Financial Impacts of Distributed Energy Resources (FINDER) Model
Andrew Satchwell Nevada E-MAP Stakeholder Workshop November 10, 2016
Financial Impacts of Distributed Energy Resources (FINDER) Model - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Financial Impacts of Distributed Energy Resources (FINDER) Model Andrew Satchwell Nevada E-MAP Stakeholder Workshop November 10, 2016 LBNL Work at the Intersection of Distributed Resources (DERs) and Utility Regulatory and Business Models
Andrew Satchwell Nevada E-MAP Stakeholder Workshop November 10, 2016
LBNL Work at the Intersection of Distributed Resources (DERs) and Utility Regulatory and Business Models
Quantifying the Financial Impact of DERs on Utility Rates and Profitability Impacts of Retail Rate Design and Net Metering on DER Economics Electric Utility Regulatory and Business Models Technical Assistance DER Valuation at High Penetration Concept Papers on Future Utility Regulatory and Business Models
Publications available at: emp.lbl.gov Focus of briefing
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Overview of LBNL Technical Assistance on Utility Business Models and DERs
assistance to state PUCs on utility business models to align utility profit motivation and profit achievement with state policy goals
– LBNL has provided technical assistance to utility regulators in several different jurisdictions (e.g., AZ, KS, MA, IL, MO, NV)
a specific utility or amalgamation of all regulated utilities in a state and quantifying the impacts of a utility’s successful achievement of aggressive energy savings goals, increasing DER penetrations, and alternative approaches to the traditional utility business model
stakeholders in an open forum to facilitate discussion and explore the impacts of alternative regulatory policy
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– Created as a deliverable (“Benefits Calculator”) for the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (NAPEE)
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Electricity Demand Module
Electricity Production Module
Resource Planning Module
utility-owned generation investment Cost of Service Module
Ratemaking Module
accounts
Distributed Energy Resource Module
module)
Cost of Service Module)
Ratemaking Module) Shareholder Impact Module
Ratepayer Impact Module
revenue per kWh of retail sales)
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Two “prototypical” investor-owned utilities
measures can be measured
and regulatory environment?
regulatory and ratemaking measures?
Analytical elements
sales (Sensitivity and Mitigation cases focus on 10% PV penetration)
Dimensions of the analysis
Southwest Utility Northeast Utility
reduces demand by less because timing of maximum PV output does not perfectly coincide with customer peak demand
timing of the net system peak shifts as PV penetration grows
6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 11,000 12,000 13,000 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Peak Customer Demand (MW) Retail Sales (TWh/yr) Retail Sales - No PV (left axis) Retail Sales - 10% PV (left axis) Peak Demand - No PV (right axis) Peak Demand - 10% PV (right axis)
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Southwest Utility Northeast Utility
their differing cost structures: i.e., SW Utility owns generation while NE Utility procures all generation requirements via purchased power
to fuel and purchased power costs, are explored further in sensitivity analysis
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.5% 5% 7.5% 10% Reduction as Percent
Reduction in Revenue Requirement ($B, 20-yr NPV @ WACC) Customer Demand Met With PV by 2022 Fuel and Purchased Power O&M Depreciation Interest on Debt Return on Rate Base Taxes Percent of Total Costs (right axis) 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.5% 5% 7.5% 10% Reduction as Percent
Reduction in Revenue Requirement ($B, 20-yr NPV @ WACC) Customer Demand Met With PV by 2022 Purchased Power Depreciation Interest on Debt Return on Rate Base Taxes Percent of Total Costs (right axis)
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reduces costs, leading to reduction in ROE (“revenue erosion effect”)
growth in fixed costs and its proportionally smaller rate base
Southwest Utility Northeast Utility
7.0% 7.5% 8.0% 8.5% 9.0% 10% 7.5% 5% 2.5% 0% Achieved After-Tax ROE (Avg.; 10-yr) Customer Demand Met With PV by 2022
5.0% 5.5% 6.0% 6.5% 7.0% 10% 7.5% 5% 2.5% 0% Achieved After-Tax ROE (Avg.; 10-yr) Customer Demand Met With PV by 2022
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deferred capital investments (“lost earnings opportunity effect”)
to the SW Utility, which owns generation and transmission, though both utilities also experience earnings erosion from deferred distribution investments (in the base case)
Southwest Utility Northeast Utility
$5,500 $5,750 $6,000 $6,250 $6,500 10% 7.5% 5% 2.5% 0% Achieved After-Tax Earnings ($M NPV; 20-yr) Customer Demand Met With PV by 2022
$500 $550 $600 $650 $700 10% 7.5% 5% 2.5% 0% Achieved After-Tax Earnings ($M NPV; 20-yr) Customer Demand Met With PV by 2022
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a greater amount than it reduces costs, which causes average retail rates to increase
impacts across all customers, thus do not directly measure cost shifting between PV and non-PV customers or for any individual customer class
Southwest Utility Northeast Utility
2.5% 1.3% 1.0% 0.0% 14.0 14.2 14.4 14.6 14.8 10% 7.5% 5% 2.5% 0% All-in Average Retail Rates (cents/kWh; 20-yr) Customer Demand Met With PV by 2022 2.7% 1.5% 0.7% 0.2% 19.0 19.2 19.4 19.6 19.8 10% 7.5% 5% 2.5% 0% All-in Average Retail Rates (cents/kWh; 20-yr) Customer Demand Met With PV by 2022
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utility operating and regulatory environment, especially for NE Utility
utility, choice of test year and load growth causes large swings in shareholder impacts, but value of PV is key for ratepayer impacts
Southwest Utility Northeast Utility
0% 10%
ROE Earnings Rates
Change from No-PV to 10% PV
Sensitivity Range Base Case
0% 10%
ROE Earnings Rates
*All sensitivity cases focus on impacts under 10% PV trajectory for illustrative purposes
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Mitigation Measure Revenue Erosion Lost Earnings Opportunities Increased Rates Revenue-per-Customer (RPC) Decoupling
Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (LRAM)
Shareholder Incentive
Shorter Rate Case Filing Frequency
No Regulatory Lag
Current & Future Test Years
Increased Demand Charge & Fixed Charge
Utility Ownership of Customer-Sited PV
Customer-Sited PV Counted toward RPS
○ May exacerbate impacts of customer-sited PV
programs, though are not an exhaustive set of options
purposes
Objective: Explore the efficacy and potential tradeoffs associated with regulatory and ratemaking measures for mitigating the impacts of PV
Example results 14
customer-sited PV, thereby improving ROE, but degree of mitigation varies by utility and depends on design (e.g., k-factor)
increase in average retail rates, illustrating one form of tradeoff
Achieved ROE Average Retail Rates NE Utility
6.9%
+1.2% +0.4% 0% 5% 10% Base 0% Base 10% RPC Decoupling - No k RPC Decoupling - with k LRAM Achieved After-Tax ROE (Avg.; 10-yr) 16.09 +0.23
+0.08 +0.03 5 10 15 20 Average Rate (cents/kWh Avg.; 10-yr)
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capitalization of customer-sited PV provides increased earnings,
impacts to shareholders
increases in earnings by investing in customer-sited PV especially given otherwise limited opportunities for capital investment
customer-sited PV may raise significant policy and/or regulatory issues around risk sharing, competition, and generation asset ownership
Achieved Earnings SW Utility NE Utility
6,484
+865 +86 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 Base 0% Base 10% Utility Ownership - All PV Utility Ownership - 10% of PV Achieved Earnings ($M NPV; 20-yr) 681
+701 +70 200 400 600 800 1,000 Base 0% Base 10% Utility Ownership - All PV Utility Ownership - 10% of PV Achieved Earnings ($M NPV; 20-yr)
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certificates (RECs) generated by customer- sited PV to utility RPS compliance reduces a portion of RPS compliance costs and reduces average retail rates
shareholder impacts as RPS compliance costs are a pass-through to customers (and RECs do not offset investments in renewable generation)
Average Retail Rate SW Utility NE Utility
12.80 +0.23
5 10 15 Base 0% Base 10% Count toward RPS Average Rate (cents/kWh Avg.; 10-yr) 16.09 +0.23
5 10 15 20 Base 0% Base 10% Count toward RPS Average Rate (cents/kWh Avg.; 10-yr)
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impacts of customer-sited PV on average retail rates may be relatively modest (though we stress that our analysis does not isolate cost-shifting per se)
much more pronounced, though they depend highly upon the specifics of the particular utility
models (as opposed to wholesale paradigm shifts) can mitigate the impacts of customer-sited PV on utility ratepayers and shareholders
either between ratepayers and shareholders or among competing regulatory and policy objectives
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Project Team:
Andy Satchwell | asatchwell@lbl.gov | 510-486-6544 Peter Cappers | pacappers@lbl.gov | 315-637-0513
Publications:
emp.lbl.gov/publications
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