[PDF] - Polycentric Organization: A Fundamental Requisite for Solving Urban PDF Document

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Polycentric Organization:

A Fundamental Requisite for Solving Urban Problems

Agus Dharma Agus Dharma

Fakultas Teknik Sipil dan Perencanaan Fakultas Teknik Sipil dan Perencanaan Universitas Gunadarma Universitas Gunadarma email : agus_dh@staff.gunadarma.ac.id email : agus_dh@staff.gunadarma.ac.id website : staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh/ website : staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh/

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What is the Puzzle?

How to provide and

produce local collective goods in urban areas of developing countries efficiently and equitably

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What are Local Collective Goods?

Local public goods

Difficult to exclude

beneficiaries

Consumption is not

subtractable

Example: Public safety

Local common-pool resources

Difficult to exclude

beneficiaries

Consumption is subtractable Example: Water supply

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What is the Challenge?

Potential for free-riding

due to difficulty of exclusion

Potential for overuse due

to subtractability

Competitive markets fail

to solve problems of free- riding and overuse of local collective goods

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When Competitive Markets Fail, What Can Be Done?

The Top-Down View – create

very large urban governments

Basis for massive reforms of U.S.

urban areas in 20th century

Basis for African post-independence

urban development strategies

The Polycentric View – a

system of large and small, public and private agencies perform more effectively

Basis for recent U.S. reforms Basis for improving urban services

in developing countries

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Assumptions of the Top-Down View

Collective goods are homogeneous Substantial economies of scale Urban voters have similar

preferences

Voting aggregates preferences well Elected officials command public

bureaus to produce desired goods

Bureau chiefs command street-level

bureaucrats to deliver goods and services

Street-level bureaucrats deliver

services to passive clients

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Additional Assumptions of the Top-Down View in Developing Countries

Government must control

provision and production of public goods

Regular citizens have limited

capacities to solve problems of collective action

People as subjects to be cared

for by national government or claimants to demand public goods

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Assumptions of Polycentric Theory

Urban collective goods vary

substantially in production and consumption characteristics

Major economies of scale do

exist for some goods, but not for all

Road networks vs education or

policing

Coproduction essential to

enhance production of education, police, and other services

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Assumptions of Polycentricity (cont.)

Urban voters have a wide

diversity of preferences

Individuals with similar, but

evolving, preferences tend to cluster in neighborhoods

Preferences within

neighborhoods are more homogeneous than across neighborhoods

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Assumptions of Polycentricity (cont.)

Aggregating citizen preferences

is always problematic

Voting systems may produce

unstable outcomes when preferences are heterogeneous

Decisions within smaller

jurisdictions related to neighborhood goods and services reduce heterogeneities

Need face-to-face mechanisms

to supplement voting

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Assumptions of Polycentricity (cont.)

Presence of many potential

producers of local collective goods

More information to citizens

and public officials

Provides an exit mode if voice

is not sufficient

Elements of competition

enhance efficiency and innovation

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Polycentric Assumptions Particularly Relevant to Developing Countries

Existence of other centers of

authority in addition to national government

National government cannot and should not strive to provide all public goods For many countries, constitutional-level reform required

Individuals need to have legal standing local communities need to have limited constitutional authority

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What are Public Economies?

Collective consumption units (local

governments, larger governmental units, neighborhood associations,

ther voluntary associations)

Production units (governments as

well as private organizations)

Relationships between them

Larger collective consumption

units with smaller producers

Smaller collective consumption

units with larger producers

Collective consumption units and

provision units of the same size

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Urban Public Economies in U.S.

Police – increased efficiency and

better service to poor neighborhoods in urban areas with complex public economies

Education – smaller schools are

more effective and efficient

Coproduction of safety, education,

health is greater in smaller units nested in a larger urban area

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Let’s Learn from Past Errors!

Many citizens in the U.S.

now receive lower performance from their “reformed” urban government than prior to the massive reforms based on unvalidated theory

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Learning from Past Errors in Developing Countries

Monocentric government

most often turns predatory

Rent-seeking is encouraged

Predatory governments often

become repressive

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Learning From the Past (cont.)

The monocentric

“developmental state” is not the answer:

Benevolent government may provide

many basic needs, but citizens/local communities may not be empowered

Participation through national

elections essential but inadequate as means of empowerment

Not all forms of “decentralization”

provide public goods equitably and efficiently and promote the empowerment of local people (local boss rule does occur)

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Critical Considerations When Providing Public Goods

Nature of goods strongly affect

performance of institutional arrangements for provision and production of goods

Biophysical and social conditions

f community need to be

considered in crafting institutional arrangements

Rules to be effective must be

agreed and known (these may or may not be the same as rules on the books)

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Essential Principles that Shape Successful Urban Collective Action

Established boundaries Cost/benefit proportionality Participation in collective choices Monitoring Graduated sanctions Conflict-resolution mechanisms Some autonomy at local level Rules governing nested

relationships with central government and external authorities

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Providing Public Goods in Urban Areas: Examples from Developing Countries

Shack/Slum Dwellers Federation

f India

Solidarity and Urban Poor

Federation of Cambodia

Community-based organizations

in Mexico City (San Miguel Teotongo, Cananea, Sierra Nevada)

Homeless People’s Federation of

Philippines

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Providing Public Goods in Local Communities:

Examples from Africa (Niger Delta, Nigeria)

Gbogbara Development

Association (Rivers State)

BunuTai Community

Associations

Gio-Kpoghor and Ogu

Communities Association

Ilaje Development

Association

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Gbogbara Development Association (Rivers State, Nigeria)

Community of about 20,000
Provided pipe borne water project through

CBO

Goal of establishing 100 mono pumps

ver 10 year period (1994-2004)

Completed 55 by 1999 Community contributed 85 per cent

funding

Local government contributed 15 per

cent

Maternity home project

Local women organizations initiated as

3 year project

Project cost N5 million Community raised 63 per cent funding

(with largest contributions from women, youth)

Local government contribution of 37

per cent funding

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Bunu Tai Community Development Associations

Association of 5 community development associations (embracing population of 25,000) Undertook bridge construction project as 4 year project (connecting communities to fishing ports and farm settlements)

Raised N12 million 92 per cent contributed by communities 8 per cent by local government

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Gio-Kpoghor and Ogu Communities

2 Communities of 12,000 Commercial center of Tai local

government but without market stalls and shed

Completed first phase of

community market project over 3 years (1998-2000) at N5 million

Communities contributed 89 per

cent

Local government 11 per cent

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Ilaje Development Association (Ondo State)

Ilaje a war ravaged community Form Gwama Cooperative

Society to lead post conflict reconstruction

Post-conflict reconstruction

activities include:

Scholarship program Micro-credit to youthful fishermen Established mass transport

business

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Common Features of Projects

Strong participation of

community-based collective action units (women’s

rganizations, youth, etc.)

Nested within area-based

development associations

Collaboration with local

government area

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Critical Challenges of Urban/Local Governance in Developing Countries

Developing/strengthening local

capabilities

Ending predatory/dependent

relationships with central government

Avoiding dependence on donor

assistance as an alternative

Connect voice and exit with

payment of local taxes

Avoiding boss rule at local level