The Irish 3.6 GHz award Webinar Thursday 26 th October, 11 am 12 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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The Irish 3.6 GHz award Webinar Thursday 26 th October, 11 am 12 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Jan 26, 2023 192 likes •432 views

The Irish 3.6 GHz award Webinar Thursday 26 th October, 11 am 12 noon (GMT) (c) DotEcon Ltd 2017 Why the 3.6 GHz band is interesting 5G use Lots of spectrum in one band for the first time Strong demand, but also unprecedented

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SLIDE 1

The Irish 3.6 GHz award

Webinar Thursday 26th October, 11 am – 12 noon (GMT)

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 2

Why the 3.6 GHz band is interesting

  • 5G use
  • Lots of spectrum in one band for the first time
  • Strong demand, but also unprecedented supply
  • Complex auction design issues, especially if

regionalisation is used

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 3

3.6GHz auctions since 2014

Where When Belgium Mar 2015 Beauty contest with single applicant Spain Mar 2016 20 MHz national block (alongside 2.6GHz in a sealed bid) Hungary Jun 2016 16 blocks of 2x5MHz in 3.4-3.6 GHz and 40 blocks

  • f 5 MHZ TDD at 3.4-3.6 GHz in sealed bid

Slovakia Aug 2016 National licences in 3.4-3.6 GHz Four 5 MHz TDD blocks and one 2x5 MHz FDD block Montenegro Apr 2017 FWA Czech Rep July 2017 Five 40MHz blocks at 3.6-3.8 GHz Highly competitive Slovakia Oct 2017 Regional auction of 40MHz blocks of 3.6-3.8 GHz 16 winners

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 4

Available spectrum in Ireland

  • 350 MHz available in two categories
  • 3410 – 3435 MHz (25 MHz) in a single A-lot
  • 3475 – 3800 MHz (325 MHz) in 65 B-lots of 5 MHz each
  • TDD band plan
  • 15-year licences

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 5

Regionalisation

  • Usually a headache for auction design
  • Possible FWA use or migration of existing FWA
  • perators’ business plans may need regionalisation
  • Complete flexibility of licence boundaries is

impossible and some tailoring to likely demand will be needed

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 6

Irish 3.6 GHz regionalisation

  • 9 regions (4 rural, 5 cities)
  • Aligned with National Broadband Plan
  • Smaller bidders might need a consortium
  • r to use the secondary market

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 7

Issues arising out of regionalisation

  • Aggregation risks
  • Switching between regions
  • Do we need it?
  • How do we design sufficiently flexible switching rules?
  • Frequency fragmentation across regions
  • Reasons for coordination of frequencies across

winners

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 8

Addressing these issues

Aggregation risks Switching flexibility CCA Relaxed bidding

Frequency fragmentation Assignment

  • ption pruning

algorithm

Frequency coordination for small winners Alliance bidding for frequencies

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 9

Combinational clock auction

  • Irish 3.6 GHz award uses a similar CCA format as the

2012 Multiband Spectrum Award

  • Bids are always for packages of lots, so regional

aggregation risks overcome

  • Rules provide for flexible switching through activity

rules based on revealed preference

  • Eligibility point scheme fairly unimportant

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 10

CCA rules

  • Main stage
  • Determines how many lots in the A/B categories each

bidder wins, but not specific frequencies

  • Open clock rounds
  • Supplementary bids round (with multiple bids)
  • Winner determination taking all bids
  • Second price (minimum revenue core pricing)
  • 150 MHz competition cap in any region
  • Assignment stage to determine frequencies
  • Single round of bidding
  • Mutually exclusive frequency options
  • Bidding alliances possible

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 11

Frequency alignment principles

  • Minimise ’untidiness’ of frequency allocations

across regions …

  • A winner getting the same number of lots

everywhere gets common frequencies across regions

  • Give choices about location across the whole band

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 12

Generating frequency options

Arrange bidders on a tree to keep frequencies tidy Permute branches of tree to move bidders around the band Use any unsold lots as padding to tidy up further Present

  • ptions to

each bidder and collect bids

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 13

Defining ‘untidiness’ when splitting up the band

  • Regional Bandwidth Variation (RBV), defined for a bidder
  • r group of bidders to be
  • the greatest number of B-Lots assigned in a region less
  • the smallest number of B-Lots assigned in a region

Region 1 Region 2 Bidder A Bidder B

RBV=4

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 14

Simple example

First find the partitions of all bidders that minimises RBV:

  • Partition {A}, {B,C,U} has RBV = 1 + 1 = 2
  • Partition {B}, {A,C,U} has RBV = 4 + 4 = 8
  • Partition {A,B}, {C,U} has RBV = 3 + 3 = 6
  • …and so on

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 15

Step 1: Partitions of bidders

{A}, {B,C,U} {A}, {B}, {C,U} {B}, {A,C,U} {A}, {C}, {B,U} {C}, {A,B,U} {A}, {U}, {B,C} {U}, {A,B,C} {B}, {C}, {A,U} {A,B}, {C,U} {B}, {U}, {A,C} {A,C}, {B,U} {C}, {U}, {A,B} {A,U}, {B,C} {A}, {B}, {C}, {D} {B,C}, {A,U} {B,U}, {A,C} {C,U}, {A,B}

Cases with lowest Total RBV of 2 Tie break rule:

  • Greatest number of groups
  • Smallest largest group
  • Random

Largest group of size 2, so take this one

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 16

Step 1: Tree of successive splittings

{A,B,C,U} {A,U} {B,C} {A} {U} {B} {C} Minimum RBV Smallest largest group Pairs split to singles (trivial in this example)

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 17

Step 2: Swapping order of branches

{A,B,C,U} {A,U} {B,C} {A} {U} {B} {C} {A,B,C,U} {A,U} {B,C} {U} {A} {B} {C} {A,B,C,U} {A,U} {B,C} {A} {U} {C} {B} {A,B,C,U} {A,U} {B,C} {U} {A} {C} {B} {A,B,C,U} {B,C} {A,U} {B} {C} {A} {U} {A,B,C,U} {B,C} {A,U} {C} {B} {A} {U} {A,B,C,U} {B,C} {A,U} {B} {C} {U} {A} {A,B,C,U} {B,C} {A,U} {C} {B} {U} {A}

A,U,B,C U,A,B,C A,U,C,B U,A,C,B B,C,A,U C,B,A,U B,C,U,A C,B,U,A

Creates only 8 of the possible 24 orderings of 4 bidders

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 18

Step 3: Using unsold lots to improve alignment

  • Measure of frequency misalignment for a bidder:
  • Gap between lowest block in any region and highest block in any

region less

  • The maximum number of B-Lots assigned to the bidder in any region

Misalignment = 4 – 4 = 0 Misalignment = 6 – 4 = 2 Misalignment = 8 – 4 = 4

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 19

Step 3: Move unsold blocks to pad

1 2 3 4 een them. However, we can reduce Bidder 3’s Misalignment by placing one

0 + 0 + 1 + 0 = 1

een them. However, we can reduce Bidder 3’s Misalignment by placing one 1 2 3 4

0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 Unallocated lots only moved to the extent this reduces misalignment

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 20

Alliances

  • Possibility of network sharing, joint equipment purchase
  • etc. might arguably require coordination of frequencies

across winners

  • An Alliance is a group of winners participating in the

Assignment Stage as one

  • Lead member bids for all
  • Total number of B lots across all members combined for

generation of frequency options

  • Lead member tells ComReg who gets which frequencies
  • Not allowed if the total spectrum to be awarded to the

Alliance would exceed the spectrum cap of 150 MHz in any region

  • Anti-collusion rules maintained for main stage of CCA

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 21

Auction results

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 22

Lessons learned

  • Regional structure allowed demand from operators
  • ther than the incumbent MNOs
  • Auction design more complex as a result …
  • … but bidder experience fairly simple
  • Prices below level of key mobile bands due to large

amount of supply

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017

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SLIDE 23

Forthcoming 3.6 GHz auctions

  • Latvia
  • France
  • Greece
  • Italy
  • Austria
  • Switzerland
  • Belgium

(c) DotEcon Ltd 2017