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Game Theoretic Analysis of Road User Safety Scenarios Involving - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Game Theoretic Analysis of Road User Safety Scenarios Involving Autonomous Vehicles Department of Information Engineering Umberto Michieli Leonardo Badia 11/09/2018 Ri Rise of Au Autonomo mous Vehicles (AVs) 1 Ri Rise of Au Autonomo


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Game Theoretic Analysis of Road User Safety Scenarios Involving Autonomous Vehicles

Department of Information Engineering 11/09/2018 Umberto Michieli Leonardo Badia

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Ri Rise of Au Autonomo mous Vehicles (AVs)

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Ri Rise of Au Autonomo mous Vehicles (AVs)

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SLIDE 4

Tr Transition to AVs

Smooth transition

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Need to overcome many conflicts

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PR PRO

  • 1. Accidents ↓
  • 2. Less stressful time
  • 3. Less road congestion
  • 4. Decreased emissions
  • 5. Eventually faster than human-drivers

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SLIDE 6

CO CONS

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  • 1. Social acceptance
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CO CONS

  • road regulations
  • AVs are cautious
  • 1. Social acceptance
  • 2. Technological issues

RI RISK SK AVERSE RSE

  • 3. Interactions w/ humans
  • snow/rain
  • yellow-lights
  • partial occlusion

MO MOORE’S ’S LAW

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SLIDE 8

Exp Expect cted Con Concl clusion

  • ns:
  • Game Theory extensions
  • Accidents ↓ as share of AVs ↑
  • Need for new traffic regulations
  • Need for communication systems

Our Our Appr pproach

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MODEL SIMULATION VALIDATION

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SLIDE 9

Mo Modeling

Human-AVs interactions

Ga Game Th Theory (our approach)

Statistics

  • Players have different utilities
  • Distinguishable set of actions
  • Statistical generality

Pr Propose sed mo models: s: 1. Cyclist vs. Vehicle on Zebra Crossing

  • 2. Pedestrian vs. Vehicle

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SLIDE 10

1.

  • 1. Cy

Cyclist t vs. . Vehicle on Zebra Cr Crossing

Human Driver Cyclist Human Driver

8 15 6 1 15 7

  • 400
  • 400
  • 500
  • 200

20 7 Yield Walk Cycle

AV Cyclist AV

5 7 3 10 20 15

  • 500
  • 300

15 15

  • 400
  • 500

Nature

Go Go Go Stop Stop Stop

probability p

Yield Walk Cycle Go Go Go Stop Stop Stop

probability (1-p)

à SIMULTANEOUS BAYESIAN GAME COMMON KNOWLEDGE & FULL RATIONALITY

AI AIMS MS:

Cyclist vs. AV or human driver Accident rate curve as AVs ↑

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TW TWO O PU PURE NEs

  • 1. (CY, SG)
  • 2. (CC, SS)

Human Driver Cyclist Human Driver

8 15 6 1 15 7

  • 400
  • 400
  • 500
  • 200

20 7 Yield Walk Cycle

AV Cyclist AV

5 7 3 10 20 15

  • 500
  • 300

15 15

  • 400
  • 500

Nature

Go Go Go Stop Stop Stop

probability p

Yield Walk Cycle Go Go Go Stop Stop Stop

probability (1-p)

ON ONE MIXED NE If If A AV: (C,S) If If h human: yield (p1) or cycle (1-p1), go (p2) or stop (1-p2) p1=93.7% p2=2.7%

1.

  • 1. Cy

Cyclist t vs. . Vehicle on Zebra Cr Crossing

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1.

  • 1. Cy

Cyclist t vs. . Vehicle on Zebra Cr Crossing

% of Autonomous Vehicles % of Collisions

10 40 50 70 60 30 20 90 80 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 low speed medium speed high speed

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% of Autonomous Vehicles % of Fatal Injuries

low speed medium speed high speed 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12

1.

  • 1. Cy

Cyclist v t vs. V . Vehicle o

  • n Z

Zebra Cr Crossing

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  • 2. P

. Ped edes estri trian v

  • vs. V

. Veh ehicle

Out Cross

Pedestrian Vehicle

Keep Brake (ta-tc’) (tc-ta) (tc-ta) (tc’-ta) (ta-tc)

PA PAYOF OFF IS TI TIME: ETA of

vehicle to make decision

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1/ 1/ta 1/ 1/tc’ 1/ 1/tc moves at 1.4 .4 m/s la lane-width = 3.7 .75 m

ta < tc tc < ta < tc’ ta > tc’ CK CB O NE NE shif ifts:

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32,23% 4,19% 63,58% 59,82% 21,07% 19,12% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% CROSS-KEEP CROSS-BRAKE OUT Human Driver AV

AV AVs hum human-dr drivers

  • 2. P

. Ped edes estri trian v

  • vs. V

. Veh ehicle

𝑤 ∼ max(𝒪(30,10), 0) km/h a = 2.5 m/s d ∼ 𝒱(10,50) m reaction time tr = 1.5 s à tc’ higher than AVs 𝑤 ∼ max(𝒪(50,10), 0) km/h }

AV AVs} huma uman n dri drivers rs SIMULATION PARAMETERS:

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Co Conclusions à Fu Futu ture W e Work rk

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Co Conclusions à Fu Futu ture W e Work rk

§ Game theory useful for human-AV interactions à improve realism

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Co Conclusions à Fu Futu ture W e Work rk

§ Game theory useful for human-AV interactions à improve realism § Models are lightweight à embedding into communication systems and

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traffic simulators

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Co Conclusions à Fu Futu ture W e Work rk

§ Game theory useful for human-AV interactions à improve realism § Models are lightweight à embedding into communication systems and

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traffic simulators § Accident rate ↓, dominance of pedestrians à new regulations needed, then new game analysis

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Thank you for the attention!

Questions?