Dualism in France: Le contrat unique Pierre Cahuc (Ecole - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Dualism in France: Le contrat unique Pierre Cahuc (Ecole - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dualism in France: Le contrat unique Pierre Cahuc (Ecole Polytechnique, CREST, IZA, CEPR) Milan March 2010 Presentation relies on reports Pierre Cahuc and Francis Kramarz (2004) Olivier Blanchard and Jean Tirole (2004)


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Pierre Cahuc (Ecole Polytechnique, CREST, IZA, CEPR) Milan March 2010

Dualism in France: « Le contrat unique »

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  • Pierre Cahuc and Francis Kramarz: Deep coordinated reform of

1. employment services 2. product market regulation

  • 3. labor contract (contrat unique)
  • Presentation relies on reports
  • Pierre Cahuc and Francis Kramarz

(2004)

  • Olivier Blanchard and Jean Tirole

(2004)

  • Olivier Blanchard and Jean Tirole (2004): Deep reform of the

labor contract (contrat unique)

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Dualism in France

  • 30 000 job separations every day in France
  • Adjustment relies to a large extent on the youth

because

  • many short term contracts
  • stringent protection of permanent contracts
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Many fixed term jobs for young workers

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Median unemployment duration by age

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Do you worry about the possibilities of losing your job? I worry a great deal I worry to some extent I worry a little I don’t worry at all”

OECD EPL indicator Feeling of job security

EPL is negatively correlated with the feeling of job security

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Propose deep change in the regulation of the employment relation Basic idea: protect individuals instead of protect jobs (flexicurity)

  • employment services (to move between jobs)
  • product market regulation in service industry (to favor

job creation, especially for young people)

  • labor contract
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SLIDE 8

Single labor contract

Strong EPL in France Firing for economic causes

  • Complex procedures
  • Important intervention of the State (Ministery of labor)
  • Employers have to try to keep the workers in the firm (provide

training…)

  • Long delay
  • Weak role of trade unions (only on the procedure)

Strong judicial insecurity

  • Problem with the definition of economic causes:

can « safeguard » the competitivity of the firm, but cannot fire to « improve » the competitivity of the firm.

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SLIDE 9

7 , 1 7 , 8 1 , 6 3 , 5 2 5 , 1 5 , 1 0 , 0 3 1 , 1 2 2 , 6 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 2 5 3 0 R o y a u m e -U n i N o u ve lle -Z é la n d e It a lie Irla n d e F ra n c e F in la n d e E t a t s -U n is A u s t ra lie A lle m a g n e

Percentage of layoffs giving rise to legal proceedings in the end of the 1990’s. Source : OECD

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The Law is circumvented

  • Layoffs for economic causes = 2 percent of separations

(has been divided by 3 since the beginning of the 1990s)

  • Collective layoffs = 0.5 percent of job separations
  • 70% of recruitings are fixed term jobs (should be the exception

according to the law: replacement, seasonal work, temporary increase in compagny activity)

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Proposal : single contract

  • 1. Same regime whatever the term (fixed or indeterminate)
  • f the contract
  • Dismissals prohibited if based on discrimination,

pregnancy, exercise of a legal right (trade union membership…). Otherwise authorized

  • Notice period increases with seniority (zero at the

beginning…)

  • Simple procedure (letter, interview, if indeterminate duration)
  • No imposed order of dismissals for collective dismissals
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  • 2. Counterpart: Layoff tax
  • difference in the social value and the private value of the job
  • experience rating (in the US), tax used to finance public

employment services

  • Amount of the tax:

1.6 percent of the wages paid to the fired workers + 10 percent for the 18 first months

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SLIDE 13

Layoff costs (in monthly wage units) and seniority (in year)