DeltaShaper Enabling Unobservable Censorship- resistant TCP - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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DeltaShaper Enabling Unobservable Censorship- resistant TCP - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

DeltaShaper Enabling Unobservable Censorship- resistant TCP Tunneling over Videoconferencing Streams Diogo Barradas Nuno Santos Lus Rodrigues INESC-ID, Instituto Superior Tcnico, Universidade de Lisboa


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DeltaShaper

Enabling Unobservable Censorship- resistant TCP Tunneling over Videoconferencing Streams

Diogo Barradas Nuno Santos Luís Rodrigues INESC-ID, Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa

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SLIDE 2

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Censors monitor / control Internet access

Censored Region Uncensored Region

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SLIDE 3

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Censors monitor / control Internet access

Censored Region Uncensored Region

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SLIDE 4

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Censors attempt to block covert channels

Censored Region Uncensored Region

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SLIDE 5

DeltaShaper

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Censored Region Uncensored Region

  • Goals
  • Establish a covert TCP/IP channel
  • Maintain unobservability
  • Resist against network perturbations
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SLIDE 6

Multimedia protocol tunneling

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System / Properties Active/Passive Attack Resistance Arbitrary Data Transmission Interactive Communication FreeWave

(Houmansadr et al.)

Audio Modulation

Facet

(Li et al.)

Video Embedding

  • CovertCast

(McPherson et al.)

Video Modulation

✔ ✔

  • DeltaShaper

Video Modulation

✔ ✔ ✔

Coverage Security

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SLIDE 7

Threat model

  • Assumptions:
  • Packets carrying multimedia data are encrypted
  • Censor’s Capabilities:
  • Deep Packet Inspection
  • Observe, store and analyze traffic flows
  • Apply artificial constraints on the network
  • Censor’s Limitations:
  • Unable to decipher the content of Skype packets
  • Not in collusion with the video-conferencing provider
  • Attempts to minimize collateral damage

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SLIDE 8

A naïve approach at data modulation

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640 px 480 px

  • Replace chat video frames
  • Encode data in all available pixels

1px = 24b R = 8b G = 8b B = 8b

~922 kB / frame

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SLIDE 9

Drawbacks of naïve data modulation

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640 px 480 px

  • Data loss
  • Lossy compression (downsampling + quantization)
  • Abnormal traffic patterns
  • Poor compression (spatial & inter-frame redundancy)

1px = 24b R = 8b G = 8b B = 8b

~922 kB / frame

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C1: Can we distinguish regular from irregular Skype streams?

  • Traffic signatures appear to be different
  • Packet lengths frequency distribution

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Frames change extensively Frames do not change

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C2: How much throughput can we achieve while preserving unobservability?

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Censored Region Uncensored Region

Good Unobservability Low Throughput Poor Unobservability High Throughput

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SLIDE 12

C3: How to maintain unobservability in adverse network conditions?

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Censored Region Uncensored Region Censored Region Uncensored Region

Ideal conditions Good unobservability Perturbed conditions Poor unobservability

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SLIDE 13

Contributions

  • DeltaShaper : A censorship-resistant system
  • Tunnel TCP/IP data over Skype videocalls
  • Distinguish regular / irregular Skype call streams
  • Packet frequency distribution / EMD
  • Maximize throughput and maintain unobservability
  • Explore the space encoding parameters
  • Adaptation to network conditions
  • Dynamic calibration of encoding parameters

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How to characterize Skype streams?

  • Characteristic Function - Create a stream signature
  • Frequency distribution of packet lengths
  • Similarity Function - Quantify streams’ differences
  • Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD)

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Different videos generate distinct traffic

  • Differences between signatures can be quantified
  • Earth Movers’ Distance

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EMD > 0.50 EMD > 0.50 EMD = 0.05

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Different videos generate distinct traffic

  • Censors can identify streams with unusual traffic

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EMD > Δ EMD > Δ EMD < Δ

Flagged Flagged Regular Call

Δ = 0.06

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SLIDE 17

Can we encode data and maintain unobservability?

  • Strawman: Embed a small payload in each frame
  • Generated traffic does not reflect this embedding

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EMD < Δ

Regular Call

EMD < Δ

Regular Call

EMD < Δ

Regular Call

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SLIDE 18

A better approach for data modulation

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(b) Payload Frame (a) Carrier Frame

+

(c) Covert Frame

=

Parameter Description ap payload frame area (pixel×pixel) ac cell size (pixel×pixel) bc color encoding (bits) rp payload frame rate (frames/s)

  • Strive for unobservability
  • Accommodate for lossy compression
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Adapt to network conditions

  • Calibrate encoding parameters
  • Maintain unobservability
  • Modulate max. amount of data

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DeltaShaper adaptation mechanism

  • Periodically:
  • Estimate network conditions from recorded baselines
  • Select adequate parameters from pre-computed table

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Which set is closest?

Cond.1

  • Cond. 2
  • Cond. n

Carrier signature

… … …

ap 1 ac 1 bc 1 rp 1 ap 2 ac 2 bc 2 rp 2 ap n ac n bc n rp n

Encoding parameters

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SLIDE 21

Implementation challenges

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  • Network interaction
  • Allow transparent TCP/IP communication
  • Video processing
  • Combine carrier / payload frames
  • Video-conferencing software as a black-box
  • Send covert frames without modifying Skype
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SLIDE 22

DeltaShaper client module

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VETH0 10.10.10.11

Client Application Linux Kernel Kernel Module Payload Encoder

IP Packet Queue

Payload Frame Queue Payload Streamer Stream Blender (Snowmix) FFMPEG

Virtual Camera /dev/video0

Carrier Streamer Carrier Frame

Client Endpoint

Network Namespace Encoder Adapter Covert Stream

VETH1 10.10.10.10

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DeltaShaper server module

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Worker Thread Worker Thread

Decoder Thread Linux Kernel

Display Framebuffer Localhost interface

Photo Thread XWD Server Application

Server Endpoint

Payload Fragment Pool Receiver Process Covert Stream

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Evaluation Steps

  • 1. Can we distinguish Skype streams?
  • 2. Can we balance throughput and unobservability?

3. How well does DeltaShaper perform?

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Can we distinguish Skype streams?

  • 83% accuracy in distinguishing Skype streams
  • DeltaShaper streams must remain under ΔI

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These streams seem to be strange... I’ll block them.

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Can we balance throughput and unobservability?

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Parameter Description Configuration ap payload frame area (pixel×pixel) 320 x 240 ac cell size (pixel×pixel) 8 x 8 bc color encoding (bits) 6 rp payload frame rate (frames/s) 1

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How well does DeltaShaper perform?

  • Achieved configuration:
  • Performance
  • Raw throughput: 7.2 Kbps
  • Round-Trip-Time: 2s 973ms

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Parameter Description Configuration ap payload frame area (pixel×pixel) 320 x 240 ac cell size (pixel×pixel) 8 x 8 bc color encoding (bits) 6 rp payload frame rate (frames/s) 1

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How well does DeltaShaper perform?

Use Case Protocol Session W/ DS (mm:ss) Protocol Session W/o DS (mm:ss) Overhead Wget (4kB file)

0:22 < 0:01 3,142.9 x

FTP (4kB file)

1:43 0:09 11.4 x

SSH + SMTP

2:41 0:38 4.2 x

SSH

1:29 0:06 14.8 x

Telnet

1:13 0:06 12.2 x

Netcat chat

0:01 < 0:01 166.7 x

SSH Tunnel

2:19 0:22 6.3 x

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  • DeltaShaper allows for the execution of traditional TCP/IP

applications which cover different users’ needs

Non-interactive session Interactive session

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Conclusions

  • DeltaShaper: A censorship-resistant system
  • Supports high-latency / low-throughput TCP applications
  • Maximize throughput and preserve unobservability
  • Greedy exploration of encoding configurations
  • Adaptation in multimedia protocol tunneling
  • Provides improved unobservability
  • Could also enhance similar systems

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http://web.ist.utl.pt/diogo.barradas