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W HAT S IN A N AME ? E VALUATING S TATISTICAL A TTACKS ON P ERSONAL - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

W HAT S IN A N AME ? E VALUATING S TATISTICAL A TTACKS ON P ERSONAL K NOWLEDGE Q UESTIONS Joseph Bonneau Mike Just Greg Matthews jcb82@cl.cam.ac.uk Computer Laboratory Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2010 Tenerife, Spain January


  1. W HAT ’ S IN A N AME ? E VALUATING S TATISTICAL A TTACKS ON P ERSONAL K NOWLEDGE Q UESTIONS Joseph Bonneau Mike Just Greg Matthews jcb82@cl.cam.ac.uk Computer Laboratory Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2010 Tenerife, Spain January 26, 2010 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 1 / 44

  2. Research Question How “secure” are personal knowledge questions against guessing? Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 2 / 44

  3. Authenticating Humans Physical Keys Crypto Hardware Fingerprints Iris Hardware Biometrics Appearance Documentation DNA Typing Gait Kerberos PKI Authentication Behaviour Post Delegation Delegation SMS Voice Handwriting OpenID Social Vouching Memory PINs Text Passwords Explicit Implicit "Cognitive" Schemes Graphical Passwords Personal Knowledge Questions Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 3 / 44

  4. Personal Knowledge Questions Pros Cost Memorability? Cons Privacy Security Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 4 / 44

  5. Authentication on the Web Text Passwords 1 Delegation 2 Personal Knowledge Questions 3 Trends: OpenID may make delegation preferred method Large webmail providers becoming the root of trust Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 5 / 44

  6. In the News Paris Hilton T-Mobile Sidekick, 2005-02-20 Sarah Palin Yahoo! email, 2008-09-16 Twitter corporate Google Docs, 2009-07-16 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 6 / 44

  7. In the News Paris Hilton T-Mobile Sidekick, 2005-02-20 Sarah Palin Yahoo! email, 2008-09-16 Twitter corporate Google Docs, 2009-07-16 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 6 / 44

  8. In the News Paris Hilton T-Mobile Sidekick, 2005-02-20 Sarah Palin Yahoo! email, 2008-09-16 Twitter corporate Google Docs, 2009-07-16 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 6 / 44

  9. Protocol Model Client Server I am i − → Increment t i Select q R ← Q i Please answer q ← − The answer is x − → Verify x Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 7 / 44

  10. Targeted Attacker Attack a specific i Real-world identity of i is known Per-target research possible Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 8 / 44

  11. Targeted Attacker Web search Used in Hilton, Palin compromises Public records Griffith et. al: 30% of individual’s mother’s maiden names found via marriage, birth records Social engineering Dumpster diving, burglary Acquaintance attacks Schecter et. al: ∼ 25% of questions guessed by friends, family Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 9 / 44

  12. Trawling Attacker Attack all i ∈ I from a large set I Real-world identities are unknown Population-wide statistics Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 10 / 44

  13. Trawling Attacker Blind attack Don’t understand i or q CAPTCHA-ised protocols or user-written questions “What do I want to do?” Statistical attack Understand q but not i Guess most likely answers Thought to be used in Twitter compromise Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 11 / 44

  14. Measuring Security Against Guessing Which is “harder” to guess: Surname of randomly chosen Internet user Randomly chosen 4-digit PIN Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 12 / 44

  15. Mathematics of Guessing Answer X is drawn from a finite, known distribution X |X| = N P ( X = x i ) = p i for each possible answer x i X is monotonically decreasing: p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ · · · ≥ p N Goal: guess X using as few queries “is X = x i ?”as possible. Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 13 / 44

  16. Shannon Entropy N � H 1 ( X ) = − p i lg p i i = 1 H 1 (surname) = 16.2 bits H 1 (PIN) = 13.3 bits Meaning: Expected number of queries “Is X ∈ S ?” for arbitrary subsets S ⊆ X needed to guess X . (Source-Coding Theorem) Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 14 / 44

  17. Shannon Entropy N � H 1 ( X ) = − p i lg p i i = 1 H 1 (surname) = 16.2 bits H 1 (PIN) = 13.3 bits Meaning: Expected number of queries “Is X ∈ S ?” for arbitrary subsets S ⊆ X needed to guess X . (Source-Coding Theorem) Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 14 / 44

  18. Guessing Entropy N � � R � G ( X ) = E # guesses ( X ← X ) = p i · i i = 1 G (surname) ≈ 137000 guesses G (PIN) ≈ 5000 guesses Meaning: Expected number of queries “Is X = x i ?” for i = 1 , 2 , . . . , N (optimal sequential guessing) Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 15 / 44

  19. The Trouble with Guessing 1 U 16 — N = 16, p 1 = p 2 = · · · = p 16 = 16 H 1 ( U 16 ) = 4 bits G ( U 16 ) = 8.5 guesses Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 16 / 44

  20. The Trouble with Guessing X 65 — N = 65, p 1 = 1 1 2 , p 2 = · · · = p 65 = 128 H 1 ( X 65 ) = 4 bits G ( X 65 ) = 17.25 guesses Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 17 / 44

  21. The Trouble with Guessing H 1 ( X 65 ) = H 1 ( U 16 ) G ( X 65 ) > G ( U 16 ) R Adversary can guess X ← X 65 in 1 try half the time! Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 18 / 44

  22. Marginal Guessing Suppose Eve wants to guess any k out of m 4-digit PINS PIN #1 PIN #2 PIN #3 PIN # m . . . 0000 0000 0000 0000 . . . 0001 0001 0001 . . . 0001 0002 0002 0002 0002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9998 9998 9998 . . . 9998 9999 9999 9999 9999 . . . Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 19 / 44

  23. Marginal Guessing Suppose Eve wants to guess any k out of m 4-digit PINS PIN #1 PIN #2 PIN #3 PIN # m . . . 0000 0000 0000 0000 . . . 0001 0001 0001 . . . 0001 0002 0002 0002 0002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9998 9998 9998 . . . 9998 9999 9999 9999 9999 . . . Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 19 / 44

  24. Marginal Guessing Suppose Eve wants to guess any k out of m 4-digit PINS PIN #1 PIN #2 PIN #3 PIN # m . . . 0000 0000 0000 0000 . . . 0001 0001 0001 . . . 0001 0002 0002 0002 0002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9998 9998 9998 . . . 9998 9999 9999 9999 9999 . . . Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 19 / 44

  25. Marginal Guessing Suppose Eve wants to guess any k out of m 4-digit PINS PIN #1 PIN #2 PIN #3 PIN # m . . . 0000 0000 0000 0000 . . . 0001 0001 0001 . . . 0001 0002 0002 0002 0002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9998 9998 9998 . . . 9998 9999 9999 9999 9999 . . . Any order of guessing is equivalent. Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 19 / 44

  26. Marginal Guessing Suppose Mallory wants to guess any k out of m surnames Name #1 Name #2 Name #3 Name # m . . . Smith Smith Smith Smith . . . Jones Jones Jones . . . Jones Johnson Johnson Johnson Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ytterock Ytterock Ytterock . . . Ytterock Zdrzynski Zdrzynski Zdrzynski Zdrzynski . . . Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 20 / 44

  27. Marginal Guessing Suppose Mallory wants to guess any k out of m surnames Name #1 Name #2 Name #3 Name # m . . . Smith Smith Smith Smith . . . Jones Jones Jones . . . Jones Johnson Johnson Johnson Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ytterock Ytterock Ytterock . . . Ytterock Zdrzynski Zdrzynski Zdrzynski Zdrzynski . . . Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 20 / 44

  28. Marginal Guessing Suppose Mallory wants to guess any k out of m surnames Name #1 Name #2 Name #3 Name # m . . . Smith Smith Smith Smith . . . Jones Jones Jones . . . Jones Johnson Johnson Johnson Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ytterock Ytterock Ytterock . . . Ytterock Zdrzynski Zdrzynski Zdrzynski Zdrzynski . . . Obvious optimal strategy Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 20 / 44

  29. Measuring Security Against Guessing Given 100 accounts: PIN: 50% chance of success after 5000 guesses Surname: 50% chance of success after 168 guesses Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 21 / 44

  30. Marginal Guessing Neither H 1 nor G model an adversary who can give up Marginal Guesswork Give up after reaching probability α of success:  �  j �   � � µ α ( X ) = min  j ∈ [ 1 , N ] p i ≥ α � �  i = 1 � Marginal Success Rate Give up after β guesses: β � λ β ( X ) = p i i = 1 Joseph Bonneau (University of Cambridge) What’s in a Name? January 26, 2010 22 / 44

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