Fuku Fukushima L shima Lesso essons ns Unlear Unlearned ned - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Fuku Fukushima L shima Lesso essons ns Unlear Unlearned ned for or Def Defense ense-In In-Dept Depth: h: Example of Example of Regula gulato tory y Trea eatme tment nt of of 131 131 Iodine Iodine Cont Containm ainmen ent an t and Emer Emergen gency y Planning lanning Commi Commiss ssion ion Briefing Briefing U.S. .S. Nuc Nuclear R lear Regula gulator tory y Commissi Commission on May 17, 2016 May 17, 2016 Paul Gun aul Gunter ter Bey BeyondNuc ondNuclear lear.or .org

Historically Unreliable Fukushima-Style Containment Systems [GE Mark I and II Boiling Water Reactors]

Focus on radioactive iodine released by severe accidents and sabotage  131 iodine radioactive half-life of 8 days and recognized as adverse risk to public health  Filtration during reactor containment venting can reduce uncontrolled radioactive releases to the environment and population exposure  Safe, effective prophylactic potassium iodide (KI) can be predistributed to protect the thyroid gland particularly young children

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Base Case for NRC Enforcement Action (EA 13-109) Phase 1 Hardened Containment Vent on the Wet Well Phase 2 Severe Accident Water Addition into the Dry Well

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NRC grants “Extension to Comply” with EA 13-109 NRC waives enforcement of Order for world’s first Fukushima-style reactor without a single public meeting (2015) Oyster Creek, NJ More waivers of Order anticipated

Emergency Planning and Radioactive Iodine The potassium iodide lesson learned from Three Mile Island (1979)

Feb. 2016, Commission voted to not expand voluntary KI distribution despite inadequacies  25 of 34 eligible states participate in KI distribution within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone of nuclear power stations  Michigan Department of Community Health surveyed AMA Publication of residents in the state’s three Disaster Medicine and Public Health radiological Emergency Planning Preparedness Zones finding that the current (October 2012) voluntary distribution plan to “ Nuclear Power Plant redeem vouchers for KI only Emergency Preparedness “5.3% of eligible residences took Results from an advantage of the opportunity to Evaluation of Michigan secure a free supply of KI for Potassium Iodide their households.” Distribution Program”

A Lesson Unlearned for the United States: NRC Failure to Act on Effective Prophylactic Protection with Potassium Iodide (KI) The ATA has recommended  Pre-distribution of KI by direct delivery to every resident within the radius of 50-miles of nuclear reactors  Stockpiling KI in hospitals, police stations and fire departments within a radius of 200-miles of nuclear reactors

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission  December 31, 2015, CNSC required the completion of predistribution by direct delivery of KI to every resident within 6 miles of all Canadian nuclear power stations  May 10, 2016, Canada expands public health awareness campaign for KI predistribution out to 31 mile radius of all nuclear power stations

Nuclear “regulatory capture” Findings of Japan National Diet’s independent investigation determined that Fukushima was “a profoundly manmade disaster” involving  “willful negligence”  “regulatory capture”  “collusion of government, regulator and TEPCO”  “letting operators apply regulations on a voluntary basis”