Lehrstuhl fr Systemsicherheit Amplification DDoS Attacks Marc Khrer - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Lehrstuhl fr Systemsicherheit Amplification DDoS Attacks Marc Khrer SPRING 9 Bochum, 31. Juli 2014 Outline Background UDP-based Amplification TCP-based Amplification Comparison UDP- / TCP-based Amplification 2 AMPLIFICATION


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Lehrstuhl für Systemsicherheit

Amplification DDoS Attacks Marc Kührer

SPRING 9 Bochum, 31. Juli 2014

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2 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

  • Background
  • UDP-based Amplification
  • TCP-based Amplification
  • Comparison UDP- / TCP-based Amplification

Outline

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3 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

[1] Christian Rossow. "Amplification Hell: Revisiting Network Protocols for DDoS Abuse". 2014 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS 2014, San Diego, CA, USA. [2] Marc Kührer, Thomas Hupperich, Christian Rossow, Thorsten Holz. "Exit from Hell? Reducing the Impact of Amplification DDoS Attacks". 23rd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Sec '14, San Diego, CA, USA. [3] Marc Kührer, Thomas Hupperich, Christian Rossow, Thorsten Holz. "Hell

  • f a Handshake: Abusing TCP for Reflective Amplification DDoS Attacks". 8th

USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, WOOT '14, San Diego, CA, USA.

Background

Publications

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4 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

Background

Amplification Attack Attacker Amplifier Victim

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5 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

Background

Scanning in IPv4

  • Internet-wide scans (4.294.967.296 IP addresses)
  • No aggressive scanning – distributed scans over time
  • Linear feedback shift register to compute order of IP addresses
  • Reverse DNS record + web server for project information
  • Explanation how to opt-out from repeated scans
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6 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

  • Background
  • UDP-based Amplification
  • TCP-based Amplification
  • Comparison UDP- / TCP-based Amplification

Outline

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7 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

Vulnerable Protocols

  • 14 UDP-based protocols vulnerable to amplification [1]
  • Highest amplification found for the NTP monlist feature: 4,670x
  • Selected the five most severe protocols:

DNS, NetBIOS, NTP, SNMP, and SSDP

  • Performed scans to enumerate hosts vulnerable to amplification
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8 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

Amplifier Magnitude

  • Scans performed for three months
  • Observed more than 5 million amplifiers for 4 of the 5 protocols
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9 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

IP Churn (1 / 3)

  • How fast does a set of amplifiers change?
  • Enumerated amplifiers based on IP address on Nov 22, 2013
  • Checked if amplifiers were still reachable the following weeks
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10 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

IP Churn (2 / 3)

  • For most protocols the churn is high (~50% after a week)
  • Amplifiers outdated within a week: mostly routing devices - validated via

device fingerprinting and reverse DNS (82.8% include „dyn“, „dialup“, „pool“)

  • Amplifiers reachable after 13 weeks: located in countries with longer IP-lease

times (Korea, United States, Canada)

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11 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

IP Churn (3 / 3)

  • 90% of the NTP amplifiers are still reachable after four weeks
  • Hosts still available after 13 weeks:
  • 40% run Cisco IOS
  • 53% are located in United States, South Korea, and Japan
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12 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

NTP monlist Campaign

  • Collaborated with organizations to create technical advisories
  • Published lists of hosts vulnerable to monlist amplification to security
  • rganizations (ShadowServer / NTP Pool Project)
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13 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

  • Background
  • UDP-based Amplification
  • TCP-based Amplification
  • Comparison UDP- / TCP-based Amplification

Outline

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14 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

TCP-based Amplification

Amplifier Magnitude (1 / 2)

  • Send a single SYN to a target host and record the traffic (no ACK / RST is sent back)
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15 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

TCP-based Amplification

Amplifier Magnitude (2 / 2)

  • Consider hosts that amplify our SYN by a factor > 20x

(including Ethernet, IP, TCP headers)

  • Almost 2 % of responsive FTP / Telnet hosts amplify a single SYN by factor > 20x
  • In total 4.8 million amplifiers
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16 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

TCP-based Amplification

Amplification Type

  • Distribution of TCP flags shows three main amplification types
  • Traffic volume
  • NetBIOS
  • 8,863 SYN/ACK amplifiers: 25 MB of traffic
  • 3,087 RST amplifiers: 12 GB of traffic
  • FTP
  • 2,907,279 SYN/ACK amplifiers: 3.2 GB of traffic
  • 5,577 RST amplifiers: 15.1 GB of traffic
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17 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

TCP-based Amplification

Packet Frequency

  • High number of packets that reach the target simultaneously is import for a high impact
  • We measured the number of packets that reach the target within 10, 30, and 60

seconds after observing the first response of a host

  • Besides a high amplification factor, RST amplifiers also cause a high packet frequency
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18 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

TCP-based Amplification

Real-World Attacks

  • Can TCP-based amplifiers be used in real-world attacks, in which an attacker would

repeatedly send spoofed SYN packets to the amplifiers to flood the victim’s network?

  • We forwarded 1, 5, and 10 SYN packets to different types of amplifiers and measured

the traffic that arrived up to 60 seconds after sending the last SYN segment:

  • SYN/ACK amplifiers:
  • 1x SYN - 34.2 MB
  • 5x SYN - 55.1 MB
  • 10x SYN - 76.0 MB (increase of factor 2.2x)
  • PSH amplifiers:
  • 1x SYN - 11.2 MB
  • 10x SYN - 110.8 MB (increase of factor 10x)
  • RST amplifiers:
  • 1x SYN - 89.6 MB
  • 5x SYN - 392.4 MB (increase of factor 4.4x)
  • 10x SYN - 789.2 MB (increase of factor 8.8x)
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19 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

  • Background
  • UDP-based Amplification
  • TCP-based Amplification
  • Comparison UDP- / TCP-based Amplification

Outline

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20 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

Comparison

UDP-based vs. TCP-based Amplification (1 / 2)

  • Amplification factor
  • UDP-based protocols:
  • 3.8x (NetBIOS)
  • 98.3x (DNS)
  • 4,670x (NTP monlist)
  • Actual bandwidth amplification much lower (<1,000 for NTP)
  • TCP-based protocols:
  • Allow much higher bandwidth amplification
  • Up to 80,000x for RST amplifiers
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21 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

Comparison

UDP-based vs. TCP-based Amplification (2 / 2)

  • Number of amplifiers
  • UDP-based protocols:
  • 2.8 million (NetBIOS)
  • 30.5 million (DNS)
  • 87,463 (NTP monlist)
  • TCP-based protocols:
  • Low number of amplifiers (particularly for RST)
  • DNS amplifiers can cause higher impact

(about 10x compared to an attack using FTP)

  • Attackers currently stick to UDP-based attacks
  • TCP attacks presumably much harder to block, though
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22 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

Contact:

Marc Kührer marc.kuehrer@rub.de

More Information:

http://syssec.rub.de

Questions?

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23 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

Background

Reflection Attack Attacker Reflector Victim

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24 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

Intersection of Amplifiers

  • Largest overlap between SNMP and DNS
  • Almost 46 million amplifiers for all scanned protocols
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25 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

Device Fingerprinting

  • Device fingerprinting based on 1,873 manually compiled regular expressions,

applied to the returned UDP payload data (+ performed TCP scans)

  • Majority of vulnerable hosts are routing devices (NTP: 40.8% Cisco IOS)
  • 1,267,008 amplifiers (17.4%) running Linux on MIPS and 357,076 devices

(4.9%) running Linux on PowerPC

  • Smaller clusters: 695 devices running Miele Logic, 51,351 DVRs, 20,927 NAS
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26 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

UDP-based Amplification

NTP monlist Campaign (2 / 2)

  • On Feb 24, 2014, the number of monlist amplifiers reached 126,080

(a decrease of 92.4%)

  • As of Jun 2014, 87,463 amplifiers still reachable

(a decrease of almost 40,000 hosts since Feb 2014)

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27 AMPLIFICATION DDOS ATTACKS | HORST GÖRTZ INSTITUT FÜR IT-SICHERHEIT | BOCHUM | 31.07.2014

TCP-based Amplification

Amplifier Magnitude (2 / 3)

  • Consider hosts that amplify our SYN by a factor > 20x

(including Ethernet, IP, TCP headers)