Lehrstuhl Netzarchitekturen und Netzdienste Institut für Informatik TU München
Bachelors Thesis: A Certification Service for future Home Networks - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Bachelors Thesis: A Certification Service for future Home Networks - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Lehrstuhl Netzarchitekturen und Netzdienste Institut fr Informatik TU Mnchen Bachelors Thesis: A Certification Service for future Home Networks based on Trusted Computing Technology Announcement: Prof. Georg Carle Advisor: Holger
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Agenda
Existing Approach Security Analysis / Motivation Key Requirements Approach Evaluation Related Work Conclusion & Future Work
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AutHoNe’s PKI
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Trust Relationship
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Trust Relationship
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Security Analysis / Motivation
Home Key and Device Key are in Danger
Identity Theft Treacherous Home Treacherous Device
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Trust Relationship
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Identity Theft
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Identity Theft
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Identity Theft
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Identity Theft
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Treacherous Device
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Treacherous Device
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R1 Protection of the Private Key
- Home Key
- Device Key
R2 Prove Protection to other Entities R3 Backup of the Home Key
Key Requirements
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Private part of a Key managed through a TPM is never readable from
the outside => R1 (Protection)
Protection and type of protection is provable => R2 (Proof) Certain Migration Schemes allow a Migration of a Key to another TPM
=> R3 (Backup)
Approach
Use a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) for Management of the Key
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Important Keys in a TPM
Endorsement Key (EK): unique for every TPM, can only sign internal
data, not migratable
Attestation Identity Key (AIK): derives from EK, can only sign internal
data, not migratable
Signing Key (SK): only signing operations of internal and external data,
migratable/not migratable
Legacy Key (LK): signing and encryption operations of internal and
external data, migratable/not migratable
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Current AutHoNe PKI
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AutHoNe TPM Integration
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TPM Credentials
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TPM Credentials - Migratability
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Evaluation
No TPM Protection Migratable Key Non Migratable Key Usability - Backup of Key Possible Attacks
- Identity Theft
- Treacherous Device
- Treacherous Home
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Evaluation
No TPM Protection Migratable Key Non Migratable Key Usability - Backup of Key
- Backup of Key
Possible Attacks
- Identity Theft
- Treacherous Device
- Treacherous Home
- Treacherous Device
- Treacherous Home
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Evaluation
No TPM Protection Migratable Key Non Migratable Key Usability - Backup of Key
- Backup of Key
- No Backup of Key
Possible Attacks
- Identity Theft
- Treacherous Device
- Treacherous Home
- Treacherous Device
- Treacherous Home
- Treacherous Home
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Treacherous Home
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Evaluation
Trade off between usability and security caused by migratability
- Migratable Key = weak security, strong usability
- Non Migratable Key = strong security, weak usability
No TPM Protection Migratable Key Non Migratable Key Usability - Backup of Key
- Backup of Key
- No Backup of Key
Possible Attacks
- Identity Theft
- Treacherous Device
- Treacherous Home
- Treacherous Device
- Treacherous Home
- Treacherous Home
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Performance
Performance of the Device Registration Process
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Performance
Performance of the Device Registration Process
Device Device with TPM Create CSR 0.697s 1.169s Process CSR through HCS 1.261s 1.427s Process CSR through Device 0.555s 0.815s
*Times without loading time and network transmissions
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Technical Limitations
Infrastructure is not completed
- PCA does not exist yet (only proof of concept)
- Not all TPM Manufacturers ship the EK Certificates
- Other Certificates unavailable
- Migration Infrastructure is incomplete
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Related Work: SKAE
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SKAE vs. this Approach
AIK signs Key directly
=> no migratability
No outstanding
benefit, reached through SKAE
CA PCA: central entities involved in the process
=> overhead
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Conclusion
Main Goal achieved:
Private Home Key is protected through a TPM
Design is dynamic and applicable also on a Device Trade off:
usability vs. security <=> migratability vs. non migratability
Trade off at users side
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Future Work
Infrastructure has to be completed Exploit advantages of provable TPM protection
- Trust Level leads to Access Level
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Questions?
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Literature
Thomas Müller – Trusted Computing Systeme Trusted Computing Group – TPM Specification Part 1, Part 2, Part 3
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/ tpm_specification_version_12_revision_103_part_1__3/
TCG Infrastructure Workgroup – Subject Key Attestation Evidence
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/resource_files/ 876A7F79-1D09-3519-AD321B21144AE93C/ IWG_SKAE_Extension_1-00.pdf
IAIK TU Graz - Trusted Computing for the JAVA Platform
http://trustedjava.sourceforge.net/
Simon Mittelberger – A Certification Service for future Home Networks