Towards Breaking the Exponential Barrier for General Secret Sharing
Tianren Liu MIT Vinod Vaikuntanathan MIT Hoeteck Wee CNRS and ENS May 6, 2018
Towards Breaking the Exponential Barrier for General Secret Sharing - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Towards Breaking the Exponential Barrier for General Secret Sharing Tianren Liu Vinod Vaikuntanathan Hoeteck Wee MIT MIT CNRS and ENS May 6, 2018 Secret Sharing [Blakley79,Shamir79,Ito-Saito-Nishizeki87] Secret s { 0 , 1 }
Tianren Liu MIT Vinod Vaikuntanathan MIT Hoeteck Wee CNRS and ENS May 6, 2018
Secret s ∈ {0,1}
Secret s ∈ {0,1}
share1 share2 share3 share4 share5
Secret s ∈ {0,1}
share1 share2 share3 share4 share5
share2 share3 share5
Secret s ∈ {0,1}
share1 share2 share3 share4 share5
share2 share3 share5
Threshold Secret Sharing [Shamir’79] YES if I gets ≥ t shares; NO INFO if I gets < t shares.
Secret s ∈ {0,1}
share1 share2 share3 share4 share5
share2 share3 share5
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} x4 ∈ {0,1} x5 ∈ {0,1} Threshold Secret Sharing [Shamir’79] YES if I gets ≥ t shares; NO INFO if I gets < t shares.
Secret s ∈ {0,1}
share1 share2 share3 share4 share5
share2 share3 share5
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} x4 ∈ {0,1} x5 ∈ {0,1}
0: not send 1: send 1: send 0: not send 1: send
Threshold Secret Sharing [Shamir’79] YES if I gets ≥ t shares; NO INFO if I gets < t shares.
Secret s ∈ {0,1}
share1 share2 share3 share4 share5
share2 share3 share5
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} x4 ∈ {0,1} x5 ∈ {0,1}
0: not send 1: send 1: send 0: not send 1: send
Threshold Secret Sharing [Shamir’79] YES if thresholdt(x1,...,xn) = 1; NO INFO if thresholdt(x1,...,xn) = 0.
Secret s ∈ {0,1}
share1 share2 share3 share4 share5
share2 share3 share5
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} x4 ∈ {0,1} x5 ∈ {0,1}
0: not send 1: send 1: send 0: not send 1: send
General Secret Sharing [ISN’89] monotone F : {0,1}n → {0,1} YES if F(x1,...,xn) = 1; NO INFO if F(x1,...,xn) = 0.
Best Known Secret Sharing Schemes
Share size ≤ O(monotone formula size) ≤ ˜ O(2n). [Benaloh-Leichter’88] Share size ≤ O(monotone span program size) ≤ ˜ O(2n).
[Karchmer-Wigderson’93]
Best Known Secret Sharing Schemes
Share size ≤ O(monotone formula size) ≤ ˜ O(2n). [Benaloh-Leichter’88] Share size ≤ O(monotone span program size) ≤ ˜ O(2n).
[Karchmer-Wigderson’93]
Lower Bounds
∃F that share size ≥ ˜ O(2n/2) for linear secret sharing. [KW’93] ∃F that total share size ≥ ˜ Ω(n2). [Csirmaz’97]
Best Known Secret Sharing Schemes
Share size ≤ O(monotone formula size) ≤ ˜ O(2n). [Benaloh-Leichter’88] Share size ≤ O(monotone span program size) ≤ ˜ O(2n).
[Karchmer-Wigderson’93]
Lower Bounds
∃F that share size ≥ ˜ O(2n/2) for linear secret sharing. [KW’93] ∃F that total share size ≥ ˜ Ω(n2). [Csirmaz’97]
Best Known Secret Sharing Schemes
Share size ≤ O(monotone formula size) ≤ ˜ O(2n). [Benaloh-Leichter’88] Share size ≤ O(monotone span program size) ≤ ˜ O(2n).
[Karchmer-Wigderson’93]
Lower Bounds
∃F that share size ≥ ˜ O(2n/2) for linear secret sharing. [KW’93] ∃F that total share size ≥ ˜ Ω(n2). [Csirmaz’97]
Representation Size Barrier?
For any collection of 22Ω(n) monotone access functions, ∃F in the collection that requires 2Ω(n) share size.
Representation Size Barrier?
For any collection of 22Ω(n) monotone access functions, ∃F in the collection that requires 2Ω(n) share size.
Representation Size Barrier?
For any collection of 22Ω(n) monotone access functions, ∃F in the collection that requires 2Ω(n) share size.
Our Theorem: Overcoming the Representation Size Barrier
There is a collection of 22n/2 monotone access functions, s.t. ∀F in the family has a secret sharing scheme with share size 2 ˜
O(√n).
Representation Size Barrier?
For any collection of 22Ω(n) monotone access functions, ∃F in the collection that requires 2Ω(n) share size.
Our Theorem: Overcoming the Representation Size Barrier
There is a collection of 22n/2 monotone access functions, s.t. ∀F in the family has a secret sharing scheme with share size 2 ˜
O(√n).
Main Tool: Multi-party Conditional Disclosure of Secrets (CDS)
Multi-party CDS scheme with communication complexity 2 ˜
O(√n).
[Gertner-Ishai-Kushilevitz-Malkin’00]
. . .
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} xn ∈ {0,1} x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1}
[Gertner-Ishai-Kushilevitz-Malkin’00]
. . .
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} xn ∈ {0,1} x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1} bit s
randomness r
[Gertner-Ishai-Kushilevitz-Malkin’00]
. . .
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} xn ∈ {0,1} x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1}
bit s
randomness r
[Gertner-Ishai-Kushilevitz-Malkin’00]
m1 m2 m3 mn . . .
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} xn ∈ {0,1} x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1}
bit s
randomness r
[Gertner-Ishai-Kushilevitz-Malkin’00]
m1 m2 m3 mn . . .
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} xn ∈ {0,1} x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1} bit s
randomness r
◮ Correctness: When F(x1,...,xn) = 1, Charlie gets s.
[Gertner-Ishai-Kushilevitz-Malkin’00]
m1 m2 m3 mn . . .
x1 ∈ {0,1} x2 ∈ {0,1} x3 ∈ {0,1} xn ∈ {0,1} x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1} bit s
randomness r
◮ Correctness: When F(x1,...,xn) = 1, Charlie gets s. ◮ IT Privacy: When F(x1,...,xn) = 0, Charlie learns nothing about s.
Multi-party CDS m1 m2 m3 mk
C
. . . x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xk bit s
randomness r
gets s iff F(x1,...,xn) = 1 for some public F
Multi-party CDS m1 m2 m3 mk
C
. . . x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xk bit s
randomness r
gets s iff F(x1,...,xn) = 1 for some public F “Promise” secret sharing
A0 A1 B0 B1 C0 C1 D0 D1 E0 E1
n/2 buckets
Multi-party CDS m1 m2 m3 mk
C
. . . x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xk bit s
randomness r
gets s iff F(x1,...,xn) = 1 for some public F “Promise” secret sharing
A0 A1 B0 B1 C0 C1 D0 D1 E0 E1
n/2 buckets
◮ Promise: Exactly one
participant from each bucket
Multi-party CDS m1 m2 m3 mk
C
. . . x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xk bit s
randomness r
gets s iff F(x1,...,xn) = 1 for some public F “Promise” secret sharing
A0 A1 B0 B1 C0 C1 D0 D1 E0 E1
n/2 buckets
◮ Promise: Exactly one
participant from each bucket
◮ Ax1,Bx2,...,Ex5 recover s if
F(x1,...,x5) = 1
Multi-party CDS m1 m2 m3 mk
C
. . . x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xk bit s
randomness r
gets s iff F(x1,...,xn) = 1 for some public F “Promise” secret sharing
A0 A1 B0 B1 C0 C1 D0 D1 E0 E1
n/2 buckets
◮ Promise: Exactly one
participant from each bucket
◮ Ax1,Bx2,...,Ex5 recover s if
F(x1,...,x5) = 1
◮ # access functions = 22n/2
Multi-party CDS m1 m2 m3 mk
C
. . . x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xk bit s
randomness r
gets s iff F(x1,...,xn) = 1 for some public F “Promise” secret sharing
A0 A1 B0 B1 C0 C1 D0 D1 E0 E1
n/2 buckets
◮ Promise: Exactly one
participant from each bucket
◮ Ax1,Bx2,...,Ex5 recover s if
F(x1,...,x5) = 1
◮ # access functions = 22n/2 ◮ A0’s share = m1(0,s,r),
A1’s share = m1(1,s,r), etc
m1 m2 m3 mn . . .
x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1} Public F : {0,1}n → {0,1} bit s
randomness r
◮ Correctness: When F(x1,...,xn) = 1, Charlie gets s. ◮ IT Privacy: When F(x1,...,xn) = 0, Charlie learns nothing about s.
mA m1 m2 m3 mn . . .
x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1} Public F : {0,1}n → {0,1} bit s
randomness r
◮ Correctness: When F(x1,...,xn) = 1, Charlie gets s. ◮ IT Privacy: When F(x1,...,xn) = 0, Charlie learns nothing about s.
mA m1 m2 m3 mn . . .
F
x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1} F ∈ {0,1}2n, Public F : {0,1}n → {0,1} bit s
randomness r
◮ Correctness: When F(x1,...,xn) = 1, Charlie gets s. ◮ IT Privacy: When F(x1,...,xn) = 0, Charlie learns nothing about s.
mA m1 m2 m3 mn . . .
F
x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1} F ∈ {0,1}2n, Public F : {0,1}n → {0,1} bit s
randomness r
◮ Correctness: When F(x1,...,xn) = 1, Charlie gets s. ◮ IT Privacy: When F(x1,...,xn) = 0, Charlie learns nothing about s.
mA m1 m2 m3 mn . . .
F
x1 x2 x3 xn x1,...,xn ∈ {0,1} F ∈ {0,1}2n, Public F : {0,1}n → {0,1} bit s
randomness r
◮ Correctness: When F(x1,...,xn) = 1, Charlie gets s. ◮ IT Privacy: When F(x1,...,xn) = 0, Charlie learns nothing about s.
bit s
randomness r
mB mA F ∈ {0,1}2n x ∈ {0,1}n F ∈ {0,1}2n,x ∈ {0,1}n
◮ Correctness: When F(x) = 1, Charlie gets s. ◮ IT Privacy: When F(x) = 0, Charlie learns nothing about s.
Communication Complexity Reconstruction Θ(2n/2) [GKW’15] linear Θ(2n/3) [LVW’17] quadratic 2 ˜
O(√n)
[LVW’17] general Ω(n) [GKW’15] general
2-party CDS
A B C
F x F,x
◮ O(2n/2) linear reconstruction [GKW’15] ◮ O(2n/3) quadratic reconstruction [LVW’17] ◮ 2 ˜ O(√n) general reconstruction [LVW’17]
Multi-party CDS
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x
2-party CDS
A B C
F x F,x
◮ O(2n/2) linear reconstruction [GKW’15] ◮ O(2n/3) quadratic reconstruction [LVW’17] ◮ 2 ˜ O(√n) general reconstruction [LVW’17]
Multi-party CDS
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x
2-party CDS
A B C
F x F,x
◮ O(2n/2) linear reconstruction [GKW’15] ◮ O(2n/3) quadratic reconstruction [LVW’17] ◮ 2 ˜ O(√n) general reconstruction [LVW’17]
Multi-party CDS
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x O(2n/2) linear reconstruction O(2n/3) quadratic reconstruction 2 ˜
O(√n) general reconstruction
2-party CDS
A B C
F x F,x
◮ O(2n/2) linear reconstruction [GKW’15] ◮ O(2n/3) quadratic reconstruction [LVW’17] ◮ 2 ˜ O(√n) general reconstruction [LVW’17]
Multi-party CDS
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x O(2n/2) linear reconstruction O(2n/3) quadratic reconstruction 2 ˜
O(√n) general reconstruction
2-party CDS
A B C
F x F,x
◮ O(2n/2) linear reconstruction [GKW’15] ◮ O(2n/3) quadratic reconstruction [LVW’17] ◮ 2 ˜ O(√n) general reconstruction [LVW’17]
Multi-party CDS
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x O(2n/2) linear reconstruction O(2n/3) quadratic reconstruction 2 ˜
O(√n) general reconstruction
2-party CDS
A B C
F x F,x Multi-party CDS
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x
2-party CDS mB
A B C
F x F,x Multi-party CDS
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x
◮ What is sent by Bob? mB(x,s,r)
2-party CDS mB
A B C
F x F,x Multi-party CDS m1 m2 mn
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x
◮ What is sent by Bob? mB(x,s,r) ◮ How can n players jointly compute mB... revealing nothing else?
2-party CDS mB
A B C
F x F,x Multi-party CDS m1 m2 mn
A C
. . . F x1 x2 xn F,x
◮ What is sent by Bob? mB(x,s,r) ◮ How can n players jointly compute mB... revealing nothing else? ◮ PSM (Private Simultaneous Messages) [FKN’94] ≈ Non-Interactive MPC
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
What is sent by Bob?
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
What is sent by Bob?
◮ Bob sends mB := r +s ·ux
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
What is sent by Bob?
◮ Bob sends mB := r +s ·ux ◮ ux: matching vector
ux,vx ∈ Zℓ
6 for each x ∈ {0,1}n
ux,vy =
if x = y = 0,
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
What is sent by Bob?
◮ Bob sends mB := r +s ·ux ◮ ux: matching vector
ux,vx ∈ Zℓ
6 for each x ∈ {0,1}n
ux,vy =
if x = y = 0,
◮ ℓ = 2O(√nlogn) [BBR’94,Gro’00]
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
What is sent by Bob?
◮ Bob sends mB := r +s ·ux ◮ ux: matching vector
ux,vx ∈ Zℓ
6 for each x ∈ {0,1}n
ux,vy =
if x = y = 0,
◮ ℓ = 2O(√nlogn) [BBR’94,Gro’00] ◮ Communication = ℓ = 2O(√nlogn)
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
What is sent by Bob?
◮ Bob sends mB := r +s ·ux ◮ ux: matching vector
ux,vx ∈ Zℓ
6 for each x ∈ {0,1}n
ux,vy =
if x = y = 0,
◮ ℓ = 2O(√nlogn) [BBR’94,Gro’00] ◮ Communication = ℓ = 2O(√nlogn)
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
PSM protocol computing mB?
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
What is sent by Bob?
◮ Bob sends mB := r +s ·ux ◮ ux: matching vector
ux,vx ∈ Zℓ
6 for each x ∈ {0,1}n
ux,vy =
if x = y = 0,
◮ ℓ = 2O(√nlogn) [BBR’94,Gro’00] ◮ Communication = ℓ = 2O(√nlogn)
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
PSM protocol computing mB?
◮ If mB(x,s,r) computable by
small arithmetic formula, PSM communication is small.
[IK’02,AIK’04]
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
What is sent by Bob?
◮ Bob sends mB := r +s ·ux ◮ ux: matching vector
ux,vx ∈ Zℓ
6 for each x ∈ {0,1}n
ux,vy =
if x = y = 0,
◮ ℓ = 2O(√nlogn) [BBR’94,Gro’00] ◮ Communication = ℓ = 2O(√nlogn)
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
PSM protocol computing mB?
◮ If mB(x,s,r) computable by
small arithmetic formula, PSM communication is small.
[IK’02,AIK’04]
◮ Is x → ux simple?
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
◮ mapping x → ux computable by small formula
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
◮ mapping x → ux computable by small formula ◮ ∀x, ux = u1,x1 ◦...◦un,xn
n pairs of vectors (u1,0,u1,1),...,(un,0,un,1)
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
◮ mapping x → ux computable by small formula ◮ ∀x, ux = u1,x1 ◦...◦un,xn
n pairs of vectors (u1,0,u1,1),...,(un,0,un,1)
◮ i-th bit of mB = r +s ·ux computable by
size-O(n) arithmetic formula r[i]+s ·u1,x1[i]·...·un,xn[i]
mB
B
x bit s
randomness r
m1 m2 mn x1 x2 xn bit s
randomness r
◮ mapping x → ux computable by small formula ◮ ∀x, ux = u1,x1 ◦...◦un,xn
n pairs of vectors (u1,0,u1,1),...,(un,0,un,1)
◮ i-th bit of mB = r +s ·ux computable by
size-O(n) arithmetic formula r[i]+s ·u1,x1[i]·...·un,xn[i]
◮ ℓ = 2O(√nlogn) 2O(√nlogn)
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}n2
s.t. zx has
n logn 1’s
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}n2
s.t. zx has
n logn 1’s ◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(
py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}n2
s.t. zx has
n logn 1’s ◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(
py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Let vx be the coefficients of py
and ux be all degree-O(
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}n2
s.t. zx has
n logn 1’s ◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(
py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Let vx be the coefficients of py
and ux be all degree-O(
◮ ux,vy = py(zx)
length = # monomials = (n2)O(√
n/logn) = 2O(√nlogn)
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}n2
s.t. zx has
n logn 1’s ◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(
py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Let vx be the coefficients of py
and ux be all degree-O(
◮ ux,vy = py(zx)
length = # monomials = (n2)O(√
n/logn) = 2O(√nlogn)
simple zx → ux
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}n2
s.t. zx has
n logn 1’s ◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(
py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Let vx be the coefficients of py
and ux be all degree-O(
◮ ux,vy = py(zx)
length = # monomials = (n2)O(√
n/logn) = 2O(√nlogn)
simplify x → zx simple zx → ux
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}2n
s.t. zx has n 1’s
◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(
py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Let vx be the coefficients of py
and ux be all degree-O(
◮ ux,vy = py(zx)
length = # monomials = (n2)O(√
n/logn) = 2O(√nlogn)
simplify x → zx simple zx → ux
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}2n
s.t. zx has n 1’s; map 0 → 01, 1 → 10
◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(
py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Let vx be the coefficients of py
and ux be all degree-O(
◮ ux,vy = py(zx)
length = # monomials = (n2)O(√
n/logn) = 2O(√nlogn)
simplify x → zx simple zx → ux
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}2n
s.t. zx has n 1’s; map 0 → 01, 1 → 10
◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(√n) over Z6 py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Let vx be the coefficients of py
and ux be all degree-O(√n) monomials of zx
◮ ux,vy = py(zx)
length = # monomials = (n2)O(√
n/logn) = 2O(√nlogn)
simplify x → zx simple zx → ux
◮ Each x ∈ {0,1}n is mapped to zx ∈ {0,1}2n
s.t. zx has n 1’s; map 0 → 01, 1 → 10
◮ There exists polynomials {px}x for each x s.t.
degree-O(√n) over Z6 py(zx) =
if x = y = 0,
◮ Let vx be the coefficients of py
and ux be all degree-O(√n) monomials of zx
◮ ux,vy = py(zx)
length = # monomials = (2n)O(√n) = 2O(√nlogn) simplify x → zx simple zx → ux
◮ Simpler matching vector x → ux
◮ Simpler matching vector x → ux ◮ (2-party CDS) Bob’s message is a small formula
◮ Simpler matching vector x → ux ◮ (2-party CDS) Bob’s message is a small formula ◮ (multi-party CDS) n parties can be efficiently emulate Bob
◮ Simpler matching vector x → ux ◮ (2-party CDS) Bob’s message is a small formula ◮ (multi-party CDS) n parties can be efficiently emulate Bob
Multi-party CDS
There is a multi-party CDS scheme with communication complexity 2O(√nlogn) as long as the total input length is n bits.
◮ Simpler matching vector x → ux ◮ (2-party CDS) Bob’s message is a small formula ◮ (multi-party CDS) n parties can be efficiently emulate Bob
Multi-party CDS
There is a multi-party CDS scheme with communication complexity 2O(√nlogn) as long as the total input length is n bits.
Secret sharing for double-exponentially many access functions
There is a collection of 22n/2 access functions, s.t. ∀F in the family has a secret sharing scheme with share size 2O(√nlogn).
2-party CDS O(2n/2) [GKW’15]
linear reconstruction
O(2n/3) [LVW’17]
quadratic reconstruction
2O(√nlogn) [LVW’17]
general reconstruction
Multi-party CDS 2O(√nlogn) [This]
general reconstruction
2-party CDS O(2n/2) [GKW’15]
linear reconstruction
O(2n/3) [LVW’17]
quadratic reconstruction
2O(√nlogn) [LVW’17]
general reconstruction
Multi-party CDS O(2n/2) [This,BP’18]
linear reconstruction, optimal
O(2n/3)
quadratic reconstruction, optimal
2O(√nlogn) [This]
general reconstruction
Secret sharing for even more access functions [This,BKN’18]
There is a collection of 2( n
n/2) access functions, s.t.
∀F in the family has a secret sharing scheme with share size 2 ˜
O(√n).
Secret sharing for even more access functions [This,BKN’18,LV’18]
There is a collection of 2( n
n/2)+2Ω(n) access functions, s.t.
∀F in the family has a secret sharing scheme with share size 2 ˜
O(√n).
Secret sharing for even more access functions [This,BKN’18,LV’18]
There is a collection of 2( n
n/2)+2Ω(n) access functions, s.t.
∀F in the family has a secret sharing scheme with share size 2 ˜
O(√n).
# monotone function ≤ 2( n
n/2)·(1+ O(logn) n
)
Secret sharing for even more access functions [This,BKN’18,LV’18]
There is a collection of 2( n
n/2)+2Ω(n) access functions, s.t.
∀F in the family has a secret sharing scheme with share size 2 ˜
O(√n).
# monotone function ≤ 2( n
n/2)·(1+ O(logn) n
)
Secret sharing for all access functions [LV’18 @STOC]
∀F has a secret sharing scheme with share size 20.994n.
(or representation)
(or representation)
Computational
◮ FHE
(or representation)
Computational
◮ FHE
Information theoretic
◮ Private Information Retrieval
(or representation)
Computational
◮ FHE
Information theoretic
◮ Private Information Retrieval ◮ Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
2-party & multiparty case
(or representation)
Computational
◮ FHE
Information theoretic
◮ Private Information Retrieval ◮ Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
2-party & multiparty case
◮ Secret Sharing
for 22Ω(n) access functions potentially for all access functions
(or representation)
Computational
◮ FHE
Information theoretic
◮ Private Information Retrieval ◮ Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
2-party & multiparty case
◮ Secret Sharing
for 22Ω(n) access functions potentially for all access functions
◮ What’s next?