Michael Zuba, Zhijie Shi, Zheng Peng and Jun Hong Cui University of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Michael Zuba, Zhijie Shi, Zheng Peng and Jun Hong Cui University of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Michael Zuba, Zhijie Shi, Zheng Peng and Jun Hong Cui University of Connecticut Underwater Sensor Networks Lab 1 Underwater Wireless Networks (UWNs) What is an UWN? An interconnected system. Distributed autonomous nodes.


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Michael Zuba, Zhijie Shi, Zheng Peng and Jun‐Hong Cui University of Connecticut Underwater Sensor Networks Lab

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Underwater Wireless Networks (UWNs)

 What is an UWN?

 An interconnected system.  Distributed autonomous nodes.  Wireless acoustic communications.  Computation & Communication.

 Potential applications

 Seismic predictions, pollution detection, Anti-submarine missions …

 Acoustic communication challenges

 Huge propagation latency.  High time variation.  Limited bandwidth.

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Challenges

 Security

 Long Propagation Delay + High Error Rates  Adversary can observe communication between devices.

 (Covert Communication is obviously more challenging!)

 Receiver cannot distinguish between authorized and non

authorized signal.

 Communication interference is not addressable through

conventional cryptographic security mechanisms.

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Jamming Attack

 A type of Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack

 Make a service unavailable to its intended users.

 Continually transmit on a wireless channel in the

same frequency band to produce intentional interference.

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Resulting in..

 Case 1

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Are you there? Aashr543k$re @$(U)$@#($#@*&$(

 Case 2

Hmm, Comm Channel is busy.. @$(U)$@#($#@*&$( ?? Packet corruption Communication channel is occupied

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Motivations

 Jamming Attacks are an effective network disruption

method because:

 An attack can be performed by listening to the open

communication medium and then broadcasting to the network;

 A well thought-out attack can drastically degrade the

performance of a network while only incurring small costs to the attacker;

 In general, no special hardware is needed to launch a

jamming attack.

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Attack Models

 Smart (Deceptive) Jammer:

 Knows some information about the network protocols

being used.

 Generally does not follow the underlying MAC protocols.  Uses legitimate packets to occupy channel or congest

network.

 Dummy (Signal) Jammer:

 Jammer knows nothing about the underlying protocols of

the network.

 Generates a signal or noise to jam the communication

channel and/or corrupt control/data packets.

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Types of Attacks

 Constant Attack:

 Jammer continually injects signals or packets into the

communication channel to corrupt packets or congest network.

 Random Attack :

 Jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming the

communication channel continually.

 Reactive Attack :

 Jammer remains idle until a transmission is sensed and

then the jammer will start transmitting to jam the network.

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Field Experiments

 Mansfield Hollow Lake, Connecticut, USA  Two acoustic modems:

 Benthos ATM-885  OFDM Prototype

 MAC protocol:

 BCMAC  Sending Rate = 0.04  400 bytes pkt length

 Routing protocol:

 Static routing

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298.8 meters

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Jammer Hardware

 12V Battery  Amplifier  ITC-1032 deep water omnidirectional transducer

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298.8 meters

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Case Study 1

 Mansfield Hollow Lake, Connecticut, USA  Benthos ATM-885

 9-14 kHz frequency band

 Four different attacks

 Constant Jammer  Random Jammer  Reactive Jammer  White Noise Jammer

 Recorded transmission.

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298.8 meters

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Metrics

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298.8 meters

 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) – Number of packets sent

  • ut by the sender to the receiver over the number of

packets the receiver actually received.

 Packet Sending Ratio (PSR) – Ratio of packets sent

  • ut successfully by a source node compared to the

number of packets that were intended to be sent out, as recognized by the MAC layer.

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Results

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298.8 meters

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Case Study 2

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75m 167.3m 298.8m 400m

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Signal Diagram and Results

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Case Study 3

 Mansfield Hollow Lake, Connecticut, USA  OFDM Prototype

 16-20 kHz frequency band

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200m

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Signal Diagram

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245ms Attack 1 Attack 2 Attack 3

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Discussion

 Preamble is most effective attacking point.  Effective scheme requires three phases:

 Detection of transmission (1)  Starting jamming transmission (2)  Period of jamming transmission (3)  Signal Propagation Time (4)

Preamble 1 2 3 4

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Conclusions

 Jamming attacks can be easily launched and

degrade network performance significantly.

 No special hardware.  Short jamming burst.

 Security issues are important.

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Future Work

 Detection is still difficult.

 How to differentiate between harsh conditions and

a jamming attack?

 Mitigation of Jamming Attacks.

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Questions?

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