Lottery system Flexible damage multiplier Adversely affects the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Lottery system Flexible damage multiplier Adversely affects the - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A PROPOSAL Jef De Mot & Ben Depoorter Lottery system Flexible damage multiplier Adversely affects the probability of adjudication 1. Example - Risk neutral and fixed costs - Three types of


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SLIDE 1

INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A PROPOSAL

Jef De Mot & Ben Depoorter

  • Lottery system
  • Flexible damage multiplier
  • Adversely affects the probability of

adjudication

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SLIDE 2
  • 1. Example
  • Risk neutral and fixed costs
  • Three types of plaintiffs: A, B and C
  • All three have 70 % chance of winning
  • Amount at stake = 1.000
  • Trial costs: A = 500, B = 1.000, C = 2.000

A: 0.7 x 1.000 – 500 = 200 > 0 B: 0.7 x 1.000 – 1.000 = - 300 < 0 C: 0.7 x 1.000 – 2.000 = - 1.300 < 0

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SLIDE 3
  • 1. Example

1. Let plaintiff choose multiplier. Damages are multiplied with that multiplier in case plaintiff wins. For example: plaintiff chooses multiplier of 2  receives 2.000 instead of 1.000 if he wins 2. Courts select randomly with probability inverse to multiplier. If plaintiff chooses 2  50 %, if he chooses 3  33.33 %

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SLIDE 4
  • 1. Example
  • B now has a credible threat:

Suppose he selects a multiplier of 2: ½ x (0.7 x 2.000 – 1.000) + ½ x 0 = 0.7 x 1.000 – 1.000/2 = 200 > 0

  • If C chooses a multiplier of 2, his suit still is NEV:

½ x (0.7 x 2.000 – 2.000) + ½ x 0 = 0.7 x 1.000 – 2.000/2 = - 300 > 0

  • But if C chooses a multiplier of 3, his suit has PEV:

1/3 x (0.7 x 3.000 – 2.000) + 2/3 x 0 = 0.7 x 1.000 – 2.000/3 = 33 > 0

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SLIDE 5
  • 2. General

Without: Pp x J – Cp With: Pp x J – Cp/M 1/M x (Pp x M x J – Cp) + (1 – 1/M) x 0

equal decrease

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SLIDE 6
  • 2. General

Defendant: EL = 1/M x (Pd x J x M + Cd) = Pd x J + Cd/M Settlement before multiplier has been chosen: between Pp x J – Cp/M and Pd x J + Cd/M.

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SLIDE 7
  • 3. Disadvantages of the proposal
  • 1. Risk costs
  • Plaintiff: not being selected
  • Defendant: may have to pay a multiple of the harm he

caused

  • Settlement before plaintiff has choses M
  • Maximum multiplier
  • Up to certain value
  • Linking maximum multiplier to amount at stake
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SLIDE 8
  • 3. Disadvantages of the proposal
  • 2. Increased trial expenditures
  • Higher amount at stake  increased exp.
  • Risk aversion  low multipliers
  • High multiplier  high probability of

elimination

  • Increased trial expenditures  increase

settlement frequency

  • Trial expenditures do not increase

proportionally

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SLIDE 9
  • 3. Disadvantages of the proposal
  • 3. Frivolous suits
  • Ask for high multiplier in the hope that

case will be randomly selected  risk averse defendants may settle

  • Punishment of frivolous suits
  • Maximum multiplier/ other measures
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SLIDE 10
  • 3. Disadvantages of the proposal
  • 4. Weak cases
  • Reduces costs of litigation relative to the

gains

  • Maximum multiplier.
  • Tying multiplier to the merits of the

case

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SLIDE 11

Conclusion

  • May promote valuable suits
  • Disadvantages/ eliminated