2009 National Oil & Gas Safety Conference Improving Industry - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Improving Industry Health & Safety Performance

Simon Schubach Acting CEO, NOPSA Aug 2009

2009 National Oil & Gas Safety Conference

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NOPSA’s functions

Monitor & Enforce Co-operate Investigate Advise Promote

Balanced judgment is required for these functions

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Proactive

27 OHS Inspectors ► 89 Inspections 163 Facilities (68 pipelines)

Reactive

Assessments ~ 220 Accident & DO Notifications ~ 400 Complaints ~ 25 Enforcement

Improvement Notices ~ 40 Prohibition Notices

~ 10

NOPSA Activities 2 0 0 8 -0 9

(Based on current data Jul 2008 – Jun 2009)

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NOPSA focus areas: 2 0 0 9 -2 0 1 0

• Industry safety leadership
• Asset integrity
• Emergency preparedness
• Contractors

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Safety Leadership & Asset I ntegrity

Themed Audits

What is a themed audit?

Company-wide critical examination

• f operator

systems and facilities

To be conducted this year:

• 5 safety leadership audits
• 5 asset integrity audits

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Them ed Audits

Elem ents Safety Leadership Audits

• draw on Baker Panel & Buncefield reports and consider:
• Process safety expectations,
• Communications & visibility,
• Involvement in process safety audits,
• Employee empowerment,
• Resources & positioning,
• Process safety in decision-making

Asset Integrity Audits

• draw on NOPSA FI results and sources such as OGP Asset Integrity question set:
• Facility major incidents & barriers
• Critical equipment
• People & processes
• Projects
• Culture

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W e are VULNERABLE … so be VI GI LANT

21st Anniversary of the Piper Alpha tragedy 6 July 1988

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Texas City Refinery 1 5 Fatalities – March 2 0 0 5

$US ~1 Billion

Victim Compensation

$US ~1 Billion

Renewal Plan

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US Chem ical Safety Board

• Mistakes made in Texas City have their roots in

decisions made by managers, sometimes years earlier

• Safety culture is first and foremost about how

managerial decisions are made

• Are production and cost control being rewarded at

the expense of safety and risk management?

• Recommended BP set up independent panel

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Major Accident Prevention – US CSB

Ask yourself these questions:

• Is it an engineering problem?
• Is it a problem of employee

compliance?

• Is it a matter of corporate policy and

behaviors?

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Baker Report Findings Jan 2 0 0 7 Corporate safety culture

• effective process safety leadership
• perating discipline: no toleration of deviations from safe operating practice

Process safety management systems

• process safety standards & good engineering practices
• translate corporate expectations into process safety criteria

Performance evaluation, corrective action and oversight

• effective root cause analysis of incidents & audits to ensure performance
• senior management oversight of process safety

Pre ve nting pro c e ss ac c idents requires

vigilanc e… Pe o ple c an fo rge t to be

afraid!

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Buncefield Oil Storage Depot

United Kingdom

Dec 2 0 0 5

₤1 Billion

Economic Impact

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Buncefield I nvestigation Findings

• Leadership and Culture
• Collate and communicate data
• high potential incidents
• solutions and control measures
• Undertake thorough root cause investigation
• Share lessons learned and best practices

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Offshore Petroleum I ndustry Health & Safety Perform ance Collected since NOPSA commenced

• Accidents and Dangerous Occurrences
• Planned Inspections
• National Programmes

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MAJOR A + DOs include: Death/serious injury Could cause death/serious injury Fires or explosions Collision marine vessel & facility Hydrocarbon gas release >300 kg Petroleum liquid release >12 500 L

MAJOR Accidents & Dangerous Occurrences

Major Incidents - rolling 12-month totals 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Jan05- Dec05 Jul05- Jun06 Jan06- Dec06 Jul06- Jun07 Jan07- Dec07 Jul07- Jun08 Jan08- Dec08 Jul08- Jun09 The International Regulators Forum (IRF) has devised a severity rating. ‘Major’ is considered more serious, followed by ‘Significant’.

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SIGNIFICANT Accident & Dangerous Occurrences

SIGNIFICANT A + DOs include: Incapacitation LTI ≥3 days Could cause an LTI ≥3 days Other kind needing immediate investigation Damage to Safety-critical Equipment HC gas release >1-300 kg PL release >80 -12 500 L Well kick >50 barrels Unplanned Event - Implement ERP Significant Incidents - rolling 12-month totals 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Jan05- Dec05 Jul05- Jun06 Jan06- Dec06 Jul06- Jun07 Jan07- Dec07 Jul07- Jun08 Jan08- Dec08 Jul08- Jun09 The International Regulators Forum (IRF) has devised a severity rating. ‘Major’ is considered more serious, followed by ‘Significant’.

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Accidents & Dangerous Occurrences

Top 5 Root Causes

Data from Jul 2008 – Jun 2009

2 4 6 8 10 12

Preventive Maintenance Procedures - Not Followed Design Specs Design Review Procedures - Wrong

Per cent

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Root Causes

Com parison w ith previous years

2005 2006 2007 2008 YTD 2009 Procedures - Not Followed Preventive Maintenance Preventive Maintenance Preventive Maintenance Procedures - Wrong Preventive Maintenance Procedures - Not Followed Design Specs Procedures - Not Followed Design Specs Design Specs Human Engineering - Machine Interface Procedures - Not Followed Design Specs Preventive Maintenance Work Direction - Preparation Design Specs Procedures - Wrong Equipment / Parts Defective - Handling Equipment - Design Review Other Work Direction - Preparation Equipment - Design Review Procedures - Followed Incorrectly Procedures - Not Followed

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Accidents

Top 5 Root Causes

Data from Jul 2008 – Jun 2009

Top 5 most common Root Causes of Accidents (LTIs and Major Injuries)

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

Procedures - Followed Incorrectly Procedures - Not Followed Procedures - Wrong Work Direction - Preparation Human Engineering - Work Environment

Per cent

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Comparison with IRF injury rates

(ADI + LTI) Rate ≥1 day

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Australian Rate

4.94 6.99 8.35 7.81

IRF Average Rate (Benchmark)*

3.28 3.74 3.68 3.19

IRF Best Rate

2.93 2.23 2.75 2.06

US

Netherlands Netherlands

US

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Hydrocarbon Gas Releases

Num ber per year

Gas Releases 12-month totals

5 10 15 20 25

Jul05-Jun06 Jul06-Jun07 Jul07- Jun08 Jul08- Jun09

Number

Major (>300 kg) Significant (>1 - 300 kg)

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Even taking into account higher levels of activity …

As per IRF guidelines – process-related releases only. i.e. NOPSA Gas Release Rates only include data from the following facility types: Platforms, FPSOs, FSOs, MOPUs

Gas Release Rates

(per 100 Production Facilities per month) 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0

Jan05- Dec05 Jul05- Jun06 Jan06- Dec06 Jul06- Jun07 Jan07- Dec07 Jul07- Jun08 Jan08- Dec08 Jul08- Jun09

Rate

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Com parison w ith I RF gas release rates

Australia Total Rate International Benchmark Total Rate

2005 1.85 3.08 2006 2.73 3.46 2007 3.27 5.16 2008 3.02

not yet available

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Hydrocarbon Gas Releases

Root Causes

Top 5 most common Root Causes of Gas Releases (Jan 2005 - Jun 2009)

5 10 15 20

Preventive Maintenance Design Specs Procedures - Not Followed Design Review Quality Control

Per cent

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Gas Releases per Facility for Production Operators Jan 2005 - Jun 2009

2 4 6 8 10 12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Number

Production Operators

Gas releases per Facility per Operator

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Production Operator # 2

Root Causes

Top 5 Root Causes per Operator #2 for Gas Releases 10 20 30 40 Quality Control Design Review Preventive Maintenance Design Specs Procedures - Not Followed

Per cent

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Production Operator # 3

Root Causes

Top 5 Root Causes for Operator #3 for Gas Releases 5 10 15 20 Preventive Maintenance Procedures - Not Followed Design Specs Procedures - Wrong Management System

Per cent

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Overall Proportion of FI Releases Jan 2005 - Jun 2009 % Other Incidents % FI Incidents

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Facility I ntegrity

National Program m es

• NOPSA Inspections

(FI Prompt sheets)

• Analysis of Accident

& Dangerous Occurrences

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FI : I nspection Results by Focus Areas

Percentage Facilities at each FI Expectation Level at Jun 2009

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Facility Integrity Mgmt System - Onshore Topsides Maintenance System - Onshore Topsides Maintenance System - Offshore Topsides Process Integrity Topsides Pressure Integrity Topsides Corrosion and Erosion Topsides Structures SmallBore Piping/Tubing, Flexible Hoses

Does not meet FI Expectations Partially meets FI Expectations Meets FI Expectations

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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Facility Integrity Mgmt System - Onshore Topsides Maintenance System - Onshore Topsides Maintenance System - Offshore SmallBore Piping/Tubing, Flexible Hoses

Does not meet FI Expectations Partially meets FI Expectations Meets FI Expectations

FI : Focus Area Elem ents that require attention

Audit & Review Compliance with Performance Stds System Test of SCE Field Installation

8 areas, also; process pressure corrosion structures

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Key Findings from National Program m es

• 1. NOPSA Inspections (FI Prompt sheets)
• Backlogs in testing & maintenance of safety critical

elements

• Monitoring, independent auditing and review
• 2. Analysis of Accident & Dangerous Occurrences
• Safety Critical Elements: inadequate testing &

maintenance

• Equipment and Parts Defects

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Parts and Equipment involved in FI Incidents

Hydrocarbon Releases Parts and Equipment Involved Jan 2005 - Jun 2009

5 10 15 20 25 30

V a l v e s / V e n t s P i p e s / T u b e s O t h e r J

• i

n t s / F l a n g e s G a s k e t s / S e a l s P u m p s / C

• m

p r e s s

• r

s I n s t r u m e n t s T a n k E n g i n e s

Per cent

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HSE ( UK) Asset I ntegrity Program m e ( KP3 )

Maintenance Management System areas of concern:

– Maintenance of SCEs – Backlog – Deferrals – Measuring compliance with Performance Stds – Corrective Maintenance

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Process safety indicators

• APPEA has taken the initiative to trial 3 leading

indicators: safety tours, high potential incidents and audit action close-outs

• AIChE CCPS (www.ccpsonline.org) has proposed a

series of leading process safety indicators, including one for mechanical integrity: SCE inspections completed/Total SCE inspections due

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Accidents & Dangerous Occurrences Root Causes Overall Top 3 (Jan 2005 – Jun 2009)

• 1. Preventive maintenance

needs improvement

• 2. Procedures

not used/not followed

• 3. Design specifications

needs improvement

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2 0 0 9 National Oil & Gas Safety Conference

Thank you