Beacon detection in PCAP files Supervisor: Sjoerd Peerlkamp[Shell] - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Beacon detection in PCAP files Supervisor: Sjoerd Peerlkamp[Shell] - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Beacon detection in PCAP files Supervisor: Sjoerd Peerlkamp[Shell] Leendert van Duijn Universiteit van Amsterdam - System and Network Engineering Leendert.vanduijn@os3.nl July 3, 2014 Leendert van Duijn (UvA-SNE) Beacon detection July 3,


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Beacon detection in PCAP files

Supervisor: Sjoerd Peerlkamp[Shell]

Leendert van Duijn

Universiteit van Amsterdam - System and Network Engineering Leendert.vanduijn@os3.nl

July 3, 2014

Leendert van Duijn (UvA-SNE) Beacon detection July 3, 2014 1 / 18

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Beacons

What are they?

Reoccurring automated messages

What can they do?

Reveal your location, Leak data, Get Bots configured to do damage

Leendert van Duijn (UvA-SNE) Beacon detection July 3, 2014 2 / 18

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What sends beacons?

Malware polling for instructions Botnet membership maintenance Periodic service checks, Nagios Periodic updates, your favorite software Visual feedback from network services

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Related work

ProVeX, deep packet inspection of Malware traffic, Rossow and Dietrich Detecting P2P Malware traffic based on regional periodicity, Qiao et al. Jackstraws, executable code analysis using behavior graphs, Jacob et al. Using host level intrusion detection to detect advanced persistent threats, Liang et al.

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Data sets

Sinkholing, reducing Malware impact by redirecting it Multiple days of traffic dumps available Diverse hosts, protocols and realistic data Not truly the native behaviour

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Research questions

Can traffic dumps be used to detect beacons produced by Malware? Can detection performance be improved by early classification? Is it possible to differentiate Malware in the presence of legitimate beacons? How can this be used in practice?

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Detecting beacons

Obtain a traffic dump with suspected beacon activity Separate packets into several classes of similar or related traffic Identify/prioritize suspect classes using prior knowledge or experience Look for local patterns within individual classes Export traffic per class to investigate with Wireshark

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Classes

Focus on relevance Capture anomalies Adjustable

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Classes

Focus on relevance Capture anomalies Adjustable Clustering using K means Clustering by tree building Rule based, user configurable classes

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Classifiers

Source IP address TCP Destination port Source and destination IP, protocol, length, entropy

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Patterns

Localized Generic Performance

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Patterns

Localized Generic Performance Histogram, activity over time Frequency analysis Auto correlation

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Sinkhole, what hosts are beaconing?

Classifier Source IP Packets 2.4M over 2 days Found classes 421 X axis Auto correlation over 1 window Y axis Sliding window in time from top to bottom Selection From the top 10 in number of packets

Figure: Outgoing packets sinkhole, all protocols and destinations

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Sinkhole, results

Figure: TCP outgoing every 26 and 3 seconds respectively. Uniform traffic

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Non Malware beacons

Legitimate beacons can occur, what do they look like? Don’t websites autorefresh all the time? Does encryption hide beacons?

Figure: An hour of HTTPS traffic while writing and browsing

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Non Malware beacons - HTTP, SSH

Figure: An hour of traffic, watching a movie, listing some files

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Conclusion

Can traffic dumps be used to detect beacons produced by Malware? It is possible to detect beacon traffic in packet dumps using auto correlation of the packet rate over time. Can detection performance be improved by early classification? Using classification or clustering can help in isolating streams/types of traffic, increasing the number of data sets to analyze in exchange for signal clarity. Is it possible to detect Malware in the presence of legitimate beacons? There are features which can be used to distinguish beacons from each other, packet rate, packet uniformity and presence in time.

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Future work

Define a scoring method for the Auto correlation waterfalls to automate potential hits Investigate parameter automation Go from audits to live analysis Investigate sparse data, methods of combining/splitting data with significant gaps. How does it handle noisy data, cloaked Malware and App traffic?

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Questions?

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References

Gregoire Jacob, Ralf Hund, Christopher Kruegel, and Thorsten Holz. Jackstraws: Picking command and control connections from bot traffic. In Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Conference on Security, SEC’11, pages 29–29, Berkeley, CA, USA,

  • 2011. USENIX Association. URL

http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2028067.2028096. Yu Liang, Guojun Peng, Huanguo Zhang, and Ying Wang. An unknown trojan detection method based on software network behavior. Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences, 18(5):369–376, 2013. ISSN 1007-1202. doi: 10.1007/s11859-013-0944-6. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11859-013-0944-6. Yong Qiao, Yuexiang Yang, Jie He, Chuan Tang, and Yingzhi Zeng. Detecting p2p bots by mining the regional periodicity. Journal of Zhejiang University - Science C, 14(9): 682–700, 2013. Christian Rossow and Christian J. Dietrich. ProVeX: Detecting Botnets with Encrypted Command and Control Channels. In Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Detection

  • f Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA), July 2013.

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