Alternative financing of rail networks Ren Naumann, Thomas Petersen - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

alternative financing of rail networks
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Alternative financing of rail networks Ren Naumann, Thomas Petersen - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Alternative financing of rail networks Ren Naumann, Thomas Petersen INFRADAY Berlin, 2011-10-08 starting point focus of this presentation state-owned rail infrastructure in Germany operator: DB AG separated into different companies (DB


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Alternative financing of rail networks

René Naumann, Thomas Petersen INFRADAY Berlin, 2011-10-08

slide-2
SLIDE 2

2 KCW GmbH

starting point focus of this presentation

state-owned rail infrastructure in Germany

  • perator: DB AG – separated into different companies (DB Netz,

DB Station & Service) focus on costs of infrastructure provision, such as

  • peration and maintenance of infrastructure

reinvest (depreciation) financing administration, profit, etc. financing of infrastructure provision via track charges station charges contract regimes to impose efficiency

slide-3
SLIDE 3

3 KCW GmbH

starting point rail infrastructure – a natural monopoly

demand average costs marginal costs price

  • utput

pM pE qM qE

pM 2nd best price pE 1st best price (Pareto optimum)

non-regarded demand Deutsche Bahn‘s charge-setting is comparable to monopolist‘s calculation

M E essential facility non-contestable market economies of scale

slide-4
SLIDE 4

4 KCW GmbH

starting point current design of DB infrastructure charges

IM calculation

infrastructure provision costs number of use

100 €

20 € 20 € 20 € 20 € 20 €

additional use is charged by same extent  windfall profits infrastructure provision costs financing costs depreciation maintenance

  • peration

administration, profit

slide-5
SLIDE 5

5 KCW GmbH

demand different market segments

market segment charges price elasticity

  • f demand

market structure SPFV long-distance traffic Very low (integrated RU) SGV freight traffic reasonable (affected by economic cycles) SPNV regional traffic (subsidised by Federal States) ~ 0

slide-6
SLIDE 6

6 KCW GmbH

vertical integration DB some remarks

DB divisions yield different profits (EBIT/turnover 2010) long-distance traffic RU (DB Fernverkehr) ~ 3% regional traffic RUs (DB Regio) ~ 9% freight RU DB Schenker Rail ~ 1% DB Schenker Logistics ~ 2% infrastructure track – DB Netz ~ 13% stations – DB Station&Service ~ 20% infrastructure yield highest profits loss of market shares in transport segments can be easily compensated by infrastructure‘s monopoly EU law requires independent infrastructure companies

slide-7
SLIDE 7

7 KCW GmbH

infrastructure charges draining the budget

development of regional transport‘s infrastructure charges in relation to the budget constraint by the Federal States

2000-2010 +3,9% 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Development Budget (RegG) (Index) Developmemt track charges (Index) Development station charges (Index) 2000-2010 +32,8% 2000-2010 +24,6%

slide-8
SLIDE 8

8 KCW GmbH

natural monopoly of German rail (infrastructure) market comprehension

non-constable market public protection of state-owned IM (no competition of the track) vertically integrated company – Infrastructure and rail services discriminatory potential (proved by FNA and law courts) market barrier for (intramodal) competition on the track indirect cross-funding between subsidiaries X-efficiency proved by few benchmarks (stations) track access charges without any incentives to increase demand worsening of rail‘s intermodal competitiveness but: currently no evaluation of productivity by FNA complains about insufficient quality of track and stations

slide-9
SLIDE 9

9 KCW GmbH

reform main tackles

  • 1. how to implement marginal cost pricing?

demand average costs marginal costs price

  • utput

pM pE qM qE

M E

  • 2. how to induce steering mechanisms for price and quality

measures effectively?

slide-10
SLIDE 10

10 KCW GmbH

side-step contractural agreements

contracts on service-levels and financing-levels (LuFV) incentive-based contract on provision of rail infrastructure between public body and IM appropriate output (quality and quantity) specificaton, e.g. average age of assets controlling instruments

  • utput level defines amount of fundings

penalty and sanction system LuFV Bund – DB since 2009, regarding maintenance of rail infrastructure, but inadequate output measures (productivity) and controlling instruments sanctioning virtually impossible

slide-11
SLIDE 11

11 KCW GmbH

reform (1) splitting cost basis

splitting provision costs into fix costs and variable costs

infrastructure provision costs financing costs depreciation maintenance

  • peration

administration, profit fix costs 100% 100% ~80% ~0% ~100% variable costs (marginal costs) ~100% ~20% ~0% 0% 0%

    

slide-12
SLIDE 12

12 KCW GmbH

reform (2) splitting responsibilities

infrastructure

  • 1. for long-distance, agglomeration, and freight traffic (main track)
  • bligated by constitution: Bund
  • peration by state-owned IM (DB Netz)
  • 2. for regional traffic only (regional tracks)
  • bligation: Bund, execution: Federal States

reason: infrastructure is re-financend mainly by Federal States‘ subsidies Federal States choose IM‘s for operation of regional tracks inducing competition in monopolistic market establish benchmarking for infrastructure provision costs principle of subsidiarity

slide-13
SLIDE 13

13 KCW GmbH

reform (3) contractural agreement – main track

contract on service-levels and financing-levels between Bund and state-owned IM Bund compensates fix costs directly  fix costs seperated from infrastruture charges incentive regulation of costs (productivity) IM‘s profit depends on level of quality and costs infrastructure-charging between state-owned IM and RU

  • n basis of marginal costs (mainly operational costs)

inducing additional demand problem: price differentiation between market segments

fix costs maintenance financing costs depreciation administration, profit

 minimisation of the natural monopoly‘s effects

slide-14
SLIDE 14

14 KCW GmbH

reform (4) contractural agreements – regional tracks

responsibility for regional tracks

Federal States/PTA

additionally: disposition of funds

contractual agreement with IM PSC Regional Rail PSC Regional Rail PSC plus contractual agreement with IM (vertical provider)

devolution of regional rail infrastructure

  • peration modell

x years

Bund / DB

contractual agreement as for main track – quantity and quality incentive regulation by benchmarking of similiar networks possible

slide-15
SLIDE 15

15 KCW GmbH

Bund Federal States

public funding

PTA

reform (5) contractural agreements – main and regional tracks (scheme)

responsibility

RU RU RU IM IM IM

access charges contractual agreement public funding

slide-16
SLIDE 16

16 KCW GmbH

KCW GmbH Fon: +49 (0) 30/40 81 768 – 52 Büro Berlin Fax: +49 (0) 30/40 81 768 – 61 Bernburger Str. 27 Mail: naumann@kcw-online.de D-10963 Berlin Web: www.kcw-online.de René Naumann KCW GmbH Berlin

thank you for your attention! contact