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Power Auctioning in Resource Constrained Micro-Grids: Cases of Cheating Anesu Marufu a , Anne V.D.M. Kayem a , and Stephen D. Wolthusen b,c a Department of Computer Science, University of Cape Town b aNISLab, Faculty of Computer Science and Media


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Power Auctioning in Resource Constrained Micro-Grids: Cases of Cheating

Anesu Marufua, Anne V.D.M. Kayema, and Stephen D. Wolthusenb,c

a Department of Computer Science, University of Cape Town b aNISLab, Faculty of Computer Science and Media Technology(NTNU) c Royal Holloway University of London

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Table of Contents

 Background  Problem  Support of Cheating Attacks  Cases of Cheating  Proposed Countermeasure  Acknowledgements  References

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Background – Continuous Double Auctioning

Continuous Double Auctioning (CDA):

  • market mechanism supporting power trading in

resource constrained (RC) smart micro-grids

Advantages:

  • coordination of distributed components on

incomplete and imperfect information

  • incur minimal computational cost
  • ensure robust, reliable and fair energy allocation

1) Anesu M.C. Marufu, Anne V.D.M. Kayem, and Stephen D. Wolthusen (2015) A Distributed Continuous Double Auction Framework for Resource Constrained Microgrids, In Proceedings, 10th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2015),

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Background – Resource Constrained Micro-grid

Resource Constrained Micro-Grids (MG):

  • small, integrated energy systems intelligently

managing distributed load and energy resources.

  • capable of autonomous operation in case of

failure of national grids, (islanded mode)

  • operate on resource limited information

technology infrastructure.

  • we conform to a MG model specified in other work

2) Anesu M C Marufu, A V D M Kayem, and S. Wolthusen (2016). Fault-Tolerant Distributed Continuous Double Auctioning on Computationally Constrained

  • Microgrids. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy, ICISSP 2016, pages 448–456. SCITEPRESS, 2016.
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Shared Smart Meters Trading Agents

Household Area Network Neighbourhood Area Network

Control Centre Sentinel

Buyer Seller Sentinel

Background – Resource Constrained Micro-grid

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Problem – Realisation of Cheating

Strategy Manipulation Attacks

  • Victim Strategy Downgrade
  • Collusion Attack
  • Fairness important in ensuring trust
  • CDA [2] is ideal – Fairly robust to traditional

cheating forms: e.g. Multiple bidding; Bid shading, Shill bidding

  • operate on resource limited information

technology infrastructure.

Order-book

Resource limited Microgrid Agent Strategy CDA

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Support of Cheating Attacks

  • Superior strategies = more surplus vs. inferior counterparts
  • Superior strategy: Adaptive Aggressive (AA)
  • Inferior strategy: Zero Intelligence (ZI)
  • Gjerstad-Dickhaut Extended (GDX) challenges supremacy of AA.
  • GDX gains more surplus vs. AA sometimes

3) Marco De Luca and Dave Cliff (2011). Human-agent auction interactions: Adaptive-aggressive agents dominate. In IJCAI Proceedings-International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 22, page 178. Citeseer, 2011 4) Perukrishnen Vytelingum (2006). The structure and behaviour of the Continuous Double Auction. PhD thesis, University of Southampton, 2006. 5) Daniel Vach and Ales M. A. Mar ´s ˇal (2015). Comparison of double auction bidding strategies for automated trading agents, 2015.

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Cases of Cheating

1) Victim Strategy Downgrade

  • One adversary uses a tool (e.g.

malware) to control other participants’ trading agents.

  • dynamic ‘downgrade’ of victim trading

strategy.

  • Adaptive Aggressive (AA) > Zero

Intelligence ZI strategy

2) Collusion Attack

  • a number of traders collude to change

bidding strategy

  • K colluders coordinate agent strategy

change: AA-GDX

  • Adversary population ratio to victim

population must ensure max. surplus

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Proposed Countermeasure 1

  • Cheating is auction specific – likewise countermeasures
  • Current security measures are inadequate:
  • Absence of central auctioneer
  • Different clearing mechanisms
  • Cheating gives rise to exceptions,
  • Exception handlers adopting a citizen approach are proposed
  • Make use of allocative efficiency & # of messages
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Shared Smart Meters Trading Agents

Household Area Network Neighbourhood Area Network

Central Sentinel

Buyer Seller

Sentinels

Sentinel

Proposed Countermeasure 2

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Buyer Seller TA-Sentinel T-Sentinel KEY Token

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Acknowledgements

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Conclusion

  • Continuous Double Auctioning ideal for power allocation
  • Automated Cheating is possible
  • Exception handling mechanism using a citizen approach can be

used

  • Future work: validate and evaluate the exception handling protocol

1) Anesu M.C. Marufu, Anne V.D.M. Kayem, and Stephen D. Wolthusen (2015) Circumventing cheating on Power Auctioning in Resource Constrained Micro-grids. To appear in Smart City 2016, Sydney, Australia

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