Lessons-Learned from License Reform in City of Cimahi and Pro-Poor - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Working with Power in Politics: Lessons-Learned from License Reform in City of Cimahi and Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in City of Semarang Hari Kusdaryanto TALEARN Annual Workshop: Facing Shared Challenges, Advancing Collective Change Jakarta, March 12-15, 2014

The two case studies – the Cities of Cimahi and Semarang Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in Licensing Reform in Cimahi Semarang • Newly established • Capital of Central Java municipality (est. 2002), Province, population of 1.5 rely on service and trade, m, highly urbanized, clean and smart Mayor dynamic economy • In 2006, Asia Foundation, • A corrupt and patronage- through local partners, B- seeking Mayor who lost Trust , requested by Mayor popular support due to to improve business corruption licensing services • A parliament united in their (integrated licensing hostility to the Mayor, service – one stop shop, intent on utilizing their OSS) power to legislate • 84 types of business • Asia Foundation’s local licensing issued by various grantee, Pattiro , has an technical dept(s): costly “open menu”: a pro -poor and cumbersome budget advocacy (free to • USAID PROMIS program in choose the program) Business Enabling • DFID -funded program in 38 Environment (2005-2008) cities/districts

Stakeholders Map – Cimahi : when Mayor’s commitment not shared by his lower-ranks bureaucrats Actors Pre-Facilitation Position Interests Mayor Reformer (Idealist- Wanted to make licensing transparent to control land use, well- Pragmatist) known at the provincial (and national) levels Regional Reformer (Idealist) Idealistic and reform- minded bureaucrat, Mayor’s right hand Assistant for Econ Dev’t Head of OSS Reformer (Idealist) Wanted to have legacy before retiring. She was blamed for not making the OSS work Staffs of OSS Reformer (Idealist) Head of Licensing Division wanted to increase his authority and power in licensing. A young staff (moved from Spatial Planning) was idealistic, wanted to reduce corruption Mr. Y, Building Opponent (Wrecker) Very powerful (“untouchables”), didn’t want to be promoted or Control rotated for more than 10 years. Wanted to keep his power in Section Head reviewing Construction Permit (IMB) license applications Technical Opportunists Although they hold higher position, but didn’t have real power, since Depts (SKPDs) they were “new comers” to the municipality administration Heads Civil society & Reform supporters Critical of the government, support reform, but too weak and private sector disorganized

Stakeholder Map - Semarang: Allies act when Executive power is weak Stakeholder Map – Semarang (AFTER) Mayor Sukawi - DPRD (Ari & PDIP Ahmadi – PKS) Dep. Mayor Mahfud - PKB Pattiro Media BAPPEDA - Power Sudarto Health Office Academics - Rahmat Constituents Reform-mindedness

Working Politically – strategic phases: In addition to the technical steps, local implementing partners tried to: Understand the importance of allies and coalitions  Map agents and political positions at the start and seeking alliances • with reformers Utilize formal and informal channel to build relationships, foster trust, and  gain entre’ to policy making process; Use critical juncture(s):  Important momentum (political events, national regulations, etc) • 5

Then what? Cimahi: The upgraded business licensing OSS was launched on March 2007, • with full authorities to issue 60 types of licenses; MoHA used Cimahi’s experience to formulate national guideline in • 2007 In 2008 and 2009, Cimahi’s OSS awarded by national government as • the best business licensing OSS. Semarang: Local regulation on Poverty Alleviation passed in 2008 • Municipal Poverty Alleviation Team (TKPKD) established – led by • Deputy Mayor City’s free health care for the poor ( Jamkesda ) established in 2009 to • expand coverage of nationally-funded Jamkesmas 6 

Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming FLEXIBILITY is key  Focus on objective, broadly defined, rather than programs/outputs/outcomes in • narrowly defined sense Allow partners to “make mistakes”: messy start, trial and error • Flexible budget structure: clusters of budget rather than rigid budget line items • Should cover informal meetings / lobbying activities  Involve substantially / hands-on during program implementation  Backstop local CSOs (grantees) intensively, be ”a sparring partner” along the way, • challenge them with right questions, join in important field discussions/meetings Challenges  It is more time-consuming than conventional technical assistance approach • Not easy to find people with “working politically” mindset Not practical for a • parallel sub-national program (working in tens of ) 7

Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming (2) For CSO (grantees), being a facilitator is key factor and extremely important to  have: Capability to build trust (education background, knowledge about the reform, • no vested interest) Capability to think, work and act politically. The facilitators need to • understand and know the actors of reform, their interests and power to support or block reform. Reform process can be facilitated even without initial commitment and “buy - in” of  the executive leader (mayor/regent), as long as the facilitators understand the situation and develop the program based on it. Informal meetings and personal approach are often more important than formal  workshops/meetings There is no formula of building alliances – opponents can either be alienated (only  “dedicated” actors) or included in the alliance (“tactical”); the alliance can be formal or informal. 8

Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming (3) Technical vs political  Semarang : TA alone will not resulting in pro-poor budget allocations, • extending partnerships to constituent-based organizations, and in particular Muslim mass-based organizations, can increase the political capital of advocates Cimahi : Technical aspects of reform can be supported after building alliance • and converging the actors’ interests to support reform Reform through working politically likely be more sustainable – • transformative, change the incentive structure 9

THANK YOU 10