Office for Security & Counter Terrorism Learning from the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Office for Security & Counter Terrorism

Learning from the Skripal attack for CBRN Preparedness.

Presented by: Anita Friend Date: 24th April 2019

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

Reflections – Skripal response

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The response was effective and impressive but at times very difficult

• The ‘FUSION’ of health, science, policy and communications was

essential to make risk based decisions against an incomplete evidence picture.

• The event presented challenges not reflected in our planning

process and generated large impacts locally, nationally and internationally.

• Departments were unable to share information, due to a lack of

awareness of the system, and who needed to know.

• The event spanned Resilience / National Security / Defence

The Challenge of the Skripal Event

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Political Dimension CBRN Response International Dimension

Salisbury

Root Causes

A CBRN attack is different to a conventional attack

• Inherent uncertainty of what has happened
• Therefore a greater reliance on science, public health and SME’s to

understand what has happened.

• Greater need for coordination and collaboration due to multiple critical

interdependencies.

• CBRN is a multi dimensional risk with different factors that can potentially

change the response required.

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Deductions

• There is a disconnect between those who are responsible for

the spectrum of CBRN risks, and those that deliver the capability for those risks.

• The national planning assumptions for CBRN risks do not

represent the full range of challenges.

• There is no one organisation/department that has a full

system awareness of the CBRN risk

• Capabilities are generated without the visibility of the risk
• wners.
• Capabilities whilst effective in isolation, may not deliver

against the risk spectrum. In the light of the shift in threat, the lack of whole system approach to CBRN preparedness increases our vulnerability.

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Next Steps

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Phase 1

Short Term

• NSSIG CT agrees with the

findings and deductions

• NSSIG CT agrees to own

domestic CBRN (regardless

• f actor/motive)
• Stakeholder Departments

(TBC) agree to form and resource a cross government team to address CBRN Preparedness

• Min 1 FTE per core

department (MOD, CO, DHSC, DEFRA, HO OSCT)

• Min 1 PoC per

supporting department (DfT, BEIS, UKIC, CT Police, HO CPFG)

Official Sensitive

Phase 2

Medium Term <6mths

• Cross government team to produce:
• Cross government CBRN ownership and

delivery map – Understand the System

• Factors that shape a CBRN Response to:
• Better inform planning

assumptions

• Understand capability gaps

Derived from Policy and Scientific inputs (CSAs)

• Develop a cross government CBRN

response strategy

• Develop and ratify a comprehensive

CBRN preparedness governance structure

• Joint CSR bid to
• Enshrine Fusion based approach

to CBRN preparedness

• Close capability gaps identified.

Phase 3

Long Term >6mths

• Deliver CSR bid proposal
• Deliver CBRN response

strategy

• Manage a cross government

work program to close capability gaps.

• Jointly feed into NRA/NRPA

process to ensure they reflect the multidimensional factors that shape a CBRN response.

• Maintain a fusion based

approach to CBRN preparedness, either virtually

• r physically.

Intent To deliver a fusion based approach to CBRN Preparedness for the UK in order to address the systemic barriers to joint CBRN risk, planning, awareness and delivery.

Questions

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