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System Provider escrypt GmbH for Embedded Security A Generic Architecture and Extension of eCryptfs: Secret Sharing Scheme, Smartcard Integration and a new Linux Security Module Daniel Bumeyer 2 , Benedikt Driessen 1 , Andr Osterhues 1 ,


  1. System Provider escrypt GmbH for Embedded Security A Generic Architecture and Extension of eCryptfs: Secret Sharing Scheme, Smartcard Integration and a new Linux Security Module Daniel Bußmeyer 2 , Benedikt Driessen 1 , André Osterhues 1 , Jan Pelzl 1 , Volker Reiß 1 , Jörg Schwenk 2 , Christoph Wegener 2 1 escrypt GmbH – Embedded Security, Bochum 2 Chair for Network and Data Security (NDS), Ruhr-University Bochum escrypt GmbH Lise-Meitner-Allee 4 44801 Bochum info@escrypt.com phone: +49(0)234 43 870 209 fax: +49(0)234 43 870 211

  2. Overview  Introduction  Generic security architecture  Linux Security Module – esCAP  Integration of eCryptfs  Secret Sharing Scheme  Smartcard Integration  Implementation Details  Conclusion info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 2 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  3. Introduction  Goal: handle security-sensitive data in Linux environments  Encryption systems:  File encryption systems:  GnuPG  Device/partition encryption systems:  DM-Crypt, TrueCrypt, eCryptfs  Security often depends on strength of chosen password info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 3 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  4. Introduction – Problems  Weak passwords -> vulnerable to dictionary and/or social engineering attacks  Single key for single user -> single point of failure  User can (accidentally) write data to insecure places (USB sticks, email)  System admin (superuser) can access keys (using exploits, tracing/debugging processes etc.) info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 4 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  5. Introduction – Solution concepts  Weak passwords: use smartcards instead  Single key for single user: secret sharing scheme  User can (accidentally) write data to insecure places (USB sticks, email): restrict user by applying access control using a Linux Security Module  System admin (superuser) can access keys: restrict root user by applying access control using a Linux Security Module info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 5 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  6. Generic Security Architecture info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 6 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  7. Generic Security Architecture  Security-critical data is stored in encrypted form on a central server  Limit superuser:  Still can administer most services and infrastructure (e.g., backups)  No access to security-critical data, keys or configuration files  Mandatory Access Control (MAC) mechanism called “esCAP”  Device encryption (eCryptfs) using symmetric keys  FEK: File encryption key, per file  FEKEK: FEK encryption key, per device/partition  Asymmetric cryptography (RSA)  Encrypt symmetric keys (FEKEKs) info@escrypt.com  Based on smartcards, RSA private key never leaves smartcard 29/10/2009 7 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  8. Linux Security Module – esCAP  Mandatory Access Control system, in-kernel  Subjects: tasks or processes  Objects: tasks, keys or inodes  Association: read/write access  Rule: Subject S may or may not read/write an object O  Rules are set using esCAP’s procfs interface  Fast interpretation of rules, virtually no performance penalty info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 8 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  9. Linux Security Module – esCAP  Object-specific rules  Defined at run-time by giving subject, object and association  Control read/write access, signals, debugging  Limit access (read/write/search) to kernel keyrings  Special case: File “firewall”  Notification on file access  Applet forwards notification to user  Generation of dynamic rule depending on user decision  Global rules  Defined at startup  Enable/disable module loading info@escrypt.com  Enable/disable raw sockets 29/10/2009 9 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  10. Integration of eCryptfs  Wrapper library  Attach symmetric key to user’s keyring  Remove a key from user’s keyring  Mount a directory  Unmount a directory  PKI module for eCryptfs  AES Key Wrap algorithm [NIST 2001]  Encrypt/decrypt symmetric file keys (FEKs) using a symmetric directory key (FEKEK)  FEKEK is encrypted with the smartcard’s public key (RSA -2048)  FEKEK can only be decrypted using the private key, which remains on the smartcard info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 10 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  11. Secret Sharing Scheme  Idea: distribute a secret (key) among a group of n users  Secret is split into n parts  Threshold k with 2 ≤ k ≤ n : amount of users required to reconstruct the secret  Used for emergency file access in our system:  For each new directory, a secret sharing group and threshold k is defined  The directory’s FEKEK is split among the secret sharing users  In an emergency case, k of the users can reconstruct the secret and access the directory info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 11 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  12. Smartcard Integration  Generic smartcard interface:  Decryption  Signature generation  Read bytes from random number generator (RNG)  Read/write files  Smartcard requirements:  Asymmetric cryptography (RSA decryption and signing)  Secure storage (for private key)  Minimal filesystem (for the public key and certificates)  True random number generator (TRNG)  Supported smartcards: info@escrypt.com  eDA (elektronischer Dienstausweis , “electronic office ID card”) 29/10/2009 12 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  13. Implementation Details – Overview info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 13 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  14. Implementation Details – Client-side Modules  Control: Central module, message passing  GUI: Graphical User Interface  DirCache: Cache of directory-related information from DirHeader  Smartcard: Smartcard interface  esCAP Applet: GUI for “file firewall” function of esCAP info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 14 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  15. Implementation Details – Server-side Modules  Daemon: Central module, XML script interpretation and message passing  CertStore: User certificate storage  DirHeader: Information about each directory  DataBase: List of user’s directories  Secret Sharing: Secret sharing implementation  FireWall: Netfilter configuration, dynamic rules  esCAP: Interface to esCAP kernel module  FileSystem: Interface to eCryptfs info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 15 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  16. Implementation Details  Programming language:  C++ for framework and modules  C for esCAP and eCryptfs PKI module  Message flow:  Definition of use cases  UML 2.0 sequence diagrams  XML scripts  Small and simple XML parser  Command interpreter in Daemon  Easy adoption of use cases by changing the XML script  Hardware: info@escrypt.com  Standard smartcard readers 29/10/2009 16 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  17. Conclusion  Software suite:  User-friendly GUI  Command-line tools for security administrator and system administrator  Based on a Fedora 10 distribution  Slightly modified Linux 2.6.26 kernel (patches include esCAP and eCryptfs modifications)  Demonstrator already available, prototype in near future  Project homepage: http://sourceforge.net/projects/esosi  License: LGPL info@escrypt.com 29/10/2009 17 escrypt GmbH - Embedded Security

  18. Dr.-Ing. Jan Pelzl Geschäftsführer jpelzl@escrypt.com Dr.-Ing. Thomas Wollinger Geschäftsführer twollinger@escrypt.com Dr.-Ing. André Weimerskirch CEO USA aweimerskirch@escrypt.com escrypt GmbH Lise-Meitner-Allee 4 44801 Bochum info@escrypt.com phone: +49(0)234 43 870 209 fax: +49(0)234 43 870 211

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