COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS - - PDF document

CRITICAL PATH APPROACH TO COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

BY

• D. J. LAMB AND P. F. O'NEILL

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS OTTAWA, CANADA

OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION

DEFINITIONS PARADIGMS METRICS zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

AND

MEASURES TIMELINES CF zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

LAND

FORCE EXAMPLE CF AIR FORCE EXAMPLE CONCLUSIONS

DEFINITIONS zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA COMMAND zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

(1) zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN AN INDIVIDUAL OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR THE DIRECTION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL

OF MILITARY FORCES. (2)

THE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION BY A PROPERLY DESIGNATED COMMANDER OVER ASSIGNED FORCES IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A MISSION.

• 2 -

CONTROL

(1) zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

THE AUTHORITY EXERCISED BY A COMMANDER OVER PART OF THE ACTIVITIES OF SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS NOT NORMALLY UNDER HIS COMMAND, WHICH ENCOMPASSESS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTING ORDERS OR DIRECTIVES.

... MAY BE

TRANSFERRED OR DELEGATED.

(2)

COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED THROUGH AN ARRANGEMENT OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS, FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES EMPLOYED BY A COMMANDER IN PLANNING, DIRECTING, COORDINATING, AND CONTROLLING FORCES AND OPERATIONS IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION.

CCIS

A COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (CCIS) IS AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM COMPRISED OF DOCTRINE, PROCEDURES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS WHICH PROVIDES AUTHORITIES AT ALL LEVELS WITH TIMELY AND ADEQUATE DATA TO PLAN, DIRECT AND CONTROL THEIR ACTIVITIES.

• 3 -

C"1"

m = 3

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) m = 4 C3 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

+ COMPUTERS

n = l INTEL

n = 2 INFORMATION

ADDITIONAL TERMS FOR COMMAND & CONTROL

+

m 1 5

COORDINATION, CAPABILITY, COMPATABILITY, CONSULTATION, .

.

.

n 2 3

INTEROPERABILITY, INTEGRATION/FUSION, .

.

.

IRRELEVANT TERM FOR COMMAND & CONTROL

COMMAND DESTRUCT SIGNAL

• 4 - zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

PARADIGMS zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

SPCDA (LAWSON) SAGSPD (MORS NPG WORKSHOP) MCES HEAT ACCES SHOR C2RM (MAYK&RUBIN)

METRICS zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

AND MEASURES

MOPS zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

BIT ERROR RATE; END TO END DELAY PDET; PFA; COVERAGE VOLUME

MOEs No OF TARGETS DESTROYED PER DAY

SURVIV ABLXTY

MOFEs

BDE SUCCESS AT BREACHING MINEFIELD

MOPES

VICTORY OR DEFEAT; TERMS; IMPACT ON FUTURE

2 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

\

V

' zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

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1

Launch under attack timeline.

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r?

ATTACK zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

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5 1 0 1 s 2 0 2 s

30 YlNS

SLIM. DE ECTION I

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5

1 0 1 s 2 0 2 5

30

+

m s i nmu.LEvLL

LAUNCH UNDER ,A zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

h

ATTACK

I

ACTIONS

. I . ,

• e

zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Diaanm Derived from US Army Declslon M o m

nand Brlaade zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Planning zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

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A - - .

FIGHTER GROUP DEPLOYMENT PLAN zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

360

(1992) zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

DEPLOYMENT OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS: Comox, B.C.

1

Inuvik, NWT

1

Yellowknife, NWT zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I

lqaluit, NWT

1

Goose Bay, Labrador

I

from Cold Lake, Alberta from Bagotville Quebec NORAD AIR SOVEREIGNTY MISSION ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT ON 1992 VERSION OF THE PLAN

by Operational Research Field Station

Fighter Group / Canadian NORAD Region HQ

FIGHTER GROUP DEPLOYMENT PLAN 360 (1992) SIMPLIFIED PERT VIEW

. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

U

.

SIMPLIFIED PERT VIEW WAS EXPANDED TO AN APPRORIATE LEVEL zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

OF

DETAIL WARNING PHASE: AIRLIFT OF ADVANCE PARTIES TO FOLs CF-18 LOAD CONFIGURATION & PREPARATION ATG RECALL OF CC130S & KC-130s RECONFIGURATION OF CC1 30s & KC1 30s DEPLOYMENT OF CT-33s TO FOLs ATCCU PREPARATION FOR AIRLIFT DEPLOYMENT PHASE: AIRLIFT OF PERSONNEL & MATERIEL TO FOLs CF-18 FINAL PREPARATION & DEPLOYMENT KC-130 FINAL PREPARATION & DEPLOYMENT zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I

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PRINCIPAL zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

1 SUB-STEPS

I MODELLED I

I I

I FINDINGS

AIRLIFT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE TARGET COMPLETION TIME IMPACT OF SHORTFALLS MIGHT BE MINIMIZED BY: LOAD PRlORlTlZTlON DE STI N AT1 ON PRIOR IT

I 2

AT

I

ON INCREASED DAILY FLYING RATES AUGMENTING AIRLIFT ASSETS

Abstract The ABCA Scenario zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

• Issues for Analysis
• Mr. William J. Krondak

TRADOC Analysis Center Scenario and Wargaming Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA The Scenario and Wargaming Center has supported the American, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) Quacfripartite Working Groups (Q WG) with scenario efforts zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

f

• r

more than ,

two

• years. 7he scenarios are designed to assist the ABCA Q

WG develop concepts

f

• r

standardization agreements and plans that allow those nations to cooperate in engagements ranging fiom operations other than war (OOrw) to mid-intensity conventional battles. This paper briefly describes the background of the most recent scenario eflort, the scenario development criteria, the scenario overview, and some analytical issues that the scenario

• supports. The scenario

provides a realistic, reasonable, and robust setting

f

• r

examining the

activities of rapidly deployed ABCA forces at brigade, division, and corps level. It generates

• pportunities

f

• r

analysis o f doctrine, organization, equipment, and command and control issues

across a Jpectrum

• f

combat intensity. The scenario allows exploration o f such topics zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA a s

winning the information war and dealing with zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

c o m m d ,

control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) in a multinational

• force. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

1

: Introduction

1.1 : The Scenario and Wargaming

Center built the ABCA scenario to assist the ABCA QWG develop and explore doctrinal concepts. Each participating nation developed a scenario at the request of the Washington Standardization Office. T

h i s

scenario focuses on mid-intensity

• perations requiring the commitment of ABCA forces in corps strength. The scenario is designed

to be used as a test bed for interoperability, not contingency planning. It is incorporated in the latest ABCA doctrine guide.

1.2: T

h i s

paper covers the background of this effort, provides an overview of the scenario, and discusses some of the analytical issues that the scenario generates.

1.3: The scenario provides a realistic, reasonable, and robust setting for examining the activities

• f

rapidly deployed ABCA forces at levels from brigade through corps. Although set in a fictitious country, the scenario uses actual terrain and weather to facilitate simulation and analysis efforts. It represents a significant effort to create a useful and plausible setting. Many of the details reflect arbitrary choices and can be modified at the user‘s discretion to support analysis.

1

A 2

2: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Background.

2.1: Washington Standardization Officer memorandum dated 19 February 1992, subject: ABCA

Combat Development Scenarios, tasked the QWG Army Operations Research (AOR) group to develop four scenarios (1). Australia was to develop a low intensity counterinsurgency scenario. Canada was responsible for low intensity protected evacuation. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

WSO

asked the UK to develop a low intensity peace operations scenario, and asked the U.S. to develop a mid-intensity conventional operations scenario. The U.

• S. scenario focuses on mid-intensity operations

requiring the commitment of ABCA forces in corps strength.

2.2:

The U.S. national point of contact (NPOC) asked the Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center (TRAC) to develop the mid-intensity scenario. TRAC's Scenario and Wargaming Center responded by modifjmg an existing unclassified scenario. Taking the Generic 1

.O scenario

• riginally

designed for analysis of U.S. doctrinal concepts, scenarists modified the force structure lists, deployments, and employment concepts to support ABCA work. The initial scenario effort was submitted for review in August 1992 (2).

2.3: During 1993, the UK evaluated the draft scenarios, using a cardinal points specification

(CPS) to ensure that all essential information was included. In October 1993, the UK NPOC provided the CPS and comments on the U.S. scenario (3). Table 1 shows the features of the

• CPS. Although the actual scenario document addresses each CPS item, in the interest of brevity,

this paper only discusses some of the highlights. In November 1993, in response to tasking &om the U.S. NPOC (4), Scenario and Wargaming Center modified the scenario in preparation for presentation at the January 1994 QWG AOR meeting at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Further review generated additional changes and TRAC submitted the latest version in April 1994 (5). The QWG Doctrine incorporated the scenario into its Doctrine Guide in mid- 1994. Table 1. Cardinal Dohts wecification Scenario factor Location Terrain, weather, ports, infkastructure Geopolitical situation Command, control, information, Military objectives Military aims, timing Constraints Oppositiodthreat Order of battle (fiiendly) Logistics Opening situation Examples of factor details zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

*

Economy, form of government, treaties, political afEiliations and communications Levels of command, communication capabilities Rules of engagement, environmental issues Military order of battle, insurgentdguerillas Land, a

i r ,

maritime forces for allies and host nation Resources, positioning, host nation support Force dispositions, readiness, intelligence summary

* examdes are not commehensive zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

2

3: Scenario Overview zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

3.1: Country setting. This conflict is zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

s e t in a coastal nation zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

• n

a fictitious Pacific continent located approximately at latitude 32 degrees n

• r

t h , longitude 150 east ( s e e figure 1). Terrain includes a coastal prairie, f d a n d s , and rolling h

i l l s with increasing vegetation as

• ne moves
• inland. The zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

nation, Blueland, is bordered by

hostile Redland and the neutral countries of Brownland and Greenland. Orangeland, an ally of Redland, L i e s to the Northwest. The terrain and weather are based on the actual Gulf coast data of the U

. S .

state of Texas (see figure 2). Figure 1. Geography

3

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• I

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Figure 2. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

A r e a

• f operations

3.1.1

: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

K e y

terrain features include large cities, airports and aifields, major highways and rail lines, major rivers, dams, ports, beaches suitable for amphibious operations, and offshore oil fields.

3.1.2: The climate is temperate with hurricanes and tropical storms possible along the coast and

significant periods of precipitation and fog. Temperatures are moderate along the coast and more variable moving inland.

3.1.3: Blueland experienced economic prosperity by pursuing a democratic form ofgovemment

and exploiting its significant natural resources. Redland continues to be r

u l e d

by a communist

• government. Its l

a c k

• f access

to ports retards i

t s economic growth. 3.1.4: Blueland maintains modem communications facilities and services in its large cities.

Telephone, television, and radio serve as a "man means of communicating i n f

• r

m a t i

• n

throughout the country.

3.1.5: Blueland possesses

moderate capability to provide host nation support to deploying zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

military

• forces. About 500,000 gallons of drinking water per day can be made available. Available fuel

resources can supply about a million gallons of fuel per day. Food stuffs are available although

4

western menus cannot be readily supported. Moderate amounts of construction material can zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

be

made available. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

3.1.6: Blueland patterns its democratic government on a zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA mix of western and oriental concepts.

The aggressor nation, Redland, is ruled by a zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA firmly established communist party structure. Redland supports a radical political party, the Blueland Reunification P

a r t y ,

and its insurgent force, the Blueland Reunification Force, in Blueland. The group advocates unification of Blueland and Redland. 3.1.7: Figure 3 shows the various countries in the region, their political afEliations, and their involvement in the crisis. Regional Strategic UN Involvement Miation Affiliation Membership

in Crisis

Blueland Former Red Pact zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

• Treaty w/

Yes (not on Victim member ABCA nations security council) economic union

• Regional

Redland Red Pact communist Yes (security) Aggressor council) Orangeland Red Pact communist No 90 days wait and see.. . Orangeland poses a serious threat to regional balance of power if it commits forces in this conflict. Brownland Armed neutral

• Regional

No Only if attacked economic union Greenland Armed neutral

• Regional

No Only if attacked or economic sealanes threatened union Figure 3. International af€iliations.

5

3.2: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Road to war.

3.2.1 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

: Over 50 years ago, Redland and Blueland formed a league of nations (Red zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

P a c t )

with a common economic, political, and military structure. The pact dissolved about ten years ago because of economic differences and political revolutions. Redland’s economy suffered since the

breakup because of the loss of access to deep water ports. Redland threatened to reestablish the pact by force to regain access to Blueland‘s

resources and ports.

3.2.2: Blueland’s significant mineral resources and democratic posture caused western nations,

including the ABCq to provide diplomatic and economic support. When Redland deployed forces to the Blueland border regions, Blueland requested and received ABCA m i l i t a r y assistance

• initially a naval show of force and some military advisors and advance party personnel. ABCA

forces were alerted and received marshaling instructions.

3.2.3: When Redland attacked, the UN Security Council issued a mandate requiring an immediate

cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Red forces from Blueland. UN negotiators arrived on the scene but made little progress. Redland continued the attack to seize the port of Cville.

3.2.4: Blueland military forces, unable to defend their border, delayed southward and created

strong defenses around Blueland’s capital, Sville, and its southernmost port city, Bville.

3.2.5:

Redland forces assumed a defensive posture after seizing Cville. Upon learning of ABCA military preparations, they resumed the offensive toward Bville to seize the port and prevent deployment of any international military forces. AE3CA forces begin deploying to Blueland.

3.3: Scenario facts and assumptions. 3.3.1:

Facts.

3.3.1.1

: No ABCA forward deployed units or prepositioned materials exist in Blueland.

3.3.1.2: The majority of ABCA forces will move equipment by sealift. The early arriving U.S.

heavy brigade will use Afloat Prepositioned Ship zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

(APS)

• equipment. The APS

asset is within five days of sailing time of Bville.

3.3.1.3:

The insurgent Blueland Reunification Forces aggressively work to undermine Blueland’s resistance to the invasion. They are also exploiting other minority groups within Blueland, trying to create.a coordinated effort by making wild promises.

3.3.1.4:

Redland possesses chemical weapons that can be delivered by tactical ballistic missiles and fixed wing aircraft. No clear intelligence exists regarding Redland‘s possession of fbnctional nuclear weapons. 6

3.3.2. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Assumptions.

3.3.2.1: No other major regional conflict is in progress, although other trouble zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA spots

around the globe may flare up concurrently.

3.3.2.2: Redland would not attack into Blueland if ABCA or other international coalition forces

were already present. Success zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

can

• nly be achieved prior to the introduction of si@cant

international forces.

3.3.2.3:

ABCA nations can use international sealanes. The Suez and Panama canals are open.

3.4: Military Situation 3.4.1 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

: National strategic objectives.

3.4.1.1

: Redland seeks to seize Blueland's port and lines of communication to aid failing commerce, install a government in the Blueland capitol that is favorable to Redland, and gain international recognition of the annexation of territory. The desired end state is a stronger economy and worldwide recognition as a regional power.

3.4.1.2: Blueland wants to defend against the Redland attack, gain international military

assistance, expel Redland forces fiom its territory, strengthen political and economic ties with the ABCA nations and receive worldwide recognition and sympathy. The desired end state is re-establishment of country boundaries and stronger relations with western countries.

3.4.1.3: ABCA nations want to expel and defeat Redland forces, and assist Blueland in restoring

its borders. The desired end state is restoration of military and economic stability in the region

• n terms favorable to ABCA nations.

3.4.1.4: Blueland insurgent forces and the Blueland Reunification P

a r t y

(BRP)

want unification of Blueland and Redland under a BRF-led socialist system. Ifnecessary, they will resort to terrorism to achieve their goals.

3.4.2: Military objectives and missions. 3.4.2.1

: Redland's military objectives include seizure of port facilities, annexation of the port and lines of communication, isolation and capture of the Blueland capitol, defense of new boundaries against aggressors, and denial of ports to any incoming international military forces.

3.4.2.2:

Redland forces mission and intent. Attack rapidly into Blueland to seize port facilities at Cville and related lines of communication. Defend new boundaries against aggressors, deny Bville port to incoming international military forces, and initiate negotiations to gain international consent of annexation.

7

3.4.2.3: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Blueland military objectives include defense of homeland borders, delay enemy advaacc, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA strongpoint capitol and other zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

c r i t i c a l

facilites, and zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

seek hternatiod zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA d a n c e .

3.4.2.4: Blueland forces

mission and

• intent. Delay while gaining international zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

military zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

as&ance.

With external help, expel Redland forces, regain l

• s

t territory, and restore boundaries. S e e figure

4 for sketch of initial campaign.

I

,

I

!

• i

.- -._..

100 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

zoo

Figure 4. RedlBlue initial campaign sketch @day to D+6)

3.4.2.5: The militaty objectives ofthe ABCA nations include: Assist Blueland defeat and expel

Redland forces, restore country boundaries, reestablish economic and military stability, and protect Gendly interests in the region.

3.4.2.6: ABCA

mission and intent. Secure Blueland territory and critical facilities, on

• rder,

defeat Redland forces in Blueland, and disable Redland offensive capabilities. Resolve s

i t u a t i

• n

rapidly to “ize casualties and limit damage to Blueland resources.

8

3.4.3: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Order of battle.

MIG-23

3.4.3.1: Redland order of battle is shown in figure zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

• 5. The Army consists of four army corps, two

independent motorized rifle brigades, an artillery brigade, multiple rocket regiment, two missile brigades, an antitank regiment, air defense brigade, attack helicopter regiment, and two special

• perations brigades. Redland uses the special operations brigades to exert significant control over

the five provincial brigades of the Blueland Reunification Forces. The zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

a i r force consists of a

fighterhomber regiment, two interceptor regiments, a ground attack regiment, radio electronic combat regiment, attack helicopter regiment, transport helicopter regiment, and a remotely piloted vehicle regiment, The a

i r force controls the A

i r Defense Command that includes four brigades of surface to zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

air missiles. Equipment in the army and a

i r force is largely of Russian or Chinese

• rigin. Redland economic difficulties retarded modernization.

Hind-D HIP zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

,

• =

Red zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I and

I Insurgents 1

23 24 T-72 BMP2

X X

I l l

X

1 m F

I E

l m

2

• 9ox2A36

36 X 8W22 18 x SS-21 IMRB 18x9A52 T-62 BMP2

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I l l

X

I l l

SA8 SA-1

4

12 x SS-1C

54 x MT-12

24 x SA-4

40 x Mi-24

27 x AT-6

Figure 5. Red order of battle

3.4.3.2:

Blueland order of battle is shown in figure 6. Blueland ground forces include four divisions, one independent armored brigade, an artillery brigade, and an a

i r defense brigade. The

air force includes four wings of modem aircraft 0;-

15, Tornado, F/A- 18). Blueland invested in a

modem air force while equipping its ground forces with early generation U.S. and Russian equipment.

9

r

1

Blue land zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

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• w

rn m e nt

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• L zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I

T O W W II

155 How (T) Stinger M

48 MIOA3

BRDM2 M 108A3 Vulcan

I

ITV Tow 155 How (1) Avenger

I

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Air Force

F15CID Tornado F l A l 8 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA '1999 Equlpmonr Cur-of1 Dale

Figure 6. Blueland order of battle

3.4.3.3: ABCA forces are shown in figure 7. In

keeping with the ABCA lead nation concept for various scenarios, the U.S. is the lead nation in this operation. British, Canadian, and Australian forces are under operational control of the U.

• S. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

corps.

1 :

Y A l l F O R zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

• 9

S O C F O R

rl

round

• Fors. (-1

Figure 7. Coalition order of battle 10

3.4.4: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Scenario situation. When ABCA forces begin to arrive, the Bville port and lodgment are threatened by Redland forces. Redland forces have been given a mission to seize the port at Bville and isolate the Blueland capitol at Sville to prevent reinforcement. Redland zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

a i r forces zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

will

assist by conducting preemptive strikes against Blueland airfields and communications centers.

3.4.5: ABCA campaign concept. The ABCA forces campaign concept consists of four phases as

shown in figure 8. Phase I consists of deployment and defense of lodgment. Phase zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I I

includes stabilizing the situation and setting conditions for decisive operations. Tasks include blockading the captured Cville port, relieving the capitol, and recapturing airfields critical to the a

i r effort.

During Phase 1

1 1 , the ABCA forces conduct decisive operations to cut Redland LOCs, and defeat

and expel Redland forces. Phase I

V

includes reconstitution, reconstruction, counterinsurgency suppression, humanitarian assistance, and redeployment. The actual scenario documentation provides more detail for operations during the first two phases. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Proiecied zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

D-Day - D+12

D+13

• D+74

D+75

• D+90

D+91- Phase I - Deployment and defense of lodgment

• Deploy and build-up
• Defeat Redland attack on lodgment
• Reconstitute Blueland forces

Phase zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

It - Stabilizing the situation and setting the conditions

• Blockade Cville port
• Protect civilian population and critical resources/facilities
• Break siege of Sville (capitol)
• Recapture critical airfields and establish air superiority
• Cut Red LOCs
• Defeat Redland forces in Blueland

Phase IV - Peacekeeping

• Nation building
• Counter-insurgency
• Humanitarian assistance
• Redeployment

Phase 111 - Decisive operations

I

Figure 8. CINC Concept

4: Analytical issues. The Scenario and Wargaming Center designed the scenario to support

exploration of key doctrinal issues for the ABCA. In addition, the scenario provides an excellent setting for analysis of a number of combat development issues. These issues range fiom evaluation of doctrine, organization, and materiel, to exploration of issues unique to the ABCA combined operations environment. Some key analytical issues are shown in figure 9. The following paragraphs provide some additional discussion.

4.1

: Deployment and redeployment. The scenario document provides a sample ABCA deployment scheme by tonnage, l i i requirement, and closure day. The Commander in Chief must

11

accomplish a number of deployment and early entry tasks. These include securing zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

sea

and air lines of communication to Blueland, securing the air and sea points of debarkation, establishing a secure lodgment, coordinating early entry operations with the Blueland land and air forces, actually deploying the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

ABCA forces, initiating his air campaign and countering the Redland

tactical ballistic missile threat. Redland's resumption of offensive operations to deny ports also results in the capture of several important airfields. This restricts the availability of runways and ramps for deployment of air and land forces and requires some flexibility on the part of the air

• commander. He must arrange for significant air support from bases outside of Blueland (carrier

based aviation and in-flight refueling) to set the stage for achieving air superiority. Although no other contingency operation is underway, the commander must also make arrangements for rapid and efficient redeployment of any or all of his forces, either when

• perations against Redland are terminated or when a higher priority contingency requires forces

under his control. Analysts can explore various deployment schemes, basing schemes, and assist

in analyzing the criteria for prioritization of lift and basing assets.

Deployment and redeployment Lead nation command and control concept

• Communication and intel linkage
• Coordination with Blueland forces

Airpower and seapower integration zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

• Air defense integration
• Air tasking coordination
• Fire support coordination

Logistical support issues

• Automation interoperability
• Common items (POL, water)

Other issues

• Winning the "information w

a r "

• Identification of fiiend and foe
• Militaxy assistancehraining
• Counterinsurgency assistance

Figure zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

9.

Scenario analysis issues zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

4.2: Lead nation command and control concept. The current ABCA command and control

concept calls for the lead nation to provide the headquarters and the command and control for the highest level organization committed (whether it is a corps, division, or brigade). The other

12

ABCA forces link into that headquarters with appropriate zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA staff and liaison elements. The lead nation prescribes the doctrinal procedures to be followed. Analysts can explore potential disconnects in doctrine, shortages of liaison personnel and equipment, and differences zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

i n the

• rganizational structure that may impact on effectiveness of this concept. Another area for

exploration that links command and control with deployment and redeployment is the structure

and hnction of a combined movement control element. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

4.2.1

: Communication and intelligence linkage. Interoperability of communications provides a fertile field for analysis. Allocation of satellite communications channels and arrangements for communications support to Blueland and ABCA countries is a good area for review and analysis. Countries must arrange for sharing of intelligence. U.S. commands such as Pacific Command have a Joint Intelligence Center. For the operation portrayed in this scenario, ABCA countries might consider establishing a combined intelligence center.

4.2.2:

Coordination with Blueland forces. This scenario requires ABCA countries to assist Blueland in the defense and then help prepare Blueland forces for later operations. In additions to the types of command and control issues listed above, combat service support requires attention. Blueland support requirements in terms of equipment, support materiel, maintenance capability, transportation assets, and other service support operations provide a broad range of analytical

• issues. Provision of liaison personnel, special operations forces, and other personnel with

knowledge of Blueland language and customs also generates possible areas for analysis.

4.3: Airpower and seapower integration. 4.3.1:

Air defense integration. The commander and staffs must plan to integrate a

i r defense.

Because of the initial shortage of available airfields, air superiority may not be immediately

• accomplished. The command and control aspects of detecting, identifling, tracking, arid engaging

enemy aircraft present a challenge. The ABCA forces must also consider several aspects of missile defense (battle command and control, passive defense, active defense, and attack

• perations). These four areas must be integrated to decrease risk to deploying forces. Analysts

can examine various techniques and capabilities.

4.3.2:

Air tasking coordination. Fixed wing interceptors and zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

a i r superiority aircraft provide a

major component of air defense. With significant numbers of friendly and enemy aircraft flying, generating air tasking orders and coordinating the execution of those orders will be a challenge. Analysts can look at the methodologies, communications linkages, and administrative support aspects of the air campaign.

4.3.3: Fire support coordination. The availability of cannon and rocket assets in the ABCA and

Blueland forces poses significant fire support coordination issues. Ensuring the safety of fiiendly forces, getting appropriate munitions on targets, and precluding unnecessary collateral damage to Blueland infrastructure and resources requires significant effort. Being a coastal nation, naval gun

and missile fires must be integrated into the overall fire plan. Analysts can examine these areas as

well as the interoperability of the automated command, control, and communications systems for artillery and naval fires.

13

4.4: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Logistical support issues.

4.4.1: Automation interoperability. With new concepts such as split-based support and total asset

visibility, automation becomes extremely important in logistics support. The linkage or interoperability of logistics automation systems requires analysis. With limitations on zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

lift and

ports of debarkation, what to carry, what to bring later, and what to bring in zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

"as

required" is an important analysis issue.

4.4.2: Common items (POL, water). Although each nation brings its own supplies and repair

parts and is responsible for its first and second level maintenance support, limitations on deployment and the availability of facilities in the host nation present significant challenges to the

• logisticians. The commander and stafF

must arrange for common item support from the host nation wherever possible to minimize the burden on strategic lift assets.

4.5: Other issues. 4.5.1: Winning the "information war." Just as

the air commander plans the a

i r campaign and the

naval commander designs his sea superiority efforts, the combined commander must plan to win the "information war." Coordination between military and political leaders of ABCA nations and Blueland is a critical element. Considering the ubiquity of Cable News Network,, the commander must arrange support for the media. ABCA operations must meet the test of acceptability in terms of ways and m e a n s . The commander must plan for the types of information he wants the enemy to know and must plan to restrict information flow or overwhelm the enemy with information depending upon the situation. Civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and psychological operations must be coordinated to maximize the impact on friendly and enemy leaders, soldiers, and civilians.

4.5.2: Identification of Friend and Foe (

I F F ) . Although some casualties from friendly fire may be

unavoidable in war, the social and ethical values of ABCA countries zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

call for significant efforts in

this area. Recent reviews of historical data show that fiiendly fire casualties may be higher than commonly believed (6). Available technologies and techniques can certainly help in this area. Analysts can evaluate the interoperability of such systems between ABCA countries (and host nation countries such as Blueland). In some cases, simple procedures may greatly reduce risk.

4.5.3: Military assistancdtraining to Blueland. Paragraph 4.2.2 discussed some host nation

support issues. Analysts can also help in determining the content of training assistance packages, military equipment transfers or sales, and training and assistance facility requirements. Although the specifics of each program would differ depending upon host nation circumstances, analysts can certainly develop methodologies and techniques to facilitate determination of the specifics.

4.5.4: Counterinsurgency assistance. Success against insurgencies requires significant

commitment from the host nation government and population. Australia and the UK have significant experience in support to counterinsurgency efforts. Examining the theoretical principles of counterinsurgency is certainly one type of analytical issue. Developing or evaluating methodologies for counterinsurgency programs is another.

14

4.5.5: Restorationheconstruction. At the termination of combat operations, restoration and reconstruction must begin. Planning must be ongoing during combat operations. Analysts can develop or evaluate methodologies for planning. They can assist by analyzing the personnel, equipment, and materiel requirements, the time and money zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

cost of restoration and reconstruction,

and the impact on redeployment and availability

• f combat service support forces.

5: Summary. Although the ABCA scenario is fictitious, it provides a realistic, reaspnable, and robust tool for analysis of a variety of mid-intensity conflict issues. In various forms, the scenario has been used for doctrinal analysis by the U.S. Army and the ABCA QWG. By examining zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

the scenario or by enhancing or m

• g

it in their particular area of interest, analysts zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

can make

significant contributions to military operations and planning. In particular, evaluation of current doctrine, equipment, and organizations can help. Development and analysis

• f methodologies to

support actual (not fictitious) operations perhaps provide the most benefit for fbture commanders and staffs. With great uncertainty about the future, analysts must help their military plan for coalition operations over a wide range of situations. The ABCA scenario supports such efforts in mid-intensity conflict. Bibliography

i

• 1. Memorandum, Washington Standardization Officers, WSO (7794) CD Guide, dated 19

February 1992, subject: ABCA Combat Development Scenarios.

• 2. U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command, Generic 1.1 Scenario (ABCA Division),

TRAC-SC-0692, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 1992.

• 3. Memorandum, Ministry of Defence, Defence Operational Analysis Centre, D/DOAC/47/7,

dated August 1993, subject: ABCA Fictitious Scenarios. Enclosure consisted of the cardinal points specification

• utline.
• 4. Memorandum, Headquarters, Department of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations and Plans, DAMO-ZDS, dated 17 November 1993, Subject: American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) Combat Development Scenarios.

• 5. U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center, Generic 1.1 Scenario Mid-Intensity Conflict,

TRAC-SC-0194, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 1994.

• 6. Hawkins, Charles F. "Rules of Thumb for Representing Fratricide Casualties in Wargames,"

Phalanx, Vol27, No 1, Alexandria, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA VA, March 1994. William J. Krondak is the senior civilian analyst at the Scenario and Wargaming Center, TRADOC Analysis Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a Bachelor of Science degree

from the University of Nebraska and a Masters in Public Administration fiom the University of

• Oklahoma. He graduated from the Armed Forces StaECollege and is enrolled in the U.S. Army

War College. Mr. Krondak possesses nearly 20 years of experience in building and using combat development scenarios for military analysis. He can be reached at (913) 684-4015 or by zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA FAX number (9 13) 684-40 1

• 1. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

.

15

The Use of Analysis and Test and Evaluation to Support the Acquisition of the Army Tactical Command and Control System zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

ATCCS Overview The Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) is an automated, standardized, secure, integrated family of interoperable systems which supports commanders at all levels in commanding their forces and which assists the staff in controlling their functions in support of the commander. It is an information network that provides automated and integrated command and control support to enhance the processing and dissemination of time sensitive tactical information. ATCCS will be employed in the tactical corps and below to the battalion level. ATCCS consists of a deployable network of hardware, software and tactical shelters with combined local area network (LAN) and wide area network (WAN) capabilities that can be operated in both garrison and field environments. It can operate as a cluster of interactive work stations on a LAN and as an interactive network consisting of numerous independent work stations and LANs connected by existing tactical communications systems. It

• perates as a system integrating command post facilities, communications, and

automation equipment to generate common data bases and pictures of C2 information providing a consistent view of the corps battle ATCCS provides a hierarchy of distributed data bases within five component battlefield functional areas (BFAs); maneuver, fire support, intelligence and electronic warfare, air defense, and combat service support. The composite of all BFA's data information systems becomes the commander's distributed data base. The common picture of the battlefield is the sum) of all information in this distributed data base in a graphic display (functional data base situational maps, battle resource reports and intelligence products) tailored in content, size, area of coverage, map and overlay features for the subsystems and echelons where applied. Each of the five component BFAs has an automated system to process and store data generated internally or provided by external sources. These systems are briefly described below: Maneuver Control System - MCS primarily supports the planning and controlling of close combat resources such as armor, cavalry, aviation and infantry

• units. It also supports the coordination and synchronization zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
• f

aviation, engineer,

nuclear, biological and chemical, signal and military police operations. MCS is the component of ATCCS over which the common picture of the battlefield will be provided. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System - AFATDS will provide the fire support coordinator with a fully automated means for the planning, coordination, control and execution of fire support missions. AFATDS integrates all fire support

assets including naval gunfire, close air support and mortars as well as tube artillery. All Source Analysis System - ASAS produces and disseminates all source intelligence to US forces. The ASAS Collateral Workstation permits the reporting of military intelligence information to the commander's common distributed data base. Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control and Intelligence System - FAADC21 provides the consolidated air defense profile to other battlefield functional area commanders through ATCCS. FAADC21 interfaces with all elements of the FAAD weapons systems and provides the automation necessary to conduct AD engagement

• perations.

Combat Service Support Control System - CSSCS provides integrated and accurate combat service support information to field and theater commanders. The automated processing of critical resource data and transmittal to higher echelons is used to evaluate current and projected force sustainment capabilities. These five battlefield functional area systems and /or their LANs are interconnected using standard Army communications systems. The systems available are Combat Net Radio, the Army Common User System (a type of battlefield cellular telephone system) and the Army Data Distribution System (ADDS). Acquisition of each of the five battlefield functional area system programs are managed by a program office headed by a Colonel. The five program managers report to the Program Executive Officer for Command and Control Systems, a Major General. Also reporting to the PE0 CCS is an additional program office responsible for the acquisition of the common computer hardware and software used within the program. Likewise, the three communications program each are managed by a Colonel, and they report to the Program Executive Officer for Communications, a Brigadier General. Analvsis Strateclv Department of Defense and Army policies require the performance of a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis to support major acquisition decisions. A COEA is a comprehensive analysis of a system in development and any viable alternatives. The analysis focuses on the battlefield effectiveness contribution made by the system and the costs to field and sustain the system. The Army is conducting COEAs for MCS, AFATDS, FAADC21 and CSSCS at the present time. The COEA for ASAS was completed last year. The MCS COEA will address the integration of the five programs, thus a separate ATCCS COEA will not be

• performed. These analyses are utilizing common methodologies. While each analysis

is being conducted individually, one overarching supportability analysis is being done to assess the merits of using products from the common hardwarekoftware program. The results of these analyses as well as the results of testing will be used to support

the decisions to move these programs from full scale development into full scale

• production. Since it has been completed, the ASAS COEA is used as an example to

provide more detail on the process employed. The first step in the COEA process was the establishment of the COEA issues by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). In the ASAS COEA, the following issues were developed: What are the alternatives' impacts on the performance of the tactical intelligence system at division and corps? What are the alternatives' impacts on overall combat results at division and corps? What are the alternatives' impacts on sustainability at division and corps? What is the cost benefit of each alternative? These issues were passed to the agency tasked to perform the study. For all these COEAs, the study performer is the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC). TRAC in conjunction with HQDA developed alternatives to be analyzed. The alternatives in the ASAS COEA were the current Block I ASAS, Block II ASAS (an enhancement to Block I needing approval to begin development) and a Marine Corps developed intelligence analysis system. The study employed a methodology consisting of discrete, yet interrelated and interdependent activities. These activities included: 1

) a functional analysis to

establish the ASAS functional requirements, to evaluate each alternatives' capability to satisfy these requirements, and to screen out any infeasible alternative, 2) a performance analysis to measure the system-level performance capabilities of each remaining alternative and to develop system-level performance data needed to evaluate the operational performance and effectiveness of the alternatives in the force-

• n-force model, 3) an effectiveness analysis to measure the operational performance

and to determine the impact of each alternative on the commander's perception of the battlefield and the overall force combat effectiveness, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 4) a cost analysis to compute the decision costs and life-cycle costs associated with each alternative, 5) a sustainability analysis to measure the reliability, availability, maintainability and transportation characteristics of each alternative and determine their impacts on logistics support policies and force structure, and 6) an integration of the results from all these analyses into a decision matrix. The purposes of the functional analysis were to identify intelligence functional area requirements, to identify the alternatives' support to the intelligence cycle, to

determine if each alternative is a feasible solution, to determine the extent to which ASAS operational requirements are met and to determine if alternatives have clear measurable differences. A thorough document review was performed as part of this analysis, and it also included site visits to program management offices, testing activities and training activities. While the Marine Corps system satisfied its requirements] it satisfied very few Army requirements. This was due to very different doctrine employed by each service and the Army's desire to have the intelligence system linked with other battlefield functional areas through automation. The ASAS Block I and Block II systems were found to have distinct differences, and they were carried forward into the performance analysis. The performance analysis was done with a model called ASAS NET. This model was built with the Modeler tool, which is a stochastic, timed, attributed petri-net model used to represent the behavior of complex humanlmachine systems. ASAS NET modeled the functions of ASAS at the workstation level and provided measurements of message throughput rates and times from the intelligence collection sensor to the

• commander. Modeler results showed that message queues built up over time with the

Block zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I system, but did not with Block II.

The objectives of the effectiveness analysis were to determine the performance

• f ASAS Block I and Block II in a Southwest Asia operational environment and to

determine the relative contributions of ASAS Block I and Block II to force effectiveness. Both objectives were supported by the Vector-In-Commander Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Functional Area Model (VIC IEW FAM). Performance data from ASAS NET along with availability data from the sustainability analysis (see subsequent paragraph) were used as input. The effectiveness analysis was focused on the essential elements of analysis which were derived from the study issues. For ASAS, the EEAs were: What is the contribution of the alternatives to the commander's perception

• f the battlefield?

What is the contribution of the alternatives to lethality of the force? What is the contribution of the alternatives to force survivability? What is the impact of the alternatives on mission accomplishment?

In a similar fashion, measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness

(MOE) were developed. Some examples of these were artillery targets located with an error of 100 meters or less (MOP), percentage of enemy units in the ASAS data base

• ver time (MOP), number of collection management tasks generated over time (MOP),

time to mission accomplishment (MOE) and loss exchange ratios (MOE). ASAS Block II provided the commander with more current and comprehensive intelligence than Block I. It built a data base with a decreased target location error, thereby providing an

improvement in fire support effectiveness. The freshness and the amount of intelligence resulted in an improved perception of the battlefield for the commander, allowing more opportunities for optimal synchronization of maneuver and fire support. The bottom line was improved combat effectiveness for the force. The cost analysis was conducted to determine the decision cost associated with each ASAS alternative. Cost categories of development, procurement, operations and maintenance and military pay and allowances were examined. Unexpectedly, this analysis showed that fielding the newer technology of Block II to the entire force was less costly than expanding the fielding of Block I beyond the limited group now having it and maintaining it for a 20 year period. The purpose of the sustainability analysis was to assess the impact of the ASAS alternatives on logistical force structure, considering transportability, deployability and

• perational availability. Block II not only was projected to have improved reliability, but

its operational concept which consolidates terminals in one location and its enhanced fault diagnosis capability made it superior to Block zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I.

The integration of these sub-analyses was relatively straight forward. Block II

• ffered enhanced capabilities at a lower cost than full fielding of the Block I system.

The results of the COEA along with testing results and a comprehensive review

• f acquisition planning will be presented to decision making officials in the Army and

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These inputs, with affordability taken into account, will form the basis for the decision to complete the limited fielding of Block I ASAS and to begin development of Block II ASAS or to pursue some other course of action. Test and Evaluation Strateqy in Two basic types of testing are performed on ATCCS, technical testing and

• perational testing. Technical testing is done to confirm that the system meets its

specifications and to provide a degree of confidence that the system will perform well in

• perational testing. Operational testing is done to determine if the system is effective

and suitable when operated in a realistic environment with typical user troops. Technical specifications are based on the applicable operational requirements document (ORD), and operational testing also uses the ORD as a basis thereby serving as the link between these tests.. Each of the ATCCS BFA systems and the communications systems undergoes an extensive series of technical tests. These tests include things such as hot and cold temp er at u re, hum id

it

y

, re

I i ab i

I it

y

, e I

e ct ro m a g net

i

c i

n

t

e rfe re

n

ce , and basic system

• performance. Many of these tests are performed in the system contractor's plant with

Government personnel as witnesses. Usually the system under test is stimulated artificially so that it is functioning under the load conditions expected in normal usage.

While this testing checks interface parameters with other systems, it does not test the entire ATCCS. The Army was concerned that the lack of an ATCCS level technical test could cause system level problems to remain undetected until operational testing was

• conducted. Since the operational tests are extremely expensive in terms of both

manpower and dollars, this risk was deemed unacceptable. To correct this, ATCCS must now undergo a system confidence demonstration (SCD) prior to starting

• perational tests. The SCD is performed by the ATCCS Experimentation Site (AES),

Fort Lewis, Washington. AES has the ability to link the ATCCS components together

• ver actual communications systems. The system is stimulated by the Army's standard

training simulation, the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), and a mix of actual operators, training teams and contractors serves as operators. The SCD closely replicates what will be done during the operational test, but in a garrison vice field environment and on a smaller scale. The results of this demonstration are key to deciding whether or not to begin operational testing. Operational testing of ATCCS will be divided into two distinct segments. First, each component which is completing the development phase will undergo a stand- alone Initial Operational Test and Evaluation. The results of the IOTE will be used to support the decision for each component to enter full scale production, initiate the next phase of development or complete fielding. These separate IOTEs will be conducted

• concurrently. Upon completion of the individual IOTEs, the components will be

interconnected to assess the functioning of ATCCS in an operational environment. ATCCS operational testing is conducted at Fort Hood, Texas, and is supported by the Ill

• Corps. The Army has decided to limit the impact this test support has on Ill

Corps' primary mission of being prepared to support contingency operations. The result is that a yearly test window is defined within which all testing will take place. The window is of two or three months duration, beginning in the Spring or early Summer. While testing itself generally takes about a month, it is preceded by a period of training and equipment familiarization. When testing is concluded, new equipment remains in the hands of the test unit. Testing is based on a Southwest Asia scenario and, as in the SCD, is stimulated by CBS. Since the development schedules for the BFA programs are not aligned, not all systems are ready for test at the same time. In any given window one will find a mix of systems which have undergone IOTE in a previous window, which are undergoing IOTE in the given window and which will undergo IOTE in a future window. Those systems in this last category are represented by a less that fully functioning capability

• r by a simulator. As an example, the Fiscal Year 94 window (June-September 1994)

includes IOTEs for ASAS, CSSCS and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting Systems (EPLRS - a part of ADDS). All remaining systems will be present during the

• window. The remaining communications systems have completed IOTE, FAADC21

will undergo its IOTE after the ATCCS window at Fort Bliss, Texas (unique test range

requirements due to aircraft involvement) and AFATDS while not ready for IOTE will be;. present in the form of lesser capable version supplemented by simulation. The basis of operational testing is the operational requirements document. This is a summary of the user's need for a new system. Based on the ORD, the user produces the critical operational issues and criteria (COIC) which are used to structure the test. The critical operational issues are high level questions that the test must answer, and they are intentionally kept to a minimum. The criteria associated with each issue specify the minimum acceptable system performance requirements. The two ATCCS critical operational issues and their corresponding criteria are shown below: 1. Does ATCCS automation enhance the capabilities of commanders and staffs to conduct tactical operations? The commander's situation report will show no more than 2 hours difference in information between corps/division and 1 hour difference between division/brigade and between TAC/MAIN/REAR at an echelon. Provide the sender with indication of unsuccessful data transmission attempt. 2. Do the ATCCS BFA component systems effectively interoperate to support commanders and staffs in the conduct of tactical operations and interoperate with joint, combined and allied systems? BFA component systems will query each other and respond and transmit information in prescribed formats. BFA component systems will interoperate with joint, combined and allied automated systems. ASAS will continue to serve as the example system, and shown below are its COICs: 1. Does the ASAS satisfy the commander's intelligence and targeting support requirements in an operational environment? A majority of commanders and their staffs render a positive assessment that ASAS provides an improved battlefield capability when considering timeliness, accuracy and completeness. 2. Can the ASAS establish and maintain interfaces to provide required information exchanges? ASAS must accept and process message text formats, maintain

I

interfaces to other system through the Army Common User System, interface with other ATCCS nodes and interface with applicable tactical/theater/joint/national C31 systems. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

3.

Can ASAS deploy and operate on the battlefield? ASAS must be deployable on C-I 30 and larger aircraft, be capable

• f emplacing/displacing/moving with associated command posts and operate at

acceptable reduced levels under NBC and ECM conditions. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 4. Can the ASAS operators/analysts/maintainers achieve a level of system training readiness during peacetime that provides a wartime readiness capability for sustained combat operations? ASAS must provide adequate training support to prepare

• perational crews and maintain their levels.of proficiency and provide adequate

logistics support to sustain ASAS for combat operations. The operational testers may generate additional operational issues and criteria to focus testing on specific system requirements deemed important, but not adequately addressed by the COIC. They then use both the critical and additional issues as the foundation to develop measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. MOEs are few in number and closely related to the COICs. MOEs for the ASAS test include commander/staff consensus that ASAS provides an improved battlefield capability, ability to receive/transmit information fromlto other available systems, ability to deploy and operate on the battlefield and ability of representative soldiers to operate, maintain and support the system. For each MOE and COlC there are several MOPs which focus

• n the detailed capabilities of the system. A sample of the ASAS test MOPs is

provided below: Proportion of i ntel zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

I igence requirements sat

i

sf ied Time to accurately enter intelligence preparation of the battlefield templates and overlays. Proportion of enemy units identified in the All Source Correlated Data Base(ASCDB) as compared to message truth. Proportion of enemy equipment identified in the ASCDB. Time to develop and display queries against the ASAS data bases. Time to generate intelligence report messages. Time to generate and release tasking messages/requests for information.

Proportion of target nominations that were valid, accurate and timely. As stated earlier, the above list is a sample. There are similar detailed MOPS that relate to ASAS interfaces with other systems, to survivability/mobility, to soldier/machine interfaces and to training and supportability. The operational test evaluators in conjunction with the Training and Doctrine Command have developed a series of expected outcome "templates" based on the test

• scenario. These "templates" forecast the types of major enemy activities and unit

locations that should be identified by ASAS operators. The actual performance of the system and its operators will be measured against these expected outcomes. ATCCS testing will begin at Fort Hood, Texas in mid July. The first phase will consist of an integrated pilot test of approximately two weeks to insure troops are trained, communications are established, test instrumentation is functioning and data collection processing is adequate. This will be followed by the individual IOTEs which

• ccur concurrently over a one month period. These IOTEs will be controlled in that the

battle is simulated by the Corps Battle Simulation using a Southwest Asia scenario. Interfaces have been developed between CBS and each of the ATCCS BFAs so that appropriate ATCCS message traffic will be generated. In this control phase the inputs to ATCCS will be known and outputs will be collected through instrumentation. The individual IOTEs will be followed by an Integrated lnteroperability Control Phase of three days duration. In this phase, all ATCCS systems will be linked and be expected to exchange messages in an operational environment. As in the previous controlled IOTEs, this phase will be driven by CBS and data collection will be automated. The last phase of ATCCS testing will be a free-play command post exercise (CPX). As the name implies, this phase is not controlled so inputs to ATCCS will not be known. Some automated data collection can be employed, but much data collection will be done manually by observing staff functions at various echelons. While the manual data collection will be less specific than the automated results, it is expected to provide insights in the degree to which the staff utilizes and relies on ATCCS. As briefly described earlier, the results of testing will be provided to decision makers in the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Test results, the COEA, a review of the acquisition program and funding will form the basis of decisions made on the future of these programs. Linkage of COEA and Test and Evaluation One of the common terms used in both the COEA and the testing program is effectiveness (or measures of effectiveness). However, there are slightly different meanings as can be seen from the examples previously provided. The COEA strives to assess the value of the system in terms of its contribution to combat outcome. The

• bjective MOEs in the COEA focus on effectiveness of the force. The test cannot

replicate the same environment that can be created in a force-on-force model, so test

4

MOEs are really high level (aggregated) MOPs. This "disconnect" is not serious and is resolved at the next lower level, the MOPs used in the COEA and the test. An examination of the MOP examples previously provided for the COEA and the test shows a strong relationship if not a direct correspondence. This is where the test and the COEA are linked, and that linkage is not left to chance. Both test and COEA planning documentation require the linkage between the two efforts to be described. This linkage permits an adjustment of COEA results if that is needed. Since the COEA and the test results are presented to decision makers at the same major program review meeting, they are accomplished in parallel. Planning, execution and, in the case of the test, analysis of results for these two major efforts can take over a year. Timing is driven both by system readiness and by the planned decision program review (program funding is often a driver in setting the date of the review). Operational testing often is completed only months prior to the decision review, with test personnel hurrying to complete their analysis of data collected before the meeting. Analysts performing the COEA have had to begin their work well before testing starts, based on estimates of system performance. The fact that the COEA and test are linked at the MOP level, permits a direct comparison of the COEA estimates and the actual system performance as measured in test. Any major differences can be quickly identified and, their significance can be assessed. The COEA analyst must determine whether or not the actual MOP value from test would cause any change in the estimated combat effectiveness of the system or change the ranking of COEA

• alternatives. The process used to make that determination can vary from a simple

inspection to a rerunning of the models used to support the COEA.