Deterring Cheating in Online Environments Henry Corrigan-Gibbs - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Deterring Cheating in Online Environments Henry Corrigan-Gibbs - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Deterring Cheating in Online Environments Henry Corrigan-Gibbs Nakull Gupta Curtis Northcutt Stanford University Microsoft Research India MIT Edward Cutrell William Thies Microsoft Research India Microsoft


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Deterring Cheating in
 Online Environments

Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
 Stanford University Nakull Gupta
 Microsoft Research India Curtis Northcutt
 MIT Edward Cutrell William Thies
 Microsoft Research India Microsoft Research India

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Online
 Education

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Online
 Education Online
 Microwork

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Online
 Education Online
 Marketplaces Online
 Microwork

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Online
 Education Online
 Marketplaces Online
 Reviews Online
 Microwork

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But…

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But…

Disposable identities

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But…

Disposable identities Few enforceable rules

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But…

Disposable identities Few enforceable rules Different social norms

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Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India)
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Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India) } In the paper
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SLIDE 19

Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India)
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SLIDE 20

Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India)
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A Theory of Dishonesty

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A Theory of Dishonesty

Moral Consequences

  • Will this make me

feel guilty?

  • What would my

parents think?

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A Theory of Dishonesty

Moral Consequences

  • Will this make me

feel guilty?

  • What would my

parents think?

Material Consequences

  • Will I get caught?
  • How much do I

stand to gain / lose?


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Intervention I: Honor Code

  • Make cheating “morally costly”
  • Require signed statement declaring intent

to behave honestly

  • Evidently effective in in-person interactions

[Mazar et al. 2008], [Pruckner and Sausgruber 2013], [Rosenbaum et al. 2014]

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Intervention I: Honor Code

  • Make cheating “morally costly”
  • Require signed statement declaring intent

to behave honestly

  • Evidently effective in in-person interactions

[Mazar et al. 2008], [Pruckner and Sausgruber 2013], [Rosenbaum et al. 2014]

“I shall neither give nor receive
 help during this examination.”

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Intervention I: Honor Code

  • Make cheating “morally costly”
  • Require signed statement declaring intent

to behave honestly

  • Evidently effective in in-person interactions

[Mazar et al. 2008], [Pruckner and Sausgruber 2013], [Rosenbaum et al. 2014]

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Intervention II: Warning

  • Inform the participant of the potential

material costs of cheating

[Fellner et al. 2013]

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Intervention II: Warning

  • Inform the participant of the potential

material costs of cheating

Warning

If we discover that you violated the
 rules of this online exam, we may: – Cancel your exam.
 – Cancel your account.
 – Notify your university.

[Fellner et al. 2013]

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Intervention II: Warning

  • Inform the participant of the potential

material costs of cheating

[Fellner et al. 2013]

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General Method

  • 1. Randomize participants into treatment groups:


(a) Control
 (b) Honor Code
 (c) Warning

  • 2. Measure rate of cheating in each group
  • 3. Determine whether treatment had any

measurable effect

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General Method

  • 1. Randomize participants into treatment groups:


(a) Control
 (b) Honor Code
 (c) Warning

  • 2. Measure rate of cheating in each group
  • 3. Determine whether treatment had any

measurable effect

???

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Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India)
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Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India)
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Measuring Cheating

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Measuring Cheating

  • nlineexam.edu
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Measuring Cheating

  • nlineexam.edu
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Measuring Cheating

  • nlineexam.edu
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Measuring Cheating

  • nlineexam.edu
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Measuring Cheating

  • nlineexam.edu

wikipedia.org

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Measuring Cheating

  • nlineexam.edu

wikipedia.org

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Measuring Cheating

  • nlineexam.edu

wikipedia.org

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Measuring Cheating

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Measuring Cheating

  • For free-response questions, can use


plagiarism detection tools

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Measuring Cheating

  • For free-response questions, can use


plagiarism detection tools

“Did Alice copy verbatim from Wikipedia?”

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Measuring Cheating

  • For free-response questions, can use


plagiarism detection tools

“Did Alice copy verbatim from Wikipedia?” “Did Alice and Bob submit exactly the same response?”

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Measuring Cheating

  • For free-response questions, can use


plagiarism detection tools

“Did Alice copy verbatim from Wikipedia?” “Did Alice and Bob submit exactly the same response?”

  • In use today (e.g., Turnitin),


and we use these techniques too


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Measuring Cheating

  • For free-response questions, can use


plagiarism detection tools

“Did Alice copy verbatim from Wikipedia?” “Did Alice and Bob submit exactly the same response?”

  • In use today (e.g., Turnitin),


and we use these techniques too
 … but for multiple-choice questions?

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“Honey pot”

  • nlineexam.edu

[Provos 2004]

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“Honey pot”

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

[Provos 2004]

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“Honey pot”

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

[Provos 2004]

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“Honey pot”

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

[Provos 2004]

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org We use the cookie to
 identify dishonest behavior

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Caveat: False Negatives

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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Caveat: False Negatives

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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Caveat: False Negatives

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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Caveat: False Negatives

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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Caveat: False Negatives

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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Caveat: False Negatives

  • nlineexam.edu

exam-answers.org

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Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India)
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SLIDE 70

Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India)
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Research Questions

  • 1. How can we deter dishonest behavior in online

environments?

  • 2. How will we know when we have succeeded? 


(i.e., How do we measure the rate of cheating?)

Experiments

I. Microsoft’s online course platform (India)

  • II. Amazon Mechanical Turk (US & India)
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Experiment I: Online Course

  • MSR India free online algorithms course (2014-15)
  • Online final examination


– 14 multiple-choice questions + 1 free response
 – 409 students in spring 2014
 – 223 students in winter 2015

  • “Closed book, closed Internet” exam


 
 All students had an opportunity to opt out and we did not penalize students we suspected of cheating.

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Study population 603 students

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Plagiarized on
 free-response 102 students Study population 603 students

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Plagiarized on
 free-response 102 students Study population 603 students Visited honey pot 50 students

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Plagiarized on
 free-response 102 students Study population 603 students Visited honey pot 50 students Both 5 students

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Scores (Honest) Scores (Cheating) Frequency 10 20 30 40

0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%

Results: Cheating vs. Score

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Scores (Honest) Scores (Cheating) Frequency 10 20 30 40

0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%

Results: Cheating vs. Score

Cheating doesn’t pay! (p < 0.0001)

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Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

Results: HC and Warning

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Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

Results: HC and Warning

Honor code group saw a drop in cheating rate
 (not stat. signif.)

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Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

Results: HC and Warning

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Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

Results: HC and Warning

Warning has an effect
 (N=398, p < 0.001)

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Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

Results: HC and Warning

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Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

Results: HC and Warning

Control Honor Code Warn

MTurk (India)

41.6% 35.8% 18.3%

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Where we go from here…

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Where we go from here…

  • Does the effect of a warning diminish over time?
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Where we go from here…

  • Does the effect of a warning diminish over time?
  • Do warnings scare off honest and dishonest

users at different rates?

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Where we go from here…

  • Does the effect of a warning diminish over time?
  • Do warnings scare off honest and dishonest

users at different rates?

  • Can we use honey pots to automate the detection
  • f unethical behavior online? Abuse, etc.
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Where we go from here…

  • Does the effect of a warning diminish over time?
  • Do warnings scare off honest and dishonest

users at different rates?

  • Can we use honey pots to automate the detection
  • f unethical behavior online? Abuse, etc.
  • Can warnings help deter other bad behavior
  • nline? Nasty comments, etc.
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Summary

Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

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Summary

  • We studied the effect of an honor

code and a warning at deterring cheating in an online course and Mechanical Turk.

Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

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Summary

  • We studied the effect of an honor

code and a warning at deterring cheating in an online course and Mechanical Turk.

  • We find evidence that the warning

was effective in online settings… less so the honor code.

Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%

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Summary

  • We studied the effect of an honor

code and a warning at deterring cheating in an online course and Mechanical Turk.

  • We find evidence that the warning

was effective in online settings… less so the honor code.

  • “Honey pots” may be a useful tool

for measuring rates of cheating in future work.

Control Honor Code Warn Percentage cheating 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Online Exam

31.7% 25.9% 14.6%