clock

Example 3: Oversell

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • Round 0.0, RT
  • More demand than available

capacity (oversell)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 Price

  • 1. bidding

round (0.0)

Amount

  • avail. capacity

P0 Legend:

P0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

Example 3: Oversell

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • Round 1.0, RT + 1 large price

step (LPS)

  • B3 reduced bid
  • B5 dropped out
  • Still an oversell situation

P0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B6

  • 2. bidding

round (1.0)

P1 B4 B6 Price Amount

  • avail. capacity
  • 1. bidding

round (0.0)

B1 B2 B3 B5 Legend:

P0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

Example 3: Oversell

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • Round 2.0, RT + 2 LPSs
  • B4 reduces their bid
  • B6 drops out
  • Perfect sell-out
  • The auction closes after

round 2.0 with RT + 2 LPSs applied

Price

  • 1. bidding

round (0.0)

  • 3. bidding

round (0.0)

B1 B2 B3 B4 P2

Example 3: Oversell

Amount

  • avail. capacity

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 P0 P1 Legend:

P0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

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Ascending Clock

Example 4: Undersell

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • Round 0.0, RT
  • More demand than available

capacity (oversell)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 Price

  • 1. bidding

round (0.0)

Amount

  • avail. capacity

P0 Legend:

P0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

Example 4: Undersell

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • Round 1.0, RT + 1 large price

step (LPS)

  • B3 reduced bid
  • B5 dropped out
  • Still an oversell situation

B1 B2 B3 B4 B6

  • 2. bidding

round (1.0)

P1 B4 B6 Price Amount

  • avail. capacity
  • 1. bidding

round (0.0)

B1 B2 B3 B5 Legend:

P0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

Example 4: Undersell

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Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • Round 2.0, RT + 2 LPSs
  • B4 and B6 drop out
  • This results in an undersell

Price

  • 1. bidding

round (0.0)

  • 3. bidding

round (2.0)

B1 B2 B3 P2 Amount

  • avail. capacity

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 P0 P1 Legend:

P0 Price step (P0 =Regulated Tariff) B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

Example 4: Undersell

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SLIDE 26

B1 B2 B3 B4

Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • Previous LPS (2.0) is reversed
  • 1st small price step (SMP) is

added to RT + 1 LPS

  • This is now Round 1.1, RT +

1LPS + 1SMP

  • B4 is back in
  • B1, B2 & B3 have to bid min. P1

amount

  • Oversell

Price

  • 2. bidding

round (1.0)

Amount

  • avail. capacity

B1 B2 P1 P2 Legend:

P0 Price step (P0 =Regulated Tariff) B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

Example 4: Undersell

B3 B4 B6 P1.1

  • 3. bidding

round (2.0)

  • 3. bidding

round (1.1)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 P0

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B1 B2 B3 B4

Auction algorithm – Ascending clock

  • Round 1.2, RT + 1LPS + 2SMPs
  • B4 reduces their requested

capacity

  • B1, B2 & B3 still have to stick to

their capacity

  • Auction closes with perfect

sell-out

  • RT + 1LPS + 2SMPs will be

charged

Price

  • 2. bidding

round (1.0)

Amount

  • avail. capacity

B1 B2 P1 P2 Legend:

P0 Price step (P0 =Regulated Tariff) B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n

Example 4: Undersell

B3 B4 B6 P1.1

  • 3. bidding

round (2.0)

B1 P1.2 B2 B3 B4

  • 4. bidding

round (1.2)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 P0

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Bearing in mind

  • Participation in first bidding round
  • Ratio between the total demand and the available capacity
  • Amount of the bid

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Auction algorithms

Uniform price

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Auction algorithm – Uniform price

  • There are different possible behaviors
  • Example 1: Fill procedure
  • Example 2: Kill procedure
  • Example 3: Pro-rata allocation
  • Example 4: Demand lower than available capacity

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  • Uniform price auctions only

have one bidding round

  • Bids contain a surcharge, a

minimum and a maximum capacity amount

  • Evaluation and allocation of

capacity is done after the bidding round is closed

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount

Amount Surcharge

Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend:

Basics

Clearing Price

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Uniform Price

Example 1: Fill Procedure

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C

  • During evaluation, overdemand

is detected

  • A & B get full amounts because
  • f the higher surcharge
  • C’s maximum exceeds

available capacity

  • C’s maximum is cut to fill the

remaining capacity

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend: Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C

Example 1: Fill procedure

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C C

  • During evaluation, overdemand

is detected

  • A & B get full amounts because
  • f the higher surcharge
  • C’s maximum exceeds

available capacity

  • C’s maximum is cut to fill the

remaining capacity

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend: Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C

Example 1: Fill procedure

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C

  • Bid with minimum surcharge

that gets capacity sets clearing price for the auction

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend: Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C

Example 1: Fill procedure

Clearing Price

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Uniform Price

Example 2: Kill Procedure

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D D C

  • During evaluation, overdemand

is detected

  • A & B get full amounts because
  • f the higher surcharge
  • C’s Minimum exceeds

available capacity

  • C’s bid is killed and D is cut and

used to fill the remaining capacity

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend: Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C Maximum amount Shipper D Minimum amount Shipper D

Example 2: Kill procedure

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D

  • Bid with minimum surcharge

that gets capacity sets clearing price for the auction (D)

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend: Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C Maximum amount Shipper D Minimum amount Shipper D

Example 2: Kill procedure

Clearing Price

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Uniform Price

Example 3: Pro-Rata Allocation

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C

  • During evaluation, overdemand

is detected

  • A & B get full amounts because
  • f the higher surcharge
  • Together, C&D exceed the

available capacity

  • Prevent discrimination
  • Pro-rata used

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount

Example 3: Pro-rata allocation

D

Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend: Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C Maximum amount Shipper D Minimum amount Shipper D

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C

  • During evaluation, overdemand

is detected

  • A & B get full amounts because
  • f the higher surcharge
  • Together, C&D exceed the

available capacity

  • Prevent discrimination
  • Pro-rata used

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount

Example 3: Pro-rata allocation

D

Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend: Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C Maximum amount Shipper D Minimum amount Shipper D

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Auction algorithm – Uniform price

Example 3: Pro-rata allocation

  • Pro rata formula

Maximum demand of bid Sum of all bids at this price x remaining capacity

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  • Bid with minimum surcharge

that gets capacity sets clearing price for the auction (C&D)

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount

Example 3: Pro-rata allocation

Clearing Price Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend: Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C Maximum amount Shipper D Minimum amount Shipper D

C D

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Uniform Price

Example 4: Demand lower than available capacity

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  • Underdemand is detected
  • Clearing price is set to 0

surcharge

  • Only RT applies

Auction algorithm – Uniform price

A

Surcharge

  • avail. capacity

B

Amount Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper A Legend:

Example 1: Fill procedure

Clearing Price

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Agenda

Main elements of the regulation Auction Algorithms Secondary Market Auction results

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Secondary Market

Proposal Response Trade Creation Validation Publishing

  • f Trade

2 Types of proposals: To buy or to sell

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Secondary Market

Two types of trades: Transfer of use

  • Use of capacity

transferred

  • Obligations towards

TSOs stay with selling shipper

Assignment

  • Full rights and
  • bligations are

transferred to counterparty

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Secondary Market

  • Three different trading procedures:
  • Over the counter (OTC)
  • First come first served (FCFS)
  • Call for orders (CFO)

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Secondary Market

  • Helpful features:
  • Trader lists
  • Trading conditions
  • EIC search and anonymous trading
  • Different trade proposal stati: new, closed, rejected, expired, withdrawn

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Agenda

Main elements of the regulation Auction Algorithms Secondary Market Auction results

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Yearly auctions

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Similar results as for 2018, the majority of the capacity is bought for next gas year.

Note: The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bundled.

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Quarterly auctions

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The introduction of multiple sessions during the year, in which quarterly capacity is offered, increased the demand for quarterly products.

Note: The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bundled.

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Monthly auctions

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The demand of monthly products doesn’t seem to be affected by the introduction of multi- session of quarterly auctions.

Note: The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bundled.

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Daily auctions – sold in a month

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Also the demand of daily products is characterized by high volatility.

Note: The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bundled.

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Within day auctions – sold in a month

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Demand of within day products seems to follow the seasons.

Note: The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bundled.

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Capacity allocated via PRISMA for delivery period

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The amount of allocated capacity per delivery period increased on a yearly base.

Note: The sold capacity refers to firm products and it doesn’t take in consideration the capacity conversion from unbundled to bundled.

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Conclusion

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Conclusions

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CAM NC clearly is supporting the development of well functioning gas markets in the European countries…. … but the market conditions changes since the CAM NC approved. Amendments will be probably implemented in the upcoming years to further support European gas markets.

Note: A similar assessment is included in the ACER’s Market Monitoring Report 2018; in this report ACER stated that “The implementation of the CAM NC is favouring the possibility for shippers better to profile their capacity portfolio and to incorporate short-term price signals in the management of their capacity at the IPs. Starting from the capacity booked for 2018, more quarterly products and more yearly products were booked via the CAM auctions because of the entry into force of some amendments to the CAM NC. NRAs, the European Commission and ACER could consider the possibility to further increase the frequency of CAM auctions with a standardised timing in order to make them even more useful for the network users.”

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Back up

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Additional features implemented in PRISMA

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Any combination of such services can be selected by TSOs in order to create their own tailored service package

PRISMA currently offers a wide range of services to TSOs around capacity allocation

FCFS capacity allocation Secondary capacity trading Reverse capacity auctions Core Graphical user interface User registration User management System automation REMIT reporting Capacity linking Bid limitation Capacity upgrade (interr. to firm) Capacity conversion (unbundled to bundled) Balancing group / portfolio code management Surrender of capacity TSO acting as a shipper 1-n bundling Basic CAM Long-term auctions Day-ahead auctions Within-day auctions Bundled auctions Incremental capacity auctions Network point administration Reporting section Competing auctions Multi currency support Credit limit check Volume based tariff Specific terms and conditions

  • Autom. cancellation of
  • interr. day-ahead

auctions Minimum bid amount

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SLIDE 63

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PRISMA also offers a variety of services to SSOs and shippers

Shipper Services

Additional features and packages (Analyst API, Trader API)

Storage Services

Standard services and add-ons (Allocation, API)

Core Graphical user interface User registration User management Basic Offer publication Bid collection SSO API System automation Allocation mechanisms Automatic bid allocation Click & Book Direct request process FCFS allocation Shipper API System automation Shipper self-service Click & book add-ons Shipper admin access REMIT reporting Secondary trading Reporting to ACER Credit management Credit limit check upon bid placement

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FCFS booking

First Come First Served booking functionality

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FCFS booking

  • The platform acts as an in

inte termediary between shipper and TSO* regarding all booking information (e.g. request, confirmation of availability)

  • Capacity is sold at the re

regulated tar tariff

* FCFS is possible with selected TSOs (depending on national regulation and TSO decision)

Shipper requests capacity TSO checks if capacity is available Either confirms

  • r presents

alternative

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FCFS

  • Domestic Points
  • Not all TSOs support it
  • No auctions – booked as required if available

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Surrender

Or what to do when you booked too much capacity

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Surrender

  • Return capacity to TSOs for re-marketing
  • Important:
  • TSOs will first market free capacity, then surrendered
  • A surrender can be partially successful
  • Not all TSOs offer surrender

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REMIT Reporting

  • Mandatory for all secondary activity
  • Responsibility to report data lies at shipper
  • As an Organised Market Place (OMP) PRISMA offers its

registered shippers to report their capacity bookings on the secondary market

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