Model Building for Enhancing Homeland Security James R. Thompson - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Model Building for Enhancing Homeland Security James R. Thompson - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Model Building for Enhancing Homeland Security James R. Thompson Dept. of Statistics Rice University Supported in part by the Army Research Office (Durham) under DAAD19-99-1-0150. Some Useful Texts Herman Kahn On Thermonuclear War Thinking


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Model Building for Enhancing Homeland Security

James R. Thompson

  • Dept. of Statistics

Rice University

Supported in part by the Army Research Office (Durham) under DAAD19-99-1-0150.

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Some Useful Texts

Herman Kahn

On Thermonuclear War Thinking About the Unthinkable On Escalation

Victor Hanson

Carnage and Culture

James Thompson

Simulation: A Modeler’s Approach

James Thompson & Jacek Koronacki

Statistical Process Control: the Deming Paradigm And Beyond

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Deming’s Theorem for Acceptance Sampling Under the Risk Function of Expected Value, the Number of Sampled Items Should be Zero or the Number in the Total Sample.

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Let Q be the total expected cost involved in sampling of a batch of n Let x be the number of items inspected Let c1 be the cost of examining an item, Let c2 be the cost of accepting a bad item Let p be the probability an item is defective Q= c1 x + (n-x)p c2 =(c1 - p c2)x+ n p c2. Then it is clear that we minimize Q by If c1 > pc2, set x=0; If c1 <pc2, set x=n.

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Unfortunately, The Cost of Missing A Terrorist Is So High That Deming’s Theorem Tells Us To Subject All Passengers To A Thorough Inspection. Problem: If We Did This, We Would Bankrupt The US Airline Industry. Reality: We Have To Work With A Constrained Optimization Problem. Our Task: With x and n Fixed, Find the Allocation of Thorough Samplings Which Minimizes Q.

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n = n1+n2 Assume second population more likely to exhibit "failures" Q= c0 x 1 + (n1 - x1 ) p1 c + c0 x2 +(n2 - x2) p2 c Q=x 1 (c0 - p1 c ) + n1 p1 c + x2 (c0 - p2 c ) + n2 p2 c .

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Most likely, c0 -p2 c <0. Consequently, since we are limited by inspections capacity to inspect a total of x items, we should follow the following rule If n2 < x, sample all persons from Group 2 and x-n2 persons chosen at random from Group 1. If n2 > x, sample x persons from Group 2. Consider delaying flight until all n2 are sampled.

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Does this mean profiling? Yes. Here is a profiling strategy. 1.Let the first persons checked be the least likely (by stereotype) to be terrorists. Older persons of European origin, may be selected as frequent victims of the thorough search.

  • 2. Select all persons in the group of particular interest for thorough

checking.

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Perhaps, all this is illegal. It is certainly profiling. Under the present situation, it appears unlikely that class action lawsuits would be filed. There is a certain false symmetry presented when nuns and rabbis are being checked, albeit, on the average, much less frequently than young Muslim males. It has the effect

  • f being onerous to all groups without singling out one

group and excluding others. Because the persons of stereotypical inclusion in the riskier group are in the small minority, it will almost always be the case that the middle-aged white businessmen and grandmothers outnumber young Muslim males as targets of inspection.

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Even if the proportionality of inspection be very different among the various groups, as long as all are significantly at risk of being checked, it seems that the kind of inspection currently followed will be tolerable to all, at least for the foreseeable future.

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We note here an obvious strategy for the terrorist game master: flood flights with large numbers of persons from Group 2 so that n2>x. This can be done for numerous flights over time without any untoward items being on the inspected persons. This can disrupt the inspection system.

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On the other hand, a sophisticated security game master can then look at putative causes of these pulse floods

  • f persons from Group 2, e.g., travel

to conventions, etc., and the identities of the persons from Group 2 in the floods, and backtracking their contacts. The commonality of travel reasons provides a venue for discovering the activity of the terrorist game master. Even if the putative travel reasons are such matters as visiting relatives, going

  • n holiday, the security game master can seek threads of commonality

amongst the travelers as a venue for discovering the activity of the terrorist game master.

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At the present time, it is unlikely the linkages between al-Quaida and the mainstream American Muslim community are sufficient to provide cascades of suspicious persons to push through the system. However, continuing disaffection due to ill treatment of, say, Palestinians, might, if unchecked, lead to a situation where people who were unwilling to commit a terrorist act might nonetheless be willing to participate in discomfiting the security system. The current security system of the airlines would be seriously stressed if the mainstream Islamic community started to be so offended by US foreign policy that they, and their friends, spontaneously participated in a kind of defacilitation of the security system.

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Thus, we note another grand strategy possible for the security game master: minimize, by changes in policy, the fraction of persons in the general population who are in Group 2. That might be achieved by foreign policy modifications, such as establishment of a viable Palestinian state. Negative reinforcement is also a possibility. For example, there appears to be substantial evidence that Wahabi mosques in the United States are established via funds from the Saudi state. Since proselytization by nonIslamic groups is strictly forbidden in Saudi Arabia (as is public Christian worship), the Saudi government might be told to cease such Wahabist support

  • forthwith. It might also be indicated that the next time

an attack organized by Saudi activists took place on NATO territory, occupation of Saudi oil properties would be executed forthwith.

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This is, of course, a political matter, rather than a statistical

  • ne, and the strategies listed in this paragraph are simply hypothetical.

However, the posing of the problem in a simple mathematical model at least gives information to policy makers which they may find useful. Diminishing n2 and/or p2 by positive and/or negative reinforcement is clearly indicated to be a good thing by the model. Actually, that is the main message of the model: diminish n2 and/or p2.

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For crews, baggage handlers, etc., 100% inspection by regular random polygraphs and inspections whenever entering the work site are clearly in order.

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Cost saving technology in the transportation of goods has led to the use of large containers of standard dimensions which can be loaded and stacked in ships and easily transferred to trucks. The size of these containers is sufficient to accommodate thermonuclear devices in the multiple-megaton range. Dirty bombs with thousands of pounds of nonfissionable nuclear material with a conventional explosive trigger are easy to contruct and can be accommodated by such containers. Most

  • f our major ports are within a few miles of

population centers. Rail and truck logistics plus offloading considerations do not admit of taking cargo

  • ff in isolated ports. Even were this possible, the containers

might be detonated while on rail lines or

  • trucks. This kind of Trojan horse strategy for the terrorist game

master would appear to be too tempting to resist for long.

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Thinking Outside the Box War is too important to be left to the

  • generals. Clemenceau
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Homeland Security Is Too Important To Be Left To The Policy Wonks.

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President Eisenhower warned of the military industrial complex. Now we must worry about the cozy relation between a host of federal agencies, think tanks, beltway bandits, academia.

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Consider the “War on AIDS.”

1 9 85 1 9 87 1 9 89 1 9 91 19 9 3 19 9 5 5 10 15 YEAR

UK N L D MK Can Fr C u m u l a t i v e R a t e f

  • r

U S A C u m u l a t i v e R a t e f

  • r

C

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America has spent more on AIDS than the rest of the First World

  • combined. And it has done the poorest job in the First World of controlling
  • AIDS. The political correctness of the CDC would not allow the simple

expedient of closing the gay bathhouses in the USA. Thus we have an AIDS rate ten times that in the UK.

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If one or more federal agencies want to show that the “Gulf War Syndrome” is purely delusional, they may be assured of widespread support within think tanks, universities, other federal agencies and professional scientific associations.

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The pervasive spread of federal funding throughout American society has brought the levels of professional objectivity of scholars and researchers to a level far lower than anything Eisenhower envisioned. We tend to spend far too much time admiring the Emperor’s new clothes. We are approaching Something of the scientific era of political correctness typified in the Soviet Union by the bizarre genetics of Lysenko. We recall that many

  • f those who disagreed with Lysenko (including his

thesis advisor) wound up in the gulags.

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Trofim Denisovitch Lysenko (1898-1976)

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Herman Kahn 1922-1983 Thinking Outside the Box

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  • 1. The Escalation Ladder
  • 2. Scenario Analysis
  • 3. Translation of Military Power into Economic

Power

  • 4. Translation of Economic Power into Military

Power

  • 5. Distributed Decision Nodes
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Some of Kahn’s Insights It is easier to teach quantitative scientists history and political science than it is to teach historians and political scientists quantitative reasoning. Poorly axiomitized models of real geo-political situations can be attacked by quantitative scientists. It is generally better to have some criterion functions about, rather than simply trying to muddle through.

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Some Lessons from the Past

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Battle of Vienna Sept 11 1683 The First 9-11

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Jan Sobieski

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Battle of Vienna Sept. 12, 1683

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A Different Kind of War American Religious Identity Survey of 2001 76.5% Christians 1.3% Jews 0.5% Muslims

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Terrorist Organizations

  • 1. Assassins
  • 2. Mahdists
  • 3. Core and Periphery Model
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The Old Man kept at his court such boys of twelve years old as seemed to him destined to become courageous men. When the Old Man sent them into the garden in groups of four, ten or twenty, he gave them hashish to drink. They slept for three days, then they were carried sleeping into the garden where he had them awakened. When these young men woke, and found themselves in the garden with all these marvelous things, they truly believed themselves to be in

  • paradise. And these damsels were always with them in songs and great

entertainments; they received everything they asked for, so that they would never have left that garden of their own will. And when the Old Man wished to kill someone, he would take him and say: ‘Go and do this thing. I do this because I want to make you return to paradise’. And the assassins go and perform the deed willingly. — The Adventures of Marco Polo Hasan-i Sabbah

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The Mahdi

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Core and Periphery

Attacker in LAX Beltway Snipers Fragging Sergeant

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Other Ideas from the Past

  • 1. Find centers for retaliation against al-Quaida.
  • 2. Consider the possibility of hostage exchanges

to insure treaties are maintained.

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What New Stuff Can We Bring To The Table?

Models (lots of them) Data Based Stressing of Models Arguments about Models

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  • 1. Simulation Models for Bio-Terrorist Attacks.
  • 3. Models Which Take Account of Opportunistic

Attacks by Powers Which Are Neither Christian Nor Islamic.

  • 2. Models for International Dynamics Between

the Western World and the Islamic World.

  • 4. Models Which Distinguish Between Various

“Terrorist” Organization Types.

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  • 5. Models Which Visualize A Functioning

American Society Dealing With Endemic Terrorism.

  • 6. Models Which Seek To Keep The Endemic

From Becoming An Epidemic.

  • 7. Models To Deal With Contamination of

Municipal Water Supplies.

  • 8. Models To Deal With EMF Attack.
  • 9. Models To Deal With Internet Sabotage.
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Memento Mori

A Model May Be Useful, But It Is Unlikely To Be Complete. Organizations Who Are Wedded To Generations Of Models Built Upon Unproven Concepts Should Not Be Surprised If They Get Into Trouble. Modelers Who Avoid Data Should Be Themselves Avoided.

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When All Your Experts Are In Agreement, You Are Probably The Victim Of Having Allowed Funding To Create Orthodoxy

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Let Us Try And Avoid

Clash of Civilizations

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Palestine May Be The Key

Yitzhak Rabin 1922-1995 represented the position that an Israeli state could live in peace with a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. He was assassinated by a right wing Israeli.

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Jenin after Sharon’s “Pacification”

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The traditional position of the Likud is that the boundaries of the “Kingdom

  • f David” must be achieved by Israel.

If this model be followed, an extended war with Islam is likely. In such a case, America would be drawn in on Israel’s side. This could lead to a perpetual terrorist threat against the American homeland.

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You shall not molest or oppress an alien, for you were once aliens yourselves in the land of Egypt. Exodus 22:20

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The Challenges

  • 1. Solve the easy well-posed problems (such

as airline inspection) immediately.

  • 2. Begin hard thinking on the harder

problems,such as container inspection.

  • 3. Invite outside the box analysis which

produces a variety of strategies, rather than

  • ne orthodox one.
  • 4. Avoid an unnecessary “Clash of

Civilizations.”