And What Will Europe Do? The European Council and Military Strategy - PDF document

No. 46 May 2013 And What Will Europe Do? The European Council and Military Strategy Sv Sven n Bi Biscop own territory, which role exactly does Europe Important decisions on Europe’s military with all its capabilities aspire to as a security capabilities are expected from the provider ? December 2013 European Council. But why? What do Europeans actually want to Europe, not the CSDP. In his speech at the do with their capabilities? The answer to annual conference of the European Defence that question would be the crowning piece Agency (EDA) on 21 March 2013, Herman of the European Council’s decisions. Van Rompuy clearly expressed his main concern to be not the Common Security and Defence Policy as such, but “the state of Pooling & Sharing of military capabilities, defence in Europe”. 1 Obvious it may be, but procedures and institutions for crisis never officially stated before: one can only management, and defence industry are on the draw the maximum benefit from Pooling & agenda of the European Council for December Sharing if the total armed forces of all Member 2013. But as the highest political body of the States are taken into the balance. The European Union, the European Council, at the capabilities debate cannot be limited to some instigation of its President, will likely also want theoretically separable part of the armed forces to discuss the political dimension of European available to the CSDP. Similarly, the strategic defence. The fundamental political question is debate that should drive capability deceptively simple – and has always been development cannot be limited to some conveniently ignored: why? EU Member States aspects likely to be acted upon through the collectively have yet to say why Europe needs CSDP. The challenge is to define overall the military. The 2003 European Security priorities for the use of the military Strategy (ESS) states that “Europe should be instrument, in function of the vital interests ready to share in the responsibility for global and the foreign policy of the EU and its security and in building a better world”: grand Member States, without any prejudice to but vague. action under UN, NATO, CSDP or national command – the crisis will determine that The political question is the strategic choice in each individual case. question therefore: apart from defending its 1 EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations

I NTERESTS D RIVE R ESPONSIBILITIES priority areas of focus for a European military strategy. These constitute the responsibilities that At its December 2012 meeting, where the Europeans assume as a security provider agenda for the December 2013 meeting was outside their own territory, and are therefore set, the European Council “note[d] that in willing to act upon. In (1) crisis management, today’s changing world the European Union is Europeans must be able to act across the full called upon to assume increased responsibilities spectrum of expeditionary operations, from in the maintenance of international peace and evacuation, support to humanitarian relief, and security in order to guarantee the security of its assistance and training, to peacekeeping, peace citizens and the promotion of its interests”. enforcement and indeed war. But a military strategy also encompasses (2) prevention, by As a starting point, the European Council way of maintaining a permanent forward could now emphasize that in spite of the many presence in priority areas, and (3) deterrence, differences in the focus of national foreign by maintaining a credible power projection policies and threat perceptions, the Member capacity at all times. 2 States as an integrated economy with a distinctive social model do indeed share vital Setting priorities does not mean that interests: Europeans will never address any other issues,  Preventing threats against their territory but that this is what they will prepare and plan from materializing; for. Nor does it mean that the military is the  Keeping open all lines of interaction only instrument with which these priorities will with the world, notably sea lanes, be addressed, but that because of their pipelines, and cyberspace. importance Europeans must be prepared to act  Assuring the supply of energy and forcefully if, and only if, its permanent natural resources for the economy; preventive policies fail. Even then the military  Managing migration in order to will always be one dimension of a maintain both a viable work force and a comprehensive approach aiming at a clear viable social system; political end-state.  Mitigating the impact of climate change;  Strengthening international law as a The context in which priorities must be fundament of international stability, decided upon is one of austerity budgets. That notably the UN Charter and the simply makes prioritisation even more Universal Declaration of Human important: when the means are limited, Rights; political guidance is crucial to assure that what  Preserving the autonomy of their means we do have are spent in the most decision-making by preventing undue relevant way. The shift of the American dependence on any foreign power. strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region is another major factor. The “pivot” does not Europeans need not be timid about the fact determine what European priorities are – our that they too seek to defend their interests – interests do that – but in limiting the extent to that is the point of policy-making – as long as which American capabilities can be counted they continue to do so in a way that does not upon it does determine how many European harm the legitimate interests of others. capabilities will be required. The regions and contingencies in which Analysing Europe’s vital interests and the their vital interests are most directly threatened potential violent threats against them, three by the potential use of force should form the priority responsibilities emerge: 2 EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations

 Taking the lead in assuring peace and alone if it is the only option. In any scenario a major contribution will be expected. security in Europe’s “broader neighbourhood”.  Contributing Intra-state conflict, particularly when the to global maritime security. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) arises (i.e. in case of war crimes, crimes against humanity,  Contributing to the collective security genocide or ethnic cleansing), would ideally be system of the UN. addressed by regional actors. The will and certainly the means to do so remain limited R EGIONAL L EAD however, hence European intervention will “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is often prove necessary. In such cases, Europe is still important”, states the ESS. The most more likely to be the only or certainly the obvious priority undoubtedly is to maintain leading external actor, preferably still in peace and security in Europe’s own coalition with regional actors, as in Libya (2011) neighbourhood, where its vital interests are and Mali (2013). Unless the government of the directly at stake. country in question requests intervention, a UNSC mandate is much less certain. As in Syria Geographically, this zone of responsibility today, but also in Georgia (2008), the military extends beyond the area of the European feasibility may be constrained by the Neighbourhood Policy (Eastern Europe, the implication of external powers, the chance that Caucasus, the Maghreb and the Middle East), encompassing what are now often “Europeans must be able to act called “the neighbours of the neighbours” in the Sahel, the Horn of across the full spectrum of Africa, and the Gulf (and to a lesser extent Central Asia). All of these expeditionary operations” regions as such are important to our vital interests and many of them form “security complexes”, i.e. their security is any benefits are outweighed by major negative inextricably linked together (as we have side effects, or an unacceptably high risk of witnessed in the Maghreb and the Sahel e.g.). casualties. Intervention may then be limited to That this broad region, both east and south of preventing spill-over and possibly supporting Europe, is very volatile and will see a high risk the legitimate party in the conflict. of inter as well as intra-state conflict for years to come needs no further explanation. Whether it intervened or not, Europe definitely has a responsibility to stabilize any To which extent do we feel responsible for post-conflict situation, including through this “broader neighbourhood”, i.e. in which peacekeeping, SSR/DDR, and training and scenarios must military action be considered? assisting local armed forces (as well as the security and justice apparatus). On a more Inter-state war, including spill-over of a civil permanent basis, a military presence through war into neighbouring countries, must certainly cooperation with regional partners can be an always be prevented or ended. In such a important confidence and security-building scenario, the UN Security Council is more measure, provided it is firmly anchored in a likely (though not guaranteed) to seize the broader political partnership and does not run matter, and Europe will then probably act as counter to EU objectives in the field of part of a broader coalition, notably with the US, democracy and human rights. and preferably always with regional actors – but 3 EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations