Lessons-Learned from License Reform in City of Cimahi and Pro-Poor - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Working with Power in Politics: Lessons-Learned from License Reform in City of Cimahi and Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in City of Semarang

Hari Kusdaryanto

TALEARN Annual Workshop: Facing Shared Challenges, Advancing Collective Change Jakarta, March 12-15, 2014

The two case studies – the Cities of Cimahi and Semarang

Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in Semarang

• Capital of Central Java

Province, population of 1.5 m, highly urbanized, dynamic economy

• A corrupt and patronage-

seeking Mayor who lost popular support due to corruption

• A parliament united in their

hostility to the Mayor, intent on utilizing their power to legislate

• Asia Foundation’s local

grantee, Pattiro, has an “open menu”: a pro-poor budget advocacy (free to choose the program)

• DFID -funded program in 38

cities/districts

Licensing Reform in Cimahi

• Newly established

municipality (est. 2002), rely on service and trade, clean and smart Mayor

• In 2006, Asia Foundation,

through local partners, B- Trust, requested by Mayor to improve business licensing services (integrated licensing service – one stop shop, OSS)

• 84 types of business

licensing issued by various technical dept(s): costly and cumbersome

• USAID PROMIS program in

Business Enabling Environment (2005-2008)

Stakeholders Map – Cimahi : when Mayor’s commitment not shared by his lower-ranks bureaucrats

Actors Pre-Facilitation Position Interests Mayor Reformer (Idealist- Pragmatist) Wanted to make licensing transparent to control land use, well- known at the provincial (and national) levels Regional Assistant for Econ Dev’t Reformer (Idealist) Idealistic and reform-minded bureaucrat, Mayor’s right hand Head of OSS Reformer (Idealist) Wanted to have legacy before retiring. She was blamed for not making the OSS work Staffs of OSS Reformer (Idealist) Head of Licensing Division wanted to increase his authority and power in licensing. A young staff (moved from Spatial Planning) was idealistic, wanted to reduce corruption

• Mr. Y, Building

Control Section Head Opponent (Wrecker) Very powerful (“untouchables”), didn’t want to be promoted or rotated for more than 10 years. Wanted to keep his power in reviewing Construction Permit (IMB) license applications Technical Depts (SKPDs) Heads Opportunists Although they hold higher position, but didn’t have real power, since they were “new comers” to the municipality administration Civil society & private sector Reform supporters Critical of the government, support reform, but too weak and disorganized

Stakeholder Map - Semarang: Allies act when Executive power is weak

Mayor Sukawi - PDIP

• Dep. Mayor

Mahfud - PKB DPRD (Ari & Ahmadi – PKS) Pattiro Academics

• Rahmat

Constituents BAPPEDA - Sudarto Health Office Stakeholder Map – Semarang (AFTER)

Power Reform-mindedness

Media

5

In addition to the technical steps, local implementing partners tried to:

• Understand the importance of allies and coalitions
• Map agents and political positions at the start and seeking alliances

with reformers

• Utilize formal and informal channel to build relationships, foster trust, and

gain entre’ to policy making process;

• Use critical juncture(s):
• Important momentum (political events, national regulations, etc)

Working Politically – strategic phases:

6

Cimahi:

• The upgraded business licensing OSS was launched on March 2007,

with full authorities to issue 60 types of licenses;

• MoHA used Cimahi’s experience to formulate national guideline in

2007

• In 2008 and 2009, Cimahi’s OSS awarded by national government as

the best business licensing OSS.

Semarang:

• Local regulation on Poverty Alleviation passed in 2008
• Municipal Poverty Alleviation Team (TKPKD) established – led by

Deputy Mayor

• City’s free health care for the poor (Jamkesda) established in 2009 to

expand coverage of nationally-funded Jamkesmas

• Then what?

Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming

• FLEXIBILITY is key
• Focus on objective, broadly defined, rather than programs/outputs/outcomes in

narrowly defined sense

• Allow partners to “make mistakes”: messy start, trial and error
• Flexible budget structure: clusters of budget rather than rigid budget line items
• Should cover informal meetings / lobbying activities
• Involve substantially / hands-on during program implementation
• Backstop local CSOs (grantees) intensively, be ”a sparring partner” along the way,

challenge them with right questions, join in important field discussions/meetings

• Challenges
• It is more time-consuming than conventional technical assistance approach
• Not easy to find people with “working politically” mindset Not practical for a

parallel sub-national program (working in tens of )

7

Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming (2)

• For CSO (grantees), being a facilitator is key factor and extremely important to

have:

• Capability to build trust (education background, knowledge about the reform,

no vested interest)

• Capability to think, work and act politically. The facilitators need to

understand and know the actors of reform, their interests and power to support or block reform.

• Reform process can be facilitated even without initial commitment and “buy-in” of

the executive leader (mayor/regent), as long as the facilitators understand the situation and develop the program based on it.

• Informal meetings and personal approach are often more important than formal

workshops/meetings

• There is no formula of building alliances – opponents can either be alienated (only

“dedicated” actors) or included in the alliance (“tactical”); the alliance can be formal or informal.

8

Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming (3)

• Technical vs political
• Semarang: TA alone will not resulting in pro-poor budget allocations,

extending partnerships to constituent-based organizations, and in particular Muslim mass-based organizations, can increase the political capital of advocates

• Cimahi: Technical aspects of reform can be supported after building alliance

and converging the actors’ interests to support reform

• Reform through working politically likely be more sustainable –

transformative, change the incentive structure

9

THANK YOU

10